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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore the origins, formulation, course and 
outcome of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees meeting (better 
known as the Evian Conference) of July 1938.   Special emphasis was placed on 
contemporary and later historical assessments of this assembly which represented the first 
international cooperative attempt to solve an acute refugee crisis.    A general review 
followed by a more detailed evaluation was made of existing official and un-official 
accounts of the meeting utilizing both public records, private diaries, books, newspapers, 
journals and other periodicals for the period of January 1, 1938 through December 31, 
1939.  This data was supplemented by later recollections of conference participants as 
well as post-Holocaust historical scholarship.    
Various appraisals have been made of the motivations behind the summit and its 
ultimate success or failure.  Franklin Roosevelt has particularly come under criticism by 
scholars who believed that his Administration had “abandoned” the Jews to their fate.  
The President’s supporters, on the other hand, declared that FDR did everything possible 
given the existing political, economic and social conditions of the late 1930’s. It is my 
conclusion that although Roosevelt may have been sympathetic to the plight of Central 
European Jewish refugees their resettlement and ultimate destiny merited a lower priority 
given his focus upon rebuilding the national economy and defense.  The President clearly 
recognized the looming threat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan but was unwilling to 
expend political capital on an issue that faced domestic and political opposition.  I further 
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maintain that the conference was set up to fail while providing propaganda value for the 
participating democracies.   
The hypocritical rhetoric and actions of the delegates and the ineffectiveness of 
the conference’s sole creation, the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees, 
was clearly recognized by Nazi Germany and ultimately influenced its anti-Jewish 
policies. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the pogrom of November 1938, Kristallnacht, 
occurred only four months later.  The avoidance of dealing with the Jewish refugee 
problem was further highlighted in the futile Wagner-Rogers Bill of 1939, the Hennings 
bill of 1940 and especially the Bermuda Conference of 1943, a time in which the details 
of mass murder of Jews and other groups was already well known within official circles.  
Further work needs to be done on the diverse responses of the Jewish community both 
within the United States and abroad to the peril facing their co-religionists.   
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“A Refugee’s Prayer” 
 
Representative James, J. Davis, Penn. entered the prayer of Martin Marden, a 16-
year-old German refugee, which had been “recommended for reading by every American 
by the superintendent of New York City Schools, Harold G. Campbell.  We may all be 
proud that we live in a land where, as this lad says, ‘the youth of all races have a 
tomorrow.’  Despite the unemployment here, the problems of the depression, the 
difficulties of the stock market, and the war clouds which loom ever closer, who among 
us does not respond enthusiastically to these radiant words?” 
One day in the year should be reserved for prayers of thanksgiving in which we 
give thanks for something  that has been granted us; for having been saved from 
some great destruction caused by nature or 
 man. 
 I am thankful that I have been given an opportunity to be educated in the United 
States of America. 
 I am thankful that I live in a land where, regardless of race, everyone may take 
part in national ceremonies. 
 I am thankful that I live in a land where a person may sing the National Anthem 
without having someone tell him that he may not because of his race. 
 I am thankful that I live in a country governed by democracy rather than force. 
 I am thankful that I live in a country where one is not persecuted. 
 I am thankful that I live in a land where there are people who have real 
sympathy for refugees from European countries who have gone through horrible 
experiences. 
 I am thankful that I have been given the opportunity to enjoy the many 
privileges that are unheard of in European countries. 
 I am thankful that I shall be able to realize my ambitions, which would have    
been impossible had I remained in my native land. 
 I am thankful that I live in a land where the future seems bright and hopeful 
rather than dark and hopeless. 
 I am thankful that I live in a land where the youth of all races have a tomorrow, 
rather than in my native  
 land, where the youth of the race is without a tomorrow. 
 I am thankful that I have been permitted to tell you of the troubles in European 
lands in order that you may develop a real sympathy for the oppressed of the 
earth. I am thankful that I am happy and free.1 
                                                 
      
1Martin Mardin, “A Refugee’s Prayer,” Washington Herald, March 31, 1938 cited in Congressional 
Record Appendix, Seventy-Fifth Congress, 3rd sess., vol. 10, April 1, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1938), 1269.  He left Germany during 1935 with his sister and rejoined his widowed mother, Mrs. Betty 
Mardin, who had emigrated to the U.S. a year earlier. 
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                                                      INTRODUCTION  
    
On Rosh Hashanah it is written, 
On Yom Kippur it is sealed: 
How many shall pass on, how many shall come to be; 
Who shall live and who shall die; 
Who shall see ripe age and who shall not; 
Who shall perish by fire and who by water; 
Why by sword and who by beast; 
Who by hunger and who by thirst; 
Why by earthquake and who by plague; 
Who by strangling and who by stoning; 
Who shall be secure and who shall be driven; 
Who shall be tranquil and who shall be troubled; 
Who shall be poor and who shall be rich; 
Who shall be humbled and who exalted. 
But REPENTENCE, PRAYER and CHARITY 
temper judgment’s severe decree.1 
 
1938 was a portentous year in the history of German and Austrian Jewry and 
ultimately for the Jews of Europe.  The Anschluss or annexation of Austria by Nazi 
Germany on March 12 signaled to the world that Jews could no longer survive within the 
German community.  Faced with an existential threat and unable to adopt the time 
honored stratagem of accepting the status of a protected but second class and subordinate 
minority, the Jews of Germany were once more forced upon the road of the wanderer 
seeking sanctuary and resettlement.  
       The American President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, seemed to offer such 
salvation through his call for the creation of an international conference to deal with this 
                                                 
    
1Central Conference of American Rabbis, Gates of Repentance: The New Union Prayerbook for the 
Days of Awe (New York: Central Conference of American Rabbis and Union of Liberal and Progressive 
Synagogues, 1978), 313-314. 
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refugee crisis. The meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees 
(better known as the Evian Conference, held in France during July 1938 and attended by 
thirty two nations), raised expectations that a solution would be found to the problem of 
forced emigration but such hope proved to be ill-founded.  Faced with a humanitarian 
crisis of immense proportions democratic governments sought a workable solution to this 
problem but in a half-hearted, constrained and hypocritical fashion. While offering 
expressions of sympathy, each delegation, with few exceptions, justified its inability to 
admit the displaced and oftentimes impoverished refugees.  
The decisive failure of the meeting and the inadequacy of its sole construction, the 
Intergovernmental Committee established in London, filled the victims of persecution 
with despair and their persecutors with a sense of impunity. It demonstrated to an 
emboldened German leadership that the strategy of compulsory emigration had failed due 
to the resistance of other nations to offer havens to involuntary, stateless and destitute 
refugees.  Consequently, a far more radical approach would be required. It can be argued 
that the Evian disappointment and the abandonment of Czechoslovakia during the 
Munich Crisis encouraged the Nazis to carry out Kristallnacht, the November 1938 
pogrom that swept Germany and Austria.  It was not a coincidence that Crystal Night 
occurred only four months after the conclusion of the Evian Conference. The liturgy of 
the “Days of Awe,” the Jewish High Holidays, declares that on Rosh Hashanah the fate 
of man is written and on Yom Kippur it is sealed.  The destiny of Central European Jewry 
was written on the day of the Anschluss and sealed on Kristallnacht.  Eventually, the 
cover of European war would provide the most radical solution to the problem of the 
Jews.   
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The Evian Conference, the Wagner-Rogers bill of 1939, the Hennings Bill of 
1940 and the Bermuda Conference of 1943 illustrate the diverse attitudes and approaches 
adopted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his Administration, Congress and the 
American public as well as the global community in dealing with European immigration 
and refugee issues.2  Whereas the Evian Conference and Wagner-Rogers bill were 
regarded as a measure primarily favoring German and Austrian Jews that subsequently 
failed, the Hennings bill was an attempt to rescue British Christian refugee children 
(although not refugees in the true sense—not fleeing persecution but potential bombing) 
that, after receiving widespread public and governmental support, successfully made its 
way through Congress and was written into law.  The sentiments and actions of the 
American public, Roosevelt, the departments of his Administration and the legislative 
branch and their international counterparts demonstrated similarities but also many 
contradictions and inconsistencies during these 1938-1940 events.  These differences 
have led to disparate and controversial perceptions of the adequacy of the American and 
worldwide response and the assessment of responsibility during the years of the pre-war 
period and the Holocaust.   
      Various opinions have been offered regarding the reactions of Roosevelt and the 
democratic nations to this humanitarian calamity.  Some writers have asserted that FDR 
could have done more to aid the refugees but instead abandoned them to their collective 
fate. Others claim that given the economic, social and political context and climate of the 
                                                 
      
2The Wagner-Rogers Bill called for the entry of 20,000 Jewish and non-Aryan children into the United 
States outside of the annual quota from Germany and Austria (27,370)—10,000 in 1939 and 10,000 in 
1940.  The Hennings Bill offered an Amendment to the Neutrality Act allowing American “mercy” ships to 
transport British Christian children, in unlimited numbers outside the quota to the United States during a 
time of war.  The Bermuda Conference of April 1943 was convened by the United States and the United 
Kingdom ostensibly to consider the issue of wartime Jewish refugees at a time the Allies were aware of the 
Final Solution but it too, like its Evian predecessor, was set up to fail. 
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time the President did everything that was possible to resolve the problem.  This author, 
however, contends that the Jewish Question was a matter of low priority to a Chief 
Executive whose major focus was upon domestic economic and political recovery and the 
strengthening of national defense.  Little political capital would be expended upon an 
issue that lacked widespread public support.  Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that 
the invitation to and the framing of the Evian Conference was primarily a thinly guised 
publicity ploy that was set up to fail; a move clearly recognized by participating countries 
and by the Nazi regime.  The London based Intergovernmental Committee was likewise 
an illusion, an operation of smoke and mirrors, designed to demonstrate official action 
but in reality geared to accomplish little.  
This thesis will focus in detail upon the initiation, planning, execution, reactions 
to and the aftermath of the Evian Conference which affected future international refugee 
policies during the critical inter-war years of 1938 and 1939 and, following the outbreak 
of hostilities on September 1, 1939, the fate of European Jewry itself. The paper is 
divided into sections that will examine pre-war Austria and the Anschluss, the origins, 
construction, course, results and consequences of the Evian Conference and 
contemporary and later historical assessments of the actions of Roosevelt and the 
convention participants. A general review followed by a more detailed evaluation was 
made of official and un-official accounts of the meeting utilizing public records, private 
diaries, books, newspapers, journals and other periodicals for the period of January 1, 
1938 through December 31, 1939.  This data was supplemented by later writings and 
statements of conference participants as well as post-Holocaust historical scholarship.  
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Part I, “The Gathering Storm,” includes Chapter 1-4.  Chapter 1 provides 
information regarding the Austrian Jewish community prior to the Anschluss.  Jewish 
emigration from Germany, beginning with the ascension to power of Adolf Hitler, is 
broken down into four distinct phases.  Chapter 2 describes the Anschluss itself and the 
Jewish and international reactions to what many regarded as a violation of the Versailles 
Treaty.  The specter of forced emigration from the Eastern European countries of Poland, 
Hungary and Rumania appears on the horizon as a potential and greater threat and will 
influence the formation and scope of the Evian Conference.  The immigration policies of 
various countries are touched upon and the positive actions of Bolivia and a Chinese 
diplomat, Feng Shan Ho are highlighted.  Warnings about the dangers of mass migration 
are broached by such journalists as Dorothy Thompson and are influential in the 
American decision to convoke an international refugee conference.  Chapter 3 explores 
the failure and successes of the League of Nations in dealing with refugee matters and 
frames the United States Department of State official invitation to attend the meeting 
which will be held in Evian, France.  Initial reactions for and against the meeting are 
discussed and greater details of national immigration policies are provided.  The ominous 
threat of the Eastern countries is again addressed to a greater degree and Palestine is 
excluded from discussion as a site of possible refuge. Chapter 4 delves more deeply into 
the reactions of the American and foreign press, politicians and Jewish and Muslim 
communities towards the convocation of the conference.  The Presidential Advisory 
Committee for Political Refugees, created by Roosevelt and headed by the former High 
Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, James G. McDonald makes its appearance 
on the scene. 
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Part II, “Hope Ascending,” includes Chapters 5-10.  Chapter 5 describes the 
planning of the Evian Conference and the creation of two technical sub-committees.  The 
panels were established to hear testimony from refugee organizations and obtain 
confidential information regarding each nation’s immigration policies and willingness to 
accept involuntary immigrants.   Palestine is secretly excluded from consideration due to 
British pressure and Myron C. Taylor, the chief American delegate, announced that the 
annual immigration quota of Germans and Austrians would be combined.  This 
consolidation marked the limits of action on the part of the United States and would have 
profound ramifications on the policies of the other participants as well as on Germany 
itself.  Day One began with opening statements from Henri Bérenger, the chief French 
representative, Taylor and Lord Winterton, his British counterpart.  The delegates of The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Canada, Argentina and Brazil expressed a common 
theme that would run throughout the conference and, with few exceptions, would be 
echoed by the subsequent speakers.  Each nation was sympathetic to the plight of real and 
potential Jewish refugees but domestic conditions precluded mass immigration.  Further 
analysis of the immigration rules and regulations of the attendees are provided.  Chapter 
6 opens with Day Four of the Conference; two days were spent in electing Taylor 
President of the meeting.  Statements are made by a number of Latin American nations, 
Denmark and Haiti and continue the premise “we are sympathetic but…”  The sole 
exception is the Dominican Republic which, for a variety of reasons that will be outlined, 
agreed to receive one hundred thousand refugees. 
Chapter 7 discusses the activities of the Technical Sub-Committees and the 
testimony provided by Jewish and non-Jewish refugee organizations as well as the 
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League High Commissioner Sir Neill Malcolm. The organizations offer four possible 
approaches to solving the emigration impasse.  Chapter 8 reports the activities of Day 6 
in which Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, Paraguay and Central American countries 
continue the sympathetic but hollow rhetoric.  Behind the scenes, however, the Swiss 
diplomat is secretly negotiating with the German Government to block all Jewish 
immigration into Switzerland.  Chapters 9 and 10 analyze the reports of the Technical 
Sub-Committees and include the closing statements of Taylor, Bérenger and Winterton.  
The latter, for the first time, openly addresses the issue of Palestine as a site of 
resettlement but discounts it as a site of relocation.  The question of the retention of 
Jewish capital to facilitate migration is raised and will become the major confounding 
factor ensuring the failure of the Conference.   Chapter 11 described the role of Palestine 
and Jewish attitudes towards Zionism and its interaction with the meeting. 
Part III, “Hopes Dashed,” includes chapters 11 and 12.  Chapter 11 discusses the 
initial assessments and criticisms of the Evian Conference.  Italy now appears on the 
scene as a possible additional source of forced Jewish emigration due to enactment of 
Aryan racial policies.  The role of Jewish disunity and the failure to provide a united front 
at the Conference is analyzed as are differing opinions regarding the role of Palestine.  
German Nazi reaction to and criticism of the lack of success of the meeting is described; 
a disappointment that will affect subsequent dealings with the Reich authorities and result 
in a profound change in the tenor of German policies towards its Jewish population.  
Chapter 12 discusses the sole creation of the conference, the Intergovernmental 
Committee for Political Refugees, based in London and its attempts to negotiate with the 
Germans to facilitate orderly migration. 
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Part IV, “Appraisals,” includes chapters 13 and 14.  Chapter 13 analyzes the role 
played by Roosevelt and lays out the arguments regarding Presidential actions and 
inactions during this critical time in Jewish history.  Chapter 14 concludes the work and 
continues the discussion of the effect of the Conference on German as well as Polish 
policies.  It also offers a link to future refugee problems. 
The Evian Conference marked the first global attempt to resolve an international 
refugee crisis through diplomacy. Its success hinged on the interplay between varied 
economic, social, political, racial and ideological factors that came into conflict and 
eventually resulted in the “Perfect Storm.”  The destiny of Continental Jews and of the 
world itself was ultimately affected by the decisions (or lack thereof) of the meeting of 
the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees held in the confines of a 
luxurious hotel on the shores of a scenic and serene lake.   
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PART 1: 
GATHERING STORM 
Chapter 1 
 “Heaviest of Blows” 
“The world seems to be divided into two parts—those where the Jews could not 
live and those where they could not enter.1 
 
  “The emigration problem is therefore for all practical purposes insoluble…”2 
    
The rise of Nazism to the central stage of domestic politics and authority 
threatened and eventually revoked the rights and privileges granted to Jews following the 
Emancipation of the Nineteenth Century.  Jews who had considered themselves Germans 
first and practitioners of the Judaic faith second found themselves in a position of 
increasing social, political and economic isolation and disenfranchisement.  The 
application of state sponsored violence and arbitrary imprisonment eventually convinced 
the majority of German Jews that continued existence within the borders of Germany was 
no longer a viable or realistic possibility.  Consequently, forced migration became the 
primary modus of survival. 
                                                 
     
1Chaim Weizmann, Manchester Guardian, May 23, 1936 cited in A.J. Sherman, Island Refuge: Britain 
and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933-1939 (Portland Oregon: Frank Cass, 1994), 112. Weizmann was a 
British Zionist leader, chemist and first President of the State of Israel. 
 
     
2Joachim von Ribbentrop, “The Jewish Question as a Factor in Foreign Policy in 1938,” Foreign 
Ministry Circular January 25, 1939 available from 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:kGh4aYQrNIAJ:www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jso
urce/Holocaust/forpol.html+%22The+Jewisy+Question+as+a+Factor+in+Foreign+Policy+in+1938%22&c
d=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; Internet; accessed May 29, 2010. 
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The period of Twentieth Century Jewish emigration from Germany (and later 
Austria) can be demarcated into four well-defined phases.  The first stage began with the 
ascension of Adolf Hitler to national power in January 1933 and ended with the 
enactment of the Nuremberg Racial Laws in 1935.  A limited degree of flight occurred 
during September 1930 when 107 National Socialists gained seats in the Reichstag but 
the overwhelming majority of Jews continued to maintain a sense of personal security 
within the new Nazi State.   This self assurance, however, dramatically changed 
following the destruction of the national parliament building (Reichstag) on February 27 
and the subsequent proclamation of the “Decree of the Reich President for the Protection 
of the People and State” on February 28, 1933.  This edict, purportedly issued to prevent 
further “Communist acts of violence” against the State, indefinitely suspended a number 
of the Articles of the Weimar Constitution.3 Strict limitations were placed on civil 
liberties granted by law such as the freedoms of expression and of the press, the right of 
free association and assembly, the privacy of personal and business communications and 
the sanctity of the home and property.  The central government assumed powers 
originally allocated to the Federal States and could issue draconian punishments for 
offenses that previously warranted life imprisonment.4 The Reichstag, on March 23, 
                                                 
    
3The “Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and State” (Verordnung des 
Reichspräsidenten zum Schutz von Volk und Staat) was also known as The Reichstag Fire Decree. The 
Weimar Constitution was signed on August 11, 1919 following the collapse of the German Empire.  It 
provided for universal suffrage and a nationally elected parliament but ultimately proved unable to 
withstand economic collapse, rising nationalism and conflicting ideologies. For a delineation of the Articles 
of the document see “The Constitution of the German Federation of August 11, 1919” cited in H. 
Oppenheirmer, The Constitution of the German Republic available from 
http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~jobrien/reference/ob13.html; Internet; accessed October 8, 2010.  
 
    
4
“Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and State of 28 February 1933” cited in 
United States Chief Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 
III, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), Document 1390-PS, 968-970. 
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1933, approved the Enabling Act or the “Law to Remedy the Distress of the People and 
the Empire” which granted Hitler dictatorial powers under the veneer of legality.  The 
Reich Chancellor was empowered to issue laws without the consent or participation of 
the members of the Reichstag.5 Subsequently, on July 14, 1933 the Government enacted 
the “Law against the Establishment of Parties” which effectively made the National 
Socialist Party the only legally sanctioned political party.6 
The adoption of dictatorial powers and the escalating hegemony of the Nazi Party 
over the operations of the State and society led to the relentless implementation of 
increasingly severe anti-Jewish and anti-non-Aryan policies.  These acts were formulated 
to disenfranchise and separate the Jews and non-Aryans from the heart and fabric of 
German society and the economy.  Random and orchestrated psychological terror, 
physical violence, arrest and the ominous threat of the concentration camp became an 
increasingly common modus operandi designed to create a fearful atmosphere in which 
Jews would be forced to emigrate, providing a solution to the “Jewish Question” in 
Germany.7 However, by the fall of 1933 it was clear to many in the German Jewish 
                                                 
     
5
“Law to Remove the Distress of the People and the State” (The Enabling Act or Ermächtigungsgesetz), 
reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Division of European Affairs, National Socialism. Basic Principles, 
their Application by the Nazi Party’s Foreign Organizations and the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi Aims 
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), Appendix, Document 11, 217-18. 
 
     
6
“Law against the Establishment of Parties” July 14, 1933 cited in Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey 
Pridham, eds., Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945 (London: Cape Publishing, 1974), 200.  Article I: The 
National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) was the “only political party” and Article II: Anyone 
who sought to continue an existing or create a new party faced a three year term of “penal servitude” unless 
the offense mandated a “heavier penalty.” 
  
     
7Dachau was the first concentration camp officially established by the fledgling Nazi regime in March 
1933 and was initially utilized primarily for Social Democrats, Communists, trade unionists and other 
political prisoners.  Gradually, Dachau and other concentration camps began to house additional groups 
considered inimical to the Reich such as the Roma, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals and Jews.  The use 
of the camps as a weapon of terror against the Jewish population rapidly accelerated following the 
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community that the Enlightenment strategy of “accomodationist secularism” that had 
promoted the assimilation of Jews into the dominant culture of Germany would no longer 
provide security.8 Consequently, many German Jews resorted to the age old formula of 
survival, utilized in previous periods of persecution, in which second class status was 
accepted with the hope that conditions would improve in the future.  As a result, the 
number of Jews seeking to emigrate with the help of the Aid Association of German Jews 
(Hilsverein der Deutschen Juden), the Palestine Office and other relief and resettlement 
organizations dramatically fell.  During April-July 1933 four hundred to five hundred 
Jews per day sought emigration assistance decreasing to one hundred to two hundred per 
day in the autumn of the year and to ten to twenty per day in early 1934.9  
 Such Jewish sentiments were facilitated by some Government officials while 
others sought the institution of more discriminatory, punitive and ultimately separatist 
policies.  This reflected the contradictory nature of the anti-Jewish paradigm adopted by 
the Nazi regime; a conflict between those who opted for a conservative and gradual 
approach to exclusion and disenfranchisement and those who sought a more radical 
resolution.  The Württemberg Minister of Economics, for example, banned on November 
24, 1933 any acts of discrimination against Jewish and other non-Aryan artisans, business 
                                                                                                                                                 
Anschluss and Kristallnacht during which Jews faced mass arrest.  If a Jew could find the wherewithal to 
emigrate abroad he would be released from incarceration. 
 
     
8Bernard Susser and Charles S. Liebman, Choosing Survival: Strategies for a Jewish Future (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 123.  
 
     
9Mark Wischnitzer, “Jewish Emigration from Germany 1933-1938,” Jewish Social Studies 2, no. 1 
(January 1940): 26-27.  The mission of the Palestine Office was to facilitate Jewish immigration into the 
British Mandate of Palestine. “Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden,” Shoah Resource Center available from 
http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%206371.pdf; Internet; accessed October 
1, 2010;  “Palestine Office” Jewish Virtual Library, available from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0015_0_15348.html ; Internet; accessed 
October 1, 2010. 
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owners and laborers and offered police protection to skilled craftsmen at local fairs and 
markets.10 The Reich Minister of Labor, Franz Seldte, decreed on the same date that 
Jewish workers were to enjoy the same privileges and legal protections as their Aryan 
counterparts.11 The Reich Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick issued an order to the 
Governors of the German States that Jewish businesses were not to be harmed by Aryan 
rules and regulations.12 
Dr. Loewenstein, President of the Union of Jewish Front Fighters (Reichsbund 
jüdischer Frontsoldaten), declared in their official publication, The Shield (Das Schild), 
that the “solution of the Jewish question within our homeland” is obtainable provided 
“racial differentiation” did not connote “racial defamation” which the Jewish war 
veterans would denounce on the “grounds of our equal-born achievement.”13 The sons of 
such veterans would be allowed, according to Prussian Minister of Education Bernhard 
Rust, to take their final exams in school.14 Jews who had fought in the post-Great War 
period in the Baltic and Upper Silesia or against the Spartacist, Communist and 
Separatists revolutions would also be considered “front fighters” and would be exempt 
from the “Aryan clause.”15  The President of the Hilsverein declared on May 27, 1934, 
                                                 
     
10Harry Schneiderman, ed., The American Jewish Year Book 5695 September 10, 1934-September 27, 
1935, vol. 36 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1934), 168 available from 
http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/Vol_36__1934_1935.pdf; Internet; accessed October 8, 
2010. 
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and again on June 18, 1935, that German Jews sought to remain within “their homeland, 
Germany, whose future was their own.” Jews would seek to emigrate only for economic 
reasons or for the education of their children who were excluded from mainstream 
schools and universities.  The February 4, 1934 issue of the C.V. Zeitung, the publication 
of the Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith (Centralverein Deutscher 
Staatsbürger Jüdischen Glaubens), commented that German Jewry cannot and would not 
“surrender the values which German culture and nature have given to us.”  It did, 
however, acknowledge the right of the “German nation to decide,” with the participation 
of the Jewish community, “the limits and the extent of our scope of activity and the form 
and content of our co-operation” within German society.16  
Overall, the League High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, James G. 
McDonald, noted that by 1935 more than eighty thousand people had emigrated from the 
Reich of whom fifteen to twenty percent were non-Aryan or Aryan Christians opposed to 
Nazism and its anti-theological stance.17 Thirty thousand immigrated to France from 
which twenty thousand departed for other destinations.  5,263 refugees found haven in 
The Netherlands and more than five thousand entered Czechoslovakia.18 
                                                 
     
16Die Arbeit des Hilfsvereins der Juden in Deutschland 1934-35 (Berlin: 1935), 6, 11 cited in 
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The second phase of emigration was initiated by the adoption of the Nuremberg 
Racial Laws of September 15, 1935.19  The loss of German citizenship and the gradually 
expanding pool of anti-Semitic rules and regulations finally convinced many German 
Jews that continued existence within the homeland was no longer a plausible proposition.  
Only emigration with its potential for resettlement and the re-establishment of normalcy 
in their lives offered a viable solution.  More than two hundred potential refugees 
approached the Hilsverein in Berlin every day for emigration assistance.20 Increasing 
British and Arab resistance and concerns about the absorptive capacity of Palestine, 
however, diverted the quest for resettlement to other locations: 
Emigration                               Palestine                               Other Locations 
 
1933-35                                  12,871                                       3,615 
1936-37                                    5,879                                     10,10621 
 
 
German Jews belonging to the Reich Association of German Jews 
(Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden), however, maintained their belief that continued 
Jewish existence within Germany was practicable.22 Although the Laws dealt the 
                                                 
     
19The Nuremberg Race Laws were officially announced during a Nazi Party Rally on September 15, 
1935.  The “Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor” banned marriages and sexual relations 
between Jews and Aryans.  Jews were barred from employing Aryan women as domestic servants and 
could not display the German flag.  Violations of this law would be punishable by imprisonment and hard 
labor.  “The Reich Citizenship Law” defined the parameters of citizenship granted to persons living within 
the Reich and annulled Jewish citizenship in the German State.  A citizen was defined as a “subject who is 
of German or kindred blood” who demonstrated “that he is both desirous and fit to serve the German 
people and Reich faithfully.” Only officially recognized citizens would be granted “full political rights.” 
Both laws provided a legal basis for further discrimination and isolation of German Jews and were later 
applied to Austria following the Anschluss.  Noakes and Pridham, Documents on Nazism, 463-467.  
 
     
20Wischnitzer, “Jewish Emigration,” 29.   
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unification of the State Association of the Jewish Communities, large Jewish private organizations and 
major Jewish population centers.  This reordering was in response to the recognition that German Jewish 
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“heaviest of blows” to the Jewish community it was still possible, it assumed, to create a 
“tolerable relationship” between the Aryans and the Jewish minority provided the regime 
ended “defamation and boycott.”   The creation of an “autonomous Jewish leadership” 
headed by the Reichvertretung could accomplish this goal.  Emigration would depend 
upon “large-scale planning” with a focus on young adults who required instruction in the 
necessary skills and professions for resettlement.  The Reichvertretung would attempt to 
safeguard “the existing means of livelihood” as well as provide necessary “economic 
aid.”23  
More than ten thousand potential refugees underwent occupational training for 
new pursuits during 1938 and 1937.24 However, unemployment rose as Jewish owned 
enterprises declined and hiring preference was given to Aryans.25 Consequently, demand 
for the opportunity to emigrate escalated but was countered by increasing foreign 
nationalism and greater admission selectivity that limited the number of potential 
permanent sites of resettlement.  For example, the South African Aliens’ Act of February 
1, 1937 based admission on the likelihood of assimilability into the dominant European 
                                                                                                                                                 
survival depended upon “unity and cooperation.”  German Jews, it was felt, needed to speak through one 
voice and structure in order to “struggle for every right, for every place, for every opportunity to continue 
to exist.”  Failure to comply with such a design would be regarded as a “wrong [committed] against the 
vital needs of the German Jews.” The leadership, headed by Rabbi Leo Baeck, Otto Hirsch and others, 
“hope[d] for the understanding assistance” of the Nazi Government and the “respect of our gentile fellow 
citizens, who we join in love and loyalty to Germany.”  “Proclamation of The (New) Reichsvertretung” in 
the Juedische Rundschau, no. 78, September 29, 1933, available from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/proc.html; Internet; accessed October 8, 2010.  
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derived population.  An Immigrants Selection Board was empowered to admit or bar 
entry to any immigrant who was not of British or Irish extraction.  While 3,615 German 
Jews entered the Union of South Africa during 1933-1936, following the enactment of 
this bill only 1,900 managed to gain entrance during 1937-1940.26 Seizure of Jewish 
passports by the German Government also led to greater pressures (and larger obstacles 
preventing migration) upon Jews to leave the country. 
The period of March-November1938 has been described as a “crucial milestone” 
in the history of Central European Jewry and represented the third stage in emigration 
from the Reich.  (The fourth phase of emigration, commencing with Kristallnacht, will 
not be considered within the context of this paper.) It marked the cathartic moment in 
time when a majority of German (and later Austrian and Czech) Jews at last recognized 
that their continued existence within the bounds of the Reich was no longer tenable.  
Involuntary emigration, oftentimes to points unknown, became the only alternative to 
potential “annihilation.”  1938 also represented for the German leadership a major 
turning point because the official policy of forcibly exiling Jews and non-Aryans was 
proceeding too slowly.  Involuntary migration was hampered in large part by the Nazi 
seizure of financial assets and businesses that increasingly disenfranchised and ultimately 
impoverished the would-be émigrés, thus diminishing their value as desirable immigrants 
and potential citizens.  The barriers to both exit and entry proliferated creating a pool of 
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stateless refugees dependent upon the inadequate resources of Jewish and Christian relief 
organizations, the charity of others and the whims and rhetoric of government.27  
Following the enactment of the Nuremberg Laws the German Jewish leadership 
estimated ten years would be required to complete an orderly mass migration of Jews 
from Germany at a rate of twenty thousand to twenty five thousand per year.  
Approximately 135,000 German Jews had already left the Reich by December 1937 of 
whom 43,000 had entered Palestine.  After the Anschluss the impetus to emigrate 
accelerated and one hundred thousand Jews departed Germany.28 An additional 128,000 
refugees quit Vienna between March 1938 and mid-November 1941 when S.S. leader 
Heinrich Himmler blocked further emigration.29  Overall, between March 1938 and 
August 1939, prior to the outbreak of the German invasion of Poland, roughly 380,000 
Jews had fled Germany, Austria and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.30 As will 
be seen in the next chapter the events of March 12, 1938 was a wakeup call for the 
majority of Jews of Greater Germany but was it simply too late? 
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Chapter 2 
ANSCHLUSS: “The Leader is Coming” 
 
“And thus it is all over Germany; wherever the Leader goes there is rejoicing, 
gigantic crowds; all want to be where he is, to see the Leader.  One sees their 
eyes shine, particularly those of youth; one sees in their boundless gratitude 
crowds of men and women reach a state bordering on ecstasy; like an electric 
current the news passes through the teeming masses—‘The Leader is 
coming!’…And the German people know that the longed-for and inspired leader 
is Adolf Hitler!1 
 
The post-Great War independence of Austria under Chancellor Kurt von 
Schuschnigg ended at daybreak on March 12, 1938 when the German Army crossed the 
Austrian border in violation of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles and Article 88 of the 
Treaty of St. Germain which guaranteed the sovereignty of Austria.2  A plebiscite would 
be held on April 10, 1938 among eligible voters (those twenty years of age and older who 
were not Jewish or of Jewish background) to ratify this unification or Anschluss. This 
was seen as a “mere formality” or legal façade since 99.7% of the Austrian population or 
4.287 million voters out of an eligible pool of 4.3 million voted Ja for union which 
became formalized via the Federal Constitutional Law Regarding the Reunion of 
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Germany and Austria.3  The ballot asked the voter: “Do you acknowledge Adolf Hitler as 
our Fuehrer, and acknowledge the reunion of Austria with the German Reich which was 
effected on March 13, 1938?”  Sirens signaled German and Austrian residents and road 
traffic on the day of the vote to come to a halt for two minutes while planes circling over 
head dropped leaflets calling upon the public to vote yes for union.4  Those who had 
voted Ja were awarded a pin and opponents, who had voted against the Anschluss, 
received nothing, making the dissenters readily identifiable in the public eye.5 
The Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Theodore Innitzer, ordered the bells to be 
rung and swastikas flown from all Catholic Churches within the city.6 Austrian Catholic 
bishops had come out publicly in favor of unification with Germany prompting a rebuke 
from the Vatican.  A “solemn declaration” had been issued in all Catholic Churches 
calling upon the faithful to vote Ja in the plebiscite.  The bishops issued “this appeal 
without apprehension” because they had been assured that Hitler’s policies were “guided 
by the words, ‘Render unto God that which is God’s and unto Caesar that which is 
Caesars.’”  A Vatican City radio broadcast warned, however, that any church official who 
made “declarations of a political or economic nature” was accountable for a “breach of 
                                                 
     
3The Glasgow Herald, March 14, 1938, 14.  Preliminary results of the plebiscite (combining German 
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Electorate:                          49,546,950 
Total votes:                        49,326,791 
Votes for union:                 48,799,269 
Votes against union:               452,180 
Invalid votes:                            75,342 
Percentage in favor of union:     99.08 
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trust and loyalty.”  Such actions represented “political Catholicism” which was to be 
reviled.  Consequently, any true Austrian Catholic was not morally bound to follow the 
dictates of their bishops who had demonstrated themselves to be “cowards [who did] not 
[recognize] the wolf in sheep’s clothing [and] were unworthy to carry on the struggle for 
Christ.”7      
Although there was an atmosphere of intimidation during this vote many 
Austrians viewed this national merger as a means of ending the political instability of the 
First Republic, an opportunity for economic revitalization, fulfillment of a pan-Germanic 
ideology and the creation of a relationship to Germany that would resemble the earlier 
Dual Monarchy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  However, reality soon set in when Dr. 
Artur Seyss von Inquart addressed Hitler in Vienna:  “As the last head of the Austrian 
State, I announce the legal execution of the German nation’s will.  Austria is now a 
Federal State of the Reich.  A century-old dream has come true.”8  Instead of becoming 
co-equal with Germany Austria became the Ostmark, a province of the Greater German 
Reich.  Egbert Krispyn has argued that for Hitler the Anschluss possessed potent “private 
[and] emotional significance” as it represented an “act of revenge” on his native 
homeland for its failure to appreciate and recognize “his genius.”  Consequently, 
planning for annexation began soon after the Nazi accession to power.9 
Observers noted that the German Army was warmly received by the bulk of the 
Austrian population who bore flowers and waved Nazi flags. One soldier, Ludwig 
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Sertorius, viewed the Anschluss as the fulfillment of “ancient German longings” in which 
a “great German people’s Reich” was created.  German soldiers entered Austria not as 
combatants or conquerors but as “representatives of a general…will” to unify the German 
Nation through ties of “brotherhood”; an emotion reciprocated by their Austrian cousins.  
There was a “spontaneous [connection linking] heart to heart.”  It simply was “love at 
first sight.”10  Hermann Goering described Hitler’s reception by the Austrian populace as 
a scene of “overwhelming joy” coupled with “absolute [and] complete enthusiasm” for 
the National Socialist ideology.  The entire “affair,” to his surprise, had “crystallized into 
a march of joy.” 11 
Hitler returned to the land of his birth with a grand entrance, like a “modern 
Caesar,” that absolved the personal failings of his youth, the obscurity of his artistic work 
and his life as a penniless house painter. Standing erect with an outstretched arm in a 
large black open Mercedes Benz he received a tumultuous “royal” welcome in his 
hometown of Linz with cries of “today Germany is ours!” and “tomorrow the whole 
world!”12 A “million shouting, flag-waving Viennese in a state of mad frenzy” greeted 
the Fuehrer as he coursed through the city streets. Storefronts were adorned with flowers 
and placards acclaimed “Welcome to our Fuehrer.”13 “Masses of shouting, singing, flag-
waving Viennese” paraded and drove through the streets uttering “Seig Heil!” (Hail 
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Victory!) and “One Reich, One People, One Fuehrer!”14  An Austrian, Susi Seitz, 
recalled the warm sentiments elicited by Hitler’s arrival. As one they called upon the 
Leader to “‘get us to the German country, get us to Germany, let us be with you.’”15 
Women street vendors sold flowers, metal swastika pins and homemade flags.  Hitler 
proclaimed from the balcony of the Imperial Hotel that “no force on earth can shake” the 
resolve of the Greater Germany.  “The German Reich as it stands today is inviolable.  No 
one can shatter it!”16  “An eternal historic bond” linking Germany and Austria was 
restored following its disruption in the aftermath of the Great War.17 
Following the Anschluss the Austrian Federal Army was placed under the control 
of the Reich and its officers, as well as Aryan public officials, were required to take a 
personal oath of allegiance to “Hitler, Fuehrer of the German Reich and People.”  Jewish 
officials were excluded.  The assets of the Austrian National Bank were transferred to the 
Reichsbank and 21-year-old men were ordered to report for active military service.  A 
decree issued by Hitler and the German Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm von Frick, 
applied the Reich laws, including the Nuremberg Racial Laws of 1935, to the Ostmark.   
Opposition of the other European powers to the annexation of Austria was 
limited.  Hitler obtained Mussolini’s acquiescence in return for the Italian retention of 
South Tirol.  The United Kingdom, following a policy of appeasement under Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain, would not take up arms over Austrian independence and 
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France, scarred by memories of the 1914-1918 war, was unable to act unilaterally and 
would remain in a defensive posture.   
Preceding the Anschluss the Habsburg Statute of 1890 had granted the Austrian 
Jewish community (Kultursgemeinde) religious autonomy.  Although there were only 
190,000 Jews (three percent of the total population) residing within Austria, primarily in 
Vienna (ten percent of the city population), the community was quite diverse with more 
than 440 synagogues (Sephardic and Ashkenazic), museums, libraries, schools, medical 
clinics and hospitals, orphanages, theaters, sports associations, political groups, 
newspapers, journals and the Jewish Great War Veterans Association.  Jews controlled a 
significant percentage of the textile industry and were heavily represented within 
academia, the arts, medical and legal professions, industry, newspapers and the stock 
market.18  
The Anschluss marked the major turning point in the lot of Jews and non-Aryans 
residing within Greater Germany.19  Prior to March 1938 German anti-Jewish laws and 
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regulations had been introduced slowly and incrementally due to concerns about adverse 
domestic and foreign public opinion.  The Government also feared that the sudden 
expulsion of Jews from the national economy would have disruptive effects on German 
economic recovery from the Depression and Hitler’s plans for military rearmament.  
Between 1933 and 1937 135 anti-Jewish laws were enacted, marked especially by the 
1935 Nuremberg Racial Laws.  Many Jews, as noted earlier, hoped that the latter 
promulgations would lead to an inferior but stable position within German society; a 
situation reminiscent of previous events in Jewish history.  Hitler, however, had issued a 
warning during a 1935 speech in Nuremberg that if this arrangement for a “separate 
secular solution” collapsed then it would become necessary to grant to the Nazi Socialist 
Party the legal authority to devise a “final solution” to the Jewish Question.20  
Hitler undoubtedly had long hoped for the failure of such a “secular” solution. 
Reflections within Mein Kampf, as well as a discussion held with a journalist and retired 
Major, Josef Hell, in 1922, revealed that the would-be Fuehrer predicted the slaughter of 
German Jewry if he acquired the reins of national authority.  His “first and foremost task” 
would be the “annihilation” of Jews by public hanging.  Jews would be executed 
“indiscriminately…until the last Jews in Munich has been exterminated.”  Such a 
program would continue until the Fatherland had “been entirely cleansed of Jews.”21 
 Anti-Jewish laws and regulations were enacted rapidly within Austria over the 
course of two to three months.  The seizure of Jewish monies and other assets were 
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followed by a policy of forced emigration.  Jews were ordered on April 27, 1938 to 
register with the Government all resources exceeding $2,000 (personal, bank or saving 
accounts, stocks and bonds, insurance policies, pension payments and other forms of 
revenue and wealth); a cumulative sum estimated to be worth $800,000,000. The amount 
of money that could be withdrawn from bank accounts per week (except for the payment 
of wages or business expenses) was severely limited in order to prevent the “smuggling 
of ‘Jewish capital’” out of the country.22  All postal packages leaving Austria would be 
subject to search and seizure.  Such a program was to be carried out in an orderly fashion 
to avoid economic disruptions.   
The French Police reported in April 1938 that the speed and rigor with which anti-
Semitic policies were enacted within Austria far surpassed that of Germany itself.  “The 
misery that has overtaken Vienna's Jewish population is indescribable.”23 Jews in Austria 
constituted three percent of the population as compared to one percent in the Reich. More 
than six hundred thousand “half-Jews” or roughly ten percent of the Austrian population 
would fall victim to the racial clauses of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 which were 
instituted during May 1938.24  
Unification allowed legitimization and expression of Austria’s own anti-Semitism 
as well as the proliferation and dissemination of German anti-Jewish policies.  Many 
Catholic, rural and conservative Austrians resented and felt threatened by Jewish inroads 
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into the economic, cultural and political spheres of Austrian life, especially in the capital 
of Vienna, in which the majority of Jews in 1938 resided. Whereas the Socialists and 
Communists were the first victims of Hitler’s accession to power, in Vienna it was the 
Jews who bore the “brunt of the Nazis revolutionary fire,” facing mass arrest, plunder, 
impoverishment and the fury of the mob.  
The Central Office for Jewish Emigration (Zentralamt jüdischer Auswanderung 
or ZjA) was established in March 1938 in Vienna by Adolf Eichmann of the 
Sicherheitsdienst or S.D. (in the former Rothschild palace at 20-22 Prinz-Eugen-Strasse) 
to systematize and expedite the emigration process and the transfer of Jewish capital. He 
compared the process to that of a factory conveyor belt: “The initial application and all 
the rest of the required papers are put in at one end, and the passport falls off at the other 
end.”25 Eichmann informed his superior in the Gestapo Department of Jewish Affairs, 
Herbert Hagen, on May 8, 1938 that he had “demanded” that twenty thousand Jews 
“without means” emigrate from Austria during the period April 1, 1938-May 1, 1939 and 
received assurances from the Jewish community and Zionist groups “that they would 
keep to this.”26  
Eichmann and many other Nazi ideologues viewed the Jews as the “eternal” and 
“most dangerous enemy” of National Socialism.  Germany had to become Jüdenrein or 
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free of Jews by forced emigration based on financial, social and political 
disenfranchisement.  However, such resettlement could not threaten German interests and 
should be focused on the “backward” regions in Palestine, Africa, Asia and South 
America.27 This pro-Zionist view of Palestine as a potential haven was, according to 
Hanna Arendt, an “indisputable” component of the early phase of German anti-Jewish 
policy.   Eichmann’s success served as the model for the management of Jewish affairs in 
Berlin and later in Prague following the creation of the Protectorate over Bohemia and 
Moravia as well as the forced deportation of Jews and Poles during 1939-40 from regions 
of occupied Poland and their replacement by ethnic Germans, the Volksdeutsche.28 
Fear rapidly engulfed the Jewish community as the Nazis assumed power in 
Austria, accelerated by the rapid enactment of anti-Semitic laws coupled with a one week 
long pogrom.  Hundreds and later thousands of terrified Jews would besiege foreign 
consulates seeking visas that would aid their escape from the Reich.  Jewish men and 
women were randomly assaulted on the streets and Jewish owned stores and businesses 
were ransacked and destroyed.  Jews tried to hide themselves within the confines of their 
homes located in the Leopoldstadt suburb of Vienna in which one-third of the city’s Jews 
resided.  This area, allocated to the Jews by Emperor Ferdinand II in the Edict of 
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Privileges in 1624 as a ghetto and later known as District II, was situated within the heart 
of the capital, and formed, together with Brigittenau (20th District), a large island 
bounded by the Danube River and the Danube Canal. Jews comprised 38.5 percent of the 
population in 1923 and consequently the region was nicknamed Mazzesinsel or “Matzoh 
Island.”29  By March 14, 1938 approximately 191,000 Jews (ten percent of the city’s 
population) lived within Vienna, making it, after Warsaw and Budapest, the third largest 
community of Jews in Continental Europe.30 
Following the Anschluss all Austrian Jews were ordered to relocate to Vienna and 
eventually into Leopoldstadt itself.  The “relentless tramp of Nazi storm troopers’ boots 
on the stairs and the knocks of rifle butts” on the doors of Jewish residences signaled 
impending arrest or the plundering of their businesses.  Members of the Hitler Youth 
(Hitler Jugend) rousted Jewish merchants living in the Jew’s Alley (Jüdengasse) and 
compelled them to open their stores from which goods were plundered. Jewish coffee 
houses were forcibly closed or turned over to new Aryan managers.31 Jews were forced to 
their knees to scrub Schuschnigg crosses (placed by the Fatherland Front, two weeks 
earlier in support of an anti-Anschluss plebiscite) from the pavement and were serenaded 
by the gathering crowd with the shouts of “Perish Jewry”, “Out with the Jews” and “Who 
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has found work for the Jews? Adolf Hitler!”32 Stores that were not marked by a swastika, 
the inscription “Aryan Store” or other sign of Aryan ownership were highlighted by a red 
painted Jude.  Many cafés posted notices that “Jewish customers [were] not desired.”33 
Jewish businesses were to be boycotted by Aryan customers.34  The ultimate goal was the 
Aryanization of Jewish holdings at the lowest financial costs.  The Reich Governor or 
Statthalter, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, decreed that a “trustee manager” would be appointed to 
take over the operation of a Jewish business concern if the owner disappeared, was 
incarcerated, unable to conduct business or posed a threat to smuggle assets out of 
Austria.35  Jews were conscripted by Nazi brownshirts (S.A. or Sturmabteilung) for 
forced labor in “cleaning brigades” so that Jews would “learn what real manual labor 
means.”36             
Field Marshal Herman Wilhelm Goering warned that Jews no longer had a place 
in Austrian society and must emigrate.  He warned that Vienna would “become German 
again.  The Jew must know we do not care to live with him.  He must go.” 37 He also 
announced that the Government would begin the process of “legally and quietly” 
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converting Jewish firms into Aryan enterprises. 38  1,000-1,500 Jews besieged the 
American Consulate in Vienna per day in their quest for immigration visas following the 
Reich Marshal’s speech and warning.39 
Dr. Leo Lauterbach, the London based Director of the World Zionist Organization 
(WZO) and a secretary of the Zionist Executive, reported from Vienna to the Executive 
of the WZO on April 29, 1938 that the new policies within Austria appeared to be 
“essentially different from that adopted in Germany” and threatened the “complete 
annihilation of Austrian Jewry” by their exclusion from “economic life,” the deprivation 
of “all their financial resources” and their ultimate starvation or forced expulsion 
“without means,” dependent upon Jewish charity and the “help of such countries as may 
be willing to receive them.” 40  A petition was submitted to the Executive Council of the 
League of Nations in Geneva calling for an end to the “martyrdom of Austrian Jews” and 
warned that failure to intervene would result in suicides.41  
The international press reported that “plunderings, beatings, arrests and 
dispossessions were only a forerunner of a more drastic persecution” to come.42  “Brutal 
terrorism” awaited every Austrian regardless of “class or creed” who stood for national 
independence.  The Jews in Austria were destined to be subjected to “unrelenting 
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persecution” but without knowing where Hitler would “strike next” how could the Jewish 
victims “find certain sanctuary?”43 The British muted acceptance of the Anschluss was 
criticized as “sheer boot-licking” while the League of Nations refused to accept the 
Italian seizure of Abyssinia.44 One Jewish editorialist observed that the fate of Austrian 
Jewry was clear.  “Hitler’s brown-shirted executioners [were] already at work” and their 
labors would not cease “until the destruction of the Jewish community in Austria is 
complete.”45 
The New York Times, noting that the daily Jewish suicide rate in Vienna had 
dramatically increased, commented that “death [had become to the Jews] the kindest 
gift”; a means of avoiding the “great gates of the central prison” which, for many, marked 
the “first stage of [perhaps the final] journey to the concentration camp.46 Austria had 
been transformed into a “vast prison from which there is no outlet and with which all 
chance of a livelihood is dead.”  Jewish leaders noted that the number of suicides was 
“increasing by the hour” but such acts were viewed with an air of complacency by the 
Gestapo.47 The Viennese police reported that between March 12 and 21 approximately 
one hundred suicides had been reported, averaging four to five per day.48 Reportedly a 
“suicide epidemic” was rampant among Jewish students and youth who were expelled 
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from academic institutions and who only had bleakness on their horizons.49 Minister of 
Propaganda Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary entry of March 23, 1938 that increasing 
numbers of Jews were taking their lives in the Austrian capital.  “Previously,” he 
claimed, “Germans committed suicide.  Now it is the other way round.”50  Goebbels 
declared before an Austrian crowd of 25,000, that it was impossible for the authorities to 
“protect every Viennese Jew with a special policeman” to prevent suicide from 
occurring.51 
Putting it more clearly into human terms it was reported from Vienna that the 
suicide of a Jewish eighteen-year-old musician, Gertrude Wolkner, marked the extinction 
of three generations; her entire twenty two member family.  All had taken their own lives 
with the exception of a brother who died in a concentration camp.  Prior to ending her 
short and unfilled existence Gertrude left a message requesting that a single grave marker 
be placed over the burials of all of the fallen Wolkners.52 Suicides were not limited to 
Germany or Austria.  Liesel Wolfe, a thirty seven year old woman from Germany, leapt 
to her death from a window on the fifth floor of the Do Hirsch Residence Hall for Young 
Women in New York.  Unable to provide immigration authorities proof that she would 
not become a public charge she was due to be deported back to the Reich on the 
following day.53 
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 Israel Cohen, another representative of the WZO in Vienna, noted that rising 
levels of “despair” drove “thousands of Jews” to besiege the Embassies and Consulates 
of different Governments in frantic efforts to obtain visas” 54 It was estimated that by the 
end of April twelve thousand Jews had been arrested and an additional one thousand were 
charged during May with violation of the Nuremberg Racial Purity Law.  Arrests 
continued for the next two months with many prisoners dispatched to concentration 
camps, especially Dachau.55  Conditions within Germany and Austria thus drove Jews to 
seek legal and illegal means of escape to other nations. 
European countries enacted special precautions at their borders to prevent a flood 
of Jewish refugees.  Switzerland ordered reinforcement of its customs and security forces 
along the Austrian frontier and the placement of barbed wire to block an invasion of 
Jewish and non-Aryan refugees.56 The Dutch Government decreed on May 7, 1938 that 
The Netherlands would no longer accept forced émigrés.  Instead, all migrants “will in 
future be considered persona non grata…an undesirable foreigner” who must be 
“expelled” or barred from entry.57 Dutch Jews were also concerned about the incursion of 
refugees into their country.  R.H. Eitje, one of the two primary assistants to David Cohen, 
the head of the Amsterdam based Committee for Jewish Refugees (Comité voor Joodsche 
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Vluchtelingen), claimed that the organization had prevented the admission of more Jews 
into Holland than the entire “police and Government put together” by advising their 
“contacts” within the Reich “as we still do today” that the “flood of refugees” into the 
country must be prevented.58 
Edouard Daladier assumed the mantle of French Prime Minister again on April 
10, 1938 marking the rise to power of a center-right political coalition that would 
disavow the liberal immigration policies of the Popular Front under Léon Blum.  A 
Decree of May 2 legally differentiated between prior groups of political refugees and the 
new wave of forced émigrés.  Russians and Armenians who had entered France during 
the 1920s were granted permanent residence but Spanish, German and other more recent 
entrants were obligated to apply for increasingly more restricted temporary residency 
permits.  In addition, security forces on the frontiers were allocated greater authority to 
block the entry of refugees.59  Daladier advised Justin Godart, president of the   
Committee for the Defense of Jews in Central and Eastern Europe, that “humane 
suggestions might be entertained” regarding Spanish and German refugees in France but 
temporary or permanent havens could not be assured due to the potential threat of conflict 
with neighboring Fascist countries.60   
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons on 
March 14, 1938 and noted that both England and Germany were signatories to treaties 
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which guaranteed the independence of Austria and required the approval of the Council 
of the League of Nations for any union with the Reich.  The Anschluss called for the 
“severest condemnation” of an act that threatened the preservation of “European peace” 
and the policy of appeasement.  However, the British Nation had to face the “hard fact” 
that Germany would have only been deterred by force and any response offered by the 
United Kingdom or other nations would have to be tempered by “cool judgment” and a 
review of national defense.61 Many in the press viewed British acquiescence as a sign of a 
“new realistic [diplomatic] policy” or recognition that a German confrontation with 
Austria represented a “danger point” that threatened stability on the Continent.62 Other 
editorialists predicted that another Anschluss “will be only a question of time,” most 
likely against Czechoslovakia.63 On March 12 the Foreign Office did, however, send a 
memo to Vienna describing the “Desire of his Majesty’s Government to Protect the Jews 
and Socialists in Austria” and articulated “considerable anxiety” for the plight of these 
minority groups.64 
Major Herwald Ramsbotham, the Minister of Pensions and a Conservative 
government spokesman, asserted that it is one thing to proselytize about the sanctity of 
international treaties, brotherhood, minority rights and the rule of law but a realist faced 
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with a struggle with “cold, hardheaded, ruthless [and] determined men” acknowledged 
that the British people cannot save Europe by acting like a “knight-errant rescuing 
damsels in distress.” It was not the Nation’s role to act as “our brother’s keeper” or an 
“amiable Don Quixote.”65 Some Home Office officials suggested that a prime motivating 
factor behind the Nazi anti-Semitic policies was to create a forced emigration dilemma 
that would create for the United Kingdom a domestic “Jewish problem.”66  Such 
sentiments were, of course, applicable to all of the Western nations.   
Home Office Assistant Under-Secretary Courtenay D.C. Robinson advised Sir 
Neville Bland, British Minister to The Hague, that German annexation of the Austrian 
Republic mandated that the Royal Government revisit its policies allowing the entry of 
“aliens” possessing “Austrian passports. who may seek admission” into the United 
Kingdom.  These emigrants would in all probability, Robinson believed, have the status 
of stateless refugees and consequently, it would become “impossible” to expel such 
people once they gained admittance.   In addition, despite the 1933 written assurances to 
the Home Office from the leaders of the British Jewish community that all Jewish 
refugees would be financially provided for by private sources and thus avoid going on the 
public dole, by 1938 the scope of the new refugee crisis prevented Jewish relief 
organizations from bearing the economic costs of resettlement and assimilation.  
Therefore, Robinson concluded, the Government needed to institute stricter passport 
controls that would severely curtail the numbers of foreigners admitted into the country.  
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Visas would be required of all refugees possessing Austrian or German passports.67 The 
“potential threat” of the admission of “enemy agents” among the Jewish refugees was 
also touted as a rationale for restricting immigration.68  Similar fears would greatly 
influence immigration policies of the United States following the outbreak of the 
European War in September 1939 and would be used as justification by the 
Administration for severely limiting the entry of aliens from Germany and Austria. 
Sir Andrew Noble, an expert on artillery and explosives, observed that the Home 
Office regarded the “visa system as more humane than a scheme of uncontrolled 
immigration” as it would be less likely that emigrants would be barred from entry at their 
port of call.69  The Government would be spared the “ultimate” embarrassment of 
returning a refugee to the Reich who faced the real possibility of imprisonment within the 
concentration camp system.70  The press echoed such sentiments warning that an open 
door policy would create selection problems for the immigration authorities and inflict 
“hardships” on all who had undertaken “fruitless journeys across the continent.”71 The 
Foreign Office did attempt to achieve some form of balance between humanitarianism, 
the British historical tradition of admitting forced exiles and the interests of the nation 
and viewed it “extremely undesirable to restrict more than absolutely necessary the 
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immigration of Austrian refugees at the present time.”72  However, emphasis was placed 
on the provision of temporary havens with a view to future migration to a place of 
permanent resettlement.73 The Foreign Office stressed that the United Kingdom was not 
an “immigration country” due to its “being an old country…highly industrialized, very 
densely populated” suffering from high domestic unemployment. 74  Such rationalizations 
would be utilized by Britain as well as other nations during the Evian Conference as 
justification for containing Jewish immigration. 
Austrian Jewish refugees attempting to enter Britain without sufficient funds to 
support themselves without the public dole were barred from entry.75  Between March 13 
and 20 the Home Office reported that 422 applications for landing had been received but 
61 were denied. Fourteen thousand Austrians were already residing in the United 
Kingdom but naturalization law required the alien to reside within the Dominions for five 
out of the prior eight years, of which one must have been spent in Britain. 76 The Labor 
Party introduced into the House of Commons a bill that would grant unlimited and 
unrestricted admission and British citizenship to Austrian refugees but was defeated by a 
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vote of 210 to 142.77  The Labor Member of Parliament (MP) for Newcastle-under-Lyme, 
Colonel Wedgwood, asserted,  in his motion concerning “Austrian Refugees Immigration 
and Naturalization,” that British honor would suffer if German and Austrian refugees 
were prohibited from entry.  The United Kingdom could not be perceived as being “less 
generous than the French” and the “voice and spirit of Cromwell, of Palmerston, of 
Gladstone” must be preserved.  During the Nineteenth Century the British had provided 
aid and succor for the “negro slaves.”  Failure to act similarly for the persecuted of 
Central Europe would “destroy the traditions of our race and sacrifice to unworthy fears 
the honor of England.”78 
Major Sir George Davies, Conservative MP from Yeovil, asserted, in the debate 
over Wedgwood’s motion, that the refugee community should be viewed as a whole, 
composed of both Jews and non-Jews, and special consideration could not be granted to 
one group over another “when the conditions that appeal to the hearts of all of us may be 
the same in many other countries.”79 Davies was not, however, averse to using late 
Nineteenth Century negative imagery of Eastern European Jewish immigrants that had 
been utilized in anti-alien debates: 
Think of the difficulty after their landing, after their spreading amongst 
the population, of the police department, the safety department of this 
country, which has to see that our own people are protected against 
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those who might quite easily slip in—drug traffickers, white slave trade 
traffickers, people with criminal records.80 
  
 
C.B. McAlpine and others feared that the admission of sizeable numbers of 
Jewish refugees would create a domestic Jewish Question and its attendant risk of anti-
Semitic hostility. The United Kingdom had “benefited greatly” by the admission of 
talented and resourceful Jews but such progress “may be too dearly bought at the price” 
of unbridled immigration.81  Similar concerns were presented in the press.  The Daily 
Express warned that increased Austrian and German Jewish immigration would foster 
home grown anti-Semitism and garner support for the “extreme left.” A liberal admission 
policy could also prompt the Eastern European countries of Poland, Rumania and 
Hungary to forcibly expel their own Jewish population.  Would Britain, they asked, be 
obligated to “admit them too?  Because we DON’T want anti-Jewish uproar we DO” 
insist upon the application of “common sense in not admitting all applicants.”82 
Home Secretary Samuel Hoare acknowledged that Britain had a long standing 
policy of granting sanctuary to victims of political, racial and political persecution but 
concerns about the domestic economy and unemployment would, by necessity, temper 
such a compassionate policy.  He warned that while he was willing to be supportive in 
aiding refugees “there was a good deal of feeling growing up in this country—a feeling 
which was reflected in Parliament—against the admission of Jews to British territory.”  
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Consequently, the decision to admit a refugee would have to be individualized but the 
Government would attempt to maintain its “traditional policy…of offering asylum” with 
the greatest latitude.83 As early as 1933 the Home Office was dismissive of a “right of 
asylum… [for] political refugees.”  The granting of entry into the country would not be 
based upon strict humanitarian concerns but whether or not the alien would serve “the 
public interest.”84 Parameters were established by the Government that would gauge the 
admissibility and desirability of prospective emigrants.  The absence of sufficient 
“resources” and the lack of “definite prospects” for self sufficiency that would potentially 
place the refugee on the public dole served as grounds for automatic exclusion.  The Nazi 
appropriation of Jewish funds and its resultant impoverishment severely limited the 
number of desirable émigrés.  Other groups were labeled as “prima facie unsuitable” due 
to the risk of competition with local labor.85  Once again, similar themes would resonate 
throughout the dialectic of the Evian Conference. 
Fears of escalating immigration of non-Anglo-Saxon stock driven by political and 
ethnic instabilities within Eastern Europe and the Czarist Empire coupled with domestic 
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economic, labor, social and racial concerns had led the British Government to earlier 
embark on a policy of increasingly restrictive immigration controls.  Between 1905 and 
1920 Parliament enacted four series of progressively stringent measures against the entry 
of aliens which would remain operative until the outbreak of war in 1939 and beyond.   
The 1905 Aliens Act was written in reaction to the mass migration of Eastern European 
and Russian Jews and introduced a system of admission controls at approved ports of 
entry.  The poorest of the émigrés were obliged to undergo official inspection by 
immigration officials who were authorized to deny admittance to refugees considered 
undesirable for health, psychiatric, criminal or economic reasons (unable to demonstrate 
the ability to provide for themselves and their dependents).  Exceptions would be made 
for those who feared persecution for religious or political reasons should they return to 
their country of origin.86 
With the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914 the Government issued the 
Aliens Restriction Act which obligated all foreign émigrés to register with the police and 
reside within specified areas. The Home Secretary was granted the power to bar or deport 
any refugee; such individuals were denied the right of appeal.  Thirty two thousand aliens 
were interned during the conflict and 28,744 were deported.87The wartime Restriction 
Act was formulated to be a temporary measure that would be rescinded with the coming 
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of peace but Parliament annually renewed this policy until 1971, while adding more 
stringent controls.88 The subsequent Aliens Restriction Act of 1919 and the Aliens Order 
of 1920 decreed that every immigrant (except those entering on a temporary basis) who 
lacked sufficient means of support or a work permit from the Ministry of Labor would be 
barred from landing.  Any right of appeal to the Home Secretary was again abrogated and 
the traditional claim of asylum was revoked.89 The Government would selectively admit 
refugees on the basis of national need but in the “rhetoric of debate on refugee questions, 
the tradition of asylum was accorded quasi-constitutional sanctity.”90 
 French Interior Minister Albert Sarraut sent reinforcements to the borders to 
prevent Jews without proper documentation from entering France.  The Government was 
opposed to the admission of any new refugees and informed the German Government 
that France would no longer tolerate the dumping of German and Austrian refugees 
across the border onto French territory.  A decree was issued on May 2, 1938 that 
categorized potential immigrants as “desirable” or “undesirable.”  Sarraut justified this 
edict by claiming that “the ever-growing number of foreigners” that had crossed into 
France posed an internal threat to the economy and national security.  Therefore, the 
granting of permission to enter and reside within French territory would have to become 
highly selective, differentiating between the “foreigner[s] of good faith” who 
demonstrated “an absolutely correct attitude vis-à-vis the Republic and its institutions” 
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and those “’clandestine’ foreigners, irregular guests…unworthy of living on our soil” 
who would be forcibly expelled.91  
The 1920s marked a shift in French immigration policies which previously had 
been very liberal in its scope.  The growth rate of the French population during the time 
span 1836-1936 had been relatively flat increasing from thirty six million to thirty nine 
million.  A steadily declining birth rate coupled with the male casualties of the Great 
War, an aging population and a need for manpower to reestablish and expand the 
domestic economy and military led France to adopt an open door policy for émigrés. 
During the Nineteenth Century France had received the greatest number of immigrants in 
Europe and, prior to August 1914, the majority of aliens originated in Belgium, Italy and 
Spain.92  Following the War many Russians sought refuge in the wake of the November 
Revolution.93   
As national recovery progressed, however, the demand for foreign labor 
diminished.  Thus, the French Government began to adopt more restrictive measures 
(applied to the immigrant population as a whole) during the late 1920s in an attempt to 
stem the tide of immigration that threatened the employment of French citizens.  
Unemployed foreign workers were deported and residency permits were not renewed for 
aliens working in sectors in which French laborers remained idle.  Labor contracts with 
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foreign workers were discouraged and pressure was exerted upon employers to terminate 
these agreements.94  
1931 marked the high water mark of French immigration with an estimated three 
million alien laborers and their dependents residing within the Republic.95 By 1932-1933 
the Government attempted to limit the number of immigrants, differentiating between 
political refugees and economic migrants.  Nazi persecution of its Jewish population was 
initially seen as a transient phenomenon but the realization of the scope, magnitude and 
probable permanence of this humanitarian problem drove the French authorities to adopt 
a harsher immigration doctrine.  The implementation of accords dealing with the 
problems of Russian refugees in 1922 and Armenian refugees in 1924 elevated the issue 
of the care and protection of refugees onto the international stage.96 Consequently, France 
would view its moral obligations towards German and Austrian refugees as a burden to 
be shared by the international community as a whole.  
Bolivia was one of the few nations in the world to accept Jewish refugees 
following the Anschluss although primarily as a temporary haven, later known as “Hotel 
Bolivia.”  Prior to Hitler assuming the mantle of the Reich Chancellor and Fuehrer less 
than one hundred Jews had immigrated to Bolivia.  However, beginning in the mid-
1930’s thousands of refugees, Jews and non-Aryan political exiles, from Central Europe 
found shelter in this Latin American nation.  Between Kristallnacht and the end of 1939 
approximately twenty thousand refugees from Germany and Austria had entered this 
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republic; a number exceeding Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and Canada 
combined.  Most of the immigrants settled in the area of La Paz and smaller urban and 
agricultural communities.97 
Feng Shan Ho (1901-1997) served as the Consul General of China in Vienna 
during the period of the Anschluss.  A political economist with a Ph.D. from the 
University of Munich in 1932, he observed that the persecution of Austrian Jews by 
“Hitler’s devils” was increasing on a daily basis prompting him to maintain secret 
contacts with American charitable and religious organizations involved in refugee work.  
He recalled that he “spared no effort in using any possible means” to rescue “innumerable 
Jews” by adhering to a “liberal” policy of granting visas to Shanghai to any and all who 
requested one.  This Chinese port city, however, was then under Japanese occupation and 
thus outside of sovereign Chinese control and authority.  Although an entry permit was 
not required for admission into this coastal city it served as proof of destination to the 
German authorities and opened the door to escape to Shanghai and other locations.  The 
Shanghai visas also served as a means of release of Jewish inmates from Dachau and 
other prisons.  The Chinese Ambassador to Berlin and Ho’s superior, Chen Jie, viewed 
the granting of visas to Jews as an impediment to friendly German-Chinese diplomatic 
relations but was unable to curtail the Consul’s activities.  Chang Kai-Shek, facing war 
on two fronts with the Chinese Communists and Japanese, depended upon German 
weapons and military advisors. His son, educated in Germany, became a second 
lieutenant in the German 98th Jaeger Regiment and took part in the takeover of Austria.  
When asked years later why he was willing to intervene and rescue the Jews of Austria 
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Ho responded that “I thought it only natural to feel compassion and to want to help.  
From the standpoint of humanity, that is the way it should be.”  The number of visas 
granted by Ho remains a matter of speculation but by October 1938 1,900 visas had been 
issued and by the time of the outbreak of war in September 1939 more than eighteen 
thousand European Jewish refugees had immigrated to Shanghai.98 
Prior to the Anschluss many Americans in their private, professional and official 
capacities condemned Nazi policies of persecution.  The U.S. Ambassador to Berlin, 
William E. Dodd, resigned from his position on December 7, 1937 and was replaced by 
Hugh R. Wilson on January 7, 1938.  On January 8 Dodd condemned the German record 
of anti-Semitism, rearmament and violations of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.  He 
believed that it was the responsibility of American diplomats to remind the world of the 
“significance of democratic civilization for which peoples have struggled since the 
sixteenth century.”  Speaking on January 13 Dodd denounced the tenets of Aryanism and 
accused the Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, of murdering “more personal enemies in five 
years than Charles II of England did in twenty years” precipitating an official protest 
from the German Ambassador to Washington, Dr. Hans Dieckhoff.  During February the 
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America and the Universal Christian Council 
for Life and Work held a dinner in New York City honoring Dodd.  One of the speakers, 
Dr. Ernst Wilhelm Meyer, who until May 1937 had been a career German diplomat and 
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first secretary of the Embassy in Washington, expressed harsh criticism of Hitler and his 
regime, categorizing them as betrayers of the “lasting interests of the German 
Fatherland…[and] the foe of so many things I had been taught Germany stands for.”    
One could not serve the Reich, he argued, if it was necessary to abandon “moral law and 
loyalty to the true Germany” while supporting false doctrines of Aryan superiority.  
Meyer condemned Nazi anti-Semitism and declared that the German Jew had always 
been a “devoted and useful citizen” and to claim otherwise represented “ignorance or 
lying.” 
The American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting, held in 
Indianapolis during late December 1937, denounced the suppression of “intellectual 
freedom” as “intolerable forms of tyranny.”  An earlier resolution, introduced by 
physicist Dr. Robert A. Millikan and astronomer Dr. Henry Norris Russell, was 
reaffirmed and viewed the “suppression of independent thought and its free expression as 
a major crime against civilization itself.”  Scientists and all such thinkers were duty 
bound to rebuke “all such nations as intolerable forms of tyranny” with whom 
compromise was inherently impossible. 
On January 17, 1938 a large percentage of leading American publishers 
announced that they would withdraw from the annual Leipzig International Congress of 
Book Publishers.  Such participation, it was felt, would represent a “contradiction of the 
very essence of our function as publishers.” They criticized the censorship, banning and 
criminalization of the possession of ninety percent of the works of modern German 
writers whose works had been translated into English.  The German Publishers 
Association planned to introduce into the Congress a resolution calling for international 
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cooperation in preventing the publication of all works “libeling the head of a State or the 
sacred institutions of a State through misrepresentation of history.”  Such a resolution 
was declared unsupportable by the American publishers and represented a source of 
“humiliation.”99 
American political and popular reaction to the Anschluss was mixed.  President 
Roosevelt ended the preferential tariff treatment of Austria and Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull advised the German Government that the American Administration held the Reich 
responsible for the payment of Austrian financial debts to the United States—both actions 
signaling American acquiescence to the annexation of Austria.100  Hull directed U.S. 
Ambassador to Berlin Hugh Wilson to protest the persecution of Jewish American 
citizens and the confiscation or the destruction of their property.  The Reich Government 
granted in return limited concessions:  American Jews would not have to comply with the 
mandatory registration of their property unless they were living within Germany or 
Austria or had been German citizens who emigrated after 1933.101 
A survey of newspaper editorials on the Austrian situation noted that fifty three 
percent favored isolationism while forty seven percent believed that a strong national 
defense and a willingness to fight would ensure the peace.102 Senator Elbert D. Thomas 
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argued that the failure of the Great War victors to contest German violations of the Treaty 
of Versailles proved that war was a futile means of resolving international conflicts.  He 
anticipated the abolition of freedom of religion, speech and the press in Austria and 
predicted future Hitlerian expansion into Central and Eastern Europe.  Recent events had 
demonstrated that the European War had failed to preserve democracy on the Continent 
and consequently, American attention and resources needed to remain focused at 
home.103  This theme that the United States should avoid foreign entanglements and focus 
its resources on the needs of the American citizen would echo throughout the future 
debates on national defense and immigration policies. 
Washington Representative John M. Coffee addressed the National Jewish Unity 
Conference at the Mecca Temple in New York City on March 12 and claimed that Jewish 
persecution was not a unique phenomenon but rather the “Jewish problem” needed to be 
viewed in its economic and social milieu. “Never in history have the ‘chosen people’ 
alone been chosen for oppression.”  The destiny of the Jews was “inseparable from the 
fate of all the common peoples of the world…The future of the Jews is the future of 
democracy.”  The “Jewish problem” would be forever solved if the problems of food, 
shelter, jobs, clothing and freedom were eliminated.104  
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The National Conference of Jews and Christians issued a declaration of 
principles, co-signed by ninety-nine leading Jewish, Protestant and Catholic theologians, 
predicting that Nazi policies would be “relentlessly furthered in Austria” and that all of 
the religious faiths were obligated to unite in the defense of universal “human rights and 
liberties.”105 Dr. Cyrus Adler expressed in a statement, issued in the New York Journal 
and American (among other Hearst papers), that only force could alter the ideological 
path of Hitler as there were “no forum or bar to which decent world opinion can appeal 
from the unconscionable assaults of Nazi Germany.”  Adler called on American Jews to 
“steel themselves” in order to provide aid to their beleaguered co-religionists.  The 
Executive Committee of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America passed 
a resolution critical of the “extension to Austria of the [German policy of]  inhuman 
persecution of the Jews” which threatened “our Christian brethren in Austria, both 
Catholic and Protestant, whose religious liberty is destroyed with the loss of their 
political independence.”  The Women’s Division of the American Jewish Congress on 
March 30 condemned the Anschluss and its resultant persecution of religious minorities, 
Jew and non-Jew.106 
           Herbert Feis, a Jewish economic advisor in the State Department and a supporter 
of New Deal policies, called for American engagement in the refugee crisis and noted 
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FDR’s receptiveness to such an idea.107 He viewed Under Secretary of State George S. 
Messersmith (considered the State Department’s authority on the Reich with influence 
over the Visa Division) as a possible impediment to any refugee rescue plan.  Feis 
believed Messersmith was “slow to recognize the inadequacy” of American immigration 
practices and was hampered by the “fear [of] any new though wholly reasonable and 
justified flexibility in our laws.”108 
Foreign correspondent and Berlin bureau chief for the New York Post, Dorothy 
Thompson, observed that the Anschluss was an international incident of the “first order” 
that threatened to generate an uncontrollable cascade of events that would result in 
American entrapment in foreign affairs, war or the “utter capitulation” of the world’s 
democracies. The drama being played out on the streets of Austria—the beatings, 
terrorization, imprisonment and economic disenfranchisement—had been predicted by 
the earlier events within Germany itself.  The world had already been provided with a 
“blueprint” of fascist plans and the ultimate question was whether or not “western liberal 
culture can indefinitely tolerate the aggrandizement upon it, step by step, of a barbarian 
revolution!”  Democracies were not threatened by nation-states but by “international 
revolutionary movements” of which fascism posed the greatest danger.  The democracies, 
although endowed with “enormous wealth and power”, were “totally paralyzed” and 
unable to see the ideological peril.  Isolationists were “blind and worse than blind” for 
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awareness of that danger is the first true line of defense.109  Thompson also warned that 
the forced expulsion of unwanted minorities threatened international order with anarchy. 
If involuntary émigrés were not provided with the means to reestablish themselves as 
productive citizens then they would “become [an unwanted] burden upon their hosts.” As 
a result, the immigrants and receiving nations faced potential “catastrophe.” Mass 
migration, she believed, was no longer solely a matter of humanitarian concern but “must 
now be regarded as a problem of international politics.”110 
  Consequently, she called upon the Roosevelt Administration to enter into 
discussions with the German Government to devise a rescue scheme along the lines of the 
earlier Ha’avarah Agreement which coupled Jewish immigration into Palestine with 
increased German foreign trade; a process that allowed émigrés to retain adequate monies 
to facilitate resettlement and assimilation into a new homeland.111 She believed that only 
the United States, with its “faith in the democratic principles,” could lead an international 
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rescue effort; a project based not on “pity for the exiles” but as a symbolic “reaffirmation 
of our own [core] beliefs.”112  Thompson argued that any solution to the refugee crisis 
would require multinational cooperation and the creation of an organization that would 
have the proper amount of expertise, influence and finances. The European refugee 
situation, however, created a potential “trap” for the United States and the Western 
European nations.  Any failure to act could “make them complicit” in Hitler’s anti-Jewish 
policies and “discredit them before their own publics” or “force them into ineffectual 
action divisive of their domestic public opinion.”113           
Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut have suggested that Feis and Thompson 
were the sources of “four key proposals” adopted by the U.S. Government in its approach 
to the refugee problem.  Feis argued for the consolidation of the annual German and 
Austrian immigration quotas; “streamlining” the mechanism of obtaining and providing 
“affidavits of support” from American sponsors and the creation of the Presidential 
Advisory Committee for Political Refugees.  Thompson’s primary focus was on the 
creation of an international refugee organization to deal with forced migration as a multi-
national effort.114  Some historians, as will be described, have asserted that it was 
Thompson’s public criticism of the Administration for its official inaction that prompted 
FDR to call for a refugee summit 
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Chapter 3  
Flight: “A Problem of Growing Gravity and Complexity” 
 
Austrian refugees in Bolivia: “Visas!  We began to live visas day and 
night.  When we were awake we are obsessed by visas.  We talked 
about them all the time.  Exit visas.  Transit visas.  Entrance visas.  
Where could we go?  During the day, we tried to get the proper 
documents, approvals, visas.  At night, in bed, we tossed about and 
dreamed about long lines, officials, visas.”1 
 
The world is closing in on the Jews as Fascism is triumphing over 
democracy.  The Jews as Jews seem powerless to do anything about it.  
Only the voice of Secretary Hull has been lifted inviting the 
governments to give the refugee problem immediate and practical 
attention.2 
 
 
The goal of the first phase of Nazi anti-Jewish policy was to make Greater 
Germany Jüdenrein or cleansed of Jews by means of forced emigration, the seizure of 
their assets and property, the elimination of Jews from the workforce and by the use of 
terror.  525,000 Jews resided primarily within the urban areas of Germany when Hitler 
assumed the Chancellorship in January 1933 (one percent of the total population with 
one-third of Jews living within Berlin) and two hundred thousand dwelled in Austria at 
the time of the Anschluss.  Seventy percent, or four hundred thousand Jews, resided 
within municipal communities with half located within the ten largest German cities.  
Four hundred thousand Jews (eighty percent) living within Germany held German 
citizenship and the remainder were primarily of Polish origin; the majority born in 
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Germany who had been granted permanent resident alien status.  Table 1 demonstrates 
that the majority of Jews were of non-agricultural backgrounds; a deficiency that would 
greatly hinder resettlement. 
TABLE 1: Jewish Occupations in Germany in 1933 Census 
 
Occupations                                                                        Percentage 
 
Agriculture                                                                                        1.0    
Industry and handicraft                                                                   19.1 
Trade, insurance, communications and  
Transportation                                                                                 52.5 
Public service and professions                                                        10.7                    
Domestic service                                                                               0.7 
Independent; no occupation                                                            16.7 
Die Glaubensjuden im deutschen Reich, 25 cited in Tartakower, “The Jewish 
Refugees,” 332-333. 
 
Hitler’s rise to power led 37,000-38,000 Jews to move to neighboring European 
countries, primarily France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland and 
Czechoslovakia.  “Stabilization of the domestic political situation” and increasing 
resistance of the United States and other nations to accept refugees, however, led to a 
decline in the number of migrants seeking refuge.  The passage of the 1935 Nuremberg 
Racial Laws did not significantly accelerate the emigration process.  15,000-135,000 
Jews left Germany between 1933 and 1937 of whom 42,000 entered Palestine, 48,000 
migrated overseas and 25,000 returned to their countries of origin.3   
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“Memorandum of the Jewish Agency, Palestine, to the Evian Conference” The Central Zionist Archive 
S7/693 available from  http://www.zupdom.com/icons-
multimedia/ClientsArea/HoH/LIBARC/ARCHIVE/Chapters/Terror/RefugeeP/Memoran1.html; Internet; 
accessed May 15, 2010; “Germany: Jewish Population in 1933,” Holocaust Encyclopedia available from 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005276; Internet; accessed June 12, 2010. 
According to the 1922 Census 168,000 Jews or 4% of the total population lived in the capital Berlin with 
26,000 in Frankfurt am Main, 20,000 in Breslau, 17,000 in Hamburg, 15,000 in Cologne, 13,000 in 
Hanover and 12,000 in Leipzig.  Approximately 10,000 lived in the Free City of Danzig. During 1933 20% 
of Jews lived in smaller town.  An estimated 178,000 Jews lived in the Austrian capital Vienna and 35,000 
in Prague. 
 
58 
 
The Anschluss (and Kristallnacht) clearly revealed the fragility and the precarious 
situation of the German Jewish community.  State sponsored terror generated a “flood of 
visa applications.” The initial émigrés in 1933 were able to retain seventy-five percent of 
their assets but expanded anti-Semitic measures, Aryanization of Jewish enterprises, 
economic disenfranchisement and the pre-Nazi era Flight Tax or Reichsfluchtsteuer 
reduced their resources to ten percent with the balance seized by the Nazi government.4  
Following Kristallnacht and the enactment of the Atonement Fine Jews were able to 
retain only ten Reichmarks per person.   The ultimate impoverishment of the real and 
potential refugees would prove to be one of the critical factors complicating resettlement 
efforts.   It was the plight of these Jews and non-Aryans and fears of involuntary mass 
migrations from other European locales that led to calls for an international solution to 
this refugee crisis. 
Eventually, 36,000 Jews managed to leave Germany and Austria during 1938 and 
77,000 in1939.  The latter year marked the first time that the entire American annual 
quota for Germany and Austria was filled (including the annexed portions of 
Czechoslovakia following the Munich Agreement).5  305,000 Jews and non-Aryans had 
filed applications for approximately 27,000 visas by June 30, 1939.  Prior to the onset of 
hostilities in September 1939 282,000 Jews had emigrated from Germany and 117,000 
from Austria of which 95,000 entered the U.S, 60,000 Palestine, 40,000 the United 
Kingdom, 75,000 Central and South America (primarily Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
                                                 
     
4The Times, July 6, 1938, 15. 
     
5The Munich Agreement of 1938 that ceded the Sudetenland to Germany, the establishment of the 
Hlinka Autonomists, the pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic regime of Slovakia and the return of the Free City of 
Danzig to the Reich led to a significant worsening of the Central European refugee crisis. 
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Bolivia) and 18,000 to the port of Shanghai, China.  By the end of 1939 202,000 Jews 
remained within Germany and 57,000 within Austria.  Further emigration was blocked by 
order of the S.S. Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler in October 1941.6 Table 2 and 3 
provides a detailed breakdown of the numbers and destinations of Jews who were able to 
flee Greater Germany. 
 
TABLE 2: Emigration of Jews from Austria and Germany 
April 1933-May 1939 
US                                                          63,000 
Palestine                                                 55,000 
UK                                                         40,000 
France                                                    30,000 
Argentina                                               25,000 
Brazil                                                     13,000 
South Africa                                            5,500 
Italy                                                         5,000 
Other European countries                     25,000 
Other South American countries          20,000 
Far Eastern Countries                           15,000 
Other                                                       8,000 
Total                                                    304,000 
110,000 fled to neighboring countries only to fall under German control during the war. 
“Jews in Germany 05: Third Reich 1933-1939,” Encyclopedia Judaica (1971), vol. 7, 
col. 491, available from  http://www.geschichteinchronologie.ch/eu/D/EndJud_juden-in-
Deutschland-05-3R-1933-1939-ENGL.html; Internet; accessed March 12, 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
     
6
“German-Jewish Refugees, 1933-1939,” Holocaust Encyclopedia, available from 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005468; Internet; accessed January 6, 2008. 
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TABLE 3: Austrian Jewish Emigration, 1933-1945 
                                                                                        NO. OF AUSTRIAN JEWS 
Europe                                                                                                  69,390 
United Kingdom                                                                                   31,050 
Switzerland                                                                                             5,800 
France                                                                                                     4,800 
Czechoslovakia                                                                                       4,100 
 
North America                                                                                    29,942 
United States                                                                                        29,860 
 
Palestine                                                                                              15,200 
 
Asia                                                                                                        7,190 
Shanghai                                                                                                 6,220  
 
South America                                                                                      6,845 
Argentina                                                                                                1,690 
Bolivia                                                                                                        940 
 
Africa                                                                                                     1,125 
South Africa                                                                                               332 
 
Australia                                                                                                1,050 
Jonny Moser, Demographie der jüdischen Bevökerung Österreichs 1938-1945, DÖW, 
Vienna, 1999, in “The Austrian Jewish Community before the Anschluss,” Claims 
Conference The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany. 
 
Consequently, on March 25, 1938, the U.S. State Department issued a press 
release announcing that the President and the American Government had recognized the 
“urgency” of the refugee crisis (ninety percent of real and potential refugees were Jews; 
remainder were primarily non-Aryan Christians or political dissidents) and sought to 
establish a “special committee” of European and Western Hemisphere nations, including 
New Zealand and Australia, that would meet in Europe with the goal of “facilitating the 
[orderly] emigration from Austria, and presumably from Germany, of political refugees.” 
Invitations were to be limited to those nations that could be categorized as “receiving 
States,” i.e., those countries that had already received or could potentially accept forced 
emigrants. Special emphasis was placed on the countries of Latin America which, it was 
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anticipated (and which proved to be a wrong assumption), could be coerced into 
accepting European Jewish refugees. The British Dominions and Colonies were also 
regarded as likely sites of resettlement.7  Following Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s 
advice Germany was not invited as Hull felt that it was improper to “negotiate with the 
felon about his misdeeds.”8   
It was hoped that a form of international passport would be granted to these 
stateless refugees along with a permis de sejour (residence permit) and permis de travail 
(work permit).9  Officially, the Conference was to deal with all refugees coming from 
Germany and Austria but it was blatantly clear that the vast majority would be Jewish.  
The United States Government had not communicated diplomatically with the German 
Government (nor the League of Nations or High Commissioner for Refugees from 
                                                 
     
7It was assumed by the American and European planners of the Evian Conference that the readiness of 
Latin American countries to receive immigrants during earlier periods of migration would translate into an 
acquiescence to accept Jewish refugees, especially in Argentina and Brazil.  However, it was clear that the 
Jewishness of the potential émigrés would play a critical role in opening (or closing) the doors to 
immigration.  A high level Brazilian official observed that “all the South American Republics made it clear 
at Evian that they were repulsed by Jewish immigration [and would never] receive these subversive 
elements who bring social disorder.” Others warned that such charity would lead members of the domestic 
German minorities into the ranks of an enemy fifth column threatening national security.  Brazil was 
viewed as the Latin American nation with the greatest potential for receiving refugees and was specifically 
“targeted.” However, the existence of domestic pro-National Socialist or anti-refugee groups was ignored 
by the U.S. State Department.  It was believed that the “similarity of outlook and traditional close 
collaboration” between the two large Western Hemispheric states would bridge such gaps and gain 
Brazilian cooperation. Jeff Lesser, Welcoming the Undesirables: Brazil and the Jewish Question (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1995), 112, 191-192, 199 
 
     
8Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue The Roosevelt Administration and the  
 Holocaust, 1938-1945 (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 27, 32. 
Ultimately, the Latin American countries introduced or changed existing laws to severely limit or bar 
completely Jewish immigration.  Myron Taylor to Cordell Hull, August 5, 1938, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1938, vol. 1, 760.   
 
     
9The Times, July 6, 1938, 15. 
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Germany) regarding aid to refugees and it became apparent that the Reich authorities first 
became aware of the Conference planning following the Hull announcement.10   
The terms of the American invitation set the hypocritical tone for conference, 
provided an official basis for inaction and helped to guarantee its failure: 
UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
ON REFUGEES:  
 
The government has become so impressed with the urgency of the 
problem of political refugees that it has inquired of a number of 
governments in Europe and in this hemisphere whether they would be 
willing to cooperate in setting up a special committee for the purpose of 
facilitating the emigration from Austria, and presumably from 
Germany, of political refugees. Our idea is that whereas such 
representatives would be designated by the governments concerned, 
any financing of the emergency emigration referred to would be 
undertaken by private organizations with the respective countries. 
Furthermore, it should be understood that no country would be 
expected or asked to receive a greater number of immigrants than is 
permitted by its existing legislation… It has been prompted to make its 
proposal because of the urgency of the problem with which the world is 
faced and the necessity of speedy cooperative effort under 
governmental supervision if widespread human suffering is to be 
averted.11 
 
It appeared that the plan had been promoted by the President without prior 
consultations with foreign governments and without formulation of specific goals and 
proposals. It followed upon the heels of earlier refugee organizations which had a limited 
degree of success such as the Nansen International Office for Refugees (established by 
the League of Nations in 1931 and scheduled to be closed in 1938) and the Migration 
Bureau of the International Labor Office. The High Commission for Refugees Coming 
from Germany was launched on October 11, 1933 by the League Secretariat to provide 
for the political and legal protection of forced refugees.  It was accountable to the fifteen 
                                                 
     
10The Deseret Times, July 1, 1938, 36. 
 
     
11Department of State, Press Releases, XVIII, March 26, 1938. 
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nations Governing Body under the leadership of the American, James Grover McDonald 
(October 1933-December 1935) and his successor, Major General Sir Neill Malcolm.12 
More than one million Russian refugees had sought shelter in European countries 
following the November Revolution of 1917, the Russian Civil War and the famine of 
1921.  This led the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to demand that the 
League of Nations provide relief to these now stateless refugees.  The ICRC President, 
Gustave Ador, noted that this particular group of émigrés lacked “legal protection,” 
clearly delineated “legal status” or “any legal means of subsistence.” Therefore, an 
“obligation of international justice” necessitated the appointment of a High 
Commissioner for Russian Refugees.13 Consequently, the League named Fridjhof Nansen 
as the first High Commissioner for Russian Refugees.  He introduced a form of passport 
that officially recognized these migrants who were granted the right to a twelve month 
period of foreign travel. This system was later expanded to include Turkish, Armenian 
                                                 
     
12The League Assembly meeting of September 30, 1938 decided to replace the Nansen Office and the 
High Commission for Refugees from Germany with a new organization, the Office of High Commissioner 
for Refugees under the Protection of the League of Nations, headed by Sir Herbert Emerson (commencing 
on January 1, 1939).  Emerson would later assume the directorship of the Intergovernmental Committee for 
Political Refugees following the resignation of George Rublee (who had been chosen by the 
Intergovernmental Committee to negotiate with Germany and nations of potential refuge).  McDonald had 
been the president of the Foreign Policy Association and a professor of political science and history.  As 
High Commissioner he dealt with the issues of passports, travel and identification documentation and 
permits granting the right of residence and work.  He also sought sites of permanent resettlement abroad 
aided by less restrictive German policies on the transfer of capital and foreign exchange.  After two years of 
ineffectual work, coupled with a paucity of support from the League, McDonald resigned on December 20, 
1935.  He called for the League and its constituent members to utilize their “moral authority” to persuade 
the German Government, for the sake of “humanity and of the principles of the public law of Europe,” to 
end its policies which created international “unrest and perplexity” by the forced emigration of Jews and 
other refugees.  He argued that proactive action must be taken and “considerations of diplomatic 
correctness must yield to those of common humanity.” “League Aid Asked by McDonald to End Nazi 
Persecution,” New York Times, December 30, 1935, 1, 12.  
 
      
13Gustave Ador to the League of Nations, “The Question of Russian Refugees, League of Nations 
Official Journal, Annex 2, 1921 (February 20, 1921): 228. 
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and Chaldean refugees and by 1924 the documents were accepted by more than fifty 
governments.14 
The Commission centrale pour l’étude de la condition des réfugiés russes et 
arménians attempted to codify the rights of these refugees through international 
agreements but it was not until 1928 that the “Arrangement on Russian and Armenian 
Refugees” was adopted.  This document allowed nations to grant non-statutory consent 
conceding the refugees the right to work, access to the judicial system and protection 
from deportation.15 The 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees 
expanded the terms and scope of the 1928 agreement to include social welfare, education, 
and labor conditions.16 
The Great Depression, with its mass unemployment among native workers, 
created domestic hostility towards foreign laborers.  Consequently, the host nations 
adopted policies of restriction, limitation of privileges and refoulement.17 Critically, the 
                                                 
      
14
“Circular Letter from the League of Nations Secretary-General August 14, 1928, Official Journal 
(1929): 323. The White Russians fleeing the Soviet takeover were granted by the League of Nations a 
special form of papers: the Nansen passport, named after Fridtjof Nansen.   Nansen was appointed League 
High Commissioner for Refugees in 1922.  This passport was granted to other stateless refugees and was 
recognized by 52 nations.  Approximately 450,000 had been granted. 
 
       
15James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 86.  
 
       
16Article 3 of the Convention pledged each signatory power “not to remove or keep from its territory 
by application of police measures, such as expulsion or non-admittance at the frontier (refoulement), 
refugees who have been authorized to reside there regularly,” unless they represented a threat to “national 
security or public order.”  Refugees must not be denied entry “at the frontier of their countries of origin.”  
The “Contracting Parties” retained the right to utilize necessary “internal measures” for those refugees 
“expelled for reasons of national security or public order [who] are unable to leave its territory” or lack the 
necessary papers or official permission to relocate in another country.  Nine nations, including the United 
Kingdom and France ratified the agreement but Britain disavowed the right to deny entry at the border.  
Gilbert Jaeger, “On the History of the International Protection of Refugees,” International Review of the 
Red Cross (IRRC) 83, no. 843 (September 2001): 727-736. 
 
      
17Hathaway. The Rights of Refugees, 88.   
 
65 
 
1933 Convention on Refugees restricted legal safeguards to earlier groups and 
individuals who had already been subsumed under the rubric of “refugee.” The flight of 
German Jews and non-Aryans from Hitler’s Germany, in essence, created a new class of 
stateless refugees who were devoid of legal status and protections, contradicting 
Nansen’s 1926 belief that the international refugee problem would remain limited in 
scope and soluble by international agreement.18  By 1933 the willingness of host nations 
to accept additional refugees became increasingly constrained by domestic economic and 
political conditions as well as rising nationalism.19 The League, in a half-hearted attempt 
to solve this new refugee crisis, created the High Commissioner for Refugees from 
Germany under the chairmanship of James G. McDonald in October 1933 but, in contrast 
to the support offered to the Nansen Office High Commissioner for Russian Refugees, all 
funding for the new establishment had to be derived from private sources as a means of 
placating German hostility towards the League and its activities.20 
          The checkered past of prior attempts at international cooperation for the 
resettlement of refugees led Franklin Roosevelt to believe that an organization separate 
and distinct from the League of Nations was necessary if a solution to the problem of 
German refugees was to be found.  The High Commission for Refugees Coming from 
Germany encountered much resistance and many obstacles to the facilitation of 
immigration and did not achieve any meaningful results.  The primary tasks of the High 
Commissioners were to facilitate and coordinate the resettlement of stateless refugees and 
                                                 
     
18Marrus, The Unwanted, 109. 
 
     
19Simpson, The Refugee Problem, 139. 
 
     
20Louise Wilhelmine Holbom, Philip Chartrand and Rita Chartrand, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time, 
vol. 1 (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1975), 14. 
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to conduct negotiations with foreign governments to provide temporary or permanent 
havens.   
Although James G. McDonald was named to this position by the League his 
salary and expenses were funded by non-governmental private Jewish organizations.  
Secretary-General Joseph Avenol informed McDonald that the initial 25,000 Swiss francs 
provided by the League to the High Commission was to be regarded merely as a loan to 
fund and establish operations that would have to be repaid within one year.21 In addition, 
McDonald would report directly to a special Governing Body composed of nations that 
were deemed likely to accept refugees rather than to the League Assembly as a whole.22  
With the exceptions of French Senator Henry Bérenger, the American Joseph 
Chamberlain and the British Sir Robert Cecil the Governing Board was composed of low 
level professional diplomats assigned to the League in Geneva, who, according to 
Norman Bentwich, “knew little, cared little, and wanted to do as little as possible about 
the cause.” 23 The democratic European powers had, by this time, concluded that 
oversaturation mandated resettlement beyond the borders of Europe, funded by private 
sources.  Bérenger countered Chamberlain’s justification of the restrictive quota system 
of the United States by noting that “hard times were universal, so was the 
problem…Whereas, France was caring for nearly half the refugees, the United 
                                                 
     
21Claudena M. Skran, "Profiles of the First Two Commissioners" Journal of Refugee Studies 1, no. 3/4 
(1988):  277-95. 
 
     
22Simpson, The Refugee Problem, 216; Barbara McDonald Stewart, United States Government Policy on 
Refugees from Nazism, 1933-1940 (NY: Garland Publishing, 1962), 99. 
 
     
23Norman Bentwich, My 77 Years: An Account of My Life and Times, 1883-1960 (London: Routledge, 
1962), 131.  
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States…had scarcely taken any.”24    The Roosevelt Administration had announced, in 
March 1938, the consolidation of the annual German and Austrian immigration quota but 
would not liberalize it policies to admit larger numbers; a stance that would resonate 
throughout the Evian Conference. 
Consequently, the Governing Board accomplished very little prompting 
McDonald to resign his position during December 1935.  His resignation letter severely 
criticized the League for its “diplomatic correctness” that prevented the rescue of Jews 
who faced “demoralization and exile.”  “Common humanity,” he believed, expressed 
through the actions of the League Assembly, member states and global public opinion 
would “avert the existing and impending tragedies.”  The separation of the High 
Commission from the body of the League had fatally weakened the effectiveness of his 
office.25 Therefore, the catastrophic conditions facing the refugees from Germany 
mandated “reconsideration by the League…of the entire situation…”26 He acknowledged 
that the League and private relief organizations could “only mitigate a problem of 
growing gravity and complexity.”  Since European nations would only accept limited 
numbers of stateless refugees the solution of the problem could only be “tackled at its 
                                                 
     
24Stewart, United States Government Policy, 120. 
 
     
25Norman Bentwich, The Refugees from Germany, in S. Adler-Rudel, “The Evian Conference on the 
Refugee Question,” Year Book XIII of the Leo Baeck Institute (London: 1968), 268; “Letter of Resignation 
of James G. McDonald” December 27, 1935 C1538 20A-80732-22873, ix, League of Nations Archives 
cited in Richard Breitman, Barbara McDonald Steward and Severin Hochberg, Refugees and Rescue: The 
Diaries and Papers of James G. McDonald 1935-1945 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 
102. Other entities such as the Nansen Office of the League of Nations and the Migration Bureau of the 
International Labor League also encountered similar difficulties and lack of success. 
 
     
26James G. McDonald, The German Refugees and the League of Nations (London: Friends of Europe, 
1936), 5-12.  
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source [meaning Germany] if disaster [was] to be avoided.”27  It was necessary for the 
Reich, McDonald argued, to demonstrate “courage and generosity” by allowing their 
“non-Aryans” to maintain a “tolerable” existence whole awaiting emigration.  In 
addition, Germany must provide the financial means (i.e., the release of sufficient 
personal assets) to facilitate such a population transfer.  Furthermore, the potential 
countries of resettlement should not “fear” calling upon Germany for a greater degree of 
cooperation in resolving the refugee problem by issuing a “general appeal” that stems 
from “deep springs of pity” for the “sufferers” of persecution and the “indignation that 
our common humanity should be so wronged.” 28 
McDonald’s departure from the High Commission generated positive responses 
from the international press.  The Washington Post described his action as “one of the 
most powerful indictments of the Nazi regime of terrorism yet given to the outside 
world.”  The San Francisco Chronicle noted that the persecution of Jews was “nobody’s 
legal… [or] military business” but the “uncivilized” actions of Germany made it the 
“moral business of civilization.”  The Nation observed that McDonald “resigned with a 
bang [with] reverberations…still sounding in every corner of the world with results that 
have only begun to be felt” and represented the “most effective act” of his official tenure.  
“His mission was an honorable failure.”  The Manchester Guardian ominously warned, 
however, that “for the Jews the Dark Ages have returned.”29 
                                                 
     
27
“Letter of Resignation of James G. McDonald,” December 27, 1935, ix cited in Harriet Davis, 
Pioneers in World Order: An American Appraisal of the League of Nations (NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1944), 228. 
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“Britain is Aroused by McDonald Plea,” New York Times, December 31, 1935, 7. 
     
29Breitman et al, Refugees and Rescue, 103-104.  Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle and 
Manchester Guardian (December 31, 1935); The Nation (January 15, 1935). 
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McDonald’s relinquishment of his office “both shocked the League and shamed it 
into continuing the Nansen tradition of humanitarian assistance.” 30  The League 
membership was divided between those who wanted to dissolve the Nansen Office and 
end its refugee efforts and those who sought the creation of a new refugee body.  Many 
States endeavored to avoid any action that would “prevent the eventual return of 
Germany to the League” or provoke the fears of the Soviet Regime that the League was 
planning to continue the Nansen Office (which had provided passports for White 
Russians) despite its earlier decision to dissolve this organization in December 1938.31 
A Committee of Experts was established to examine the refugee problem as a 
whole and concluded that any project to promote mass resettlement of stateless migrants 
required cooperation between nations who belonged to or remained outside of the 
League.  The Committee called for the merging of the Nansen Office and the High 
Commission for Refugees from Germany and the granting of a wider scope of authority 
to the High Commissioner.  In addition, the Committee believed nations needed to share 
the financial, political, legal and bureaucratic responsibilities among themselves coupled 
with a greater degree of cooperation with private organizations.  However, the 
recommendations of the Committee of Experts were ignored.  Instead, the activities of 
the High Commissioner were to be limited “to seeking the assistance of Governments” to 
resolve issues regarding the “legal status of refugees.”  Changes to national immigration 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
     
30Skran, “Profiles,” 292-293. 
 
     
31Observations Présentées par Sir Horace Rumbold (annexe) - Comité Pour L’Assistance Internationale 
aux Réfugies. Procès-Verbal (C.A.I.R./P.V.), December 18, 1935, League of Nations Archives 
R5633/21365/20038 cited in Philip Orchard, “A Right to Leave: Refugees; States, and International 
Society” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 2008), 191. 
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quotas were to be avoided and the internal affairs of States continued to be regarded as 
sacrosanct. Direct assistance to the involuntary exiles was to remain solely within the 
“province of the private organizations.”32  The United Kingdom favored an international 
solution to the refugee crisis but disavowed the acceptance of any further obligations for 
the support and resettlement of refugees.33 Moreover, the functions of the High 
Commission were to be restricted to “existing, not…potential refugees.” Otherwise, 
greater numbers of Jews would be emboldened to leave Germany for other lands.34 
Sir Neill Malcolm proved to be less intimately involved with refugee matters than 
had been his predecessor, McDonald. He was primarily concerned with issues of “legal 
and political protection, on which he…effectively intervened with governments.”35 
Norman Bentwich, the Secretary of the Liaison Committee between private organizations 
and the High Commission, was unimpressed with Malcolm’s abilities and 
accomplishments.  The High Commissioner was “devoid of initiatives and ideas 
[thinking] exclusively in terms of formalities and meetings.”  His reports to the League 
were a “sad confession of inactivity.”36 He did personally intervene, however, in the 
rescue of approximately five thousand refugees by 1938.37  Sir Neill declined financial 
                                                 
     
32Sir Neill Malcolm, Refugees Coming From Germany: Report submitted to the Seventeenth Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, A.19.1936.XII. September 1, 1936 cited in E. Reut-
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34British Foreign Office Memorandum on Report of Committee on International Assistance to Refugees.  
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support from private parties and, although he asked for advice from relief organizations 
(via the Liaison Committee), he was wont to ignore their recommendations.38  The 
League granted a restricted number of Nansen passports to German refugees, as outlined 
in the non-binding Provisional Agreement of 1936 (between the U.K., France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Denmark), but the Nansen Office itself would not 
cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner in the handling and processing of 
these travel documents.39 
 The League ultimately decided to combine the Nansen Office and the High 
Commission in 1938.  Although the United Kingdom now favored the consolidation of 
the two organizations the Home Office was wary of the new entity pursuing an “idealistic 
and adventurous policy” that could bring undue pressure upon “countries of temporary 
refuge.”40  The Soviet Union dropped its opposition to the plan provided the organization 
would operate on a temporary basis separate from the League bureaucracy and any 
reference to Nansen in its title would be avoided.41 The focus of the newly created High 
Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees would remain centered upon the 
legal and political safeguards offered to the refugees.  The facilitation of emigration and 
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permanent resettlement necessitated some degree of cooperation between governments 
and private relief organizations.42 
The retiring Governor of the Indian province of Punjab, Sir Herbert Emerson, was 
appointed as the new High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany and, like 
McDonald and Malcolm, was limited in his authority and powers.43  The League refused 
to provide any financial or legal support and he was barred from entering into any 
agreement regarding refugees while acting as the representative of the League of 
Nations.44 The primary aim of the League was to streamline the emigration process, 
improve and simplify cooperation between relief organizations and governments and 
encourage resettlement of stateless refugees.  Emerson was viewed by the British Foreign 
Office as a dedicated bureaucrat who would focus on the machinery of immigration and 
not seek to “forge” his own refugee policies.45 
The U.S. State Department agreed to the appointment of Dr. Joseph Chamberlain, 
a protégé of McDonald, to be the American representative on the new High Commission 
but he would not receive any direct financial support from the Department.46 However, it 
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was predictable that “there was no hope” that such a consolidation of refugee offices 
would result in any meaningful accomplishments.  The League leadership was politically 
conservative and averse to risk taking. In addition, the potential countries of permanent 
refuge were limited in their willingness to admit involuntary exiles.47 John George 
Stoessinger had observed that the League was a house “divided against itself,” with 
member states both supportive and opposed to international efforts at solving the refugee 
crisis.48  Many members believed that their parochial interests would be threatened by 
any weakening or liberalization of their respective immigration policies and quotas.49 
Ultimately, the reluctant efforts of the League High Commission would be replaced by 
those of Roosevelt’s Evian Conference and its creation, the Intergovernmental 
Committee for Political Refugees from Germany. 
Pessimistic views soon arose regarding the likelihood of success of the upcoming 
refugee talks.  Solomon Adler-Rudel commented on June 3, 1938 that the Evian 
Conference was a “total improvisation” due to the lack of a working agenda.  Harold 
Ginsburg, a representative of the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), was informed by 
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the American delegates to Evian during a June 27  meeting of the Council of Germany 
Jewry held in London, that the United States wanted the meeting itself to set the agenda 
and procedures. Ginsburg advised the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem that the 
conference would fail due to lack of adequate preparatory planning.  Eliahu Dobkin, the 
director of the Jewish Agency’s Immigration Department, addressed the Jewish Agency 
Executive in Jerusalem and echoed Ginsburg’s sentiments. James G. McDonald, the head 
of the newly appointed President’s Advisory Committee, was also ill-informed regarding 
the structure and functions of the meeting and was uncertain about the results to be 
expected from the Conference.50 
The United States had hoped to hold the conference in Geneva, Switzerland but 
the Swiss, wary of offending Germany, loyal to the Geneva based League of Nations and 
also conscious of its own restrictive immigration policies, declined.  The Swiss also 
feared that they would be called upon to host any permanent refugee committee created 
by the Evian Conference.51  The French government, under Premier Léon Blum and the 
French Foreign Minister Joseph Paul Boncour, offered the “luxurious” Hotel Royal, 
                                                 
     
50Adler-Rudel/Correspondence, 171, 240, Minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive meeting June 26, 
1938, Adler-Rudel Diplomatische Politische Korrespondenz ll, 240 cited in Shabtai Beit-Zvi, Post-Uganda 
Zionism in the Crisis of the Holocaust, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: AAARGH Publishing House, 2004),  142.  Dobkin 
(December 31, 1898-October 26, 1976) was a leading Zionist and signatory to the Israeli Declaration of 
Independence.  Adler-Rudel was born in Czernowitz, Austria-Hungary (June 23, 1894-November 15, 1975) 
and worked as a social worker in Vienna and Berlin.  He served as the executive secretary of the 
Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden and on the executive board of the Zionistische Vereinigung fuer 
Deutschland from 1933-36 when he immigrated to the United Kingdom and later resettled in Israel in 1949.  
Fred Grubel, ed., Catalog of the Archival Collections Leo Baeck Institute (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1990), 
2. 
 
     
51Michael Mashberg, “American Diplomacy and the Jewish Refugees, 1938-1939,” YIVO Annual of 
Jewish Social Science 15 (1974), 346; “Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland—Second World 
War “Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era” (Bern: 1999), 41 available from 
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Documents/DOC_15_Bergier_Refugee.pdf; Internet; accessed June 19, 
2010. 
 
75 
 
located in the spa town of Evian-Les-Bains, “the gayest resort town” lying on the French 
shore of Lake Geneva, as the conference site.52  The locale was described as a “pretty 
place, quiet and old-fashioned; its waters and baths have a high repute; its hotels are 
among the best in France, and its summer climate is perfect… [I]ts greatest attraction is 
the enchanting country with which it is surrounded.”53 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated, in his proposed agenda submitted to 
foreign governments and refugee organizations, that humanitarian concerns required 
“speedy cooperation if widespread suffering is to be averted.” 54 The two major 
provisions of the American invitation had, as noted earlier, specified that the cost of 
resettlement would be borne by “private organizations” and “no country would be 
expected or asked to receive a greater number of immigrants than is permitted by its 
existing legislation.”55 The focus of the proposed Committee’s work would be the 
resettlement of the “most urgent cases” as allowed by the “regulations of the receiving 
countries…”  Each government was expected to provide “strictly confidential” 
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information regarding its immigration policies and statutes as well as a “general 
statement” detailing the “number and type” of aliens it would accept.  In addition, a 
mutually agreed upon “system of documentation” would be required for those migrants 
who lacked the “requisite documents.”  Finally, a permanent organization was to be 
established “to formulate and to carry out, in cooperation with existing agencies, a long 
range program” that would lead to the resolution or the “alleviation of the [refugee] 
problem in the larger sense.”  Success, however, of such a construction depended upon 
fruitful negotiations with the German Government. 56 The convening of such a meeting 
may have served an unspoken purpose, i.e., the expression of international sympathy for 
the persecuted Jews of Germany but, as will be demonstrated, such consideration did not 
translate into tangible and significant actions.  The Committee ultimately defined the 
forced émigrés as “political refugees,” devoid of any specific religious or ethnic identity, 
who sought to leave or had already succeeded in departing the Reich. 
Undersecretary of State Sumner Wells cautioned the President to remain 
cognizant of domestic restrictionist opinion and to avoid any representation that implied 
or overtly stated that the annual quota or immigration laws would be modified.57  The 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 marked the first American legislation that limited 
immigration into the United States and represented white opposition to the importation of 
cheap labor.  The closure of the American frontier in 1890, coupled with increasing 
mechanization and industrialization, reduced the need and demand for foreign labor.  
Congress in 1891 established the Office of the Superintendent of Immigration and 
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enacted a Federal program of comprehensive immigration reform that barred the entry of 
certain categories of aliens and provided for the deportation of those who had entered the 
nation illegally. The Immigration Act of 1917 and its amendments created the Asiatic 
Barred Zone encompassing most of the Pacific islands and East Asia from which no 
immigrants would be allowed entry.  Literacy tests were adopted and émigrés could be 
excluded on the basis of economic, mental, physical and moral standards or on the basis 
of political ideologies.  The 1921 Emergency Quota or National Origins Act limited 
immigration to three percent of a particular nationality based on the 1910 census or 
approximately 375,000 per year.  This Act was driven by nativist fears of Eastern and 
Southern European immigrants and of the “Red Scare” (the importation of Bolshevism).58 
The Johnson-Reed or National Origins Act of 1924 adjusted the quota to two percent of a 
nationality based on the 1890 U.S census.  Initially 164,000 foreigners would be admitted 
per year but by 1927 annual immigration would be reduced to 150,000 per year with the 
greatest percentage allocated to the United Kingdom, Ireland, France and Germany.  
Limitations were not placed on Canada or Latin American but all Asians were denied 
entry and restrictions were placed on Southern and Eastern Europeans and Russians.  
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Preference and admission outside of the annual quota was granted to the parents, spouse 
and children of American citizens.59  
 Table 4 describes the number of foreign born residing within the U.S. as a 
percentage of total population from the mid-Nineteenth to mid-Twentieth Centuries and 
Table 5 lists the number of total immigrants during the a similar time frame.  The latter 
highlights the significant drop in aliens admitted during the critical years of the 1930s and 
1940. 
 
TABLE 4: Foreign Born in the United States, 1850-1940                    
 
Year                         Number (millions)          Percentage 
 
1850                                     2.2                             9.7 
1860                                     4.1                           13.2 
1870                                     5.6                           14.0 
1880                                     6.7                           13.3 
1890                                     9.2                           14.7 
1900                                   10.4                           13.6 
1910                                   13.6                           14.7 
1920                                   14.0                           13.2 
1930                                   14.3                           11.6 
1940                                   11.7                             8.9 
1950                                   10.4                             6.9 
                                 Roger Daniels. Guarding the Golden Door, 5.   
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TABLE 5: Immigration 1851-1950 
 
Years                            Numbers 
(millions) 
 
1851-60                              2.6 
1861-70                              2.3 
1871-80                              2.8 
1881-90                              5.2 
1891-00                              3.7 
1901-10                              8.8 
1911-20                              5.7 
1921-30                              4.1 
1931-40                              0.5 
1941-50                              1.0 
                            Ibid. 
 The Department of Labor under Frances Perkins controlled the processes of 
immigration and naturalization until 1940.  She was the sole member of the Cabinet 
calling for a more tolerant immigration policy.  Perkins argued that liberalization of the 
quota system was “consistent with American traditions and policies to grant free entry to 
refugees.”60  She advocated for a Presidential Executive Order on April 18, 1933 that 
would suspend the Likely to become a Public Charge clause of the 1924 Immigration 
Act.   This Hoover era provision was strictly interpreted and enforced by overseas U.S 
Consuls creating an under filling of the annual German and Austrian quotas.61  Perkin’s 
efforts were bolstered by the finding of Circuit Court Judge Julian W. Mack, an 
immigration authority and a member of the American Jewish Congress, that Section 21 of 
the Immigration Act of 1917 allowed the posting of a financial bond guaranteeing that an 
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immigrant would not end up on the dole.62  This approach was opposed by Max Kohler, 
an immigration consultant to the American Jewish Committee, who asserted that if any 
German Jewish refugees became public charges the consequences would “queer all our 
efforts.”63   
The State Department also objected to this policy but a ruling by the Attorney 
General Homer Commings allowed its implementation.64  Officials in the State 
Department Visa Division warned that the arrival of ships in New York Harbor “laden 
with Jewish immigrants” would result in a communal backlash against Foggy Bottom and 
another cautioned that easing the entry of German refugees would result in the United 
States becoming “flood[ed]” with Jews.65  Following the Anschluss Perkins called for a 
more liberal approach to the granting of visitors’ visas in cases where it was clear that the 
foreigner could not return to Germany.  The State Department responded that such a 
policy would lead to the “complete breakdown” of established immigration protocol.  
The annual “quota restriction would become a farce” with stateless refugees acquiring 
“permanent admission…without immigration visas and without quota restrictions.”66   
Sumner Welles also believed that the stature and importance of an international 
conference was reflected by the rank of its attendees rather than a planned agenda.  
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Consequently, he recommended that Roosevelt appoint Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 
Welles, Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith, and Secretary of Commerce 
Frances Perkins to represent the United States at the international conference.   
Instead of following Welles’ counsel FDR selected 64 year old Myron C. Taylor, the 
former CEO of U.S. Steel, to lead the delegation assisted by State Department Divisional 
Assistant and disarmament expert Robert Pell and Foreign Service Officer, Class III 
George Brandt who were familiar with immigration issues.  Taylor was granted the rank 
of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and was elected by the Conference’s 
delegations to the chairmanship of the meeting.67 
Some representatives interpreted the appointment of Taylor, rather than a 
professional diplomat, as a sign that the American Government lacked seriousness about 
the Conference and its work.  It was reported that the attitude of the United States was 
“’one of helpfulness rather than direction.”  Officials were quoted as saying America 
would facilitate the formulation of planning but did “not intend to be the final judges of 
whatever may be done”; an attitude that would elicit some “hesitation” in accepting the 
French proposal that Taylor chair the conference.  Taylor was apparently disinclined to 
take the position and some American officials “hoped ‘it would not happen.’”68 
The President did accept Welles’ (and Feis’) recommendation regarding the 
creation of a consultative body, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Political 
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Refugees (PACPR).69 Although inclusive of a number of Jewish leaders the composition 
of the membership embraced many who lacked a “particular commitment to the Jewish 
cause.”70  Hamilton Fish Armstrong, who had succeeded McDonald to the presidency of 
the Foreign Policy Association, declined the chairmanship of the PACPR citing his 
greater interest and commitment to “international relations than relief or philanthropy as 
such.”71  
George Strausser Messersmith addressed the committee during its first full 
session on May 16, 1938 and warned its members not to expect any concrete results from 
either the Evian Conference or its creation, the Intergovernmental Committee for Political 
Refugees from Germany. He presented his confidential sentiments that although 
humanitarian rhetoric would be expressed the invited delegations and their respective 
governments were not “approaching the problem with enthusiasm and very few with the 
disposition to make sacrifices.”  Their decision to attend the conference was motivated in 
large part by a desire to avoid appearing as a bystander to Jewish persecution.  Therefore, 
it was to be expected that the attendees would merely be offering “lip service” to the idea 
of rescue coupled with “unwillingness” to liberalize their respective immigration policies.  
Likewise, the range of actions open to the United States was severely constrained by 
American immigration law and the quota system.  Messersmith hoped that the “liberal 
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attitude” the American Government had displayed towards granting visas (combining and 
more completely filling the annual German and Austrian quotas) and the resettlement of 
refugees on U.S. soil would “serve as an example and incentive” to motivate other 
nations to follow a similar path.72 
Various motives have been offered to explain the presidential decision to convene 
the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees, also known as the Evian 
Conference.  FDR asked his Cabinet during a meeting on March 18: “America was a 
place of refuge for so many fine Germans in the period of 1848.  Why couldn’t we offer 
them again a place of refuge at this time?” 73  The President would later assert that 
America had long served as the “traditional haven of refugee” for those facing 
persecution in foreign lands.  Therefore, he believed, it was both appropriate and proper 
for the Administration to resume its “traditional role and take the lead in calling and 
conducting the Evian meeting.”74 However, Roosevelt knew that the Depression had 
worsened during 1937-38 with higher levels of unemployment, estimated by the 
American Federation of Labor in 1938 to have reached a level of 11 million or roughly 
twenty percent of the available workforce.  A 1938 Roper Poll revealed that only 4.9% 
favored liberalization of the annual quotas, 18.2% called for removal of all limits on 
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admission and 67.4% of respondents called for an end to immigration entirely.  Twenty 
percent of American Jews, during July 1938, also favored a strict immigration policy.75 
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes recorded in diary that during the March 18 
Cabinet meeting the President suggested the Administration should “make it as easy as 
possible for political refugees” to enter the country while postponing any “future 
determination” as to whether or not the émigrés could remain under the existing quota 
restrictions.  Ickes believed that the provision of refuge, whether on a temporary or 
permanent basis, represented a “fine gesture” and he anticipated that the émigrés would 
become a “fine class of citizen,” similar to those who entered following the Revolution of 
1848.  The Vice President doubted that Congress would allow any amendments to the 
immigration laws and believed that if a “secret” ballot were held, the Legislature would 
ban all immigration.76 
Although the United States would take the initiative in the call and management 
of the Evian Conference FDR was reluctant to have America assume the leadership role 
and face the risk of having to commit the nation to receive the bulk of the stateless 
refugees.  Echoing his March 1933 Inaugural Address the President repeated that the 
“policy of the Good Neighbor…can never be merely unilateral” but must be a part of a 
larger “bilateral [and] multilateral policy” in which any actions on the part of the United 
States must be met with “certain fundamental reciprocal obligations.” 77 Unless it was 
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clearly demonstrated to the American public that the “good neighbor policy [was] 
responded to wholeheartedly by our neighbors,” warned Under-Secretary of State Welles, 
it would be doubtful that the nation would “favor indefinitely a continuation…of any 
policy which prove[d] to be one-sided.”78 Thus, it could be argued that the mere 
convocation of an international committee to deal with a humanitarian crisis met 
America’s moral obligation.  The burden would clearly have to be shared on a global 
basis. 
Roosevelt, according to Barbara McDonald Stewart, argued that the German 
refugee crisis meant that “America could never return to the passive role she had been 
playing.”79 Sidney Feingold believed that FDR was influenced by charitable ideals, 
especially for those “prominent refugees whose caliber impressed him and whose 
personal misfortunes aroused his sympathy.”80  This, of course, was more of a rhetorical 
question, since Roosevelt was well aware of the difficulties and risks inherent in any 
attempt to manipulate U.S. immigration laws. 
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who had promoted the idea of the 
conference to the President and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, envisaged the meeting as 
an opportunity “to get out in front” of liberal opinion, especially from such influential 
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columnists as Dorothy Thompson and “certain Congressmen with metropolitan 
constituencies” and attempt to “guide the pressure [to increase Jewish immigration], to 
seize the [diplomatic and political] initiative before pressure built and to spread 
responsibility among the thirty two nations [which attended the conference] instead of 
us.”   He was also concerned about a potential backlash from restrictionist forces opposed 
to any alteration in the immigration laws; a concern that was reflected in the terms of the 
Evian invitation.81 Welles may have been further motivated by humanitarian concerns 
after receiving a letter from Samuel Rosenman, the Jewish speechwriter of FDR, who 
was seeking aid for some German-Jewish friends.  Welles expressed to a State 
Department subordinate, George Messersmith, on March 12, 1938, that it was “shocking” 
that immigration restrictions limited the granting of entry visas to German Jewish 
refugees “solely because under present German law they have been convicted of 
Rassenschande [racial shame].  We should…correct this injustice.”82 Messersmith 
observed in a memorandum sent to Hull and Welles that “in spite of the difficulties 
involved in doing anything constructive” for involuntary refugees the potential for 
positive action remained “good.”  Mass resettlement could only be accomplished over a 
prolonged period of time and would require the “cooperative action” of a host of 
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countries that would be facilitated by the convening of such an international refugee 
conference.83 
Roosevelt could adopt the visage of “international humanitarianism” while 
avoiding any changes to the annual quota or immigration laws and preserve the political 
support of those who opposed the admission of stateless émigrés.84 Gallup and other polls 
from June 1936 to January 1938 demonstrated that approximately sixty five percent of 
Americans were against Roosevelt seeking a third term; highlighting the potential 
political risks for the President.85 Preemptive action to curtail forced expulsion, migration 
and the limitation of the conference to consideration of German and Austrian refugees 
would, it was hoped, prevent the “dumping” of unwanted Jews from Rumania, Poland 
and Hungary; countries that were formulating their own anti-Semitic policies.  Therefore, 
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the refugees under consideration were euphemistically categorized as “political refugees 
from Germany and Austria” and not as Jews. 86 
Such a conference could also serve as a means of converting isolationist 
sentiments in the American public to “active opposition [to] international gangsters” and 
reinforce America’s long-established image as a “haven for the politically oppressed.” 87 
The mere convocation of such a meeting served to demonstrate American disapproval of 
German anti-Semitic policies.88 However, if the conference successfully created a 
mechanism that facilitated the orderly exodus of Jews from Germany then, it was hoped, 
German “militancy” regarding Aryans and non-Aryans could be curtailed. 89  A Jewish 
advisor to FDR, Isador Lubin, believed that the decision to call the Evian Conference was 
the result of pressure applied by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, a Roosevelt friend and advisor, 
“for whom [Roosevelt] had a great deal of affection.”90  FDR met with Wise, Bernard M. 
Baruch and Louis Kennedy during April 1938 and informed these Jewish leaders that the 
U.S. would have to “relax” the rules and regulations dealing with visa affidavits and “if 
we really want to be of help, we will have to permit the incoming of refugees without 
affidavits.”91 Frances Perkins, U.S. Secretary of Labor, held that the President had been 
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influenced by the opinion of social activist, Jane Addams, who contended immigration 
created future consumers who would strengthen the domestic economy.92 Jewish 
Presidential advisor Ben Cohen assumed that if the conference ended in failure then Nazi 
Germany could be blamed for creating and facilitating the international refugee 
problem.93 
Others believed that the consultation was part of a “subtle and far-reaching 
international campaign” to promote the benefits of democracy in a world in which 
totalitarianism appeared to be ascendant.  In addition, any attempt to proffer aid to “fear-
ridden minorities abroad, be they Jewish or Christian, German, Italian, Russian or 
Spanish” would reap political benefits in an election year by touching “a responsive 
chord in a considerable group” of domestic voters bound by “ties of blood, of race, of 
religious or political philosophy.”94  Some writers believed that the American initiative 
for the conference symbolized a return of an increasingly isolationist United States to the 
affairs of Europe and sent a “clear political warning” to Hitler and his Government.95  
Roosevelt’s involvement allowed the Administration to cast the United States in the 
iconic role of protector of human rights but at little cost to the Nation.  Other nations 
were expected to share in the burden of resettlement.96 
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Roosevelt initially believed and expressed during a press conference in Warm 
Springs, Georgia, that the forthcoming refugee conference should include additional 
groups facing persecution such as Spanish Loyalists, German Catholics and Lutherans 
and Trotskyites.  However, the editors of Newsweek claimed that the most logical 
explanation for the President to extend the range of the conference was to avoid 
accusations of giving preference to Jews.  They argued Roosevelt was more interested in 
“belaboring Hitler” than offering a workable solution to the refugee dilemma.  The State 
Department could have ordered the consulates to liberalize immigration requirements to 
allow entry of German and Austrian Jews in numbers that could “not amount to much.”97 
Although the United States Government had called for an international conference to deal 
with the refugee problem the policies of the State Department acted to impede the entry 
of German and Austrian refugees.  Visitors’ visas would be denied to foreigners who 
were unable to enter under the quota system, who lacked an “unrelinquished domicile” in 
and the means and ability to return to their country of origin.98   
A long standing anti-Jewish attitude or complacency towards anti-Semitism was 
prevalent among officials of the State Department which impacted upon their willingness 
to facilitate the entry of immigrants. For example, soon after the Nazi ascension to power 
in 1933 the U.S. Consul in Munich, Charles M. Hathaway, Jr., compared the German 
anti-Semitic program to the earlier actions of the infamous Spanish Inquisition under 
Torquemada.  The German Government, like the Catholic hierarchy in Spain, viewed the 
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struggle to save “human souls” as a fight between good and evil in which “no quarter” 
could be offered.  A “cancerous infection of the Jewish plague” maintained a “dangerous 
hold” upon the life and survival of modern day Germany.99 The Consul-General in 
Hamburg believed that the new Reich would have a “salutary effect” on the “Communist 
plague” (with Marxism and Communism often linked to a Jewish worldwide conspiracy) 
that threatened international capitalism.100 
The State Department had recognized since 1933 that Jews within Germany were 
living under a perilous cloud. Berlin Consul General George Messersmith advised the 
President, via Under-Secretary of State William Phillips, that the official sanctions and 
actions taken against the Jewish population were “being carried out daily in a more 
implacable and a more effective manner.”101 A confidential German Ministry of the 
Interior memorandum dealing with the Jewish Question was sent from the U.S. Embassy 
in Berlin to the Department of State.  The document asserted that the problem of the 
German Jews could only be resolved if they were “detach[ed] from the Reich; an action 
that could only be accomplished through a “systematically attacked final solution…We 
must build up the country without the Jews…”102 The Roosevelt Administration at that 
time was less focused upon compassionate concerns than upon maintenance of 
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diplomatic harmony between the two nations, repayment of German reparations and war 
debts, expansion of commerce and disarmament issues.103 
FDR advised William E. Dodd, former professor of history at the University of 
Chicago and the newly appointed American Ambassador to Berlin (who was sympathetic 
to the plight of Jews in Germany), that the United States could only act in the interests of 
American citizens in the Reich by attempting to “moderate the general persecution by 
unofficial and personal influence…”104 Presidential advisor, Colonel Ed House, 
expressed to the new Ambassador words of sympathy and warning.  The United States 
should try to “ameliorate Jewish sufferings [which were] clearly wrong and terrible.”  
However, the Jews should not be allowed to once again “dominate the economic and 
intellectual life in Berlin…”105 Dodd did, however, attempt to restrain German anti-
Jewish policies by warning Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath that Germany 
would suffer from international economic boycotts and negative public opinion “so long 
as eminent leaders like Hitler and Goebbels announce from platforms in Nuremberg ‘that 
all Jews must be wiped off the earth.’”106 Dodd expressed similar sentiments to Hitler 
who claimed that fifty nine percent of the “officials of [Soviet] Russia were Jews, 
responsible for the collapse of Czarist Russia, and who posed a threat to the survival of 
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Germany.  The Fuehrer warned that if Jews continued their Marxist activities then he 
“shall make a complete end of all the Jews in Germany.”107  Consequently, the consistent 
conflation of Jews and Communism in Hitler’s worldview led Dodd to warn the State 
Department to “keep this fear of Communism in mind” in the context of any official 
American criticism of German anti-Semitic policies.108 
Despite such admonitions Dodd became increasingly critical of German policies 
and actions.  Following the Night of the Long Knives of June 30-July 1, 1934, during 
which a number of the leaders of the Brown Shirts or SA and conservative nationalists 
were arrested and murdered, the Ambassador stated that he had become repulsed by the 
spectacle of the “country of Goethe and Beethoven revert[ing] to the barbarism of Stuart 
England and Bourbon France.”109 Dodd criticized British and French policies of 
appeasement in 1937 and openly opposed any official American presence at the annual 
Nuremberg rally of the Nazi faithful; a declaration that engendered increasing German 
Governmental hostility towards the Ambassador.110 
          The 1935 Nuremberg Racial Laws, as mentioned, were applied to both German and 
American Jews residing within the Reich.  When Dodd suggested to the State Department 
that the application of such restrictions to American citizens represented a violation of the 
bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights he was advised that the 
United States Government did not consider it feasible to issue a formal opinion on the 
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subject nor would it seek joint action with other Western Governments.111 However, if a 
specific case involving an American Jew did arise Dodd was to informally call upon the 
German Government to protect the rights of all United States citizens; an approach that 
was variably effective.112 These laws, he believed, were the harbinger of more severe 
restrictions against the Jews and did not represent “the last word…on this question.”113 
During 1937 the Third Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, Jacob D. Beam, 
predicted that Nazi attempts at forced migration as a means of resolving its Jewish 
Question would inevitably be unsuccessful due to lack of sufficient foreign exchange.  
Consequently, the German Government would adopt such policies that would make 
Jewish life in Germany “uncomfortable, if not impossible” and would result in falling 
Jewish birth rates.  Therefore, German Jews would “die out in the course of one or two 
generations.”  The Embassy also believed that external diplomatic or economic pressures 
were incapable of altering German anti-Semitic policies.  Rather, “outspoken protests” 
would only result in “stiffening resistance” and any form of compromise was impossible 
as it would appear to be a form of “submission to foreign dictates.”114 
Dodd was eventually recalled from his post due to official German criticism and 
pressure from Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles and was replaced by Hugh R. 
Wilson, a devoted anti-Communist, who possessed a more liberal, conciliatory and less 
critical view of Germany.  Joseph Davies, one-time American Ambassador to Moscow, 
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and potential candidate for the Berlin post, claimed that the President wanted to replace 
Dodd with a career diplomat who would represent, “in the narrowest and most formal 
sense,” the interests of the United States.115 Moffat asserted, however, that FDR believed 
that only the avoidance of open criticism of the Nazi regime would offer any American 
Ambassador the “hope to influence events.”116 The new Ambassador believed that the 
Jewish Question was the primary point of conflict that threatened the harmony of U.S.-
German relations.  He feared that public reaction to the Anschluss and its aftermath 
would “maintain international exasperation against Germany at a high pitch.”117 
Nevertheless, Wilson convinced the President in 1938 to re-institute an American 
diplomatic presence at the annual Nuremberg Party rallies.118 The State Department 
discounted Jewish criticism that such an attendance would be viewed by the Reich as 
acceptance of the “Nazi program of racial and minority persecution.”119  Following the 
Munich Crisis Wilson attacked the negative attitude of the American press as a “hymn of 
hate [that ignored German] efforts…to build a better future.”120 Wilson warned Under-
Secretary Sumner Welles that Jews were fomenting a “hostile state of mind” that 
threatened to involve America in a Continental conflict over issues that did not “appeal to 
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the vast majority” of the public as a legitimate reason to go to war.121  Wilson did support 
the convening of the Evian Conference as a means of “banish[ing] the hatred in which 
Germany was held abroad”; compassionate concerns were of secondary value.122 
Several days prior to the opening of the conference Roosevelt stated that he 
expected “deeds and not speeches.”  He regarded the establishment of a permanent 
intergovernmental committee that would facilitate and oversee emigration to be the 
ultimate goal of the meeting.123  Peter Novick had argued that FDR sought to enlighten 
the American public—especially “nativists and isolationists”—that greater involvement 
in European affairs enhanced American self-defense and did not represent “some 
globalist do-gooding.”  Jewish affairs and problems would not be allowed to dictate or re-
direct American foreign policies.124  Jewish attendee Solomon Adler-Rudel expressed 
similar sentiments believing that “inner political considerations” and calculations rather 
than issues of humanitarianism regarding the Jews motivated the President to convene the 
Evian Conference.  The invitation itself served as a symbolic expression of the desire to 
help others while preserving morality.  Although Jews accounted for ninety percent of the 
real and potential refugees that fell under the scope of the assembly a deliberate choice 
was made to avoid direct referral to Jews, Hitler or Germany 125 
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George Rublee, who would be later selected to direct the permanent committee on 
refugees established in London, later expressed the opinion that Roosevelt’s primary 
incentive was to express “some sort of gesture” that could “assuage the [moral] 
indignation” that resulted from the German persecution of Jews.  The conference had 
minimal “hope of success” and primarily served as an “impressive protest.”126 
Foreign observers speculated on potential Presidential motivations in initiating the 
Conference.  It perhaps served as an indirect means of re-connecting the United States 
with European affairs.  “By returning to the tradition and the methods utilized by 
President Wilson,” while America retained a status of neutrality during the Great War, 
FDR could assume the mantle of “defender of the victims” of Nazi persecution by 
involving America in the “humanitarian and juridical problems” of the Continent.127 
Collaboration between the United States, France and the United Kingdom represented “a 
[form of] success” as it implied the future involvement of the American public with 
European issues and events.128  The formulation of the Evian Conference not only served 
charitable purposes but it signaled American engagement in the refugee crisis and 
demonstrated a commitment to battle for the “principles of law” in the entire world.129 
The initiation of such a conference demonstrated that the refugee problem was not an 
“internal German problem” or primarily a benevolent concern but represented an 
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“international-political” issue that required a solution not based on “charity” but rather 
upon global cooperation.130 Roosevelt, it was believed, regarded anti-Semitic persecution 
as a “Nazi germ” that posed a risk of a generalized, more widespread, infection.131 
The British Foreign Office commented that the willingness of the United States to 
participate in solving an international refugee crisis represented a marked departure from 
its “years of aloofness from the League of Nations refugee work” and, consequently, was 
“unreservedly welcomed in Whitehall.”  American participation provided an opportunity 
to diffuse the refugee problem around the world; an approach to which the League had 
proven inept and unsuccessful.132 
There were, however, dissident foreign voices who viewed the Conference with 
concern.  British Foreign Office official Roger Makins believed that Germany was 
attempting to utilize real or potential violence and suppression of its Jewish and non-
Aryan population as a form of blackmail which, with the constitution of an international 
refugee committee, would merely serve to “encourage” the Reich to forcibly expel those 
elements residing within Germany that it considered undesirable. Such actions and the 
potential for the democracies to accept refugees would lead, Makins feared, Poland, 
Rumania and Hungary to pursue similar policies of persecution as a means of solving 
their own Jewish Question “through the good offices of the Committee.”  Therefore, he 
concluded, “great caution” was needed in the formulation of the Committee and its 
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function and scope lest the Eastern European countries would “make the refugee problem 
even worse than it is at present.”133  
The British Government did adopt a policy of forced repatriation of refugees from 
East and Central Europe (other than Germany and Austria) arguing that such peoples 
were not subject to the same degree of persecution of Jews and non-Aryans within the 
Reich.134  Makins asserted that the Americans had not made adequate preparations for the 
conference and warned that the meeting could generate “wild and impracticable” 
proposals.  Consequently, the British needed to carefully construct the position they 
would adopt.  In addition, he called for the Americans to allocate three quarters of the 
combined German and Austrian quotas for refugees.135  Treasury officials were quick to 
comment that the use of governmental funding “was almost out of the question” while the 
Colonial Office noted that the Colonies “were not in a position to make a serious 
contribution” to the re-settlement issue.136 
Walter Adams, the General Secretary of the Academic Assistance Council 
(Society for the Protection of Science and Learning) and Secretary of the Survey of 
Refugee Problems, also feared the ramifications of “ominous statements” issued by other 
Central and Eastern European countries vis-à-vis their own Jewish Problem.  A Jewish 
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migration from Eastern Europe was already underway and if left unchecked it would 
devolve into a “refugee catastrophe” that was without parallel in contemporary history.  
Such a threat reflected the conundrum of the “German refugee problem; in itself a minor 
disaster, but in its implications it is terrifying.” 137  Sir John Simpson similarly argued that 
the “success” of German anti-Semitism and its policies of forced emigration and 
economic disenfranchisement coupled with a sense of “impunity” had emboldened other 
nations to adopt similar strategies as a means of ridding themselves of “a population 
labeled as ‘undesirable.’” 138 
Myron C. Taylor held preliminary discussions in Europe with other diplomats, 
which established further ground rules for the discussion.  The Evian Conference would 
be a “confidential meeting” of official representatives and not a public forum for the 
airing of “all sorts of ideas.”  Thus, only one public session would be held at the 
commencement of the summit in which “general statements may be made.”  Further 
deliberations would be conducted privately and at the conclusion of the conference a 
“formal declaration” would be released.  It was necessary to terminate the meeting by 
July 17 in order to accommodate the state visit of the King of England to Paris on July 19 
which required the presence of many of the delegations.  However, there was an 
“understanding” that the Committee could reconvene in Paris “if necessary.” 139 
The original invitation to the Evian Conference was to have been limited to 
European nations (with Germany excluded) but the United Kingdom, fearing that too 
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much emphasis would then be placed on Palestine (although it had a labor shortage due 
to Zionist development of the land and its resources) as a potential asylum, insisted that 
non-European countries be invited as well.140  The British accepted the invitation with the 
stipulation that Palestine would not be discussed at the conference and that the U.S. 
would guarantee that the U.K. would not be pressured to accept more Jewish refugees 
into Palestine.  Conversely, Britain would not attempt to pressure the United States into 
revising its immigration laws to accept more stateless refugees.   
Taylor, during a preliminary meeting with the British delegation, indicated that 
Nahum Goldmann had approached him and discussed the potential role of Palestine as a 
place of permanent resettlement.  Goldmann requested that Chaim Weizmann, the head 
of the Jewish Agency, meet with Taylor in private session to present the argument that 
Palestine offered the best haven for Jewish refugees.141  However, Sir Michael Palairet, 
deputy head of the British delegation, declared that the British government “would 
naturally prefer that this meeting should not take place.”  Taylor informed Goldmann that 
there would be an “opportunity” for a confidential meeting with Weizmann but it would 
not be scheduled prior to the commencement of the Conference.  Weizmann later noted: 
In those days before the war, our protests, when voiced, were regarded 
as provocations; our very refusal to subscribe to our own death 
sentence became a public nuisance, and was taken in bad part.  
Alternating threats and appeals were addressed to us to acquiesce in the 
surrender of Palestine.142 
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The U.S. State Department also agreed to avoid broaching the subject of 
Palestine.  The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Wallace Murray, advised 
the American Consul General in Jerusalem, Wadsworth, that it was highly likely that 
“various groups” would seek to influence the representatives of the foreign governments 
attending the Evian Conference to take up the issue of Jewish immigration into Palestine.  
Such actions should be avoided as “Zionist and non-Zionist questions” would generate 
“bitter passions” that threatened the success of the meeting.143 
Following the announcement of the Evian Conference, Germany exerted pressure 
upon Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary to hold a counter-conference 
which met in Bled, Yugoslavia during the latter half of August 1938.  The conferees 
called for a further international meeting that would deal with the global aspects of the 
Jewish Question and emigration.  However, the apparent impotency of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees from Germany led the Reich to 
abandon support for such a project.144 
The final list of invitees included Australia, the Argentine Republic, Belgium, 
Bolivia, Brazil, United Kingdom, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela and of course, the United States.  Poland, Hungary, 
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Rumania and the Union of South Africa sent unofficial observers. The United States, the 
United Kingdom and France dispatched selected representatives to serve as their 
delegations.  The remaining attendees were drawn from diplomats assigned to the League 
of Nations in Geneva or in other foreign capitals. 
Canada was a reluctant participant.  Prime Minister Mackenzie King felt it would 
be “unwise” to abstain lest Canada “be classed only with Italy as refusing the invitation.”  
Further, such reticence would potentially offend the Jewish members of his political party 
who believed that a Canadian presence was essential even if “we could do nothing later 
on.”145  He regarded the Roosevelt invitation as a “very difficult question” which could 
result in the entry of refugee Jews.  He believed that such admissions would create an 
“internal problem” and that Canada could not afford to “play a role of the dog in the 
manger…with our great open spaces and small population.”  Domestic stability was 
paramount and the intermingling of “foreign strains of blood” must be avoided or risk 
facing a domestic situation that paralleled the “Oriental problem.”  Such refugees, he 
feared, would spawn riots and internecine conflict between the Dominion Government 
and the Provinces.146  King had earlier described to an American diplomat his 
recollections of a meeting with Hitler in Berlin in 1937.  The Reich Chancellor, he 
believed, could eventually be viewed as “one of the saviors of the world.”  Hitler had 
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such an opportunity at Nuremberg in 1935 but instead chose the road of “Force…Might 
and…Violence” as the method to reach his goals “which were, I believe, at heart, the 
well-being of his fellow-man; not all fellow-men, but those of his own race.”147 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull opposed German participation in the conference 
due to his belief that a unified international position and solution was preferable to direct 
negotiations with the nation that was primarily responsible for the refugee crisis in the 
first place. Portugal was not invited although its African colonies, Angola and 
Mozambique, were later regarded as potential sites of resettlement.  Ireland sent delegates 
although it too was not formally invited.148  The Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 
Alexander Troyanovsky, viewed the conclave suspiciously, as a Western means to 
support Trotskyites hostile to the Communist regime.149  The League of Nations High 
Commissioner for German Refugees Sir Neill Malcolm was also in attendance.  A variety 
of Christian, socialist and liberal humanitarian groups were present along with at least 
one hundred journalists and a number of political, scientific and artistic notables such as 
Pablo Casals, the Italian historian Ferrero, and the exiled Italian politicians Nenni and 
Spora, the chair of the Pan-European Alliance and Count Condenhove-Kalergi.150 
A number of nations were excluded from the meeting and included Poland, 
Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Spain. Italy was invited but 
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attendance was declined by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Galeazzo 
Ciano, who, while acknowledging humanitarian concerns cited political considerations.  
He believed that such a meeting could foment hostility against the Italian Government 
due to its own domestic problems with anti-Fascist political refugees and its close 
diplomatic and economic ties with Germany.151 Iceland and El Salvador also refused to 
participate. 
There were anxieties within the U.S. State Department that Eastern European 
countries, such as Poland, Rumania and Hungary, were planning to expel their own 
Jews.152 Such actions, it was believed, could dissuade other nations from liberalizing their 
respective immigration policies while promoting more “refugee dumping” into the 
Western Hemisphere. The Polish Government noted that large numbers of Polish Jews 
residing in Austria and other European countries were returning to Poland despite the 
high level of domestic anti-Semitism.  The Polish Government enacted a new law on 
March 31, 1938 which threatened to annul passports issued to Poles living abroad but it 
was directed primarily to the fifty thousand Polish Jews residing in Austria. Anti-Jewish 
rioting, with the killing of two Jews and the wounding of more than one hundred along 
with the looting of hundreds of Jewish businesses, occurred in Warsaw on March 19. 
Crowds shouted “Down with the Jews!” and “To Madagascar with the Jews!”153 
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Despite the efforts of the central government and local authorities to prevent anti-
Semitic violence the return of large numbers of Jews from Austria and other nations 
stimulated wide spread anti-Semitic sentiments and actions.  The Camp for National 
Unity, established in March 1937, sought to unify the various Polish nationalist groups 
under the patronage of the political elite while promoting anti-Semitism and the exclusion 
of Jews from Polish society.  General Stanislaw Skwarczynski, the leader of the Camp, 
declared on February 21, 1938 that Jews represented an “obstacle to the normal evolution 
of the State” due to their loyalty to international Jewry; a state of affairs that was bound 
to generate “hostile feelings” between the Christians and the Jews.  Such a situation could 
only be resolved by a “radical decrease” in the size of the Jewish population utilizing a 
system of organized mass emigration to Palestine, Madagascar and other locales.  During 
May he called for the “Polonization” of the national economy as a means of countering 
the Jewish threat.154   
Anti-Semitic actions in Poland, of course, antedated the Anschluss.  A petition to 
the Polish Government on July 9, 1937, signed by 130 Cincinnati multidenominational 
clergymen, was read into the House Congressional Record by Representative Herbert S. 
Bigelow (Ohio) accusing the Government for failing to protect its minorities as called for 
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by the Versailles Treaties.155  The American Jewish Congress appealed to Secretary of 
State Hull on July 12, 1937 to intercede with the Polish authorities on behalf of Polish 
Jewry.  The World Federation of Polish Jews and Rabbi Stephan S. Wise (on September 
23, 1937) sent a request to the Warsaw Government via Count Jerzy Potocki, the 
Ambassador to the United States, appealing for protection of Jewish Polish citizens 
against domestic violence.  On September 24, 1937 the Federation of Polish Jews 
publicized a letter sent to Potocki criticizing renewed pogroms against its Jewish 
population.  The Federation also sent a petition to Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the 
Division of European Affairs in the State Department, calling for intercession by the 
American Government.   He replied on October 6, 1937 that, while sympathetic, the 
United States Government could not interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign nation 
unless American citizens or their interests were directly involved.  Nonetheless, the 
Jewish People’s Committee against Fascism and Anti-Semitism submitted a similar 
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memorandum and received a comparable response from the Chief of the Division of 
Western European Affairs, James Clement Dunn.156   
During October 1937 the Polish Government enacted a policy of “ghetto benches” 
in which Jewish students would be segregated from non-Jews in academic institutions.  
Many foreign and domestic critics assailed this new policy.  The President of the 
American Federation of Teachers, Jerome Davis, representing 25,000 members, 
condemned such an action as representing the “most serious possible violation of the 
solemn obligation assumed [by the Polish Government] towards [its] minority peoples” 
and was an anathema to the American aid and support that restored Poland to 
independence, freeing it from the “yoke of centuries.”  On December 6 and 16, 1937 
respectively, the American Youth Congress (three million members) and the American 
division of the International League for Academic Freedom called on the Polish Minister 
of Education to disavow such discriminatory policies as “alien to the spirit of academic 
knowledge and of free cooperation in the pursuit of knowledge that is so essential to the 
world of scholarship.”  The American Committee on Religious Rights and Minorities 
called on the Polish Government to end its anti-Semitic policies that were neither “just 
nor humane.”  The Committee requested that the League of Nations and other 
governments provide “outlets for [Poland’s] surplus population.”  The Institute for 
International Education warned on December 20, 1937 that the creation of “ghetto 
benches” represented the “beginning of the regimentation” of Polish academic life and 
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served as a signpost on the road to totalitarianism.  Similar sentiments were issued on 
December 27 by the American Writers’ Committee to Aid the Jews of Poland.157 
     The international protests fell upon deaf ears.  The Polish Parliament or Sejm, in 
response to Jews returning from Austria and Germany, empowered the Minister of the 
Interior, via an edict issued on March 31, to nullify citizenship for certain categories of 
Poles (with Jews undoubtedly serving as the main focus).  Those who had resided outside 
of Poland in Central and Eastern Europe for five or more years and adopted a “passive 
and indifferent attitude” towards the State, worked overseas to the detriment of the Polish 
Nation, fought in the Spanish Civil War on the Republican side or failed to return to 
Poland when summoned, would automatically lose their membership in the national 
body; an act affecting forty thousand Jews in Austria.  The law was set to take effect in 
late October.158 
When the Evian Conference was formally announced Poland demanded that the 
scope of the meeting be extended to Polish Jews.  Count Potocki approached the 
leadership of the American Jewish Committee and the Joint Distribution Committee 
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(JDC) on June 8, 1938 and called for the emigration of fifty thousand Polish Jews per 
year as a means of diminishing domestic anti-Semitism.159  Poland (and Romania) did 
offer to attend the Evian Conference with the status of “refugee producer” nations and 
sought international cooperation to promote the exodus of their respective Jewish 
minorities.160 
Roosevelt attempted to placate the Polish Governments and dampen its calls for 
Jewish expulsion by offering Angola as a form of compensation.  Confidential 
discussions were held with the Poles and the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax.  The Poles assured the American President that they 
would not publicly raise any territorial or political demands for this Portuguese African 
colony.  Negotiations continued under the direction of the IGCR following the 
completion of the Evian Conference.161  FDR ordered Taylor to support Angolan 
resettlement as a “Supplemental Jewish Homeland” and he emphasized the significance 
of this project to the “solution of the Jewish problem” as well as his ardent belief that 
“Angola offers the most favorable facilities for its creation.”  It was possible that 
Roosevelt viewed such a scheme as a means of diverting pressure on the United States to 
accept Eastern European Jewish refugees while obtaining British support in return for 
ignoring the potentialities of Palestine for resettlement. The Polish Government also 
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viewed the Sinai Desert, Transjordan, Syria and Iraq as prospective areas of Jewish 
colonization as well.162 
The American Minister to Rumania informed the State Department that the 
Rumanian Government hoped that the issue of the Jews of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland would be placed on the agenda of the Evian Conference. The 
Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs intimated that his country would like to expel 
annually the number of Jews corresponding to the Jewish birth rate.163  Sumner Welles 
warned it would be “unfortunate” if the creation of an international refugee conference 
would be “construed as an encouragement of legislation or acts” that would foster further 
refugee problems.164 Rabbi Stephen Wise echoed such sentiments in an interview in 
which he stated that the Evian Conference would not “sanction” the actions of any other 
nation engaging in forced emigration.  In addition, he warned the governments of various 
Central and Eastern European nations that the United States Government would not “deal 
with the problem of their own so-called superfluous populations.”165 The Roosevelt 
administration, therefore, planned to limit discussion at the refugee conference to strictly 
German and Austrian refugees.  It also avoided a specific reference to Jews, choosing 
instead the term “political refugees.”166 
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The right-wing Christian Front government of fifty-seven year old Rumanian poet 
and Premier Octavian Goga enacted anti-Semitic legislation, “following closely the Hitler 
pattern,” that eliminated Jews from a variety of professions and occupations, banned the 
use of Yiddish, barred the employment of Rumanian non-Jewish servants and closed all 
Jewish newspapers.167 These anti-Semitic policies, he asserted, would continue regardless 
of who occupied the premiership.168 He sought the denaturalization of Jews who had 
become Rumanian citizens after 1918.169  Furthermore, Goga announced that his 
Government sought to expel five hundred thousand “vagabond” Jews (out of a total 
Jewish population of 1,000,000-1,500,000/19,000,000) who came into Rumania 
“allegedly…as refugees” and who lacked any rights to citizenship.   
Forty-four year old King Carol von Hohenzollern II declared that two hundred 
fifty thousand Jewish refugees from Galicia and Russia who had entered Rumania 
following the end of the Great War had arrived “illegally” and did not constitute “a good 
element” of the population.  Such “invaders” were not protected by minority rights 
treaties and must be removed from the body politic.170  Rumania would only serve as a 
temporary haven for these now stateless Jews and would offer “asylum [only] until 
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means of forcing them to leave…have been found.”171  The law, however, was 
subsequently ruled unconstitutional by Rumanian courts.  
Eighty-two year old Alexander Cuza, Minister without Portfolio, announced plans 
for an international anti-Semitic conference in which the Jewish Question would be 
studied as a world-wide problem.  The issue needed to be “confronted frankly and 
realistically” and the only workable solution was the creation of a “Jewish nation” in 
which the Jews could be concentrated in one location, left to “work out their own 
destiny.”  Palestine would be excluded from consideration as it belonged to the Arabs but 
Madagascar (located 240 miles off the coast of East Africa) offered promise as it was a 
possession of France which “soon must solve its own very acute Semitic problem.”172 
Sixty-eight year old Patriarch of the Rumanian National Orthodox Church Miron 
Christea (who later succeeded Goga as Premier) had earlier warned, during August 1937, 
that Jews were the cause of an “epidemic of corruption and social unrest” that endangered 
the “spiritual treasures” of the Rumanian Nation.  Defense against the threats of the Jews 
was both a “national and patriotic duty.”173  In addition, he believed, the nation should be 
expunged of “these parasites who suck Rumanian and Christian blood.”174  A number of 
anti-Jewish riots occurred during late 1937 and early 1938 in Bucharest and outlying 
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areas, resulting in injury and death.  Cuza informed a German newspaper on February 9, 
1938 that the Government would resort to pogroms if the Western democracies failed to 
accept involuntary Jewish refugees.175 Clear intimations of the precarious position of the 
Jews within Rumania led many to decide to leave the country but the question of where 
to re-settle remaining unsettled.   
American attempts were made to intercede on the behalf of the Rumanian Jews.  
Senator James J. Davis (PA) introduced a resolution on January 3, 1938 calling on the 
President to inform the Senate of any anti-Semitic “edicts” enacted by the Rumanian 
Government and to utilize his “good offices to obtain a peaceful settlement of proposed 
threats” to minority groups.176 On January 6 Representative William Sirovich (NY) and 
January 25 Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr. (NY) announced similar resolutions calling 
on FDR to intervene “in the name of humanity against the shameful treatment” of 
Rumanian minorities and to sever diplomatic relations should the need arise.177 The 
American Jewish Committee passed a resolution at its 31st annual meeting condemning 
Rumania's violation of the Minorities Treaty signed after the end of the Great War.178 The 
United Rumanian Jews of America endorsed a petition to King Carol, signed by Jewish 
and non-Jewish Rumanians, urging the Government to avoid any actions that would 
“remove the name of Rumania from the roster of enlightened and humane countries of 
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the world.”179 On January 25 the Jewish Labor Committee held a mass protest rally in 
New York City and on January 28 the Executive Committee of the World Jewish 
Congress headed by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, and the American Jewish Congress on the 
30th, called upon the League to protect the rights of minorities within Rumania.180  
Secretary of State Hull, echoing earlier responses regarding the situation of Jews 
within Poland (and also about Greater Germany), announced on January 6 that the United 
States Government could not intervene in the internal affairs of another nation unless 
American interests were threatened.181  The American Minister to Rumania, Franklin 
Mott Gunther, did, however, “unofficially” advise Goga on January 12 regarding 
negative American (especially Jewish) opinion towards Rumania and its policies to 
which the Prime Minister responded that such protests were “merely impudent!”  The 
Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Ostrovsky informed Goga that Rumanian policies had led his 
presence in Bucharest to be “no longer useful” and consequently, he was returning to 
Russia within ten days.  The Rumanian Foreign Office replied publicly that the 
Government “would in no way object to the departure of the Soviet Ambassador at an 
even earlier date.”182  
The application of British, French and American diplomatic pressure, (as well as 
the failure of the law to denaturalize Jews, a faltering economy and concerns about the 
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fascist Iron Guard), did have an effect: the dismissal of Goga by the King and his 
replacement by the Patriarch Christea who initially planned to carry out his predecessor’s 
anti-Semitic program.183 However, on February 22 King Carol announced a new 
constitution and the creation of a “royal dictatorship,” termed the “National 
Concentration Government,” which granted the monarch autocratic powers with which 
he pledged to guarantee “equality before the law to all people of other races which have 
lived for centuries on Rumanian soil.”184  Cristea, who earlier had advocated anti-
Semitism, then promised the Jewish community the restoration of “spiritual peace, unity 
and brotherhood.”185 In addition, the King took steps to suppress the anti-Semitic Fascist 
Iron Guard and arrested its leader, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu.186  Despite outward 
appearances journalist Dorothy Thompson claimed that King Carol did “not make a 
secret of his conviction that there are too many Jews in Rumania and that the world 
should help him get rid of at least a few hundred thousand of them.”187 
The Jews of Hungary also faced an increasingly precarious existence. Stimulated 
by the anti-Semitic actions of the Reich many non-Jewish Hungarians called for the 
limitation or the total exclusion of Jews from many professions and other occupations 
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and the establishment of quotas for Jewish entry into colleges and universities.188  Kálmán 
Darányi, the pro-German Prime Minister, enacted measures aimed at excluding Jews 
from the national economy and cultural and social life while depriving them of 
Hungarian citizenship.  The Prime Minister believed that Jews held a “strangle hold” over 
the nation and a solution to this problem was urgently needed in order to provide 
employment for “Christian youth” while guaranteeing that the “sons of Hungarian 
peasantry” would have the opportunity for the “betterment of their social standing.”  The 
Government announced in January 1938 that Jews living within the northeast provinces 
who could not prove Magyar descent from 1851 onwards would be denaturalized.  
Following the Polish model, the Government negated the citizenship of Jews living 
abroad.  During February Finance Minister Fabinyi called for an end of Jewish 
predominance in the trades.  It was time, he believed, for the “Christian Hungarian 
population…to conquer the positions” it voluntarily relinquished over many years.  One 
month later the Minister of Education, Valentin Homan, declared that Jews could not be 
assimilated into the body politic due to their membership in a different “race.”  In April, 
Justice Minister Edmund von Micecz announced that Jewish interests were “diametrically 
opposed” to Hungarian national interests.   As in Germany anti-Jewish riots took place 
and police raids were made into Jewish quarters and random arrests were made.  The 
post-war nationalist Union of Hungarian Protectors of Race was established in May 1938 
led by the “White Terrorist” Ivan Hejjas who believed that the Jewish Question would 
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have been solved in 1919 if the country had resorted to a widespread policy of 
pogroms.189 
The threat of forced mass migration from Poland, Rumania and Hungary thus 
played a significant role in the conception of the Evian Conference.  Fears of a flood of 
destitute refugees from the East helped to shape the terms of the official invitation, the 
scope of the committee’s action and the deliberate decision to avoid any reference to the 
Jewish ethnicity of the real and potential refugees.  Anti-Semitism would be conveniently 
subsumed under the rubric of “political” persecution paving the way for the Jews of 
Central Europe to merely play the role of spectator in a drama in which the central figure 
was increasingly desperate for salvation.  The Evian Conference was seen by many as a 
beacon of light in an ever more dark and dangerous world but, as will be demonstrated, it 
proved for the majority in peril to be a road to nowhere. 
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Chapter 4 
“Firmly Fixed American Tradition” 
“It is a fantastic commentary on the inhumanity of our times that for thousands and thousands of 
people a piece of paper with a stamp on it is the difference between life and death.”1 
 
 
The revelation of the Evian Conference generated varying degrees of public and 
private support. On the same day as the State Department announcement of the 
proceeding the President declared that the primary American contribution to the 
immigration dilemma would be the consolidation of the annual German and Austrian 
quotas (open to both Christians and Jews) but he did not anticipate any change in 
immigration laws.2 FDR knew that his administration faced political risk in promoting 
Jewish immigration into the U.S. and he attempted to downplay its focus on Jews by 
asserting that “a great many Christians, too, a very large number” would benefit from the 
conference.3  
Roosevelt confided in Judge Irving Lehman, the brother of the New York 
Governor, that he hoped that “narrow isolationists” would not attack his conference 
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proposal out of “purely partisan objectives.”4 Lehman lauded the Chief Executive for his 
efforts and declared him to be the spokesman and moral voice for “those who are 
oppressed [and] deprived of freedom.”  The Presidential action, Lehman believed, 
followed in the wake of time-honored American values and would “rouse the conscience 
of humanity [and] restore sanity to a world gone [mad]…As an American and as a Jew I 
want to say, ‘Thank you.’”5 The President responded that he believed the conference 
would engender “far-reaching consequences” for “political refugees” but he regretted the 
inability of the United States to accept “more than a small proportion.”6 
The formation of the meeting carried on a “firmly fixed American tradition” 
dating back to the days of the Pilgrims, Puritans, Huguenots and Catholics. The “new 
world has been and is a haven for the politically oppressed.”7 New York City Mayor 
Fiorello LaGuardia was convinced that the clarion call of the President had “made a 
profound impression on the chancelleries of Europe.  At least there [was] one land that 
says ‘shame, shame, on your outrageous conduct!’” Women’s rights advocate, Mrs. 
Carrie Chapman Catt, appealed to the Administration to dispatch naval vessels to Europe 
to transport involuntary émigrés to the United States while carrying, in the opposite 
direction, pro-Nazi sympathizers residing within America.8  
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Conservative Rabbi Simon Greenberg of the Har Zion Temple and President of 
the Rabbinical Assembly of America viewed the announcement of the conference as 
heartening to “every lover of liberty and human decency” regardless of the lack of any 
liberalization of immigration quotas. Elias Rex Jacobs (1892-1979), editor and publisher 
of the pro-Zionist Buffalo Jewish Review, called upon Congress to “modify the 
Immigration Act” as “the number admissible under the present quota is much too 
limited.”  Dr. Dan B. Brummett, editor of the Methodist Christian Advocate in Kansas 
City, envisaged the Evian Conference as a shining example of the “best American 
traditions” of offering sanctuary to political and religious refugees and urged 
liberalization of national immigration policy. Dr. William E. Gilroy, editor of the 122 
year old Congregational Christian Churches' The Advance, believed that United States’ 
immigration policy “ought to be subject to modification or…appeal to some higher 
authority where consideration of justice and humanity are involved.” Dr. William Hiram 
Foulkes, the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, believed the 
convocation of the meeting harmonized with the “essential American spirit” and together 
with Dr. Willard E. Shelton, the editor of The Christian Evangelist, sought modification 
of the quota system.9 
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Joseph Tenenbaum, one of the leaders of the American economic boycott against 
Germany, presciently warned that failure to act at the planned talks would result in a 
“campaign of extermination of the six million Jews living under the shadow of Hitler.”10 
The Executive Council of Churches of Christ in America adopted a resolution on March 
25 supportive of the Presidential invitation.  “We rejoice in the action of our State 
Department in appealing for international cooperation to provide a haven of relief” within 
the United States and abroad for “all refugees from Austria.  We commend the cause of 
these new victims to the prayer and active support of the churches of America.”11 
Popular support was reflected in various newspapers.  Foreign correspondent, 
columnist and Pulitzer Prize winner Anne O’Hare McCormick described the 
“heartbreaking” scenes of long lines of Jews seeking visas from U.S. Consulates abroad 
while “waiting in suspense” for the outcome of the Evian Conference.  She believed that 
the issue facing America and the world was not how many “unemployed” could be added 
to the national rolls of the unemployed.  Rather, the world faced a fundamental “test of 
civilization.”  Could America accept the moral guilt, McCormick asked, if Germany was 
allowed to continue with its blatant “policy of extermination” of the Jewish people?12 
Some writers to the Editor shared the sentiments of Carrie Chapman Catts and 
suggested that the United States expel Nazi sympathizers and replace them with anti-
Nazis seeking to leave Germany.13 British journalist Wickham Steed castigated Prime 
                                                 
     
10Boycott: Nazi Goods and Services (March-April 1938), 3 cited in Spear, “The United States and the 
Persecution of German Jews,” 242. 
 
     
11Schneiderman, ed., American Jewish Year Book Review of the Year 5698, 98. 
 
     
12Anne O’Hare McCormick, “Europe,” New York Times, July 4, 1938, 12.  
 
     
13Washington Post, March 30, 1938, 6. 
123 
 
Minister Neville Chamberlain and Foreign Minister Lord Halifax for not attending the 
meeting in France or issuing a statement condemning the “abominable persecution” of 
the Jews.  Steed suggested that for every Jew “robbed” and expelled from the Reich “one 
Aryan German” should be sent back to Germany, “deducting from his wealth the 
proportion needed to help the Jewish destitute.”  How long, he asked, could Western 
civilization sit back and watch the “greatest” atrocity of the century? 14 
The Evian Conference was lauded as a testimonial of America’s tradition of 
providing a haven to the oppressed of the world and represented history’s first endeavor 
utilizing a “round-table conference of nations” to resolve a dilemma “as old as the 
Caesars.”  Many refugees seeking entry were seen as representing the most desirable 
category of immigrants possessing intelligence and resourcefulness that would benefit the 
country.  Thousands of refugees could be admitted “without changing anything—except 
for the better.”15  The American Committee for the Protection of Minorities published an 
appeal in the press, supported by 125 notable citizens, calling upon the world’s citizenry 
to join together in a “great cooperative endeavor to ask the dictatorships to let the 
oppressed people go; to welcome these exiles in so far as it is possible; to respect their 
integrity and to protect their liberty.”16  Correspondent Clarence Streit observed that the 
three major powers, the United States, Britain and France controlled “so large a share of 
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the less populated” regions of the world and its resources that the outcome and “fate” of 
the Evian Conference lay “virtually in their hands.”17 
A commentary in a Jewish newspaper predicted that “history will be made” at the 
commencement of the international council.  Although the possibilities of rescue were 
uncertain and it was doubtful that participating nations would significantly alter their 
immigration restrictions, “the significance of the refugee conference is profound when 
viewed in the light of the isolationist policies of the great, modern democracies.”  The 
occasion “mark[ed] the re-entry of Democracy—as a way of life—into the mainstream of 
world political action”; a counterbalance to the “ideology of totalitarianism.”  Asking the 
ultimate question: “Where is the conscience of the world?” he believed the answer would 
be given at Evian.18  Some heralded the Conference as the “voice of Democracy” 
overpowering the “angry roar of Fascism’s thunder” and represented the “first rebuke” of 
Nazi ideology on the “part of Democracy”; an “uncompromising and…vigorous” 
response.19  FDR’s call for the conference represented, to one editorialist, the “strongest 
kind of condemnation of Hiterlistic and other savage attacks upon human rights” and the 
“moral isolation” of those committing such “barbaric practices.”  It also demonstrated 
that America was fulfilling its humanitarian responsibilities and could no longer be 
accused of “failing to act.” Optimistically, and perhaps unrealistically, the writer 
predicted that “such spontaneous expressions [of support] by organized groups of all 
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kinds [left] no doubt” that the American people favored the granting of “asylum…to as 
many as can possibly be provided with such means of escape…”20  Roosevelt’s move was 
a “precedent-shattering move tantamount to a public rebuke” of the Reich’s racial 
policies.21 
The editorial board of The Crisis expressed dismay at the “crushing brutality” 
inflicted on the Jews in the Reich that was similar to the persecution faced by African-
Americans within the United States.  The journal criticized those who had 
“expressed…sympathy” for foreign Jews while turning a blind eye to the plight of blacks 
living within the United States.  However, “unlike the Jews in modern Germany, they 
know lynching” and view “with a twisted smile” white protests against Nazi anti-
Semitism that ignored the plight of the “Negroes”: “raiding mobs in Dixie,” limited 
admissions to institutions of higher education, the observance of “rigid color lines” by 
white Christians and attempts to provide employment for European refugees while the 
black “knocks at the doors of a thousand businesses seeking employment in vain.”  
Nevertheless, The Crisis called upon all African-Americans to oppose “Hitler and 
all that he represents.”  The primary institutional difference in the treatment of blacks 
within the United States and Jews living in Germany was the application of “every 
instrument of the state” against the Jewish minority.  Jews faced governmental censure 
while African-Americans faced institutional “indifference.”  All blacks should contest 
“Hitlerism” but American priorities should be directed towards a democratic institution 
that operated as a “reality for all minorities of whatever race, religion and or color.”  
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Secretary of the NAACP Walter White called upon “intelligent American Negro citizens” 
to demonstrate “contempt for and condemnation” of German anti-Jewish policies and 
warned that the failure of the white and black races and all religious denominations to 
oppose prejudice would result in the establishment within the States of the “horror that is 
Nazi Germany.”22 “American Negroes,” the NAACP declared, hailed the actions of the 
Administration for its efforts to find sanctuary for Jewish refugees.23 
While many agreed with the premise of the conference there were groups and 
individuals who opposed any modification of the immigration quota or the concept of the 
conference itself. Such differences cut across religious and political lines. Dr. Guy Emery 
Shipler, editor of the Episcopalian magazine The Churchman, viewed the international 
gathering as representative of the “finest American tradition in a world shot through with 
fear and cursed with timid politicians” but opposed, along with Rev. R. I. Gannon, S.J. 
President of Fordham University, any revision of the quota system due to the high level 
of domestic unemployment.  The Reverend Francis Talbot, editor of the Catholic weekly 
America, alleged modification of the annual quota would not be in the interest of the 
nation as it would be “folly for us to admit a greater influx of refugees with alien 
ideologies who could not be absorbed without grave economic, political and social 
readjustments.”   Dr. Samuel McCrea Cavert, General Secretary of The Federal Council 
of Churches of Christ in America, supported the “overture” of the Administration but 
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believed that the current quota allotments were “sufficient” to meet the needs of a 
“substantial number” of involuntary refugees.  William Green, President of the American 
Federation of Labor, believed that the United States “should take the lead” in the refugee 
resettlement issue and cited America’s custom of offering succor to victims of political 
and religious persecution.  It would be “cruel [and] illogical” and out of step with time 
honored “principles” if immigration was closed off entirely.  However, current domestic 
economic conditions mandated that the nation continue to follow the existing quota 
limitations.  Dr. Hiram Wesley Evans, the Imperial Wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux 
Klan, opposed any scheme to encourage additional immigration believing that the 
available openings would “most likely…be filled” by those refugees who met the 
mandated entry requirements.24 
Dr. Stephen S. Wise, president of the American Jewish Committee and Roosevelt 
confidante, did not believe Congress “should or would” change the existing quotas. He 
would accept the admission of a “rather limited number of children” but if there should 
develop a “conflict between our duty to those children and our duty to our country, 
speaking for myself as a citizen, I should say, of course, that our country comes 
first.”25Wise predicted in an address to a Detroit meeting of the Zionist Organization of 
America (ZOA) that the conference would result in a “dismal failure” unless Britain 
altered its Palestine immigration policy.26  Privately, he labeled Roosevelt's plan as a 
“gesture which meant little…One might have expected more from an administration that 
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pretends pity.”27  Publicly, he read to the conference a telegram received from FDR 
supportive of Zionist aspirations for Palestine in which the President stated that he had 
followed the “rehabilitation of the Jewish Homeland with deep interest” and hoped that 
“constructive action” on the part of the ZOA would lead to the “realization of a noble 
ideal.” 28  Despite such expressions of support, however, the Administration had ensured 
that during the Evian Conference Palestine would not be considered as an option for 
Jewish resettlement.   
Representative Samuel Dickstein, Democrat, NY, the Jewish Chairman of the 
House Committee on Immigration, stated that “under the existing conditions it would be 
unwise to tamper with the immigration or quota law.”  Dr. J. D. Hertzler, Professor of 
Sociology at the University of Nebraska, supported an international refugee congress as a 
means of dispersing the refugees over a number of democratic nations while highlighting 
the political and cultural milieu that had created the crisis but he opposed any alteration 
of immigration quotas as detrimental to American employment. 
Dr. Cyrus Adler, president of the American Jewish Committee, resisted changes 
in the immigration laws “as it is not likely that any larger numbers would seek admission 
here than are now possible under the quotas.”29  Adler and his colleagues preferred the 
time-honored “sha-sha philosophy of Jewish polemics, which sought to turn away wrath 
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with gentle words, to obscure the Jew from public gaze.” 30  Mrs. C. M. White of Ft. 
Dodge, Iowa, opposed the admission of agitators from Germany, Austria and Russia and 
wanted aid to be given to the American poor before admitting “Europe’s penniless…”31 
An opinion poll for March 1938, at the time of the Anschluss, revealed that forty 
one percent of Americans believed that “Jews have too much power” in the United 
States; i.e., control of finance, commerce and entertainment.  Twenty five percent of 
respondents supported the exclusion of Jews from “government and politics” and twenty 
percent favored the expulsion of Jews from the country.  Nineteen percent were in 
support of an anti-Semitic campaign within the U.S. itself.32  Sixty eight percent of 
respondents to a May poll opposed the admission of Austrian and German refugees.33 A 
June Fortune magazine poll demonstrated that 67.4% of Americans believed that "with 
[economic] conditions as they are we should try to keep [refugees] out."  18.2% replied 
that "we should allow them to come but not ruin our immigration quotas" and only 4.9% 
favored increasing the annual allowance.  The remainder was undecided.34 A June Gallup 
poll demonstrated that seventy two percent of Americans believed “we should not allow a 
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larger number of Jewish exiles from Germany into the U.S.” and fifty two percent were 
opposed to contributing “money to help Jewish and Catholic exiles from Germany settle 
in other lands.”35 Eighty three percent stated in a 1939 poll that if they were elected to the 
Congress they would oppose any legislation that would allow “more European refugees” 
to enter the country.36 
Roman Catholic Father Charles E. Coughlin, an initial FDR supporter but later a 
vocal, high profile and passionate foe of the Administration’s New Deal, was one of the 
most outspoken anti-Semites of the 1930’s who actively made use of the press and 
broadcast media.  His rhetoric increasingly conjoined economic turmoil and an unstable 
banking system with world Jewry and Communism.  He called for the creation of a 
“corporative state” in America in which political parties would be abolished and each 
social “class” would have its own Congressional representative.  Selection of the 
President would be through a House vote rather than popular election.37  Utilizing his 
magazine, Social Justice, and his organization, The National Union for Social Justice, 
plus an association with the Christian Front, Coughlin maintained that he held “no 
animosity towards the Jews [but] did distinguish most carefully between good Jews and 
bad Jews as well as I do between the good gentiles and bad gentiles.”  He asserted that 
his primary focus lay on the “atheistic Jew and gentile, the communistic Jew and gentile 
who have been responsible…for the discriminations and the persecutions inflicted upon 
the Jews as a body.”  He believed that Jewish renunciation of and active opposition to 
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communism (which he postulated was the source of Nazism) would lead Christians to 
“extend the right hand of sympathy towards the persecuted Jews in Germany.”38 
The Veterans of Foreign Wars adopted a resolution calling for a complete 
cessation of immigration into the United States for a period of ten years. Mrs. William 
Baker, President General of the Daughters of the American Revolution, argued that the 
Federal Government should not “meddle in the affairs of other nations” and called for a 
more restrictive immigration policy and increased aid to American citizens.39 The 
American Legion Executive Committee opposed any move to liberalize the entry of 
“political and religious refugees” into the United States.  Such action would be “inimical 
to the welfare” of the nation.  Although the Legion was sensitive to the predicament of 
the victims of German policies its responsibilities toward “our own citizens under the 
present distressing circumstances compels consideration even to the exclusion of those in 
foreign countries, however sympathetic we may be to them in their present plight.”40 
Representative Edward T. Taylor (Dem., CO) demanded reassurances from the 
Administration that American involvement in the Evian Conference would not result in 
an “invitation to use the United States as a dumping ground for all these people.”41 
Representative Martin Dies, Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities, warned Secretary of State Cordell Hull that the Evian Conference would result 
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in an inundation of the U.S.  by “persecuted and jobless” European refugees and feared 
that there would be “little or no reciprocal action on the part of the other countries 
involved.” He also declared that the “first duty “of the American Government was to the 
American people, especially the unemployed and “overburdened taxpayers.” Admitted 
aliens would either displace Americans from the workforce or would have to be 
maintained on the public dole.  Consequently, he supported the use of private funds to 
promote resettlement in the underdeveloped and less inhabited regions of South 
America.42 
Representative Thomas J. Jenkins criticized Roosevelt for attempting to “embroil 
us in European entanglements [by] asking the people of the United States to make a 
haven here for those who are undesirable to European dictators.” He warned that any 
refugee plan would “provide an opening for a more liberal immigration policy” and 
represented a presidential “visionary excursion into the warm fields of altruism” while 
ignoring the “cold winds of poverty and penury” that affect the “ill-clothed, ill-housed, 
and ill-fed” American citizens.   He proposed that the European nations use the funds 
owed to the United States as war debt as the financial means of resettling refugees in 
“some uncontested section of the world.”  Entry of such aliens into the United States 
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would foster “enmity and suspicion” that would be disruptive to American society and 
life.43 
Democratic Senator Robert R. Reynolds, North Carolina, opposed any loosening 
or modification of U.S. immigration laws and blamed an “enormous alien influx” during 
the Great War and in the post-war period as being the root of widespread American 
worker unemployment.  “Excess alien baggage” had led to “burdensome taxation,” rising 
national debt, a budget deficit and the importation of “subversive” ideologies and 
activities.44  Reynolds called for slashing the current immigration quotas by ninety 
percent for at least ten years until rampant American unemployment was resolved. Any 
aliens committing a crime within U.S. borders must be deported and non-citizens barred 
from organizing or heading labor organizations.  The Government for its part should 
cease employing noncitizens, all immigration laws should be rigidly enforced and 
America must be protected from the “importation of inferior human stock.”45 
Republican Congressman Karl Stefan criticized an amendment submitted to the 
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization that supported the Evian 
Conference, describing it as “the most dangerous piece of legislation” that risked 
American involvement in “foreign entanglements.”  The Evian Committee would serve 
as a replacement for the failed League of Nations transforming the United States into the 
                                                 
     
43Rep. Thomas J. Jenkins, Congressional Record, Seventy-Fifth Congress, 3rd sess., vol. 83, part 4, 
March 28, 1938  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938), 4227. 
 
     
44Sen. Robert R. Reynolds, “Displacement of Americans by Aliens,” Congressional Record Appendix,  
Seventy-Fifth Congress, 3rd sess., vol. 9, March 14, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938), 989-990. 
 
     
45Sen. Robert R. Reynolds, “Deportation of Aliens,” Congressional Record Appendix,  Seventy-Fifth 
Congress, 3rd sess., vol. 9, March 24, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,1938), 1170-1171. Reynolds (June 18, 
1884-February 13, 1963) served in the Senate from 1932-1945. 
 
134 
 
“dumping ground” for all political refugees.  He believed that such aliens already resident 
in the country should be deported.  The United States should “clean our own house before 
meddling in foreign affairs.”  Stefan also asserted that creation of the Committee was a 
ploy to create a highly paid ($17,500 per year or twenty percent of funds appropriated for 
the U.S. delegation) Ambassadorship for Myron C. Taylor. Taylor’s role as the head of 
the American delegation could be filled, the Representative believed, by the current 
Ambassador to France at no additional cost to the American taxpayer.  South Dakota 
Republican Representative Francis H. Case echoed these sentiments by labeling Taylor’s 
salary as exorbitant and called for a reduction to $7,500 with the difference used for “the 
real purposes of the item.”  Rep. Clinton A. Woodrum, on the other hand, argued that “no 
one would seriously contend” that Taylor, “the distinguished gentleman,” would “be 
attracted to [the chairmanship of the committee] because of the salary.”  His payment 
should be reflective of the “high rank” of his prospective position.46 
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 Michigan Representative Clare E. Hoffman, addressing the fifth Annual National 
Defense Meeting held in Philadelphia on March 29, attended by seventy-three patriotic 
organizations, argued that America could no longer serve as the refuge of the 
“downtrodden and oppressed.”  Rather, the alien posed an internal threat by spreading 
dissatisfaction, intolerance, Communism and calls for the “destruction of the only 
existing land of refuge”; acts facilitated by a President who had ignored historical 
lessons, abandoned campaign promises and who had “charted a course at the end of 
which lay dictatorship.”47 
One writer to the editor of a leading national newspaper voiced the concerns of 
many average Americans.  The nation should provide assistance to citizens in need rather 
than extending “an invitation to feed and care for the agitators of Russia and Germany 
and Austria.” 48 The Nation believed that any loosening of current American immigration 
laws would require an “unmistakable demonstration of [positive] public opinion” in order 
to persuade Washington politicians to confront an issue that was deemed “too hot to 
handle.”49  Others continued the argument that FDR should aid America’s own 
impoverished and unemployed and not allow entry of thousands of foreign “unwanted 
citizens” in violation of immigration laws.50 A writer to an African-American newspaper 
described the “colored people of the United States [as] among the most persecuted in the 
world.”  He believed that American attention should be diverted away from the plight of 
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Jews in Germany and the excesses of Soviet Communism and re-directed towards 
domestic prejudice.  “If America would realize the situation as it is over here and forget 
Europe, we, the colored people, would receive some justice.”51 
Foreign popular reaction was as mixed as the American to the announcement, 
planning and course of the Evian Conference.  Jews, to some, were the innocent sufferers 
of “barbarous persecution and attacks” resulting from a “biological war of 
extermination.”52  Jews who were forcibly returned to the Reich faced a “death 
sentence.”53  Emile Borel contended that if a workable solution was unobtainable with 
Germany then the democratic nations must remain true to the tenets of the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and adopt a consistent approach and equitable cost sharing that would 
lead to a solution of the refugee dilemma.54 George Bidault argued that the “enlightened 
nations” must provide assistance to the Jewish and non-Aryan refugees or risk 
dishonoring French principle, pride and the Christian ethic.55  Swedish diplomat Olof 
Lamm called upon the United States to admit one hundred thousand Jewish refugees 
immediately “so that we can catch the refugees alive.”56 The Times of London noted three 
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weeks prior to the opening of the Evian Conference that the German police had arrested 
several thousand people, primarily Jews.  These actions were designed to “frighten those 
Jews who remain in Germany and thus confirm them in their desire to emigrate.”  
Simultaneously, it was a means of “exert[ing] pressure” upon the international 
delegations soon to meet on the banks of Lake Geneva.57  
The “civilized nations” owed a “moral obligation” to aid and assist the forced 
émigrés but faced the great difficulty of reconciling such obligations with “practical 
considerations”: the costs of resettlement, effects upon local economies and jobs and the 
fact that the majority of refugees were Jews who were not “universally welcome.”  
America, the editorialist believed, approached the Conference with “good intentions” but 
was constrained by its existing immigration laws and quotas.  The greatest benefit the 
United States could offer to enhance the likelihood of the meeting’s success was to 
provide funding for resettlement and the creation of an “atmosphere of liberal 
mindedness” that would “stimulate” the other attendees to “generous action.”58 
The British journal The Round Table compared the German refugee problem with 
that of the Bulgarians and Greeks following the end of the Great War.   None of the post-
war refugee problems was “capable of a single radical solution.”  The Greeks and 
Bulgarians were returning to their national homes whereas the German refugees were 
being forcibly expelled and sent onto the world stage as a stateless alien.  The first 
refugee problem was one of “movements of concentration” while the latter was a 
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movement of “dispersion.”  Moreover, land was available to the Greek and Bulgarian 
refugees due to the evacuation of other peoples and most of the migrants were 
agricultural rather than urban workers.  Outside of Zionist circles the concept of Jewish 
statehood was not envisaged as a rational solution by this and most other papers, the 
general public and governments.59   
During July, in the Portsmouth Evening News, English philosopher Bertrand 
Russell called for aid to the displaced Jews.  He believed that it was essential to exert 
“pressure [upon] our own Government to be hospitable to refugees and not too niggardly 
in granting them” entry and the right to re-establish a new life on British shores.  This 
prompted a response by the paper’s leading commentator, Raymond Burns, who believed 
that the refugee issue could only be solved if it was not tainted by “helpless 
emotionalism” which had the potential to create a “real anti-Semitic problem” in the 
island nation.  Britain, like France and the United States, Burns believed, could make the 
“greatest contribution” to solving the problem of resettlement but all three were nearing 
the “saturation point.” Further Jewish immigration, he predicted, would generate “latent 
hostility to the newcomers” and could only result in a “sense of grievance” among the 
domestically unemployed natives.  Significantly, such emotion was shared by the 
professional classes, including physicians who feared that foreign doctors would engage 
in a “cut-price racket.”  Burns acknowledged that some form of resettlement was 
necessary but “for the sake of the refugees [Jews] it must not mean Great Britain.”  
Consequently, “extensive territory [such as East Africa and excluding Palestine] must be 
delineated for mass colonization.  The Bournemouth Daily Echo asserted that Britons 
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feared the “unrestricted entry” of all refugees: “Just as we don’t want too many Jews we 
don’t want too many Chinese or Frenchmen for that matter.”  Ironically, less than ten 
thousand refugees were in Britain in July 1938.60  
Lord Beaverbrook’s Daily Express vocalized its opposition to Jewish immigration 
in an editorial, “Shall All Come In?”  Although the British public was moved by “some 
sad stories of the persecuted Jews” it was necessary to ask “where will it end?”  
“Powerful agitation” was at play in the United Kingdom seeking the admission of all 
Jews “without question or discrimination.”  Such a humanitarian policy would be 
“unwise” as it could “stir up” domestic factions that “batten on anti-Semitic propaganda.”  
Fearing that the nation would come under pressure to admit Jewish co-religionists from 
Eastern Europe the paper concluded that “because we DON’T want anti-Jewish uproar 
we DO need to show common sense in not admitting all applicants.”61  
Beaverbrook’s other paper, the Sunday Express, warned of the refugee Jewish 
threat to the domestic economy and professions.  Jews were “overrunning the country” 
seeking the right to practice in the law, medicine and dentistry.  Consequently, the British 
professional class was driven to “resent their living being taken from them by immigrants 
from foreign countries, whether they be Jew or gentile.”  Continental Jews had 
contributed to the rise of foreign anti-Semitism by being “too prosperous.” After all, “half 
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the lawyers and doctors in Germany were Jews.”62  The Socialist Medical Association in 
London warned that admission of German refugees would threaten the “dilution of our 
industry with non-Union, non-Socialist labor.”  The Conservative Sunday Express 
editorialized that “just now there is a big influx of foreign Jews” into the United 
Kingdom who were “overrunning the country.”63 An editorial in the Palestine Post 
forecast the inevitable failure of the Evian Conference.  Although nations had voluntarily 
offered support to the cause of the Chinese Nationalists and Spanish Republicans there 
remained a global “conspiracy of silence” towards tangible aid to the persecuted Jews of 
Germany.64   
Echoes of the L’Affaire Dreyfuss and the lack of a meaningful international 
response led commentator Victor Basch to lament that the “sentiment of human solidarity 
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no longer survives.”65 Another French paper warned that failure to act in a meaningful 
manner would hurl the “humane principles” espoused in the Rights of Man into the 
“abyss.”66  The Depression and its associated economic stresses were believed to foster 
the development of anti-Semitism for it was a “natural tendency” to blame a defenseless 
population for “disagreeable conditions.” Such a worldview predicted the proliferation of 
Nazi anti-Jewish ideology as manifested by events in Poland, Rumania, Hungary and 
within some French political factions.67  Hatred of Jews, some believed, was the genesis 
of the refugee crisis and the convocation of the Evian Conference was proof of its 
recognition by the international community. Its solution, however, depended upon the 
“Christian conscience” granting charity to the stateless; a humanitarian act that could not 
cause any recipient nation to be harmed.68 
Some argued that the creation of a “class of unwanted people” was the natural 
consequence of political upheaval and cited earlier events such as the French and Russian 
Revolutions.69  The “booming guns of August 1914” marked the end of relatively free 
transit across national borders and led to governments enacting stricter passport 
controls.70 A unique species of humanity, “Homo Europaicus,” appeared on the world 
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scene, devoid of home, hearth and country. Democratic nations had become “inured to 
the sight of Jews and Aryans, Liberals and Communists—whether they were professors, 
traders, politicians, students, authors and priests—streaming out of Germany.” 71   A new 
political and social reality had been created.  
Time, some believed, was working against the resettlement of large numbers of 
Jews and a “catastrophe” could only be averted by the Reich taking positive actions that 
would assist resettlement.72  Some papers warned that the forced emigration of Jews, 
especially those deprived of adequate funds, would foster the spread of anti-Semitism 
within the receiving countries.  No state, it was argued, could absorb Jewish refugees 
without generating the “same kind of prejudice” that had led to such “extreme measures” 
within Germany.73 Some attempted to place the roots of anti-Semitism within Jewry 
itself.  The “victims” of Nazi persecution “were not so blameless as it was first thought.”  
Although acting in a fashion “contrary to ethical principles,” the Germans were 
compelled to take steps that would counter the perceived Jewish dominance of the 
professions, press and the economy.  “’Some think that they have got too strong a 
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position for such a small minority.”  Resentment and “opposition” to such control was a 
natural reaction which, under the proper circumstances and setting, could devolve into a 
“general attack” against the perceived oppressor.  “’This is how pogroms occurred in 
Russia and Rumania.’”74 The right wing anti-Semitic Argentine paper, La Fronda, 
cautioned that the “waters of Evian bring typhus.”  El Pueblo called for immigration 
restrictions that would protect Argentina from dangerous “physical, moral and 
ideological point[s] of view.”75 
The extreme French Right, like its American counterpart, sought to totally ban the 
admission of any political or religious refugees.  Journalist Raymond Recouly 
commented in the Gringoire that official German anti-Semitism was an inhumane policy 
but nevertheless acceptance of persecuted Jews would result in a “violent reaction” in 
France. Le Journal called for the internment of refugees within concentration camps and 
during the Anschluss Lucien Rebatet predicted that “sooner or later the concentration 
camp will become a necessity that remains open to the scum of the entire continent.”  
Unless the French Government enacted strict controls on immigration the influx of alien 
Jews would result in a “blind pogrom—brutal and liberating… [that would] take care of 
everything.”  Maurice Ajam strongly supported immigration restrictions in an issue of La 
Dépêche de Toulouse (The Dispatch from Toulouse), a strong advocate of the Radical 
Party in the provinces.  “Racism may be a folly” but it was essential for a “nation’s 
general well-being.” The resistance of Jews to assimilation into the dominant culture 
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posed a threat to all of the “admirable mixed breeds” responsible for the uniqueness and 
“prodigiously interesting” aspects of the nation.76 
The French Catholic paper La Croix (The Cross) echoed the opinion of the French 
delegation to Evian that the admittance of two hundred thousand refugees following the 
end of the Great War had brought France to the saturation point and could no longer 
accept forced émigrés. While France had traditionally served as a “haven” for involuntary 
migrants further admissions would place the nation in “danger…of self-destruction on the 
altar of love of its neighbor.”  The totalitarian regimes had been “generous enough to 
make us a present of some of their bacteria,” i.e. Jews who were the purveyors of Marxist 
dogma.  Nonetheless, despite such potential perils, France could not ignore human 
suffering and owed a “duty to be upright and humane.”77 Otherwise the nation would be 
complicit in the absolute “extermination” of an entire people.  Others in the United 
Kingdom averred that inaction would “make cowards of us all."78 
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      Some foreign circles regarded Roosevelt’s initiative as a symbol of American 
responsibility or obligation to open its doors to would-be immigrants.  The United States 
should provide a “fitting welcome” for Austrian and German Jews as it is “clear” that the 
geographic size and resources of America outstripped those of any Continental European 
power.  The solution of the Jewish Question posed “manifold and grave difficulties.” It 
was unreasonable to expect that nations which did not participate in the persecution of its 
Jewish minority should bear any financial, economic or social burdens or responsibilities 
for the maintenance and support of stateless refugees.79 
      Some opposed the idea of mass Jewish migration and relocation and supported a 
policy of gradual infiltration or dispersal.  It was preferable to place Jews “in equal 
numbers everywhere” in order to avoid reaching a population threshold that threatened to 
incite anti-Semitism in the native population of the receiving countries.  Consequently, 
Jews would remain a perpetual minority that would not generate fear within the dominant 
majority.80  “The troubles of the Jews” began when their “numbers or influence” 
exceeded a certain ceiling resulting in a negative “impact” upon the local residents of the 
country of resettlement.81 It should be openly expressed, it was believed, that the mere 
presence of large groups of Jews would precipitate “difficult problems within certain 
countries” especially when their domestic influence was disproportionate to their group 
size.82  
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      Jews and Jewish groups around the world responded to Roosevelt’s invitation 
with expressions of appreciation and support.  A joint cable, signed by noted 
philanthropist and the Pittsburgh owner of the Kaufman Department Stores, Edgar J. 
Kaufmann, was sent from the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish 
Congress, the B’nai B’rith and the Jewish Labor Committee to Myron Taylor wishing the 
Conference success in achieving an “effective and speedy solution” of the refugee 
crisis.83 The German Jewish newspaper, Centralverein Zeitung (C.V. Zeitung), the 
official publication of the Centralverein deutscher Stastsbürger jüdischen Glaubens 
(Central Union of German Citizens of Jewish Faith) posted a headline: “Are the Doors 
Opening?”  Alfred Hirschberg, a liberal German attorney and editor-in-chief, believed 
that deliverance lay just beyond the horizon.  A CV Zeitung reporter, upon arrival in 
Geneva, became skeptical that the international gathering would bear any fruit.  Such 
pessimism was echoed by Der Schild (The Shield) which represented the National League 
of Jewish Frontline Veterans. The Jüdische Rundschau (Jewish Review) of Robert 
Weltsch, on the other hand,  alleged that the Evian Conference carried great symbolic 
value focusing international attention on the Jewish Question, “one of the great public 
problems of our time” which would be greatly aided by American leadership and 
participation.84 
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       Banker Max Warburg opposed mass resettlement of Jewish refugees due to its 
potential for stimulating global anti-Semitism and supported a slower rate of evacuation 
lest rescue efforts “defeat its own ends.”  He wanted the Intergovernmental Committee 
for Political Refugees to exert pressure on the German Foreign Ministry not to increase 
the pace of forced emigration.  A more orderly system of departure could be financed by 
Jewish investment in German companies located abroad allowing, he believed, for Jews 
to retain a viable amount of financial assets.  By 1938 the Nazis, however, were no longer 
willing to allow direct transfer of Jewish assets as had been carried out under the earlier 
Ha’avarah plan and would later refuse to meet and negotiate with George Rublee, the 
Director of the IGCR.85  Jewish Federations within Poland lauded Roosevelt for his plan 
to rescue refugees but Myron C. Taylor sought, prior to the opening of the Evian 
Conference, to evade any consideration of the Jewish Question in Poland by avoiding 
official discussions with Polish Zionists.86   
      The Jewish Agency for Palestine hoped that the delegations would 
“emphatically protest” German anti-Semitism and adopt a “bolder immigration policy” 
                                                                                                                                                 
1933.  The organization began in 1893 but lost its autonomy following the 1938 Kristallnacht.  During 
1936 the association was renamed the Jüdischer Centralverein.  Hirschberg was later arrested and sent to 
the Sachsenhausen concentration camp but later was allowed to emigrate overseas.  Katherine Morris, 
Odyssey of Exile: Jewish Women Flee the Nazis for Brazil, (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 
1996), 116.  Robert Weltsch fled to Palestine in 1938 and became a correspondent for Ha’aretz.  During the 
Nazi economic boycott of April 1, 1933 in which a yellow star had to be prominently displayed on the 
outside of Jewish establishments, Weltsch wrote: “This is a painful reminder to all those who betrayed their 
Judaism...The Jew who denies his Judaism is no better a citizen than his fellow who avows it openly...The 
Jew is marked a Jew. He gets the Yellow Badge...This regulation is intended as a brand, a sign of contempt. 
We will take it up and make it a badge of honor.” Robert Weltsch, “Wear It With Pride, The Yellow 
Badge,” Jüdische Rundschau, no. 27, April 4, 1933, available from 
http://www1.yadvashem.org/about_holocaust/documents/part1/doc14.html; Internet; accessed March 12, 
2009. 
 
     
85
 Dippel, Bound Upon a Wheel, 226, 238. 
 
     
86
 Mashberg, “American Diplomacy,” 348.  
 
148 
 
that would afford “immediate relief.” The Agency recognized, however, that the numbers 
of immigrants that could be admitted into Palestine could not “be answered now with any 
degree of certainty.”87 The World Jewish Congress viewed the convening of the Evian 
Conference as an historic event representing the “first attempt to evolve a constructive 
and all-inclusive solution of the refugee problem” and believed it represented the “only 
hope” for hundreds of thousands of persecuted Jews. The Congress called upon the 
international missions to pressure the German Government into altering its economic 
policies that place Jews into a “state of complete destitution.”  The Evian Conference 
would be a futile exercise in diplomacy if it failed to “raise a firm protest against this 
shocking system which tramples underfoot the fundamental principles of justice and 
humanity.”  The World Congress also called for the inclusion of the Jews of Eastern 
Europe who also faced involuntary displacement.  New territories for immigration should 
be sought in underdeveloped regions but would entail a slow and expensive process.  
Palestine, the World Congress held, could absorb an annual quota of sixty thousand to 
one hundred thousand refugees per year.  Thus, it was necessary for the nations 
represented at the Evian Conference to convince the United Kingdom to honor its 
commitment to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine as outlined in the 1917 
Balfour Declaration.88 
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      The editor of the Palestinian paper Ha’aretz, Moshe Glickson, recorded that the 
Evian Conference had generated “immense esteem and admiration” for the American 
President from the Jews of the Diasporsa.89 Moshe Kleinman, the editorialist for Haolam, 
expressed gratitude to FDR and acknowledged the “historic importance” of the gathering.  
He was concerned about the potential for “further dispersion [of Jews] instead of the 
ingathering” into Palestine that was the dream of all Zionists; an ideal severely 
constrained by high costs, British immigration policies and Arab hostilities.90 Dr. 
Mordechai Ehrenpreis, Chief Rabbi of Sweden, who went to the conference as an 
observer, was moved by a “sense of growing optimism… [F]rom afar there shone the 
thought of Evian as a star of hope.”  The meeting could potentially reflect the “world’s 
conscience.”  Finally, he believed, the community of man had awakened to the evil that 
threatened Jewish existence in Central Europe.  The very convening of the Evian 
Conference represented a “resonant act” which provided hope for a “downtrodden and 
oppressed” people.”91   
      The Zionist Organization of America announced that a special edition of the 
Golden Book of the Jewish National Fund would be dedicated to Roosevelt with a 
citation acknowledging that his efforts on behalf of the Jewish people deserved to be 
“engraved in the hearts of the Jewish people.”92  Palestine was, however, to remain the 
prime focus of Jewish transfer and the Jewish Agency drafted a memorandum calling for 
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resettlement within Palestine and Transjordan.  British Zionists called upon the Home 
Government to immediately admit large numbers of German and Austrian Jews into the 
Mandate.  When it became clear that Britain did not intend to alter its policy on 
immigration into Palestine and would not broach the subject at the Conference the Zionist 
delegation at Evian announced that it would not be considered “worthwhile” for Chaim 
Weizmann to appear before a sub-committee “as one of fifty representatives of other 
private organizations.”93 
      A number of private organizations dealing with the refugee problem submitted 
to the British Home Secretary a memorandum on June 15, 1938 regarding the treatment 
of émigrés who had been allowed entry into the United Kingdom.  A deputation, chaired 
by the Archbishop of Canterbury called upon the Government to exert the utmost degree 
of international cooperation at the conference.94    
    It soon became clear at the Conference that territories with sizable Muslim 
minorities would be excluded from consideration as possible sanctuaries for stateless 
Jews.  The colonial powers feared that Muslim-Jewish discord would lead to instability 
within their possessions.  The importance of maintaining Arab support for Britain in the 
Middle East and elsewhere was summarized in statements made by Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain on April 20, 1939 (before the issuance of the May White Paper 
severely curtailing Jewish immigration into Palestine):  It was of “immense importance” 
strategically “to have the Moslem world with us…If we must offend one side, let us 
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offend the Jews rather than the Arabs.”95  Sir Herbert Emerson provided the British 
Government with a definition of “refugee” which would be utilized to control the 
numbers of Jews allowed via quota to enter Palestine.  According to this definition a 
refugee was a person who had “fled his country” for another locale due to fears that “his 
life was in jeopardy.”  Jews would not be considered refugees as long as they remained 
within Germany proper, albeit “oppressed” and “pursued” by an intolerant government 
and society.  They remained “responsible for their own fate.”  Therefore, the rescue work 
of Sir Herbert began only when the potential refugee crossed the frontier of the Reich.96 
      Some Jews, however, strongly doubted the success of the Conference.  S.A. 
Whaley, the Jewish Principal Secretary of Finance in the United Kingdom, predicted that 
the meeting would result in a “fiasco.”  He noted that few governments were currently 
admitting significant numbers of refugees and were unlikely to alter their entry policies.  
He expected the uttering of “platonic sympathies” from the various delegations and 
believed that the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees 
would not serve any “useful purpose” and, in fact, might interfere with the functions of 
the League’s High Commissioner.97  The Dutch Committee for Jewish Refugees advised 
relief organizations within The Netherlands not to send memoranda or petitions to the 
meeting as it had been “earnestly advised by the Foreign Office and the [Ministry of] 
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Justice, for highly commendable reasons that no petitions should be sent, particularly by 
Jews…either to the Dutch Government or to the Evian Conference.”98   
      Roosevelt apparently believed, as stated in the official invitation, that the bulk of 
the refugee work would be carried out and financed by private organizations. 
Consequently, he called upon the leaders of these groups to meet with him in Washington 
on April 14 in order to create the Presidential Advisory Committee on Political Refugees 
(PACPR); a construction which was tasked to cooperate with and render assistance to any 
rescue plans formulated by the international conference in Evian.  The objectives, 
however, were not clearly defined and any financing was expected to be donated by non-
governmental sources. The majority of its membership was, significantly, non-Jewish.99   
      James G. McDonald assumed the chairmanship during the first meeting on May 
16, 1938 and Samuel Cavert became secretary.  The committee set out to assess potential 
sites of resettlement and worked through the offices of the State Department with 
Roosevelt assuming little or no personal involvement. Assistant Secretary of State 
George Messersmith cautioned against too much optimism.  He advised the PACPR to 
“frankly face certain facts at the outset.”  Although the various delegations were “deeply 
moved by humanitarian instincts” the American diplomat observed they were attending 
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the congress with little “enthusiasm,” “much reserve” and minimal willingness to make 
national “sacrifices.”  Messersmith expected the delegates to “render lip service” to the 
assistance of refugees while avoiding any modification of their immigration policies.  
Although the consolidation of the American quotas for Germans and Austrians offered 
“little positive action” he hoped that the “liberal attitude” adopted by the United States 
towards the involuntary émigrés would “serve as an example and incentive to other 
countries” that would “go far towards relieving the situation.”100   
Messersmith’s sentiments proved to be quite accurate.  The groundwork was laid 
both privately and publically for the approach that would be adopted during the oration of 
the conference.  The importation of Jews created a potential risk to internal national 
security and stability.  Refugees posed a threat to the native work force and raised the 
specter of dependency upon the public coffers.  Palestine could have offered potential 
rescue to some of the refugees but British foreign interests vis-à-vis the Muslim world 
trumped humanitarian concerns.  Perhaps more importantly, the failure of the Jewish 
community to present a united front and to speak with one voice relegated the Central 
European Jews, the principal figures of the conference to the inconsequentiality of the 
sidelines; mere onlookers in the drama of life and death.   
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PART II 
HOPE ASCENDING 
Chapter 5 
Day One 
“Actual Racial Problem” 
 
“Shall we refuse the unhappy fugitives from distress that hospitality which the savages of the 
wilderness extended to our forefathers arriving in this land?  Shall oppressed humanity find no 
asylum on this globe?” Thomas Jefferson1   
 
“A conference is a gathering of important people who singly can do nothing, but together can 
decide that nothing can be done.” Fred Allen2 
 
      The original planning for the Intergovernmental Committee for Political 
Refugees (IGCPR or more familiarly known as the Evian Conference) called for two 
public sessions, which were later extended to six.  The expansion of the number of open 
sessions provided the envoys with an opportunity to indulge in lofty oratory that 
highlighted their humanitarian concerns while simultaneously explaining why their 
respective nations could not act.  Only one private meeting, composed of all the 
delegations, was held.  Two sub-committees, imbued with the spirit of the official 
invitation, would actually carry out the work of the conference.   
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The first, the Technical Sub-Committee, chaired by Judge Michael Hansson of 
Norway, was charged with the examination of the legal aspects of emigration. Each 
country would be asked to supply the particulars of their immigration laws and policies, 
an estimate of the number of refugees that would be allowed entry and the specifics 
regarding any required documentation. The panel would report their findings to the 
general conference.  The Hansson Committee would be composed of delegates from the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, The Netherlands and Switzerland, 
assisted by Sir Neill Malcolm; nations that had already expressed their resistance to 
accepting and subsidizing additional involuntary émigrés.  The response of this 
committee’s membership to its appointed task was “far from enthusiastic” marked by 
poor attendance at its initial meeting. In fact, by the time of the fourth public session 
Chairman Hansson, frustrated by the panel’s lack of interest, was forced to ask the 
delegations “to be good enough to send representatives to the second meeting of the Sub-
Committee.”  As will be noted later by the Chief Concierge of the Hotel Royal the 
opportunities for entertainment and recreation in the vicinity of Evian and Lake Geneva 
proved too difficult to resist. 3 
      The second working group, the Sub-Committee on the Reception of Those 
Concerned with the Relief of Political Refugees from Germany (including Austria), 
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chaired by the Australian Minister of Commerce, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. White 
(who openly opposed immigration into Australia), included emissaries from Belgium, the 
United Kingdom, United States, France, Mexico, Peru, Cuba, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and 
Venezuela.  Testimony would be restricted to those “organizations concerned with the 
relief of political refugees from Germany (including Austria)” and a memorandum would 
be submitted to the general meeting synopsizing the presentations.      
     Thirty nine refugee organizations were in attendance at the Evian Conference 
but only twenty four were ultimately permitted to address the Sub-Committee limited by 
severe time constraints.  Each group would be allowed one spokesman who would be 
granted a maximum of ten minutes; later abbreviated to five minutes.4  Although these 
Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) were expected to finance any resettlement project 
they were allowed to participate only in an unofficial capacity.5  Four different strategies 
or themes resonated among these PVO’s: 1. Mass emigration to Palestine coupled with a 
relaxation of the British imposed quota; 2. Assimilation within lands of temporary haven; 
3. Resettlement in remote and underdeveloped territories and 4. Granting minority rights 
to Jews in nations offering sanctuary.6  The Jewish representatives were “marched in one 
at a time, like military defaulters brought up before their commanding officer,” allowed 
to make their presentation and answer questions (if any were asked) and then 
“dismissed.”  The hearing was handled by the chairman, T.W. White, with such 
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“exemplary efficiency and dispatch” that it was completed over the course of one 
afternoon.7   
      Representatives of Austrian refugee organizations were barred from attending 
any of the meetings.  Artur Rosenberg, representing the Federation of Austrian Exiles, 
labeled such a restriction as “scandalous [as] the committee was called to discuss our own 
people.”8 He had informed the American delegation that seventy-five percent of Austrian 
citizens would leave Greater Germany if allowed to retain sufficient financial assets.  A 
Nazi Government spokesman, however, branded such a claim as “too ridiculous for 
words” and cited the plebiscite of April 10, in which 99.75% of eligible Austrians 
supported the Anschluss.9  
The German authorities (possibly Artur Seyss-Inquart himself) sent two Austrian 
Jews, Professor Heinrich Neumann von Hethars, a noted otorhinolaryngologist and Dr. 
Joseph Loewenherz, head of the Jewish community in Vienna, to the meeting and were 
rumored to have been authorized to seek specific proposals that would increase the 
facility and rate of Jewish emigration.10  It was reported that Neumann bore an unofficial 
plan from the Reich Government in which Germany sought the evacuation of forty 
thousand Austrian Jews by August 1; a request that Neumann claimed Bérenger took 
“under advisement.”  The physician claimed that his personal situation was “very, very 
difficult” as he was required to return to Germany “with a definite number to be 
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evacuated, not promises of investigation by commissions, or offices.”11 Neumann denied 
that he had been given concrete directives by the German Government to present to the 
delegations.  Rather, he would simply be following recommendations offered by Nazi 
officials in Vienna.12 
      Otto Hirsch of the National Representation of German Jews (Reichsvertretung 
der Jüden in Deutschland), Michael Traub of the Palestine Office, Paul Eppstein, Zionist 
Seigfried Moses and Dr. Werner Rosenberg, who led a mission from the Hilfsverein der 
Jüden in Deutschland, attended the conference.13  Lord Winterton, the head of the British 
delegation and later chairman of the permanent Intergovernmental Committee based in 
London, met privately with the German Jewish mission during the beginning of the 
Conference. 14 Hirsch advised him of the importance of Jews being allowed to retain 
sufficient financial assets to facilitate resettlement and estimated that approximately two 
hundred thousand Jews sought to leave the Reich.  Hirsch intimated that the Nazi 
Government would negotiate with the Reichsvertretung upon the conclusion of the 
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conference.  The one remaining detail was the choice of destination and Palestine, Hirsch 
believed, provided the best location.  However, unbeknownst to him the British 
Government, through discussions with the Americans, sought to block discussion of the 
Mandate at the Conference.  Winterton did allow that a limited number of Jews would be 
resettled in African colonial holdings but it was not possible to increase the number of 
visas for Palestine.15    
       Myron C. Taylor met with Lord Winterton and Sir Charles Michael Palairet, 
K.C.M.G., (a Jesuit; Minister Plenipotentiary to Austria at the time of Anschluss) during 
the evening of July 5 prior to the formal opening of the conference. The British, 
supportive of the work of the League’s High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, 
Major General Sir Neill Malcolm, would not agree to any measures that would lead to a 
diminution of the League’s work.  Taylor responded that the United States could and 
would not participate in the creation of any international refugee body that would serve 
an “advisory” role to the High Commission but believed that the refugee organizations 
should serve complementary not subsidiary roles.  He also acknowledged that it was the 
bureaucracy of the Secretariat of the League, and not Secretary General Joseph Avenol, 
that maintained “hostil[ity] to the extreme” towards the Evian Conference and hoped for 
its failure.16 A Major Abrams, an official involved with League refugee operations, was 
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distinctly antagonistic and engaged in “stirring up” opposition to the Conference 
especially among the Latin American delegations.17   
      The British delegation eventually agreed to join their American counterparts in 
the establishment of an “informal drafting committee,” excluding the Latin American 
nations, to produce a final resolution that would be presented to the heads of the various 
delegations. 18  Foreign Office Advisor Roger Makins believed that America, by 
necessity, must assume the leadership role in the Conference lest the “meeting…be 
chiefly occupied with passing the buck.”  French Diplomat Pierre Bressy expressed his 
Government’s opposition to locating the planned Intergovernmental Committee for 
Political Refugees in Paris maintaining that such a site would “attract undesirable 
elements” and risk jeopardizing cordial diplomatic relations with Germany.   
      Taylor then outlined his conception of the Intergovernmental Committee for 
Political Refugees (IGCPR) which “tremendously impressed” Winterton.  The American 
believed that Sir Neill Malcolm and Judge Michael Hansson of the Nansen Office 
possessed too much of a “pushing character” that would be disruptive to the efforts of the 
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working group.  Consequently, they were dropped from consideration of formal 
membership on the soon-to-be established committee.  Winterton and Bérenger then 
advised Taylor that he bore the primary responsibility to negotiate with the various 
delegations due to his role of Chairman and the “American initiative” that prompted the 
convening of the Conference.19  U.S. Ambassador to Britain, Joseph Kennedy, was, 
however, skeptical of Taylor’s diplomatic qualifications and believed that he “not only 
[lacked] knowledge of the problem, but was making no attempt to get it up.”20 
      Despite rather inauspicious beginnings the Evian Conference formally convened 
on July 6, 1938 in the Grand Ballroom of the Hotel Royal with 140 representatives from 
thirty two countries.  The meeting was scheduled to adjourn by July 17 to allow enough 
time for the delegates to reach Paris by July 19 when the King of England paid an official 
visit.  The Conference would resume in Paris if necessary.21  A telegram, read into the 
official record, was sent on behalf of the members of the Evian Conference to the 
American President by Myron Taylor.  The committee offered FDR it’s “gratitude” for 
his attempt to devise a “practical solution” to the problem of forced emigration and was 
hopeful that a general “collaboration” of all parties would produce “successful results.”22 
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Senator Henri Bérenger, head of the French delegation, chairman of the French 
Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and former member of the League of Nations 
High Commission for Refugees, served as temporary chairman, and welcomed the 
delegates.23  He described France as a nation of “refuge” and thus was certain that the 
Conference would achieve something “new and practical” to resolve the refugee crisis.  
While “heartily welcome[ing]” the attending private organizations he described the 
meeting as a simple “body” created by Roosevelt which would not serve as a “platform 
for declarations.” The American President’s goal was not to create any “innovations” but 
to bring together a committee composed of countries which would include non-members 
of the League.24 
      Myron C. Taylor, head of the American mission, next approached the podium.  
He began by describing the “millions” of people who had been or were at potential risk of 
being forcibly expelled from their country without consideration of the potential 
consequences.  The fact that the world was in the grips of an economic depression with 
high unemployment, social unrest, a rising population and declining standards of living 
greatly complicated the search for a solution to the refugee problem.  The calamity could 
no longer be considered a “purely private concern” but required international cooperation 
and action.  A “major forced migration” was underway, affecting all races and creeds, 
professions and trades, forcing the nations of temporary and permanent refuge to rapidly 
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devise a “long-range program of [a] comprehensive scale” that would solve the problem 
of “political refugees.”25 
      The “urgency” of the present situation led President Roosevelt to convene the 
Evian Conference.  Taylor believed that the current humanitarian problem differed from 
earlier migrations.26  Instead, the modern world faced an “artificially stimulated” exodus 
generated by the policies of “some countries” (Germany was not specifically) that 
resulted in the creation of “great bodies of reluctant migrants who must be absorbed in 
abnormal circumstances at a time of stress.”  The scope of the problem was so “vast and 
complex” that only international cooperation could create a mechanism that would lead to 
a “practicable amelioration of the condition of the unfortunate human beings with whom 
we are concerned.”  The only realistic goal of the initial Evian Conference, therefore, 
would be to establish the groundwork for the “machinery” of an intergovernmental body, 
preferably based in Paris that would over time devise a practical solution.  While ideally 
all international refugee situations should be under the auspices of the League Assembly 
necessity required focusing on the “most pressing” issue of “political refugees” stemming 
from Germany and Austria.  Therefore, the subjects of the committee would be limited to 
migrants who sought to leave the Reich because of “their political opinions, religious 
beliefs or racial origins” and those who had already left and were residing in temporary 
havens.  Significantly, Taylor never used the word “Jew.”  Age would play a role in the 
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ability of a Jew to leave Germany and the demographics and a breakdown by age in 
provide in table 6.  
 
Table 6: Demographics of Jewish Population in Germany as of 
 January 1, 1938 
 
Age Group                           Number                               Percent 
 
All ages                               350,000                                100.0 
 
Under 20                               54,300                                  16.0 
20-44                                   106,700                                  30.0 
45-50                                     37,100                                  11.0 
Over 50                               151,900                                  43.0 
Statistics based on information supplied to the Evian Conference by the Central 
Organization of German Jewry.  The predominance of older versus younger Jews was 
due to emigration and falling birthrates.  Arieh Tartakower, “The Jewish Refugees,” 324. 
 
Taylor acknowledged the work of the League’s High Commission for Refugees 
from Germany (HCR) and the Nansen Office but it was the official American view that 
these organizations should serve a complementary role to a new body that would be 
created by the Conference to deal with specific groups of refugees.  Unlike the British 
who wanted any permanent Intergovernmental Committee to be subsumed by the League, 
the Americans wanted the new organization to be independent, noting that the League 
had not demonstrated any “great interest” in the German and Austrian refugee problem 
prior to the Roosevelt invitation and that it tended to limit “refugee work to juridical 
protection.”  The United States believed that Germany would cooperate to a greater 
degree with a committee located outside of Geneva and membership on the committee 
could more easily be restricted to receiving States.   
      Taylor also called for a confidential exchange of information between the 
delegations regarding the “number and type” of refugees that would be acceptable to each 
nation based on its current immigration and policies as well as identification of the 
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territories on to which resettlement could occur.  The issue of appropriate travel 
documents and finance would also have to be faced.  Taylor emphasized the “liberality” 
of existing American immigration laws and highlighted the consolidation of the annual 
German and Austrian quotas allowing 27,370 to enter per year; an annual quota that had 
not been completely filled since 1915. 27   
Significantly, the merging of the two quotas, which marked the extent of 
American rescue efforts at the meeting, allayed the fears of the other delegations that they 
would be subjected to American pressure to modify their respective immigration policies.  
Harold Troper and Irving Abella noted that the representatives were “stunned; the nations 
of the world had been mobilized for this?”  The council members issued a “collective 
sigh” but for the population at risk Taylor’s announcement denoted a “cruel letdown; for 
everyone [else] at Evian it was a reprieve.” 28 
      The American Chairman concluded by stating that the “forced and chaotic 
dumping of unfortunate people in large numbers” would exacerbate existing global 
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“racial and religious problems” stimulating “economic retaliation” against those nations 
responsible for involuntary emigration.  The resultant “international mistrust and 
suspicion…and fear” would harm the policy of appeasement.  The world faced “anarchy” 
and the risk of war unless a workable solution was found to avert “catastrophic human 
suffering.”29 
      The delegates spent two days deliberating the selection of the president of the 
conference.  The United States preferred a French representative.30    However, France 
reflecting the British and French view of the need for the United States to assume the 
leading role, insisted upon an American and ultimately Myron C. Taylor, “who 
represented that very eminent personality, President Roosevelt,” was chosen.31 Twenty-
five official delegates spoke during the Evian Conference and, with few exceptions, each 
resonated a common theme: each nation felt sympathetic to the plight of the refugees but 
domestic economic, cultural, racial and ideological factors limited or prevented the 
acceptance of forced emigrants.   
      Lord Winterton acknowledged that the United Kingdom was anxious to find a 
workable solution to the refugee crisis but high levels of local unemployment and 
overpopulation precluded it from continuing its “traditional policy of offering asylum.” 
Safe haven could now only be granted “within narrow limits.” While attempts would be 
made to assimilate many of the Austrian and German refugees who had already gained 
entry into Britain His Majesty’s Government would study the prospects of admission into 
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the Colonies and especially the East African territories. However, such projects could 
only benefit a restricted number of families as regional socioeconomic concerns, 
overpopulation, climate, racial and political differences imposed barriers to mass 
immigration.  He reassured the conference delegates that “His Majesty’s Government 
does not despair that some of its colonial territories might provide a solution of the 
problem.” 
      Winterton predicted that the task facing the international conference would be 
“immeasurably complicated” or potentially “insoluble” unless the Reich allowed refugees 
to maintain assets sufficient enough to facilitate immigration and resettlement “with some 
prospects of success.”  It was unrealistic, he believed, to expect any “thickly populated” 
nation to accept individuals robbed of the “means of subsistence” prior to entry nor could 
private organizations be expected to bear the financial burden.  He also warned that “false 
expectations” would be raised by the belief that “pressure on minorities of race and 
religion” could compel other nations to admit refugees.32  Winterton carefully avoided 
any reference to Palestine in his opening remarks. 
      Although Jews represented the majority of the involuntary refugees Winterton 
informed the Jewish representatives attending the Conference that they would not be 
considered as active participants in the meeting.  Arthur Ruppin of the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine described Winterton as “a notorious opponent of Zionism and a friend of the 
Arabs.” Ruppin noted that Winterton received the Jewish representatives “exceedingly 
coldly” and was dismissive of their opinions regarding the issue of Jewish migration from 
Central and Eastern Europe.  The meeting, lasting only fifteen minutes, was a “slap on 
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the face” and Winterton emphasized that it “was not a conference…but an 
intergovernmental committee’s consultation [with] his intention being to make it clear to 
us that in fact we had no business to be here at all.” 33 MP Miss Eleanor Rathbone, during 
a House of Commons debate, also referred to the “pro-Arab sympathies of the Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster.” 34 
      Winterton served as Chairman of the Unofficial Committee to Defend Arab 
Interests in the House of Commons and was a friend of Iraqi Foreign Minister Nuri Said. 
Winterton believed (along with others) in the necessity of  Jews remaining a minority 
group, limited to forty percent of the total population, within Palestine coupled with a 
strict limitation or outright banning of land sales to Jews. Such a process, it was hoped, 
would allay Muslim fears, put an end to the Arab Revolt and pave the way for self-
government.  Said, however, would not accede to this plan.  He envisaged the creation of 
an Arab confederation, linking Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and possibly Syria.  
Restrictions on Jewish immigration into the Mandate would continue in order to maintain 
the ratio of seven Arabs to four Jews, ensuring a permanent Muslim majority in Palestine.  
Thus, Palestinian Arab fears of Jewish economic and political domination would be 
eliminated.35  
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      Unlimited Jewish migration into Palestine, however, was an entirely “untenable” 
proposition due its territorial size, “special considerations” arising out of the British 
Mandate, “as well as the local situation [the Arabs], which cannot be ignored.”36  The 
Arabs feared that the refusal of the democracies to accept a “relatively small number of 
refugees” could translate into a drastic demographic shift in Palestine should the 
Mandatory Power allow the entry of thousands of Jews; a move, of course, favored by the 
Zionists as the “only answer to Hitler.”37 61,000 Jewish refugees had entered Palestine in 
1935 but the Royal or Peel Commission of 1937, investigating the possibilities of 
partitioning the Mandate, recommended that Jewish immigration be capped at 12,000 per 
annum.  However, in that year only 10,500 actually landed.  The admittance level rose in 
1939 to 16,400 but following the direction of the Woodhead  Commission and the 
issuance of the White Paper of May 1939 British policy would only allow the 
resettlement of 75,000 over the next five years after which further Jewish immigration 
would be terminated. By October 1936 the population of Palestine consisted of seven 
hundred thousand Arabs and four hundred thousand Jews. 38 
      Henri Bérenger began his formal presentation by lauding France’s long history 
and tradition of offering asylum to refugees. He acknowledged, however, that current 
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domestic, economic, social and political considerations (the Anschluss, increasing 
persecution of Austrian Jews and concerns about forced emigration of Eastern European 
Jews as well as national security—perceived threats of a resurrected and powerful 
Germany and fears of admitting enemy aliens) had forced the French Government, under 
Premier Edouard Daladier, to adopt a policy of restricted immigration.  The Third 
Republic had “already reached, if not already passed, the extreme point of saturation.”  
Since the end of the Great War approximately two hundred thousand refugees (Nansen, 
Italian, Spanish and Central European) had already been admitted onto French soil of 
which twenty percent were Jewish. France, Bérenger believed, was no longer capable of 
accepting further refugees.  The nation also faced the difficulties of assimilating the three 
million aliens already resident within a country that had a population exceeding forty 
million.39 [See Appendix A for figures on Jews admitted into different countries, 1933-
1945, as noted by different authors and Appendix B for number of officially recorded 
unassimilated political refugees within France 1922-1939.] 
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      The Evian Conference was not an “international conference,” Bérenger advised, 
but an “Intergovernmental Committee…not a forum for eloquent speeches… [but serving 
as] a center for the coordinated work of practical experts.”  While pledging his country’s 
cooperation he warned that France had “already almost exhausted her own resources” 
which, unfortunately, did not exceed “her zeal to serve the cause of humanity.”  The 
French nation could not be expected to allow further entry of “homeless German 
wanderers.”40 He, like the other European and United States delegates, expected that the 
“new countries” of Latin America should bear the brunt of resettlement.41  Bérenger, 
while acting as France’s representative to the League of Nations’ High Commission for 
Refugees (HCR), had already declared in December 1933 that France must function as a 
nation of transit or “way station” rather than serve the role of final destination.42 
      The Chief of the Sûreté, Jean Berthoin, argued that the economic depression 
had forced France to accept only those refugees who possessed transit visas for other 
states, proper documentation, sufficient funds or the requisite skills that would benefit the 
national economy or augment the “intellectual patrimony of our country.”  “The present 
state of saturation” prevented continuation of an open door immigration policy. France 
could no longer accept the “’waste products of the entire Austrian or German 
immigration.” The Minister of the Interior Albert Sarraut and Berthoin ordered the border 
security forces to carry out the policy of “refouler without mercy.”  The unwanted would 
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be returned to Germany and Austria.43  Such a policy represented, according to Vicki 
Caron, a “virtual death sentence to the right of asylum in France” and became the basis 
upon which French policy was framed at the Evian Conference.44 
      Bérenger’s views reverberated in moderate newspapers such as Le Temps which 
likewise declared that France was “saturated” with aliens and could only serve as a point 
of transit. France needed to ensure that its “physical, moral and intellectual equilibrium 
[was] not abruptly disrupted by a pronounced influx of elements too different and 
sometimes unassimilable.”45  Such refugees were a threat to domestic employment, a 
potential source of crime, a burden to social services and “at times [they would] mar the 
physical appearance of our cities.” Therefore, a strategy of highly judicious immigration 
would need to be followed in view of “the numerical [dis]proportion between natives and 
foreigners,” while remaining cognizant of the declining birth rates among the French.  
“The unfortunate fact is that, alas, it is not the elites of Europe…who are flocking to 
us.”46 
Following the adoption of the Nuremberg Race Laws France enacted an official 
policy of impeding the entry of refugees and attempted to utilize the League High 
Commissioner as a means of removing those who had already found temporary sanctuary 
on French soil.47 Minister of the Interior Sarraut announced in the Decree law of May 2, 
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1938 that the stability of the nation was threatened by the “ever-growing” number of 
aliens residing on French soil. While claiming that the Republic would continue to honor 
its “traditional rules of French hospitality” the current situation mandated enactment of a 
careful screening process to separate “foreigner[s] of good faith” from the “clandestine 
foreigners, irregular guests…unworthy of living on our soil.”  Those selected for entry 
would be welcomed but the “undesirables” would be forcibly expelled.48  Edouard 
Daladier, at various times Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, and General Maurice 
Gamelin of the General Staff, called for enactment of stricter entry criteria and the 
possible elimination of refugee admission altogether. Such aliens posed a threat to 
domestic labor and could represent a “Trojan Horse of spies and subversives” that abused 
France’s tradition of the “open door” while serving Nazi plans to destabilize the French 
society and economy.49 
      The Foreign Ministry declared that it was impossible to admit refugees in a 
“permanent capacity” but potentially could agree to allow resettlement in the French 
colonies.50  Emile Roche, an influential spokesman for the Radical Party, stated in an 
editorial published in La République, that high unemployment and oversaturation 
prohibited France from accepting any more aliens.  He called upon the Government to 
promote emigration to French overseas holdings provided the project was infused with 
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sufficient capital to “create employment opportunities, new markets or new trade 
possibilities.”51  The conservative paper, L’Ordre, urged the French authorities to follow 
the British lead of offering refuge in their Empire.  The daily suggested that a sizeable 
number of Jewish families could be relocated to Madagascar and such settlers “would 
soon discover the joy of living through work and love of a new country.”52  
      However, the Minister of Colonies George Mandel, a Jew, warned on June 21 
that any “Jewish colonization in our overseas domains” would result in “more numerous 
dangers than advantages.”53  The spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior Bureau of 
Algerian Affairs ruled out re-settlement in this North African Colony due to Arab 
hostilities coupled with the urban background of the refugees who may have become 
tainted with socialist or communist ideologies.  In addition, the poor local economy and 
lack of employment would undoubtedly place the new arrivals on the public dole.54 The 
right wing group L’Action française opposed any resettlement of Jews in the colonies.  
“It would be inadmissible to deliver up merchants, French colonists, as well as natives of 
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Indochina or Madagascar, to the claws of German Jewish usurers.”55 Roosevelt, however, 
had wanted the issue of colonial resettlement discussed at Evian and during June 1938 the 
State Department encouraged France to consider the possibilities of Madagascar.  The 
U.S. agreed not to raise this issue on the Evian Conference agenda due to Western 
European fears that such action would stimulate the forced emigration of Eastern 
European Jews.56            
      American pressure to open up colonial holdings for refugees was, however, 
exerted upon the United Kingdom and France following the end of the conference.  
Taylor suggested, during September 1938, that France resettle thirty thousand refugees 
from Central Europe in its overseas Empire over a period of five years.  The French 
Government was expected to provide the land but the costs were to be borne by Jewish 
organizations.  Undersecretary of State Welles continued to press this issue from mid-
October, especially highlighting the prospects of Madagascar. 57 Ultimately, following 
Kristallnacht, Prime Minister Daladier pledged to Welles that France would accept forty 
thousand Jewish refugees in Madagascar while Foreign Minister George Bonnet 
promised that France would accept a limited number of Jewish refugees in its colonies as 
long as America and Britain acted in a similar manner.58  
      Similar concerns and conditions affected other European nations who expected 
the nations of the Americas to accept the majority of the refugees due to their smaller 
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populations and the availability of undeveloped lands.59 The Dutch delegate, the Head of 
the Directorate of Legal Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M.W.C. Beucker-
Andreae, expressed his sympathy and acknowledged The Netherlands’ “age-old tradition 
[of] granting generous hospitality,” but, he declared, the small nation had reached the 
saturation point and could no longer accept additional refugees except in extraordinary 
circumstances.  24,000-25,000 had already been admitted into a country with a 
population of nine million. The enactment of more stringent entrance policies was 
mandated, it was believed, by unfavorable economic conditions, fears of offending the 
Hitler regime and concerns of jeopardizing its policy of neutrality in the event of war. 
The nation could only serve as a temporary way station on the route to other sites of 
permanent resettlement.  Four hundred thousand Dutch citizens were unemployed leading 
the authorities to encourage the emigration of its own nationals as a means of decreasing 
population density and joblessness.  The Government would cooperate in the 
establishment of training centers for Jewish refugees to facilitate transmigration.  In 
addition, its overseas colonial possessions were deemed unsuitable for the resettlement of 
European Whites due to unfavorable climate.60 Dutch borders were closed to German 
Jewish refugees by November 1938 and any refugees who had managed to gain entry 
would be arrested and interned in isolated special work camps.61 
      The Belgian delegate, Robert de Foy, the director of the Belgian Sûreté de 
l’Etat, highlighted Belgium's role in admitting and assimilating Russian and Armenian 
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refugees.  Belgium had been a signatory to the Convention relating to the International 
Status of refugees (Geneva, October 18, 1933), The Provisional Arrangement Concerning 
the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany (Geneva, July 4, 1936) and had 
participated in (but not yet ratified) the creation of the Geneva Convention of February 
10, 1938 that was to supplant the 1936 Arrangement.  As a consequence, the Belgian 
Nation had received 8,800 Russian and assimilated refugees: 2,000 Germans, 800 
Austrians, 3,000 Spanish children and 120 adults, 250 Italians and 80 Stateless 
refugees—totaling 15,050.  The country was geographically small in size with a dense 
population of 7,800,000 of whom 319,230 were aliens.  Approximately 250,000 were 
unemployed.  Although it was obvious that Belgium had responded in the “most loyal 
and generous manner” to the international agreements on refugees current conditions 
(German anti-Jewish policies, the need to maintain friendly relations with the Reich and 
threats of mass expulsions from Eastern European countries) prevented, “to her great 
regret,” the possibility of assuming “fresh international obligations” entailing unknown 
consequences which might overwhelm “her practical possibilities.”   Belgian actions 
were based on the proportionate responses of the other nations and the “hope that, with 
patience, openings may be found in overseas territories…”62 
      Lt. Colonel Thomas Walter White, the head of the Australian delegation and 
chair of the Conference’s second sub-committee, acknowledged that Australia had 
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already accepted hundreds of Jewish refugees but his country could do no more. It would 
be unreasonable, he asserted, for a young nation such as his, with its majority roots 
derived from England, to accept an influx “of non-British subjects” that would be 
difficult to assimilate into the dominant culture. Significantly, he uttered a refrain that 
resonated with many of the other delegations:  It should be readily apparent that as 
Australia does not have a “real racial problem, we are not desirous of importing one” by 
supporting “any scheme of large-scale foreign migration.” Entry would be limited to 
asylum seekers who would work within certain restricted livelihoods and trades that 
would not threaten the employment of Australian citizens.63 Admission of large numbers 
of Jews, it was feared, would produce “enclaves” that would not be “easily assimilable” 
into the national body and risked creation of local anti-Semitism.64 The Sydney Truth, an 
anti-Jewish immigration Labor newspaper, regarded the entry of “unwanted and 
unabsorbable Hebrews” as a threat to Australian “race, blood, and ideals.”65Alternatively, 
one editorialist regarded such an “undue suggestion of racial intolerance” as a “betrayal 
of our cherished traditions.”  Acceptance of German and Austrian refugees would greatly 
benefit Australia by the infusion of “some of the best stock and finest minds of 
Europe.”66 
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      White, however, enjoyed the backing of the Conservative Prime Minister Joseph 
Lyons who had stated that the Dominion had not yet reached the point of becoming 
overwhelmed by immigrants from the United Kingdom.  Those “foreigners who were 
enterprising enough” and possessed assets that would assure self sufficiency as well as 
create jobs for Australian citizens “would be welcomed.”  Nevertheless, the Government 
would not grant any “special concessions” or join any “scheme” of mass resettlement that 
would threaten domestic employment.  Australia was sympathetic to the plight of the 
Jewish refugees but the Government could not allow a “large influx of aliens.”  
“Preference” would be granted to “suitable migrants of British stock.”67 
Minister of the Interior John McEwen believed that Jews represented a “highly 
intelligent” and successful class but their parochialism, religious and marital beliefs and 
separatist tendencies would interfere with successful integration.   “Difficulties” would 
undoubtedly arise wherever they constituted a significant percentage of the population.  
However, if a limited number of Jewish refugees was to be admitted preference should be 
given to those in “greater need” from Germany and Austria rather than émigrés from 
Eastern Europe who had “practically formed a state within a state.”   
      The Cabinet adopted a quota system during June 1938 that divided prospective 
refugees into the categories of “Jews,” “Christian non-Aryans” and “Aryans.”68  Such a 
program was extremely cumbersome as it required refugee applications to be sent to 
Canberra for review and approval before a response was sent back to Europe; a process 
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that would take a number of months.69 This restrictive arrangement limited the number of 
landing permits granted German and Austrian Jews to three hundred per month.  Paul 
Bartrop has argued that such restraint originated in an “anti-foreign and anti-Semitic bias 
prevalent among some key personnel in the government departments.”70 Blakeney, on the 
other hand, claimed that opposition to Jewish immigration, primarily those from Central 
and Eastern Europe, was not primarily driven by anti-Semitic sentiments but rather by 
fears of its effect on unemployment, salaries, standards of living and working 
conditions.71  Australia did agree during December 1938 to accept 15,000 immigrants or 
in the language of the day, “reffos” (refugees), over a period of three years but only 9,000 
actually landed during 1933-1943.72  
      Interestingly, some Australian Jewish leaders viewed their foreign co-
religionists with considerable narrow-mindededness and opposed the immigration of their 
German and Austrian brethren.  Sir Samuel Cohen, the president of the Australian Jewish 
Welfare Society, stated during August 1938, that the thoughts of Australian Jews were 
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“British through and through.”  The admission of “hordes” of European Jews would 
endanger the “freedom and civilization we are all privileged to enjoy…”73 The Society 
sought to influence the Government to decrease the visa allotment by one-third.  Superior 
airs and fears of inciting domestic anti-Semitism led the local Jewish community to 
caution new arrivals on their public behavior: 
Above all, do not speak German in the streets and in the trams.  
Modulate your voices.  Do not make yourself conspicuous anywhere by 
walking with a group of persons, all of whom are loudly speaking a 
foreign language.  Remember that the welfare of the old-established 
Jewish communities in Australia, as well as of every migrant, depends 
upon your personal behavior.  Jews collectively are judged as 
individuals.  You, personally, have a very grave responsibility.74   
 
      The strategy of the Canadian Government was to prevent the entrance of foreign 
Jews. Immigration laws and guidelines would need to be suspended or revised to make 
special allowance for stateless refugees. Farmers and other agricultural workers could be 
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granted preferential treatment in the admission process.75 The Prime Minister, William L. 
Mackenzie King, reacting to the U.S. announcement of the Evian Conference, feared that 
alien Jews would contaminate Canada's “bloodstream,” adversely affect national unity 
and embolden the anti-Semitic separatists of the Quebecois.  Why create, he asked, an 
“internal problem” in the process of solving an “international one.”  Canada had to be 
protected from the “unrest” of the Continent and avoid the “intermixture of foreign 
strains of blood.”  Admission of stateless Jews would lead to “riots” and to strife between 
the central Government and the provinces.76 The paper Le Devoir asked why Canada 
should admit Jewish refugees.  “The Jewish shopkeeper on St Lawrence Boulevard does 
nothing to increase our natural resources.”  French-Canadian Members of Parliament 
opposed Jewish immigration. H.E. Brunelle, for example, accused Jews of creating “great 
difficulties” wherever they settled. Members of the St. Jean Baptiste Society, with the 
support of MP Wilfrid La Croix, presented a petition to Parliament vigorously objecting 
to “all immigration” and particularly the admittance of Jewish refugees.  Such opposition 
represented the “instinct of self preservation [of the Christian religion and French 
culture]. 77  
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      The Nationalist Socialist Christian Party (Parti National Social Chrétien), led by 
Adrien Arcand, the publisher of Montreal’s Fascist paper Le Combat National and other 
anti-Semitic publications such as Le Miroir, Le Goglu, Le Fasciste Canadien, L’Unité 
Nationale and Serviam, joined with 1,500 blue shirted Fascists from eight Canadian 
provinces in Toronto’s Massey Hall on July 4 and created a new National Unity Party 
whose official slogan was “Canada for Canadians” and “King, country, Christianity.” 
Fascism appeared to take root among the Quebecois due to lower economic standards of 
living when compared with the rest of the Nation.78 Jews, Arcand maintained, were the 
root of “all the evils in the world” through the tentacles of their economic control.79  He, 
like his German counterparts, called for an economic boycott of Jewish businesses and 
establishments in order for French Canadians to regain control over the “commercial 
[activities] of their own nation.”  It was essential for French Canadians to “prosper in 
their own land rather than the Jews.”80  
       André Laurendeau, of the paper L’Action nationale and Le Devoir, warned, 
during a 1933 demonstration of the separatist and nationalist organization Jeune-Canada, 
that Jews were on a “Messianic mission” to control the world; a claim reminiscent of the 
oft cited and standard anti-Semitic fare, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.81  Pierre 
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Dagenais, the chief spokesman of Jeune-Canada, declared that the soul of Canada was 
threatened by the “Jewish element,” an entity more “powerful than the voice of blood.”  
The Jewish “plutocracy” was influential enough to elicit “condolences” from 
Government officials against the Nazi treatment of German and Austrian Jews but these 
same bureaucrats remained silent at the discriminatory treatment of French Canadians 
within their own country or the persecution of Catholics in Mexico, Spain and the Soviet 
Union.  Similarly, Gilbert Manseau of Jeune-Canada claimed that Jews sought “special 
treatment” in Canada, seeking the status of an ethnic minority awarded the same national 
rights as other Canadians.  Jews, he believed, could not be accorded such a status as the 
Constitution recognized only two national identities: British and French.82   
      Charles Frederick Blair, the Director of the Immigration Branch of the 
Department of Mines and Resources, was convinced that the European refugee crisis 
would inundate Canada with stateless Jews destined to become permanent public charges.  
Citing the Government’s post-Great War policy of excluding homeless refugees who 
were likely to “go on the rocks” and become dependent on government support Blair 
increased the landing fees from $5,000 to $15,000 and attached the stipulation that the 
émigrés be farmers.83 He advised the Prime Minister that Jewish pressure to enter Canada 
had reached new heights but he was proud to admit that after “thirty five years of 
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experience” Jewish immigration had never “been so carefully controlled.”84 However, 
Blair predicted that a successful Evian Conference would in essence reward the Germans 
by solving their Jewish Question and would undoubtedly encourage other Powers to 
follow similar policies which represented the “greatest danger” to Canada.  Encouraging 
the resettlement of refugees was “akin in a sense to the paying of ransom to Chinese 
bandits.”85  
Blair offered what he considered to be constructive criticism to the Jewish 
community.  It “might be a very good thing,” he believed, if Jewry engaged in a period of 
“humiliation and prayer” during which they would come to terms with the “question of 
why they are so unpopular almost everywhere.”  Christians should “frankly” explain the 
reasons for their disapproval instead of engaging in anti-Semitism.  Blair did not doubt 
that the Jews would be as readily as accepted as “our Scandinavian friends” if they 
successfully divested themselves of their negative “habits.”86 
Although Nazi anti-Semitic policies placed Jews at risk of “extinction” in Europe 
he did not imagine that admission to Canada would resolve the ubiquitous Jewish 
dilemma.87  The Immigration Minister later opposed the landing of Jewish refugees from 
the ill-fated S.S. St. Louis during May 1939, believing that the granting of asylum would 
                                                 
     
84Abella, None is Too Many, 8.  
     
85Blair memorandum, April 19, 1938.  Ibid. 20. 
 
     
86
 Blair to F.N. Sclanders, September 13, 1938.  Ibid., 9. 
 
     
87Blair to Judd, October, 1938. Ibid., 35. 
 
186 
 
be followed by “shiploads” of other refugees.  No nation could accept the number of real 
or potential forced émigrés and the “line must be drawn somewhere.”88 
 Likewise, Under-Secretary of State Dr. Oscar Douglas Skelton feared pressures 
from the Evian Conference would subject Canada to internal demands for the country to 
do something “for the Jews,” risk the generation of domestic anti-Semitism and influence 
other nations (primarily Eastern Europe) to solve their own Jewish Question by forcibly 
exiling Jews.89 The ultimate and oftentimes pre-determined position of Canada and other 
nations was reflected in an undated and unsigned document filed among the records of 
the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa: 
We don’t want to take too many Jews, but, in the present circumstances particularly, we don’t 
want to say so.  Certainly, we don’t want to legitimize the Aryan mythology by introducing any 
formal distinction for immigration purposes between Jews and non-Jews.  The practical 
distinction, however, has to be drawn and should be drawn with discretion and sympathy by the 
competent Department without laying down any formal minute of policy on the matter.90 
 
      Hume Wrong, the Canadian Envoy to the League of Nations, was selected by 
King to represent Canada at the Conference; an assignment he did not relish. Wrong 
advised Skelton that he expected the meeting to be a “most unpleasant affair” as it sprung 
from one of Roosevelt’s “sudden generous impulses” and was not a “well thought out” 
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concept.  His participation represented, on the whole, an “unwelcome duty.”91 He was 
instructed only to “listen, make notes and say as little as possible” while opposing any 
concrete solutions, “without seeming to be obstructionist.”92  
      The Canadian delegate informed the members of the Evian Conference that his 
Government felt “sympathy and concern…for the victims of changes of regime and of 
racial and class conflict.”  Canada had generously admitted more than ten thousand 
political refugees following the conclusion of the Great War but economic problems had 
severely impacted Canada’s capacity to absorb “considerable number[s]” of additional 
émigrés.  As a result, the Government was compelled to initiate a more restrictive 
immigration policy. There were, however, “special administrative exemptions” that the 
Dominion would, in concert with the other Powers, consider in the “most sympathetic 
and friendly manner which may be practicable in the circumstances.” Success of such a 
project depended upon Germany allowing retention of sufficient personal assets to 
facilitate and fund resettlement.  Jews possessing sufficient capital to establish successful 
farms could be prioritized for admission.93 
      Overall, Wrong viewed the preparations of the Committee as being “very 
amateurish” and warned the Prime Minister that prospects for a meaningful outcome 
were “gloomy… [as] there seems to have been no effective diplomatic or technical 
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preparations.  I think the meeting should be as short as possible.”94 He later advised King 
that there was “little chance” that “any clear conclusions” would result from the 
Conference.95 
       Following the conclusion of the conference King remarked that the admission of 
Jews posed a greater national threat to the internal harmony of Canada than did the Nazi 
or Fascist regimes.  The Fuehrer and Il Duce, the Prime Minister believed, sought to 
provide “the masses of the people some opportunity for enjoyment, taste of art and the 
like.”  “Dictatorial methods” were necessary to suppress those “privileged interests 
(presumably Jewish) that have previously monopolized it.”96 Such a world view of Jewry 
was of course, in keeping with the widely held anti-Semitic belief in Jewish domination 
of society. 
 Following Kristallnacht King expressed the opinion in his diary that the nation 
“must do her part” in offering refuge to “some” of the Jewish émigrés; an act that would 
be “difficult politically.” King pledged to “fight for it as right and just, and Christian.”97  
In reality, however, Canada accepted only five thousand refugees, during 1933-1939, of 
which 3,500 were Jews.  Most of these Jewish refugees were relocated from British 
internment camps as part of Canada's war effort to help house Austrian and German 
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“enemy aliens” that remained incarcerated until December 1943 when the camps were 
formally closed.98 
      Citing his nation’s “traditional policy” towards immigration,” Tomas Le Breton, 
the Argentine delegate (concerned that the United States and Great Britain were 
attempting to pressure Latin America into becoming the dumping ground for the 
refugees), acknowledged that his country had received the greatest number of Jews, 
second only to the United States.  However, if the factors of geographic size and native 
population were inserted into the equation then Argentina had accepted a far greater 
proportion of the forced émigrés than did its North American counterpart. During 1935 
for every forty eight Jewish refugees admitted into the U.S thirty two entered Argentina; 
considering the fact that the American population was ten times that of his country 
Breton deemed the Argentine contribution to the refugee crisis to be particularly 
“striking.” Taking into account South America as a whole Argentina had accepted more 
refugees than any other nation on the continent. Consequently, Le Breton believed that 
Argentina had satisfied its “duty of solidarity and collaboration” in the present 
humanitarian crisis.  Agricultural entrepreneurs and workers possessing certain technical 
skills were preferred candidates for entry but care had to be taken to avoid overwhelming 
the domestic labor market.  Argentina would carefully safeguard its national rights “in all 
matters relating to the manner in which, and the means by which, immigrants will be 
allowed to enter and establish themselves in our country…”99   
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      However, by the time of the July conference the Argentine Government had 
enacted a variety of immigration barriers such as the requirement of a special landing 
permit issued by the Central Immigration Department located in Buenos Aires.  This 
prerequisite was designed to guarantee the selected entry of refugees with agricultural 
backgrounds who possessed sufficient financial assets to re-establish themselves in a new 
location despite the fact that the majority of the immigrants were middle-class Jews from 
urban areas.  5,178 Jews were admitted during 1937 but only 1,050 in 1938.100   
     The Argentine reaction to the plight of Jewish refugees had been foretold by 
popular and national reaction to the Anschluss.  The Catholic press in Argentina 
denounced the German annexation of Austria.  El Pueblo, the Catholic newspaper of 
Buenos Aires, had viewed the earlier Dollfuss Government as the epitome of social 
dogma as espoused by Pope Leo XIII and Pius XI and viewed the Anschluss as an 
“Austrian tragedy” facilitated by international “collaboration” with the Reich.  Little 
attention or sympathy was focused on the plight and potential fate of Austrian Jews or on 
German anti-Semitism.  In fact, in January 1938, Gustavo Franceschi, the editor of 
Criterio, expressed his support for an Ecuadoran edict that ordered the expulsion of all 
Jews from that country.  The Jewish Question in Central Europe was, many Argentine 
Catholics and nationalists believed, the result of Jewish perfidy rather than anti-Semitic 
governmental policies. The mass arrests of “the financiers of Vienna” were described, of 
whom the majority were highlighted as “Jews.”  Jewish press attempts to counter Nazi 
anti-Semitism were portrayed by Church spokesmen in Argentina as “an expression of 
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hatred” comparable to German “propaganda itself” and Franceschi made no distinctions 
between the actions and reactions of the Nazis and Jews.  Both groups, in his eyes, stood 
outside the blessings and protections of the Catholic Church.101 
The Foreign Minister, José María Cantilo, issued Directive 11 on July 12, 1938; a 
decree publicly taking effect on October 1 (but secretly invoked immediately), which 
specified that all immigration applications were to be examined by an advisory 
committee composed of officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior and 
Agriculture. “Priority” was to be given to refugees "with the greatest capacity for 
assimilation in order to meet our social, cultural and economic needs."  Consuls would 
furnish the committee with detailed personal information, such as the reason for seeking 
entrance into Argentina. The board, upon approval of an application, would send the 
consul a landing permit.  Persons submitting requests for relatives were required to 
provide proof of Argentine residency for two years and bear the cost of all processing 
fees.  Tourists entering the country would be obliged to turn over their passports to 
immigration authorities and would be granted temporary tourist certificates of three 
months duration.102  An addendum to the new immigration policy, Directive 8972, ended 
the landing exemptions previously granted first-class passengers arriving via steamship.  
Previously it had been assumed that immigrants traveled only in second and third class.  
These additional requirements would have the net effect of further decreasing the number 
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of refugees admitted into the country.103 Security along the borders was to be enhanced to 
prevent the illegal entry of refugees.104 
      Franceschi described the new enactment as a “fine immigration policy…for such 
a worthy government.”  He argued in an article, “Once again the Jewish Problem,” that 
German anti-Semitism was an expression of loathing and arrogance; attitudes banned by 
the doctrine of the Church.  Argentine anti-Semitism, on the other hand, was a matter of 
“self-defense” and despite domestic generosity a “Jewish problem” did exist within the 
Republic that would inevitably occur “wherever the Jews [became] a sizeable section of 
the population.”  A significant Jewish presence risked the creation of a more hostile 
domestic anti-Semitism as well as calls for mass expulsion reminiscent of Germany and 
Eastern Europe.  He warned against international refugee conferences.  In his opinion the 
Jewish issue represented a “national” as well as “a religious, social and economic 
question.”  Refusal to accede to the goals of the Evian Conference represented “no more 
than a justified demand to seek a more just solution to this problem.”105 Ultimately, 
between 1933 and 1945 approximately 40-45,000 Jewish refugees were allowed into 
Argentina.106  Thirty five refugee ships were denied landing permits during 1938-1943 
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but approximately 39,400 Jews entered Argentina during the war years primarily illegally 
via Paraguay and Bolivia.107 
      Helio Lobo, the delegate from Brazil, indicated that Brazil had long held an 
“open door” immigration policy seeking the labor that would develop the country’s 
natural resources.  During the period 1820-1930 more than four and a half million 
immigrants had been admitted primarily from Europe accounting for ten percent of the 
total population but current economic conditions mandated immigration restrictions to 
protect domestic employment.  The ability of non-Latin refugees to assimilate into the 
dominant culture and potential alterations in the racial composition of the nation were 
additional concerns.  The Immigration Law of 1934 established a two percent yearly 
quota based on each nationality that had settled in Brazil over the previous fifty years and 
amounted to 42,000 per year; most of whom resided in the countryside working in the 
agricultural sector.  Germans comprised the fourth largest migrant group prior to World 
War I.  The German and Austrian quotas respectively accounted for 3,099 and 1,655 
immigrants annually.   
The Immigration Law of 1938 continued the two percent benchmark but allocated 
unused quotas to other nationalities whose yearly allotment had been exhausted.  A 
similar recommendation would be made by the British to the U.S. but the State 
Department would decline.  In addition, eighty percent of each quota had to be reserved 
for “agricultural immigrants or technical experts in agriculture.” Brazil was, according to 
Lobo, ready to “respond to the noble appeal of the American Government” and would 
cooperate to the “limits of her immigration policy…for the sake of the lofty ideal which 
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all of us here have in mind.”108  Taylor regarded Lobo as being “extraordinarily helpful” 
in influencing other Latin American nations to adopt a “reasonable point of view.”109 
      It was pointed out, however, that the majority of German and Austrian refugees 
were urbanites and not farmers.  During 1937 Brazil had admitted 2,003 stateless Jews 
but only 530 in 1938.  The Brazilian Government had agreed to the admission of nine 
thousand refugees over a three year period but with strict entry requirements: in addition 
to being true agriculturalists they had to possess $2,400 over and beyond the amount 
covering travel and resettlement expenses.110 Approximately twenty five thousand Jews 
were granted legal admission into the country during1933-1942.111 
The July 7 session ended on a common theme.  Citing economic, social, political, 
religious, and ethnic concerns each delegate expressed sympathy but offered a host of 
reasons why their respective nations could not provide refuge to stateless immigrants. 
Oftentimes their home governments were secretly working behind the scenes to construct 
obstacles that would limit or block entry altogether. The Europeans and Americans 
expected the nations of Latin America to receive the bulk of the émigrés.  Equally, these 
nations were resistant to accepting the role of dumping ground for a people that was 
considered less than desirable.  Such rhetoric, gamesmanship and plotting would continue 
throughout and color the course of the remainder of the Evian Conference.  The inherent 
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hypocrisy would become readily apparent to the victims, observers, the representatives 
and the Nazis but such knowledge would not alter the journey and eventual outcome of a 
meeting that, from its inception, was destined to fail. 
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Chapter 6 
Day Four 
“Humanity Now Plunged into Despair” 
        “I am my brother’s keeper and we are to be the benefactors of mankind and brothers to them all.”1 
 
     The Chairman, Myron C. Taylor, expressed during the third public session on July 9, 
1938 his “pleasure” over the initial delegation statements to the conference.  
Acknowledging the “economic and other difficulties” faced by the presenting nations 
their efforts had already provided “substantial contributions” to the work of the meeting.  
He was greatly encouraged by the “offers of cooperation so generously and unanimously 
extended” and was heartened by their profound “earnestness.”2  A telegram was received 
from FDR in which he wished “for all success to the committee in its work, which is of 
such importance, for a large part of humanity now plunged into despair.”3 
      Cyril Blake Burdekin, a low-ranking diplomat in the New Zealand High 
Commissioners’ Office in London and delegate to the conference, expressed his nation’s 
“sincere sympathy” with the lot of the involuntary refugees but suggested that any 
intimation that the island nation could accept more than a limited number of refugees 
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would “only be raising false hopes.”  The decision to admit any alien would be based on 
the likelihood of becoming a public charge and the demonstrable ability to prove that 
they would become a “useful citizen.”4  Immigrants from Britain or of British origin were 
preferred and Jews were viewed as particularly unwelcome aliens. Jews who were 
allowed admittance faced bigotry and mistrust due to their differing culture. Although 
thousands (perhaps as high as fifty thousand) of Jews filed visa applications only 1,100 
were accepted.  Jews were not officially regarded as refugees but as émigrés subject to 
the requirements and limitations of the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act of 
1931.5   
      The Ministry of Customs was authorized to determine eligibility for entry based 
upon guarantees of employment, finances and the possession of such “knowledge and 
skills” which would facilitate absorption, promote the national economy and not pose any 
risk to the native population.  Jewish refugees were advised by the New Zealand High 
Commissioner’s Office in London that officially the Government was not “encouraging 
immigration” of those lacking “British birth [or] parentage” and visas would be granted 
only in “very special cases.”  The mid-1930’s Comptroller of Customs, Edwin Dudley 
Good, had declared that non-Jews represented the “more suitable type of immigrant.”  
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Walter Nash, Labor Party Minister of Customs, warned that the assimilation of Jews into 
New Zealander society posed a “major difficulty” and risked generating domestic 
hostility.  He feared that the urban, professional and trade backgrounds of these would-be 
immigrants would “beat us at our own game, especially the game of money making” and 
thus foster anti-Semitism.  On other occasions, Nash stated Jews lacked the requisite 
aptitude needed to survive on the island nation.  European Jews represented too much of 
the “clerical type” rather than the “building operative type” that his country required.  
However, local trade unions objected to the admission of Jewish skilled and unskilled 
laborers who, they believed, would potentially compete for employment.  The Federation 
of Labor called for preference to be given for non-Jewish forced émigrés such as fellow 
unionists from the annexed Sudetenland and Austria.6  
The local Jewish community attempted to persuade the National Government to 
admit Jewish refugees on the basis of individuality and not “mass migration.”  The “life 
history and capabilities” of each applicant would be “known and vouched for.”7  A writer 
in the liberal publication Tomorrow called on the Government to admit German and 
Austrian refugees.  Such an act, it was argued, to accept a finite but liberal number of 
victims of persecution would alter the entire mood of the Evian Conference.8 
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      Jésus Maria Yepes of Columbia asserted that the Evian Conference faced two 
major issues: the “question of principle” and the “question of fact.”  The former raised 
the concern as to whether any nation can “arbitrarily withdraw” citizenship from an entire 
group of people and create a “stateless” class dependent upon the charity and beneficence 
of other nations.  Such a process represented an “evil internal policy” that reduced the 
Evian Conference to the role of a “modern Wailing Wall.”  As long as this action was not 
confronted by the international community then “who knows how many” other groups 
faced oppression because of their religious or political beliefs. Unsolved and ignored the 
“bad example of the Old World” would be emulated globally creating a world that would 
“become uninhabitable.”  Solution of this dilemma would require confronting the “causes 
of the evil” and extirpation at its “roots.”  
      Yepes suggested the creation of an investigative “legal sub-committee” that 
would analyze the “duty” of a sovereign government towards its own nationals and judge 
whether such people could be deprived of their citizenship without the automatic granting 
of another.  The issue of suitable travel documents needed to be resolved and stateless 
political refugees would have to be granted a form of legal status.  The mutual 
cooperation and participation of the League of Nations, International Labor Office and 
the Academies and Institutes of International Law were critical to such a process and the 
creation of a “draft resolution” that would reflect the opinion of the international 
community.  Any State that failed to follow the precepts of such an opinion would risk 
exclusion from the “civilized world” and would be deemed to have become an 
“international outlaw.” 
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      The Columbian delegate cited the “Declaration of the International Rights of 
Man” which, with the Covenant of the League of Nations” and the “great principles of 
modern international law,” affirmed that every State bore an obligation to preserve and 
protect the rights of personal liberty, property and life without regard to race, religion, 
gender or language.  Article 5 avowed that a government could not arbitrarily withdraw 
citizenship from its nationals on the basis of religion, language or race.  Such ideals were 
reiterated in Article 28 of the “Declaration of the Great Principles of International Law,” 
written by the Chilean jurist, Alejandro Alvarez.9   
      Despite lauding the nobility and loftiness of such idealism Yepes argued that the 
modern state needed to face the “question of fact.”  Although a particular group of people 
confronted a potentially catastrophic humanitarian crisis each nation needed to remain 
cognizant of its own “particular circumstances” affecting its potential contribution to 
solving the problem of forced emigration.  Despite Columbia's democratic traditions and 
“humanitarian feelings” the immigration of European aliens would have to be restricted 
to “respectable agricultural workers who are prepared to come and work on the land” and 
the nation would not “accept [or] tolerate” refugees who entered under false pretenses.  
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“Intellectuals or traders, middlemen of all kinds” could not be admitted as they would 
pose competition against native businesses, industries, commerce and the professions.     
      Yepes concluded with a mild diplomatic rebuke to Bérenger’s appeal to Latin 
America to admit the bulk of the refugees.  The United Kingdom, France and The 
Netherlands could not claim that their abilities to absorb further refugees had reached the 
saturation point while they possessed territories in the New World.  Bérenger’s appeal 
must also be applied to the nations of Western Europe.  He concluded by stating: 
“Messieurs les français, Messieurs les anglais, Messieurs les hollandaise, it is for you to 
act first: it is to you that this appeal is addressed.”10 
      Columbia required immigrants to convert to Roman Catholicism and by 1938 
Columbia refused visas to any applicant who lacked a valid passport or who could not 
guarantee the ability to return home.  Overall, during 1938 Columbia denied the entry of 
ten thousand German refugees although half had family or connections with friends 
within the country.11 
      Fernando Garcia Oldini, the Chilean representative lauded the “humanitarian 
motive” underlying the American convening of the Evian Conference.  He believed, 
however, that it would be a futile and “risky” exercise to attempt to achieve an 
“immediate and complete solution” for the current refugee crisis due to its complexity 
and the diversity of its multifaceted components involving issues of territories allotted for 
resettlement, transportation, financial support and social constructions.  Unless the 
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conference remained cognizant of its inherent limitations there was a danger of creating 
“false hopes” and eventually “cruel disillusions.”  Referring to the Conference of 
Migration for Colonizing Purposes convoked by the International Labor Office in Geneva 
Oldini warned that any potential emigration was intimately bound up with the issues of 
“production and unemployment” and the exportation of “surplus production” which 
would result from the rapid expansion of the labor pool.  Bearing in mind the domestic 
effects of the Great Depression he warned that Chile would cooperate in this “noble 
effort…to alleviate human suffering” as long as it did not compromise native productivity 
and employment.  The admission of any aliens would be based upon the “framework of 
existing legislation and regulations,” as outlined in the initial American invitation.  Each 
potential immigrant would be viewed as an individual case and consequently, Chile could 
not bind itself to any “formal obligations” or to “broad, general solutions” but would 
remain open to and provide the “most cordial consideration” to any plan outlined by the 
Committee and would study with the “utmost goodwill” any reasonable project that 
would diminish the suffering of a group of people that “evokes the anxiety and sympathy 
of mankind.”12  The Foreign Office did, however, enact new regulations limiting 
permanent residency to immigrants who were “farmers, capitalists, agricultural colonists 
or industrialist…”13 Dissenting domestic voices, such as Senate Deputy José Irarrazaval, 
called for “keeping the Chilean traditional door open to all political refugees.”  He 
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believed that Jews should not be excluded from the country for “racial reasons” and that 
Chile would establish an “example” by receiving stateless Jews.14 
      The Cuban representative, Dr. Juan Antiga Escobar, stated Cuba would not 
accept additional refugees beyond the quota allowed in its immigration laws but would 
agree to the “eventual admittance of capitalists who might contribute to the improvement 
of our nation’s economy.”15  Tirso Dominguez, the House of Representatives delegate 
from the province of Santa Clara, introduced the Cuban Exclusion Act which barred 
immigrants from a variety of Eastern and Central European nations, Africa, the Middle 
East and China.  Refugees from Austria possessing German passports would be admitted. 
Exceptions would be made for those emigrants who had been diplomatic representatives, 
lived previously in Cuba and owned local property, or aliens who possessed at least 
$25,000 to invest in the domestic economy provided they did not threaten native 
employment.  Tourists would be required to post a $5,000 bond for a six month visa.16 
Cuba did, however, admit 12,000-20,000 German Jews between 1933-1944 due to a 
Government policy of engaging in the “lucrative business [of] selling travel documents” 
and maintaining its consulates in Nazi-dominated Europe following the closure of U.S. 
Consular offices.17  The episode of the S.S. St. Louis in 1939 dampened the Jewish 
demand for visas. 
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      The Ecuadoran envoy, Alejandro Gastelù Concha, stated that his Government 
was “keenly interested” in taking part in Roosevelt’s “generous initiative” and would 
play its role within the confines of its immigration laws and domestic potential. He cited 
the 1935 admission and successful integration of displaced European professors but 
acknowledged that Ecuador was primarily an agricultural country and therefore, could 
not allow the entry of “too great an influx of intellectual workers.”  Jewish refugees could 
potentially be admitted but only if they agreed to enter industry and agriculture and not 
commerce and the liberal professions.  Nevertheless, the Ecuadoran Government was 
prepared to do its part in this “humanitarian task” and give “favorable consideration” to 
any resolution adopted by the conference.18   
           A number of projects to resettle refugee Jews within remote areas of Ecuador 
were proposed during the 1930’s but failed due to lack of Jewish enthusiasm and 
Ecuadoran public support.  For example, in 1935 the Freeland League of Jewish 
Colonization established in Paris the Comité pour l’Etude de l’agriculture, l’Industrie de 
l’Immigration dans la République de l’Equateur (Committee for the Study of 
Agriculture, Industry and Immigration for the Republic of Ecuador) which reached an 
agreement with the Government to allot 1,250,000 acres of land in Ecuador and the 
Galapagos Islands for the colonization of fifty thousand families that would be managed 
by the Committee for a term of thirty years.  Settlers were granted exemption of taxes for 
three years, citizenship in one year, and release from custom duties and free rail 
transportation from the coast to the interior.  President Federico Páez and his 
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Administration required the presentation of a detailed operations plan by May 1937 and 
the commitment of $8,000 and the settlement of a minimum of one hundred families. 
Analysis by resettlement experts confirmed the viability of such a plan and estimated that 
$360-465 per family would be required.  However, Jewish relief organizations such as 
HICEM argued that the settlement sites were too remote and of inferior quality with a 
climate that was inhospitable for Central Europeans.  HICEM also warned that the 
potential for resettlement within Ecuador was “practically nil” due to a low level of 
national economical development and salaries, limited opportunities for craftsmen and 
other artisans and professionals and a general state of political volatility. The 
International Committee of Immigration in Ecuador responded to the criticisms of 
HICEM by noting that the objections raised reflected conditions throughout all of the 
South American Republics.  Consequently, this project was abandoned.19  
       The American Joint Distribution Committee and HICEM engaged in other 
agricultural resettlement projects within Ecuador and sixty Jewish families were 
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established on chicken farms in remote areas.  However, local circumstances and the 
backgrounds of the colonists precluded success.  Most of the settlers were non-farmers of 
middle class origin from urban environments and consequently, many sought to re-enter 
their pre-emigration professions and businesses.20  This prompted the Government under 
Provisional President General Gil Alberto Enríquez Gallo to decree on January 19, 1938 
that “hundreds” of refugee Jews who had entered under the guise of being agriculturalists 
but who had in reality intended to engage in business would be forcibly expelled.21  “All 
alien Jewish traders” were given thirty days to commence farming or face deportation.22  
This decree, however, was later repealed following negotiations between the Austrian 
Jew Julius Rosenstock (selected by the Ecuadorian Government to manage the 
construction of the Sibambe-Quito railway) and Gallo. Overall, only 3,500-4,000 Jews, 
primarily of German origin, entered Ecuador by 1945.23   
      Francisco García Calderón Rey, the Peruvian delegate, pledged his nation’s 
cooperation and agreement to admit German refugees to the “extent of its possibilities” as 
defined by its immigration laws.  Peru had received a number of Jewish scientists and 
academics who were “like leaven or ferment…of value to all nations.”  The nation was 
ready to accept agricultural workers and industrial technicians but could not admit 
“traders or workmen” who potentially could disrupt domestic equilibrium and generate 
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problems “similar to those which other countries have had to tackle.”  Likewise, 
limitations on the entry of physicians and lawyers were necessary to prevent the creation 
of an “intellectual proletariat” that would threaten the “unbridled power of [the Peruvian] 
upper class.24 
      The national essence, based on a “Spanish nucleus” with its Latin and Catholic 
traditions, must be preserved.  “An unorganized influx [of non-Catholic and non-Latin 
immigrants] would be dangerous” but the Government was willing to consider admission 
of aliens on an individual, case-by-case basis.  Calderón recalled the changes in the 
immigration statutes of the United States.  Prior to 1890 an open door admissions policy 
was followed but since that time the American Government adopted “farsighted” 
legislative changes in 1921 and 1924 which severely restricted the entry of aliens.  The 
primary motivation for such limitations was the preservation of the “Nordic heritage and 
[the] Anglo-Saxon race” against the invasion and contamination of other peoples.  
Calderón cited The Passing of the Great Race by Madison Grant as supportive of such 
restrictions.25 The peace of the Americas could only be guaranteed by avoiding the 
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creation of minorities of dissimilar origins which would promote “future conflicts.”  Peru, 
like other nations faced with the potential role of providing haven to political refugees, 
must shun a “too hasty mingling of elements” inimical to national “traditions and 
ambitions” that posed a danger to national and ethnic stability.  He concluded by positing 
that a “Europe which is so disturbed must have at least one continent which is free from 
hatred and hysteria.”26  One Peruvian newspaper viewed Jewish émigrés as a threat to the 
“solid basis of our Ibero-American identity [and] our Catholic tradition” that must be 
avoided. 27 The delegation from Peru had also noted sarcastically that the United States 
had established the model to follow regarding its immigration policies: with “caution and 
wisdom.”28  By 1939 approximately 600-2,500 refugee Jews had been admitted into 
Peru.29 
      The Mexican delegate, Primo Villa Michel, declared that his Government was 
“deeply” appreciative of the “generous initiative” of FDR.  Mexico had a long tradition 
of offering “hospitality” and asylum to political refugees, especially those who were 
“afraid for their lives.” The Government was prepared to offer “full freedom and 
security” and would render assistance and provide the opportunity to work to involuntary 
emigrants within the bounds of Mexican “legal, social and economic possibilities.” Such 
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action would occur at a “rate appropriate” to the “special conditions” existing within its 
borders in order to avoid “undesirable results” for the State and aliens. The ongoing 
reforms within Mexican society and the economy necessarily placed limits on the 
numbers of immigrants that would be allowed entry or who could be successfully 
assimilated.  Nevertheless, the Mexican Government was offering its cooperation, 
“goodwill and sympathy.” The refugees, however, would have to possess sufficient 
finances to support themselves and avoid becoming public charges. It was understood 
that Jews not meeting these requirements would be barred from entry.30   
      The Mexican Government, following negotiations with Jewish leaders, did 
agree to consider the legalization of all Jews who had entered Mexico over the previous 
five years and to allow entry of refugees from Germany and Austria who had relatives or 
friends already resident within the country, provided the new arrivals possessed sufficient 
assets to support themselves.  There were, however, a number of obstacles including anti-
Semitic diatribes in the local papers and a bill introduced into the Mexican Congress by 
Senator Loayza calling for the creation Jewish ghettos.  In addition, there were economic 
conflicts between the Jewish owners of large textile concerns and native operators of 
smaller enterprises who feared bankruptcy by their bigger competitors. 31 By November 
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1938 the Mexican Government enacted additional and more restrictive entry 
requirements.  The Secretary of the Interior, Ignacio Garcia Tellez, decreed the Republic 
would admit stateless refugees “only in exceptional cases of notorious benefit for the 
country…”  Such “petitioners for admittance must affirm categorically that they have no 
racial prejudices and that they are prepared to form Mexican mestizo families [by 
marrying Indians]” and thus, facilitate the process of assimilation. Preferential treatment 
would be granted to single males less than twenty five years of age.32 
      Dr. Alfredo Carbonell Debali, the Uruguayan delegate, stated that his 
Government had given the “most sympathetic consideration to the generous [American] 
initiative” and like the other delegates, cited his nation’s humanitarian traditions towards 
immigrants but any consideration to admit refugees was contingent on Uruguay’s 
economy and the “urgent necessity for populating rural areas.”  The country’s 
developmental priorities lay in the agricultural and stock-breeding sector and 
consequently a background in these areas was a prerequisite for admission.  The ability of 
the national government to provide for immigration and assimilation was limited and any 
necessary finances must be provided by private organizations in other countries.  The 
Government was, however, “favorable to the realization of this generous and 
humanitarian work of international cooperation.”33 
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      The delegate from Paraguay, Garcia Calderon, said that his nation had “far too 
few inhabitants” in relation to its “vast territory of extraordinary fertility.”  However, 
immigration would be limited solely to agriculturists. He also stated that his country 
would welcome farmers but would “place strict restrictions on lawyers, doctors and other 
professional emigrants.”34  
      The Venezuelan delegate, Carlos Aristimuño Coll, likewise expressed his 
Government’s appreciation of the “humanitarian motives” of Roosevelt and highlighted 
its national tradition of “hospitality.”  Although it “eagerly accepted” the invitation to 
participate in the Conference the Venezuelan Government recognized that it was 
hindered by “certain restrictions” that limited its ability to admit German and Austrian 
political refugees.  The nation’s absorptive capacity was constrained by immigration laws 
and the need to select the proper type of immigrant; i.e. agricultural laborers, who would 
not disturb the “demographic equilibrium essential to racial diversity.”  Therefore, 
refugees could only be admitted via a “rigorously selective” process.35   Eventually, the 
requirement of converting to Catholicism would be added to the list of immigration 
requirements. 
      Virgilio Trujillo Molina, representative of the Dominican Republic and brother 
of the dictator Rafaël Leonidas Trujillo y Molina, described FDR’s invitation as a “happy 
idea” that deserved the “most sympathetic” reception by all of the “thoughtful and 
feeling” peoples of the world.  The Conference was faced with the most “urgent and 
harrowing problem” which warranted a humane and just solution.  Stateless and innocent 
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“modern nomads” deserved rescue and if the meeting was successful the name of 
Franklin Roosevelt would be “blessed by present and future generations.”  The 
Dominican Republic (with a population of 1.5 million) was ready and willing to make its 
contribution by the awarding of especially “advantageous concessions” to German and 
Austrian refugees provided they were “agriculturists with an unimpeachable record” that 
met the requirements of national immigration laws.  The Republic possessed ample and 
productive land, social stability and the Department of Agriculture would provide settlers 
land, seed and technical support.  “Recognized scientists,” who through their teaching 
skills rendered “valuable service” to the country, would also be considered as special 
exceptions to immigration rules and regulations.  Molina concluded with the hope that the 
Evian Conference would be “like a peaceful, limpid lake, whose health giving waters 
assuage the thirst and add to the fertility of the lands that border it.”36 
      Generalissimo Trujillo viewed the Evian Conference as an opportunity to 
refurbish his reputation following an October 1937 conflict with Haiti in which 8,000-
12,000 Haitians residing in the northwestern region of the Dominican Republic were 
massacred in order to “obliterate Haitian ethnicity” within its borders.36 The dictator 
announced, during May 1938, that he had been the only one of his countrymen 
possessing the “inflexibility of will” to deal with the “Haitian question.”37 By July 
Trujillo attempted to create a new international image by wrapping himself in the 
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humanitarian sentiments of the Evian Conference and dispatched Virgilio Molina to 
represent the Republic and to announce that their country was willing and ready to admit 
Jewish refugees.  Such an offer was described as representing “one of the boldest 
masterstrokes of modern press agentry.”38 Trujillo had earlier been approached during 
1937 by the American Jewish Congress for the same purpose.  The Congress’ 
representative, Dr. Howard Blake, described the potential benefits that would accrue to 
the Dominican leader: “Trujillo, the Emancipator!  Trujillo, the Liberator!...Who would 
be the first to buy your tobacco?  The Jews!  Your coffee?  The Jews!  Everything that 
you can export?  The everlastingly grateful Jew!”39 
      Additional considerations drove Trujillo to offer refuge to German and Austrian 
refugees. The introduction of lighter skinned Central European immigrants and Spanish 
Civil War refugees would allow the replacement of Haitian and West Indian workers and 
transform the racial demographics of his island nation while introducing outside capital 
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and technology into the economy.40  The Roosevelt Administration was approached for 
aid in enacting laws that would, according to Cordell Hull, ease the entry of readily 
assimilable “neo-white” settlers.41  Cooperation at the Evian council was also seen as a 
possible inducement to end United States control of Dominican customs and perhaps 
represented a form of penance for potentially jeopardizing Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor 
Policy (and American regional hegemony) towards the nations of Latin America.42  
Trujillo was, after all, a dictator who obtained the reins of power in 1930 as the 
consequence of an eight year U.S. Marine Corps occupation of the island from 1916-
1924.43   Rumors of clandestine bribes and a desire to develop unpopulated land have also 
been suggested as motives for Trujillo’s willingness to admit Jewish refugees.44  The 
Secretary of Legation Robert Mills McClintock clearly recognized that the Dominican 
agreement to participate in the Evian Conference was primarily to “make a show of 
cooperating in a policy” initiated by Roosevelt and supported by the American 
Government.45  Despite such pretenses the President agreed to pursue the possibility that 
the Dominican Republic would provide a “supplemental Jewish homeland.” 46 
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      Years later, Luis Hess, a German refugee who settled in Sosua and became the 
first Jew to marry a native Dominican and whose sister perished during the years of the 
Holocaust, did not comprehend the reasons for Trujillo’s offer of refuge.  Jews were 
caught, he believed between the regime of Hitler, “the German racist [who] 
persecuted…and wanted to murder us” and Trujillo, “the Dominican racist” who offered 
salvation.  The Jews of Sosua were placed in the “awkward position of having to be 
thankful to a dictator.” 47  Such principled reasoning for Hess in the end did not matter 
and he was grateful for his deliverance.  In the end “if a murderer saves your life you still 
have to be grateful to the murderer.”48 
       The project was studied by the Refugee Economic Corporation of New York 
with the assistance of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Political Refugees.  Johns 
Hopkins University President Isaiah Bowman selected agricultural experts to make an 
on-site survey and a positive report was published during early 1939.  Financing was 
provided by the Agro- Joint (composed of the American Jewish Joint Agricultural 
Corporation and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee; agreement signed on 
September 29, 1939).49  FDR issued his official endorsement describing the project as a 
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“turning point” in Jewish refugee affairs.50  During the initial meetings of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees in London in August 1938 the figure 
of one hundred thousand potential immigrants was raised by the Dominican Government 
but a later Brookings Institute study in 1942 concluded that resettlement of such a large 
number of refugees was not possible but by “proceeding gradually” a more realistic 
number was 3,000-5,000.51   
      A large contribution of Jewish money was required to ensure that the refugees 
would not become public charges.  The Dominican Republic Subsidiary Association or 
Dorsa, a subsidiary of Agro-Joint established in the U.S., signed a contract with the 
Trujillo Government in January 1940 in which one hundred refugees would be accepted.  
The first immigrant community was established in the district of Sosúa in the northern 
province of Puerto Plata on a former United Fruit Company banana plantation which 
incorporated a 26,685 acre tract of land containing 4,950 acres of pasture, more than 
twenty buildings with limited electricity, water and roads and a large reserve of virgin 
forest. Its settler population (granted inalienable rights on January 30, 1940) numbered 
around five hundred Jewish and non-Jewish settlers by 1942.  The American Joint 
Distribution Committee raised $1.423 million by the end of 1944.  However, only limited 
numbers of refugees, totaling 640, who had to agree to become agricultural workers, were 
allowed into the country.  Trujillo granted each Jew eighty acres of land, ten cows, one 
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mule and a horse.  When Trujillo later demanded ten times the amount originally paid in 
1940 the JDC refused further payments.52   
      Léon Laleau, the Foreign Minister of Haiti, made a similar offer in 1938 to 
admit fifty thousand refugees but was turned down by Sumner Welles and the American 
Government.  Haitian diplomats, however, did provide entry visas during 1937 to several 
hundred Jews before the onset of the war, saving the lives of approximately 100-300.  
Haitian President Sténio Vincent issued an edict on May 29, 1939 granting Haitian 
citizenship to refugees in abstentia (reminiscent of an earlier British proposal to grant 
Palestinian citizenship to Jews in abstentia). One historic source had suggested that until 
1938 the only requirement needed to enter Haiti was $100; later increased to $1,000-
5,000 plus a government permit.  Others claim, however, that the cost was much higher 
and the admittance of refuges was merely a scheme to generate foreign exchange for the 
national government.53 
      Latin-American countries faced pressure from Germany not to allow entry of 
German and Austrian Jews or risk economic retaliation.  Brazil was already having 
domestic difficulties dealing with a large German minority in her territory.  Profitable 
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barter agreements between the Latin American Republics and Germany would be 
potentially at jeopardy despite the Reich’s needs for foreign raw materials and other 
commodities.  Thus, these nations opposed any overt criticism of the anti-Semitic policies 
of Germany.  The demographic composition of the refugees themselves served to put a 
brake on the willingness of Latin American to accept displaced aliens.  Agricultural 
workers and entrepreneurs were needed more than professionals, merchants or 
intellectuals.54 
      Gustav Rasmussen, the Danish representative and member of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, affirmed that despite the “best of good will” the nations of Europe could 
not solve the German and Austrian refugee crisis without the aid of “other continents.”  
Denmark, like the other states bordering Germany, already had to “bear their heavy part 
of the burden thrown on them by circumstances.”  His nation was afflicted by widespread 
unemployment and had served primarily as a country of “emigration.”  Prior to the 
outbreak of the Great War over eight thousand Danes left for the Western Hemisphere 
per year with the number falling to six thousand per year after peace was concluded.  
However, during the most recent time period emigration had “virtually ceased entirely.”  
Nonetheless, the Danish Government had admitted “very large numbers” of political 
refugees from Germany but was still willing to collaborate in finding a workable and 
realistic solution to a refugee problem which was “immense, difficult and complicated 
but [not] insoluble.”55 
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Chapter 7 
“Great Human Tragedy” 
Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless; once they had left their state they 
became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum 
of the earth.  Nothing which was being done, no matter how stupid, no matter how many people 
knew and foretold the consequences, could be undone or prevented.  Every event had the finality 
of a last judgment, a judgment that was passed neither by God nor by the devil, but looked rather 
like the expression of some unredeemably stupid finality. 1 
 
 
       The “Report of the Sub-Committee for the Reception of Organizations 
Concerned with the Relief of Political Refugees Coming from Germany (including 
Austria)”, chaired by the Australian T.W. White, was submitted on July 9 and adopted on 
July 14, 1938.  This panel held only one session commencing on July 8 at 2:30 p.m. 
Statements were heard from the League High Commissioner for Refugees, Sir Neill 
Malcolm, and representatives from a variety of Jewish and non-Jewish relief 
organizations such as the International Christian Committee for Non-Aryans, Jewish 
Colonization Association and the American Joint Distribution Committee.2 These groups, 
listed in their entirety in Appendix C, were allowed to offer limited testimony, restricted 
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initially to ten minutes but later cut down to five minutes.  Consequently, the advocates 
“all left the room disheartened and disillusioned.”3  
      Catholic spokesmen claimed that five hundred thousand of their non-Aryan 
Christian brethren resided within the confines of Greater Germany and that ten thousand 
refugees were “dependent on the charity” of their co-religionists.  Catholic committees in 
the United States, headed by Archbishop Joseph Rummel of New Orleans, and similar 
groups from Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland introduced a joint 
memorandum calling upon the Evian delegations to persuade Germany to end its policy 
of forced emigration or at a minimum to allow retention of sufficient monies to provide 
re-training, transportation and resettlement.  “[A] clear reassertion of the fundamental 
rights” of mankind was essential for it was the denial and denigration of such rights that 
fostered the “tragic problem” of involuntary refugees.4 
      The British League of Nations Union introduced a statement acknowledging its 
prior attempts to unify projects of rescue under the auspices of the Geneva based body.  It 
did agree, however, that an organization independent of the League would be required to 
negotiate with the German Government and to persuade the United States and Brazil to 
assume greater responsibility in reaching a solution; i.e., accept a greater percentage of 
stateless refugees.  The British League called upon the Germans to establish a fund, 
whether by “barter, exchange or other methods” to broker the costs of resettlement.  A 
                                                 
     
3Rudel-Adler, The Evian Conference, 255. 
 
     
4
 Charles K. Streit, “Catholics Appeal to Refugee Parley,” New York Times, July 9, 1938, 1. Monsignor 
Michael Ready, the General Secretary of the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), attended the 
Evian Conference as the surrogate of Archbishop Rummel.   
 
221 
 
“planned” mass migration was preferable to a policy of infiltration which would 
encompass only small groups of migrants over a protracted time frame.5 
      New York Rabbi Jonah B. Wise pledged the cooperation and financial support 
of the American Joint Distribution Committee and noted that millions of dollars had 
already been expended in Central Europe for refugee work.  Dr. Arthur Ruppin of the 
Jewish Agency remarked that forty thousand Jewish refugees had been admitted into 
Palestine by the time of the Conference.  Norman Bentwich of the London Council for 
German Jewry and Nahum Goldmann representing the World Jewish Congress called for 
inclusion in the workings of the meeting the Jews of Poland, Rumania and Hungary.  
Goldmann anticipated the eventual migration of at least two hundred thousand Jews from 
Greater Germany in the near future.  Mrs. Mary Ormerod, a London Quaker and 
secretary of the Coordinating Committee, reminded the delegates that the refugee crisis 
was not solely a Jewish issue but included German Christians who were unable to support 
Nazi policies and consequently became “refugees for conscience sake.”6 
     “Short” analyses of the memoranda and public statements of these groups were 
constructed by the Conference Secretariat and submitted to the delegations as a whole.  
The sub-committee members heard “moving stories [of a] great human tragedy” that 
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necessitated a rapid solution and mutual cooperation.  Representations were made by 
Jewish, Catholic and other non-Aryan groups and were thematically divided into “four 
main trends of thought.”  The first called for an increase in Jewish immigration into 
Palestine by “substantially” increasing the annual quota allowed by the Mandate Power 
and noted that 45,000 German Jews had entered Palestine since the Nazi takeover of 
government in 1933.   
      A second approach called for aid to refugees that would facilitate their 
assimilation into the dominant society of the nation “into which they are transplanted.”  
Article 15 of the Geneva Convention of February 10, 1938, concerning the status of 
German refugees, called for the “contracting parties” involved in resettlement to provide 
the structure and facilities for vocational training.  In addition, the new immigrants would 
be dispersed throughout the country of reception to avoid urban concentrations that could 
generate “hostility” among the native population.7  This Convention was applied to 
stateless German and Austrian refugees who were unable to obtain a Nansen passport and 
consequently were granted “certain privileges of sojourn and residence in signatory 
states,” suitable identification and travel documentation and protection against 
involuntary repatriation to Germany.  Several organizations called for an immediate 
ratification of this Convention by its signatories and the widest degree of application. 
      The third opinion called for resettlement in isolated and underdeveloped regions 
to avoid “mingling with indigenous ethnical elements” and presumably avoid the risk of 
generating local anti-Semitism.  The fourth suggestion requested the granting of all rights 
protecting minorities to refugees in “their present country of residence.”  In addition, 
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there were political views which called upon the countries of temporary haven to grant 
refugee Jews the rights of citizens while awaiting their ultimate emigration to a place of 
permanent abode.  The degree of “wealth and social status” should not be used in a 
discriminatory fashion against refugees and priority of entry ought to be granted to those 
“political prisoners or individuals who had suffered because of their opinions.”  The sub-
committee concluded that the enactment of such diverse points of view would entail the 
transfer of “whole populations” and the allocation of “large sums of money” to relief 
organizations.  It was believed, however, that Germany, should be approached to “make 
its contribution” for financing by allowing refugees to retain sufficient levels of personal 
assets to make resettlement possible; an approach consistent with the original Evian 
Conference invitation that stated that any costs would not be borne by the nations 
receiving refugees.8   
      Solomon Adler-Rudel, one of the representatives testifying before the White 
sub-committee, was critical of the improvised nature of these hearings: 
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Nobody was prepared for it, neither the members of the Committee, nor 
the representatives of the various organizations who had to queue up at 
the door of the meeting room to be called in, one after the others, and to 
face the 11 members of the Subcommittee, [to] whom they were 
supposed to tell their tale within ten minutes at the most.9 
       
      The second technical sub-committee, chaired by Norwegian Judge Hansson, the 
director of the Nansen Office, began closed door hearings on the immigration laws and 
practices of participating nations, the qualifications and numbers of refugees that could 
be accepted and the issue of travel documentation and identification papers.  The U.S. 
was represented by George Brandt and together with E.N. Cooper of the British Home 
Office did the bulk of the work and prepared the final report.  During Brandt’s July 8 
presentation of American immigration policies he was “roundly attacked” by Sir Neill 
Malcolm who complained that if the United States was not prepared to modify its 
immigration laws rather than merely merging the annual German and Austrian quotas 
then the President should not have initiated an international refugee conference.  Taylor 
viewed Malcolm’s attitude throughout the Conference as one of “open hostility” and 
described the High Commissioner as a “semi-invalid” who performed his office for the 
League only when he could “spare time from his duties as head of the North Borneo 
Company.” Instead, he credited Malcolm’s Turkish assistant, Mr. Tevfik Erim (a member 
of the Political Section of the League Secretariat) and Lord Duncannon with the majority 
of the High Commission’s refugee work.  Malcolm’s chief attribute, Taylor believed, lay 
in his blind obedience to the dictates of the British Foreign Office and the League 
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Secretariat and his avoidance of independent action.  Most private organizations, he went 
on, viewed Sir Neill as “pleasant but of little real value.”  Judge Hansson likewise was an 
“agreeable, pleasant spoken man” who was “completely ineffective” as Chairman of the 
technical sub-committee.10 
 The White Commission, with its abbreviated sessions and constrained 
testimonies clearly demonstrated that the central figures of the performance, the German 
and Austrian Jews, merely played marginalized roles on the world’s diplomatic stage.  
Britain would not modify its stance on Palestine.  Most nations that had received refugees 
preferred to be points of transit to other countries that were themselves resistant to Jewish 
immigration.  In an age of rising ethnic nationalism and economic stress it was unlikely 
that alien Jews would be granted equal rights. Consequently, it became clearly evident 
that the strategy of mass resettlement was an unachievable goal especially when coupled 
with official German intransigence regarding release of seized funds.  Projects of 
resettlement in out of the way, less developed and underpopulated locales were 
increasingly considered by the Europeans and the Roosevelt Administration as suitable 
destinations for Jews.  Such isolation, it was believed, would prevent the development of 
domestic anti-Semitism.  These plans, however, would have to subsidized by non-
governmental sources, would take years to develop and could incorporate only small 
numbers of individuals and families, leaving the remainder to face the whirlwind. 
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Chapter 8 
Day Six 
“Greatest Sympathy” 
      
      The fourth public meeting began July 11 with statements from the remaining 
delegates which thematically resembled those of their predecessors.  Gösta Engzell, the 
Swedish representative and director of the legal department in the Foreign Ministry, 
acknowledged his nation’s “most liberal” admissions policy but noted that Sweden was 
not a state of immigration. As a consequence of local conditions the Government would 
have to deal with each refugee as an individual subject to vigorous screening criteria.  
Engzell believed that success of the Evian Conference was dependent upon relocation 
outside the bounds of Europe.  Although the majority of costs would have to be borne by 
private organizations governments needed to be prepared to make the necessary 
contributions to ensure success.  He warned that the broader European Jewish Question 
posed the greatest danger and it is in this context that a more definitive solution must be 
found.  Sweden shared the concern over the “unhappy and often tragic fate” of the 
refugees and hoped that the Conference would result in “positive and lasting results.”1.  
However, despite the expression of such humanitarian concerns Sweden (along with 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom) introduced visa controls during 1938 as a means of 
restricting the entry of Jews.  “Political refugees” were viewed as a separate group from 
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“racial persecutees” who were primarily Jewish and as a result Jews were denied 
“political sanctuary.”2 
A joint declaration was introduced by Dr. Constantino Herdocia (Nicaraguan 
Minister to Great Britain and France), Professor Luis Dobles Segreda (Costa Rican 
Chargé d’Affairs in Paris), Dr. Mauricio Rosal (Honduran Consul in Paris) and Dr. 
Ernesto Hoffman (Panamanian Consul-General in Geneva and Permanent Delegate to the 
League of Nations) on behalf of their respective governments.  They expressed their 
fullest cooperation and “moral support for the generous initiative” of FDR and the 
creation of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees but their willingness 
to accept involuntary expatriates was dependent on similar action in the other states based 
on a percentage proportional to the “territorial extent” of each nation.  Although 
“saturated with foreign elements” the absorption of aliens, they believed, provided 
positive benefits to the development of these small countries. Limitations on national 
resources, however, tempered their “power of assimilation” and refugees would not be 
accepted beyond a reasonable quota.  Any cost for resettlement must be borne by the 
refugees themselves as official funds were inadequate to meet the need.  In addition, any 
refugee “engaged in trade or intellectual work” would be barred from entry due to 
concerns about competition with the local community.3 
      Gustavo A. Wiengreen, the Paraguayan delegate and Minister to Hungary, 
expressed the deepest pleasure and the “keenest sympathy” of his Government that led to 
                                                 
     
2
 David Cesarani and Paul A. Levine eds., Bystanders to the Holocaust: a Re-Evaluation (London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 19.  Gösta Engzell has been credited with saving more Jewish lives during 
WWII than his compatriot, Raoul Wallenberg. “Teaching the Hero in Holocaust History: The Cases of 
Raoul Wallenberg and Gösta Engzell” by Paul Levine, October 14, 1999, available from  
http://www1.yadvashem.org/download/education/conf/Levine.pdf; Internet; accessed May 31, 2010. 
 
     
3
 “Proceedings,” July 11, 1938, 35-36. 
228 
 
its willingness to participate in the Evian Conference.  Paraguay possessed an “immense 
territory of extraordinary fertility” but was “too thinly populated” and needed the 
absorption of “industrious individuals” that could develop and exploit its natural 
resources.  Nevertheless, the Decree-Law of March 20, 1937, limited admission to 
agriculturists and related crafts; a restriction that essentially eliminated from 
consideration the bulk of Jewish refugees who were urban based and middle-class.4   
      The Irish envoy and Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations, Francis 
Thomas Cremins, expressed the gratitude of his Government for being able to officially 
offer its heartfelt compassion for the refugees and hoped that significant outcomes would 
be achieved.  Cremins and the Irish mission had been directed to avoid any financial 
obligation without the express approval of the Minister of External Affairs Eamon de 
Valera.  Consequently, Cremins declared that the Irish were content to have been invited 
but were not able to make a bona fide contribution to the problem at hand due to its small 
geographic size, a population numbering less than three million and an economy 
primarily based on agriculture.  Since it was necessary for so many young Irish people to 
emigrate each year in search of employment (due to the lack of available land to settle 
and the slow expansion of domestic manufacturing) it was not possible to absorb 
stateless, unemployed and often destitute refugees.  In addition, there was an 
overabundance of medical and other professionals which barred entry of aliens with 
similar intellectual and professional backgrounds.  Cremins also believed that barely a 
fraction of the stateless refugees could be assimilated into the more highly industrialized 
nations.  Thus, he argued, only sparsely settled and underdeveloped territories were 
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suitable for mass migration.  Since Ireland lacked colonies it was reluctant to recommend 
that other nations assume a burden that Eire could not share.  The Irish Government did 
have the sincere faith that a feasible solution for the “mass of human suffering” could be 
found but he warned that “the greater the hopes” offered by potential sites of resettlement 
the “greater may be the pressure” exerted upon “these unfortunate creatures” by those 
nations that sought to expel unwanted minorities.5 
      Léon R. Thébaud, the Haitian Commercial Attaché to France (with rank of 
Minister), declared that his country had limited ability to admit refugees and would give 
preference to agriculturists or specialized technicians “of thoroughly healthy stock,” who 
were easily absorbable into the local community and who possessed sufficient assets.6   
      The Swiss representative to the Evian Conference was the Chief of the Federal 
Police for Foreigners (Eidgenössische Fremdenpolizei), Heinrich Rothmund, who also 
held the position of Chief of Immigration from 1919-1954.  He epitomized the insincerity 
and the duplicitous nature of the congress.  Rothmund expressed the “greatest sympathy” 
for those forced to flee their homeland and acknowledged that the refugee crisis as a 
whole was of “particular interest” to his Government. Switzerland was a desirable 
destination for refugees (along with France and Holland) due to its proximity to Germany 
and Austria, its tradition of granting asylum, liberal constitutionalism and political 
neutrality.  He noted that aliens already comprised nine percent of the total population in 
a country faced with high levels of unemployment. Domestic fears of being overrun by 
stateless foreigners forced Switzerland to serve only as a nation of transit. Jews were not 
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regarded by the Swiss Government as being “political refugees,” i.e., a group at risk of 
persecution due to political beliefs or activities.  All other refugees would be granted a 
“temporary residence permit or a tolerance permit” which would allow sufficient time to 
plan for and carry out a move to a more permanent haven.7   
      Following the end of the Great War the Swiss Government introduced a “system 
of control” over the admission of aliens especially the Ostjuden, the Eastern European 
and Russian Jews, who were viewed as a leftist threat to Swiss culture, ethnicity and 
native employment.  Such immigrants were deemed to be unassimilable into the 
dominant culture and posed a risk of Judaization.  The Westjuden or Western Jews were 
viewed as being more easily absorbed but this attitude changed with the events in 
Germany and Austria. The 1930 census demonstrated that nine percent of the population 
(355,000 out of 4 million) were aliens of which three hundred thousand possessed 
residency permits which granted the right to work and change occupation or place of 
residence.  However, contemporary events mandated “very stringent control” over the 
entry of future refugees.  Rothmund acknowledged, during the period of April-September 
1933, that ten thousand Jewish and non-Aryan refugees had been offered temporary 
asylum within the Swiss Cantonates.  This number later diminished following the return 
of some Jews to Germany or resettlement in other countries.  By December 1933 
approximately 2,500 Jewish and non-Jewish refugees were residing within Switzerland, 
decreasing to 1,500 by June 1935, following which the number increased to 3,400 on 
March 31, 1936 and 9,000 on December 31, 1937.8  
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       After the Anschluss the number of refugees rose to greater than ten thousand 
prompting the Swiss Government to increase border security and deportations.  Between 
March 12 and April 1 3,000-4,000 refugees from Austria entered Switzerland.  
Reportedly, one thousand refugees came into the the country illegally over a three week 
period in August of whom some were interned in a camp at Dupulsau and others forcibly 
returned to Germany. Increased security was enacted in the mountain passes and on the 
Austrian border.  Consequently, the total number of refugees declined but again spiked in 
1940 following the German occupation of France.  Switzerland could continue to honor 
its tradition of political asylum to refugees, Rothmund asserted, but current conditions 
mandated that the nation serve as a point of transit to other destinations rather than a site 
of permanent resettlement.9  
      The closure of frontiers abutting Austria forced Switzerland to introduce a 
system of visas for Austrian passports in order “to secure some control over 
immigration.”  The Swiss Federal Council declared on March 28, 1938 that all Austrians 
seeking entry into Switzerland would require a travel permit.  All refugees lacking proper 
documentation were barred admission on August 18 and from October 4 onwards all 
German non-Aryans required authorization as well.10 By August an additional one 
thousand illegal refugees had crossed the Swiss frontier prompting Canton Chiefs of 
Police to warn that future undocumented aliens faced deportation, stricter police controls 
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and a ban on “lucrative” employment due to the high Swiss unemployment rate.11  
Following Kristallnacht the Swiss Government, however, honored the appeal of the 
Swiss Committee for Aid to Children of Germany to admit a limited number of Jewish 
children on a temporary basis.12 
      While ostensibly seeking an international solution to the refugee crisis 
Rothmund and the Swiss Government was secretly conspiring to stem the influx of 
Jewish refugees. He sought official German cooperation in halting Jewish immigration 
because of governmental fears that the Swiss population would fall victim to 
Überfremdung (ethnic contamination) or Verjüdung (Judaization). Germany had begun a 
policy of granting German passports to all former Austrian citizens as a means of ridding 
itself of its Jews.  The specter of ever widening involuntary migration arose with the 
Italian Government’s decision to deport all foreign Jews who had arrived after 1919 
coupled with the closure of the French frontier to further refugees.  In the background, of 
course, lay the countries of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Poland who also 
sought to solve their “Jewish Question” by forced emigration.13 
       On June 24 Rothmund advised the German Legation in Bern that unrestricted 
admission of Austrian Jews would overwhelm Switzerland which had no more use for 
Jews than had Germany.  Fearing that Switzerland would be inundated by Jews with the 
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collusion of the Viennese police and aware of the probable ineffectualness of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, Rothmund filed a complaint on 
August 10, 1938 with Under State Secretary Ernst Woermann, Director of the Political 
Department of the German Foreign Ministry.  He claimed that the entry of Jews into the 
country has reached critical levels. Therefore, all Austrians seeking entry into 
Switzerland would require a special visa.  Otherwise, Switzerland would enact draconian 
measures to prevent the continued dumping of Jewish refugees. Unless positive actions 
were undertaken by the German authorities the Swiss Government would abrogate the 
Swiss-German visa agreement.  Rothmund agreed to limit any visa requirements to Jews 
coming from Austria or Germany provided their passports unmistakably identified the 
traveler as being Jewish. The Germans, in turn, called for similar designations to be 
applied to Swiss passports.   The end result was the cancellation of all Jewish passports 
and their replacement by special documents marked by a red “J” [Jude], 3 cm. in height 
affixed to the upper left-hand corner of the first page, allowing Swiss border officials to 
more readily recognize the ethnicity of refugees.  This policy went into effect 
approximately two weeks prior to Kristallnacht.14  Rothmund was described by Adler-
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Rudel as the “prime example of the kind of man” to which the destiny of the refugees 
was consigned.15  
Thus, while the Evian Conference was ostensibly convoked to aid the rescue of 
the victims of German persecution and potentially save lives, some members were 
actively moving to cut off all routes of escape.  The road to salvation would, as time will 
reveal, become a possible route to extinction.  The report of the Technical Sub-
Committee and the closing comments of the delegations themselves would clearly 
demonstrate the ineffectualness and, perhaps, the detachment from reality of the 
Conference itself. 
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Chapter 9 
Days Nine and Ten 
“Serious Spirit of Cooperation” 
      
      The report of the Technical Sub-Committee under Judge Michael Hansson of 
Norway was submitted in private session on July 14.  The committee was charged to hear 
confidential disclosures of the immigration laws and policies of the participating 
governments and the number and category of refugees that were considered eligible for 
admission.  A solution was needed to deal with the issue of “documentation” for stateless 
immigrants.  Meetings were held on July 8, 11and 13.  The representatives arrived at a 
general consensus in which all of the governments acknowledged the “serious nature” of 
the refugee crisis and the “urgent necessity for a solution.”  The limits of cooperation of 
each country, however, were framed by “their laws and individual situation” and the 
background and qualifications of the prospective immigrant [and I would include, the 
terms of the official invitation].  The Hansson committee believed “prospects for 
increased reception of refugees” were reasonably good dependent upon the relevant entry 
requirements.  In addition, resettlement in overseas territories was being considered by 
certain powers but required detailed analysis and long-range planning. Countries 
bordering Germany and Austria could not be expected to admit more refugees until those 
who were granted temporary haven had moved on to other destinations. These nations of 
transit “may continue to make an important contribution” towards solving the crisis by 
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providing training facilities geared for the “re-adaptation of life” abroad.  The 
impoverishment of many of the refugees posed a “major obstacle” to successful 
immigration and resettlement.  The issue of utilizing Nansen or Nansen-like passports 
was also considered.1 
      The closing session of the Evian Conference convened on July 15.  The 
Columbian representative, Jesus Yepes, introduced into the record a memorandum which 
reiterated that his country’s willingness to assist German and Austrian refugees 
represented a “humanitarian effort inspired by lofty sentiments of international 
fraternity.”  He disavowed any Columbian attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of 
the Reich and any immigrants allowed entry into his nation would have to meet the legal 
migration requirements.2 
      The Evian Conference Chairman, Myron C. Taylor, returned to the podium to 
offer his concluding remarks.  He announced that the “serious spirit of cooperation” 
among the delegations had created the “machinery” that would lead to the long-term 
resolution of the international refugee crisis affecting Central Europe; an operation and 
on-going project that would require uninterrupted effort so that the hope of an anguished 
mankind would not be “dispelled and their suffering embittered.”  The Evian Conference 
was only the beginning of a process that would be continued by a permanent body, the 
Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees from Germany.  He warned that lack 
of resolve would result in “catastrophic human suffering” which could potentially 
provoke “far-reaching consequences in international unrest and strain.”  An orderly 
                                                 
     
1
 “Annex II. Report of the Technical Sub-Committee,” “Proceedings,” July 14, 1938, 51-52. 
 
     
2
 J.M. Yepes, “Draft of the Resolution with which it Proposed to Conclude the Present Session of the 
Intergovernmental Committee at Evian,” “Proceedings, July 14, 1938, 39-40. 
237 
 
system of emigration, temporary transit and permanent resettlement would replace a 
“disorderly exodus” provided “the country of origin” [note that Germany is not 
specifically named] allowed the emigrants to retain a sufficient percentage (at least 25%) 
of their property and financial assets.  Such cooperation from Germany was “imperative” 
if other nations were to open their borders to stateless refugees.3  Appendix D contains 
the official memorandum issued at the end of the conference in which the construction of 
a permanent committee in London is announced.  As can be seen by the text the Evian 
Conference failed to reach any concrete plan and continued to talk in generalities and in 
terms of long-range goals, although the situation for Jews in Central Europe was rapidly 
worsening. 
       Some observers, however, noted that the seizure of Jewish assets and property 
represented more than “mere race hatred by Nazi leaders” but was driven largely by 
domestic “economic pressure”—trade deficits, lack of foreign exchange and high levels 
of national debt due to rearmament.  The Reich, “feeling the pinch of lack took a 
convenient opportunity” to improve its financial condition and support for its “Hitlerite 
program.” 4 The Government seized and Aryanized one-third of the Jewish owned 
businesses in Austria and especially Vienna estimated to be worth £114,000,000 to 
£307,000,000.  The confiscation program was scheduled to be completed by 1941.5  
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British Ambassador to Berlin Neville Henderson believed that Jewish emigration from 
the Reich must necessarily be contingent upon the amount of capital and property the 
Jews could retain to aid their establishment of a new life abroad. He believed that such a 
connection would pressure the Germans into liberalizing their financial policies if they 
truly wanted to rid themselves of the Jews.  Henderson, however, did ask Foreign 
Minister Ribbentrop if Germany would cooperate in an orderly resettlement of German 
and Austrian Jews by allowing retention of adequate funds but was given a negative 
response.6  Similarly, the American Ambassador, Hugh Wilson, queried State Secretary 
of the German Foreign Ministry Weizsäcker and was informed that “he should not 
entertain any hopes in that direction.”7  The Earl of Plymouth, Parliamentary 
Undersecretary to the Foreign Office, and Lord Halifax had called upon Germany to 
allow refugees to retain enough assets to allow resettlement.  Otherwise, the entire 
German and Austrian refugee problem would become inordinately complicated and 
potentially “insoluble.”8 Lord Winterton opposed such a plan out of fear of antagonizing 
the Germans and jeopardizing any potential for Nazi cooperation as the Conference was 
dealing with “questions of world-wide importance.”9   FDR requested that the British 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain personally approach Hitler for greater “flexibility” 
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on the refugee problem but was turned down by Chamberlain who believed that “formal 
diplomatic channels” represented the proper approach.10 
      Winterton, head of the British delegation, believed that the Conference had 
achieved “positive progress in the direction of enlarging the opportunities” for 
immigration that would be benefited by the future work of the IGCR.  The results were 
“unanimous” and “most satisfactory” and represented the “first fruits of the wise and 
courageous initiative” of FDR.  The delegations had demonstrated “good will and a 
disposition” to liberalize their respective immigration policies allowing entry of a “great 
number” of refugees.11  There were also signs, he believed, of a forthcoming willingness 
on the part of Germany to reach an accord on the issue of retained assets.  
       Palestine, Winterton believed, was a “wholly untenable” solution to the refugee 
crisis due to its limited geographic size and “special considerations” that derived from the 
Mandate granted to the United Kingdom by the League of Nations.  The Peel or Royal 
Commission, calling for the partition of Palestine, was rejected as indefensible and 
impracticable by the follow-up Woodhouse Commission.  Jewish immigration could only 
be facilitated under “suitable conditions” which at present were limited by local events 
[the Arab revolt which began in 1936].  Thus, the British need to secure the good will of 
the Middle Eastern Arab States, along with other factors, forced the United Kingdom to 
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avoid discussion of Palestine during the Evian Conference.  A definitive solution to the 
question of the Mandate awaited the outcome of the forthcoming London Conference 
regarding the potential division of Palestine into an Arab and Jewish State.  
Consequently, it was necessary to place “certain restrictions of a purely temporary 
[author’s italics] and exceptional character” on Jewish immigration in order to maintain 
the relative size of the two populations.12  Since the Arabs refused to directly negotiate 
with Palestinian Jewry it is likely that the London Conference was viewed by His 
Majesty’s Government as a delaying tactic with little chance of success.  
      These restrictions eventually became formalized in the White Paper of 1939 in 
which Jewish immigration was to be limited for five years and then ended.  In order to 
minimize the expected opposition from Palestinian and American Jews Britain did 
increase Jewish immigration into the United Kingdom until the beginning of the war.  
During this period fifty thousand Jewish refugees were admitted while the U.S. allowed 
entry to 57,000.13  Winterton did warn, however, that other governments should not 
become involved in the internal affairs of Palestine for which Britain “as the mandatory 
power bore sole responsibility.”14 He was prepared, on the other hand, to offer some 
degree of consolation to the increasingly desperate German and Austrian Jews: Kenya 
(and possibly Northern Rhodesia) could offer opportunities for “small-scale settlement” 
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but only gradually and without utilizing land that had been set aside for the native 
population.15  
      Winterton hoped that the Evian Conference and the creation of the IGCR would 
alleviate the “sufferings” of the refugees and he complimented the “willingness” of the 
delegations and their respective governments to “contribute, as far as their circumstances 
permit, to this result.”16  To some this tentative offer of East Africa as a place of refuge 
had an “excellent effect” and provided a “bright afterglow” to a meeting that had not 
been “notable for its optimism.” It represented the most “concrete” proposal to come out 
of the meeting as most delegations were more concerned about reasons why assistance 
could not be offered rather than the consideration of ways in which immigration could be 
facilitated.17 The British Colonial Office, however, informed the Foreign Office that 
Kenya could only accommodate one hundred fifty refugees and the prospects for the 
remainder of the Colonies were limited.  Taylor tried to obtain a full accounting of the 
Colonies’ potential for resettlement but to no avail.  He received assurances that the 
Colonial Secretary was devoting his “constant attention” to the issue and that “certain 
projects” besides Kenya were under review.  The Dominions were equally evasive.18 
      A Jewish periodical skeptically viewed any plans for resettling Jews in distant 
lands: 
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Powerful nations, enjoying sovereignty and freedom, have only their 
own countries to fall back upon.  But Jewish refugees have a choice of 
many lands to pick from.  If one prefers the humid heat of the jungles 
of Guiana, he is welcome to it.  If someone else’s taste runs to tsetse 
flies and similar blessings of East Africa, they are at his disposal. 
Verily, it is good to be a refugee.19 
 
Similar passionate sentiments were expressed by Ottawa merchant and President of the 
Canadian Zionist Organization Archibald J. Freiman on December 13, 1938 in response 
to the “Madagascar Plan,” espoused by a number of European nations and more recently 
by Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the S.S. Security Service: 
We don’t want the jungles of Africa—we are people, we are human 
beings.  We don’t want to hurt anybody, but we have a right as human 
beings to be on this earth.  We are not any better but certainly not any 
worse and you cannot show me a time in history when Jews acted 
towards nations as an alleged civilized nation is treating the Jews in 
Germany.  We don’t want the jungles of Africa, we want Palestine.20 
       
      Henri Bérenger concluded his remarks by expressing French contentment at 
hosting the Conference in such a “harmonious atmosphere” that Evian and its environs 
were able to provide.  He also praised France’s long democratic and republican traditions 
which infused the “moral and material tranquility” necessary for serious deliberations 
that sought to maintain international peace and the “freedom of all citizens of the 
world.”21 Despite Bérenger’s public optimism Daladier recognized that the Evian 
Conference was an exercise in futility and concluded that stricter controls on immigration 
needed to be instituted.  He advised the Chamber of Deputies that the more recent 
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refugees whose residency permits had expired would face deportation back to Germany 
or arrest and imprisonment.  Also, refugees who failed to obtain gainful employment 
faced similar consequences.  Following Kristallnacht the Daladier Government issued a 
decree calling for the establishment of detention camps for illegal refugees and for those 
who failed to meet the terms of the May 1938 decree.  An additional edict, issued on 
April 12, 1939, called for obligatory labor and military service for political refugees who 
had resided within France for more than two months.  The border security police were 
empowered to block the entry of any refugee that was considered unfit for military 
service or hard labor.22   
      Following the closing of the Evian Conference the U.S. Government dispatched 
officials to ascertain the current situation of “potential refugees” within Greater Germany.  
State Department Counsel George Brandt visited Vienna, Berlin, Stuttgart and Hamburg.   
The purpose of the “Brandt Mission” was to obtain data from “American sources” 
regarding the nature and number of people seeking to leave Germany under the auspices 
of the IGCR and a report was to be submitted in London by August 7.23  By July 18 the 
American Consul General in Berlin announced that further applications for visas into the 
U.S. would no longer be accepted due to heavy demand.  Ten thousand files involving 
fifteen thousand refugees were already under review.  More than sixty thousand requests 
had already been submitted for an annual quota of approximately 27,370.  The State 
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Department allocated the majority of the allotment to the four Consulates in Germany: 
Stuttgart, 11,000; Vienna, 6,000; and 3,000 respectively for Berlin and Hamburg.  The 
remaining four thousand were released to worldwide U.S. Consulates.24  Desperate 
German Jews, in the meantime, searched through the New York City and Chicago phone 
books searching for possible American relatives.  “They copy the names and addresses of 
American Jews to whom they hope they are related.”25     
      The State Department announced that an immense amount of red tape 
preparatory work dealing with the financial and political aspects of immigration into the 
U. S. would be necessary before German and Austrian Jews could embark on the 
“exodus” to America and other destinations and might require five to ten years before the 
project could be completed.26  The Protestant writer Jochen Klemmer perceptively 
observed in his diary on August 23, 1938 that the failure of the Evian Conference placed 
the German Jews in a “far more tragic” position in the hands of their Nazi tormentors.27   
Once again, the immediacy of the human tragedy that was playing out within 
Greater Germany and its implications was lost on the delegations and their respective 
governments.  Rescue required prompt and bold action rather than a contemplative, 
limited and drawn out affair.  Failure to resolve the Jewish Question reinforced the 
hardliners.  Palestine represented the best, although imperfect, solution but British 
resistance and Jewish disunity barred the Wandering Jew from the Promised Land. 
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Chapter 10 
Palestine 
“Waste of Time” 
 
      Arthur Ruppin, a prominent economist and sociologist, met with other Zionist 
immigration experts to discuss the implications of the Evian Conference.  He noted that 
Palestine had a limited potential to absorb refugees.  Since the British opposed increasing 
Jewish colonization he recommended that Jews move to other areas first in order to 
expedite their flight from Germany and Austria.  Jewish resettlement, Ruppin believed, 
should be viewed in a “more general perspective” with Palestine serving in a “central” 
but not exclusive role.  He urged Zionists, who would be attending the conference, to 
present an appearance of solidarity and work towards such a goal while offering the 
delegates “sound economic and political solutions.”1  
Yitzhak Gruenbaum took a contrary view during a session of the Jewish Agency 
Executive and stated that if other territories were deemed acceptable then Palestine would 
lose its centrality in the Zionist paradigm.  Consequently, Zionists needed to uphold the 
dogma that only Palestine was suitable for Jewish resettlement.  David Ben-Gurion 
agreed with Gruenbaum and felt that acceptance of Ruppin’s idea would diminish 
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pressure on the British to open up the Mandate for migration while potentially interfering 
with Zionism’s assertion to a historic right to the land of Palestine. Although Ben-Gurion 
knew the territory was not ready to accept large numbers of refugees, he continued to 
demand a linkage of refugee relocation to Palestine.   He anticipated, however, that the 
on-going Arab Revolt and its continuing unrest and violence would lessen the prospects 
for mass Jewish immigration.  Consequently, the future Israeli Prime Minister argued that 
the primary goal of the Zionist representatives should be to diminish the harm the 
Conference might create to the prospect of a future Jewish Homeland.  Only the 
preeminent leaders, such as Ruppin, Weizmann and Menachem Ussishkin, should be sent 
to Evian, to defend against potential adversity.2 Ben-Gurion warned that the “more we 
say about the terrible distress of the Jewish masses in Germany, Poland, and Rumania the 
more damage we shall inflict [on our own position] in the current negotiations [on the 
future of Palestine].3  Ussishkin demanded that the Zionist delegation focus solely on 
Palestine as the site of refuge as “all the other countries of immigration are of no interest 
to us.”4        
       The realization that the issue of Palestine would be excluded from discussion 
dissuaded many of the leading Zionist leaders, with the exception of Ruppin, from 
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attending the meeting. Chaim Weizmann believed that under such circumstances his 
presence would have been a “waste of time.”  He advised Rabbi Stephan Wise that the 
“scope of the Conference was so narrowed down that it would have been out of place for 
me to swell the numbers of the Jewish representatives already filling the corridors” of the 
Hotel Royal.  In addition, other prominent international Jewish leaders stayed away from 
the Conference.5   
      The Pro-Palestinian Federation of American in a vain attempt wired Myron C. 
Taylor imploring him to influence the British to allow an “open-door” policy of Jewish 
immigration into Palestine as “clearly stipulated” in the Mandate awarded the United 
Kingdom.  Signatories of the cable included the president of the organization, Rev. 
Charles Edward Russell, President of the AFL William Green, President of City College 
Frederick B. Robinson, New York Senator Robert F. Wagner and John Haynes Holmes 
of the Community Church of New York City.6 
     On the other hand there were voices opposed to any role of Palestine as a 
sanctuary for Jewish refugees.  The British Delegate to the League of Nations’ Mandate 
Commission testified that British policy “was, and must be, wholly unaffected by the 
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situation of the German Jews.”7  Palestinian Christian churches favored restraining 
Jewish immigration due to a desire to appease the Arabs in their congregations, to avert 
any “decline in the importance of Christian influence and institutions in the Holy Land” 
and to continue “missionary work” and other projects.  They believed partition would 
interfere with their proselytizing and other Christian Church activities.  The Anglican 
Bishop of Jerusalem and other clerics believed that the Mandate could not accommodate 
further Jewish immigration as a means of solving the refugee crisis and blamed the entry 
of Jews during 1935 as the cause of the Arab Revolt.  Since that time, the Bishop 
claimed, “Palestine had known no peace.”8   
The Roman Catholic Church was opposed both to the Balfour Declaration of 1917 
and any Jewish immigration into the Holy Land.  Archbishop Amleto Giovanni 
Cicognani, a special representative of Pope Pius XI to Washington, informed Myron C. 
Taylor (June 22, 1943), during his role of special American Emissary to the Vatican, that 
while it was historically true that the land had at one time been occupied by Jews, there 
were no historical precedents for the resettlement of a people to an area they had departed 
1,900 years earlier.  If the goal was the creation of a “Hebrew Home” then there were 
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more “fitting” locations which would avert “grave [and] new territorial problems.”  An 
editorialist had written in the aftermath of Kristallnacht that the issue of Jewish suffering 
and Palestine was purely “sentimental and coincidental.”  Despite the needs of 
humanitarianism British commitments in Palestine could not remain open ended or be 
“influenced by the malefactions of certain European States” towards their Jewish 
population.9 
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PART III 
HOPES DASHED 
Chapter 11 
“Unique Opportunity to Study Jewish Question” 
World appeasement…was obviously the great objective towards which the great powers of the 
world today must strive. 1 
         
      Overall, the Evian Conference failed to generate any positive, significant and 
concrete results.  It afforded a “unique opportunity to discuss the Jewish Question” on an 
international stage and was the only conference held prior to the onset of World War II to 
assist the targets of “racialist persecution.”2 Its ineffectualness led to marked increases in 
the global barriers to immigration and the sympathetic but shallow rhetoric expressed by 
the Conference’s delegates emboldened the Nazis, accelerating the decline of the status 
of Jews and non-Aryans within Greater Germany and culminated in the pogrom of 
November 1938.  Although the meeting was the result of a Presidential initiative it was 
apparent to some observers that the United States’ approach involved the provision of 
“helpfulness rather than direction.”  Although American officials endeavored to facilitate 
the construction of plans “we do not intend to be the final judges of whatever may be 
done.”3   
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      Many governments recognized early on that the “existing legislation” 
acknowledged by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in the American invitation placed 
stringent limitations on the numbers of Jews that would ultimately be allowed entry from 
Germany and Austria. Taylor warned during his opening address that “some millions of 
people….are actually or potentially without a country.”4  The problem was greatly 
compounded by the efforts of certain Eastern European nations that sought to rid 
themselves of their own Jewish populations.  In addition, the failure to formulate specific 
details and proposals prior to the American announcement and official invitation imbued 
the Evian Conference with an air of superficiality, haste and insincerity. Nations 
bordering Germany and Austria feared inundation with refugees and claimed that they 
had already become oversaturated with unwanted aliens.  Some States granted transit 
visas to refugees hoping to pass them on to another country while others used the local 
police or military to seal the borders to prevent further migration.  The sheer magnitude 
of the European refugee problem may have overwhelmed the abilities of the delegates 
and their respective governments to act in a positive and effectual manner.  One 
European expert observed that “every Jew east, north and south of Switzerland” was 
potentially a refugee, numbering 5,000,000-6,000,000, exclusive of the USSR. The 
League’s Nansen Office was still confronted with refugees stemming from the Great War 
and had “500,000 homeless on its hands.”  In addition, there was the problem of non-
fascist Italians and displaced Spaniards.5   
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      The refugee problem became more complex on July 14 when the Benito 
Mussolini Government issued a ten point racial doctrine, constructed by Fascist 
university professors in the report “Fascism and the Problems of Race,” that was similar 
in content to the Nazi Aryan world view.  The new Italian canon proclaimed the biologic 
superiority of Aryans and claimed the right to declare that the Italian non-Jewish “race” 
was itself Aryan.  A “pure Italian race now exists” and the “conception of racialism in 
Italy must be essentially Italian and Aryan-Nordic in trend.”  It was time, the authors 
believed, for the Italian people to proclaim their racial consciousness.6  Il Duce asserted 
that it was necessary for the Fascist Party to deal with the “racial problem” confronting 
the nation that threatened the “health of the race that will make history.”  The press called 
for stricter legislation which would avoid the “catastrophic plague of the crossbred, the 
creation…of a hybrid race” that would promote “disintegration and revolt,” Communism 
and Masonry.  For Italy to assume its rightful place in the sun the people needed to have a 
“strong pride [and] a clear omnipresent knowledge of the race.”  However, unlike their 
German Aryan brethren Fascists believed that “to discriminate is not to persecute” but the 
proportion of Jews to true Italians would have to be strictly controlled.7  The Jewish or 
half-Jewish population in 1933 was estimated to be 57,000 out of a total population of 
45,000,000.8  
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       Some sources suggested that this racial doctrine was issued at that particular 
time as a means of deflecting German and Austrian Jews away from seeking refuge in 
Italy, increasing ties of solidarity with the Reich and minimizing the influence of 
Palestinian Jews in the Mediterranean while currying favor with the Arab world.9  The 
anti-Semitic wing of the Fascist Party demanded the exclusion of Jews from the arts and 
sciences, education and other occupations “influencing national thought,” the abolition of 
intermarriage and discharge from the military; a policy move mimicking that of its 
German ally.10  Pope Pius XI publically contested this new racial dogma.  Although he 
did not mention the Jews specifically the Pontiff stated the Church did not want to 
“separate anything in the human family” and asked why Italy now felt compelled to 
emulate Nazi Germany.11 Mussolini responded to the Papal criticism by asserting that on 
the “question of race also we will march straight ahead.  To say that Fascism has imitated 
anyone or anything is simply absurd.” 12    
      The convening of the Evian Conference was considered a “laudable” exercise 
but “informed quarters” did not have “high hopes” for any positive outcomes.  Despite an 
abundance of “high sounding resolutions” there were “too many concrete obstacles” 
lying in the way of practical solutions. The agreement of the various democracies to 
attend the meeting was viewed as a “tribute” to the prestige of the American President; a 
convocation at which the “democracies could not well afford to absent themselves.” 
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Consequently, the United States was expected to absorb the majority of the refugees 
although Congressional opposition was expected. 13  
      Various observers noted that “even when the Government representatives had 
already gathered at Evian there was very little information forthcoming” regarding the 
planned agenda, its scope and its specific goals.14  The Times correspondents reported 
none of the delegations had brought to the table any “tangible contribution” to the 
problem of mass resettlement but would only deal with individual cases within the 
context of their national immigration laws and policies.15  However, at the conclusion of 
the meeting the paper’s opinion had changed.  The assembly had performed its tasks 
“admirably” and the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees 
would convert a “haphazard flight” of impoverished Jews (assuming German 
cooperation) into an “orderly exodus.”  Each delegation offered the “prospect” that a 
greater degree of flexibility would be applied towards immigration and, as a 
consequence, it was anticipated that “200,000” refugees could be resettled.16 
      Although Roosevelt had ordered, following the Anschluss, the consolidation of 
the annual German and Austrian immigration quotas the “excessive formalism” of the 
State Department and strict consular interpretations of the Likely to become a Public 
Charge clause (LPC) significantly restricted the admission of refugees from the Reich.  
As a result, during 1933-1938 no more than 27,000 German refugees or 20% of the 
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130,000 slots allocated to the German quota actually entered the United States.17  The 
German allotment for was 25,957 but only 12,532 visas were issued and 13,425 remained 
unused (51%).  The annual Austrian quota in the same year was 1,413 with 424 issued 
and 989 unused (62%).  The amalgamation of both groups generated 27,370 annual visas 
but merely 12,956 were issued and 14,414 remained unused (52%).  Appendix E provides 
a global breakdown of the 1937 Jewish population and Tables 2 and 5 provide 
information regarding Jewish emigration from Greater Germany and Austria.  
      The number of potential refugees, however, surpassed the quantity of annual 
visas available for a number of years.  By June 30, 1937 applications submitted to 
American Consulates in Germany and Austria had exceeded one hundred thousand and 
was expected to rise following the Anschluss.  Many candidates were excluded due to 
bureaucratic technicalities that would require amending the immigration law.  Potential 
immigrants had to provide proof of employment or an attestation that they would not 
become public charges. Confirmation of good conduct had to be provided by the Gestapo 
in addition to all of the necessary documents needed to leave Germany by a specified 
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date (sponsor, visa, exit permit, proof of payment of the Flight Tax and after the pogrom 
of November 1938 the Atonement Tax, and train or boat tickets.)18   
     Dennis Laffer has argued that the summit’s sole function was to serve as a 
“politically expedient means of avoiding action to assist the Jews.”  This project was 
constructed in such a manner as to guarantee ultimate failure. 19  It has also been 
categorized as a “public relations exercise” designed to express a sense of civilized 
outrage or moral duty to those individuals rendered stateless and penniless while 
sidestepping any changes in American immigration quotas or laws.20    The hollow 
oratory of the delegations and their respective governments demonstrated that the 
“universe of obligation” was fulfilled only in words and not in deeds.21  Guy S. Goodwin-
Gill has argued that the “processes of appeasement in international relations” would have 
been harmed if the conference had not ended in inaction.22  Likewise, Robert Michael 
claimed that FDR’s primary motivation was to “assuage” the American Jewish 
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community’s call for aid to their European co-religionists while simultaneously 
guaranteeing that “no effective help” would be provided.23   
      The invitation to attend the meeting specified that participating nations would 
not have to modify their respective immigration laws and quotas and any financial cost 
would have to be borne by private relief organizations, although it was clear that only 
governments possessed sufficient monies to facilitate resettlement.  The refusal of the 
United Kingdom and the United States to alter their immigration laws led “interested and 
disinterested spectators alike” to view the conference as an “exercise in Anglo-American 
collaborative hypocrisy.”24  Louise London asserted that the United Kingdom chose the 
path of “caution and pragmatism, subordinating humanitarianism to Britain's national 
interest.”  Solution of the refugee crisis posed greater risks than benefits to British 
interests, especially in the Middle East.25   
Henri Bérenger, the head of the French delegation, concluded that the Evian 
Conference did not serve any significant purpose.  It was not an international assembly, a 
legislature or a “platform for declarations.”  The delegates were “simply a body” which 
Roosevelt “desired to create between America and the other continents.”26  The French 
Premier, Edouard Daladier, confided in Neville Chamberlain that FDR was acting merely 
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to appease American public opinion.27  Italian Fascist editor Virginio Gayda, writing for 
the Giornale d’Italia, concluded that the Evian Conference “failed to deliver any tangible 
results” and despite the many declarations of “good intentions…nobody…want[ed] the 
Jews.” He criticized the American President for “never overlook[ing] an occasion for 
filling the world with some resounding verbal gesture.”  Since each country preferred 
some other nation to accept the refugees “the merry game of passing responsibility along 
continues uninterruptedly.” 28  The British weekly paper, Observer, warned that the 
“further accretion of, say 100,000” Jews into the country risked the “danger” of 
fomenting “anti-Jewish feeling…”  The refugee problem would be insoluble “unless 
every great country [took] her proportionate share.”29 
      Sir Neill Malcolm succeeded James G. McDonald as the League of Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany in February 1936.30  Although he was 
authorized “to undertake consultations by the most suitable method” with nations of 
potential resettlement he soon realized [an analysis supported by many private 
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organizations] that there was “very little chance” for mass resettlement abroad; a view 
reinforced by the statements of the delegations at Evian.  Consequently, Malcolm 
concluded that any “large-scale scheme of migration” [Jew or Christian non-Aryan] 
attempted during a time of high unemployment “could only arouse hostility” by creating 
an “alien element inside the State concerned.”  Therefore, any relocation of refugees must 
be made on an individual basis via a “process of infiltration” that would foster 
assimilation aided by the appropriate private organizations.  Successful resettlement, in 
turn, depended upon the provision of land, specialized training and sufficient financing.  
Private organizations, however, lacked sufficient funds to carry out such work 
singlehandedly and required governmental contributions.  Although the High 
Commissioner believed that the Evian Conference offered “a very great opportunity” 
backed by the “enormous prestige” of Roosevelt and European nations he believed that 
the project was doomed to failure unless suitable places of resettlement were provided. 31   
Such reticence, German Nazis noted, provided “courage” to lesser nations to voice “their 
reluctance to permit new Jewish emigration.”32 Erika Mann and Eric Estorick observed 
that the most “outstanding” consequence of the Conference was a general consensus that 
“something should be done” but in the absence of an official and government willing to 
“assume the burden of action, nothing was done.”33 
      FDR selected Myron C. Taylor, a personal friend, Quaker and a retired 
Chairman of U.S. Steel, to head the American delegation.  Despite his lofty title of 
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Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary the appointment of a non-diplomat 
implied a lack of seriousness about the conference and its potential work.34  Taylor and 
his British counterparts agreed in advance that Palestine would be excluded from 
consideration as a possible haven. 35  The issue of forced Jewish emigration from Poland, 
Rumania and Hungary was avoided by limiting discussion to refugees from Germany and 
Austria.  Prospects for resettlement in British African holdings were also downplayed.  
Lord Winterton, in his opening speech on July 6, 1938, noted that the tropical climate 
with its adverse effects on whites, population densities and local political considerations 
would limit immigration to a relative handful; mass re-settlement was a futile 
undertaking.36    
     The Roosevelt administration, despite its call for a refugee conference, did not 
attempt to garner public or political support for opening the gates.  He avoided open 
discussion of the issue knowing that the Great Depression, unemployment, fear of aliens, 
nativism, isolationism and anti-Semitism were significant factors that promoted anti-
immigrant attitudes.  Roosevelt was not willing to expend political capital in promoting 
this issue.37 
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      Jewish groups themselves could not agree on a cohesive policy towards 
immigration and instead offered a variety of proposals calling for increased or decreased 
admissions into Palestine, vocational and retraining programs to facilitate assimilation 
into the population of a new country and establishment of Jewish settlements in out of the 
way and undeveloped regions. Those opposed to forced immigration sought the 
preservation of their minority rights in the country of origin.38  In addition the Zionist and 
non-Zionist leadership failed to send a unified high-level representation to the 
conference.  Such discord, in the opinion of Nahum Goldman, would ultimately harm the 
Jewish cause and represented a source of disgrace and derision. 39  Goldmann wanted 
Rabbi Stephen Wise to attend in his capacity as president of the World Jewish Congress, 
along with Chaim Weizmann, arguing that they could “authoritatively command the best 
hearing for the general Jewish case.”40  
      There were some within the American Jewish community who decried the lack 
of a strong Jewish leadership.  Acknowledging the past efforts of Louis D. Brandeis and 
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Julian Mack critic Ludwig Lewisohn argued that the “disease of the assimilatory theory 
of emancipation” had hindered Jewish attempts at self-preservation.  As a consequence, 
“our ablest men are alienated even in this disastrous age” and behave as if they “were not 
Jews.”  Those “few able and well-known Jews who have identified themselves with their 
people” were absent when decisive and practical leadership was needed.  Jewish survival, 
he claimed, depended upon an end to the “ravages” of this affliction.41 
Jews came before the Conference representing divergent interests and groups; 
Zionists versus anti-Zionists, Orthodox versus Reformed.  The Congress Bulletin of the 
American Jewish Congress described the situation as a “spectacle of Jewish discord and 
disruption.”42 Some of the Jewish leaders, especially those of German background in the 
United States and Great Britain, deliberately avoided an outspoken stance against Jewish 
persecution out of “fear of stirring up an anti-Semitic backlash” within Germany and 
preferred to negotiate out of the limelight.43 The American Jewish Committee, a group 
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that was “old, elitist [and] given to private persuasion,” was engaged in a running “feud” 
with the more confrontational American Jewish Congress.44 Chaim Weizmann believed 
that behinds the scenes actions, performed “privately and separately” with the various 
delegations in their respective capitals, would be more likely to lead to positive results 
than an international congress at Evian.  The exclusion of Palestine from the agenda 
convinced him as well that he would not be granted a “serious hearing,” thus constituting 
“’a waste of time.’"45 
      To Zionist historians the “appearance of the Jews at the Evian Conference was 
that of paupers.”  Jews did not come as a “united nation but [as] a homeless group of 
lobbyists.”  The leadership of the London-based Jewish Agency suggested that the British 
Council for German Jews [and possibly other organizations] formulate a joint delegation; 
a project dismissed by the Council, in part out of fear of creating in actuality “an 
international Jewry.”46 There was also concern among the assorted Jewish leaderships 
that any testimony or evidence presented to the Conference sub-committees would be 
“heard [but] would not be seriously listened to.” 47 The American Jewish Congress 
reported that the “disintegration and rivalry” between the various Jewish factions 
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provided “a spectacle of Jewish discord and disruption.”  The New York Jewish paper 
regarded the entire state of affairs as a “disgrace.”48 
      A number of major Jewish organizations did, however, make an attempt to 
present a unified front at Evian.  The Council for German Jewry, HICEM, Joint Foreign 
Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jewry, Anglo-Jewish Association, 
German Aid Committee, and Agudas Israel World Organization submitted a collective 
memorandum (composed by Solomon Adler-Rudel serving on the Zionist Actions 
Committee) to the Conference.  The communication was endorsed by the Jewish Agency 
of Palestine which chose to submit a separate note dealing specifically with Mandate 
affairs.  The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee also expressed its support 
but directed its delegate to the conference, Dr. Jonah B. Wise, to offer a separate memo.  
       The collaborative text addressed the technical issues of resettlement 
organization and financing and was non-ideologically based.  It was estimated that two 
hundred million dollars were required to remove five hundred thousand Jews from 
Germany, with additional funding needed for relocation in agricultural colonies.  Eighty 
million dollars were needed for the evacuation and retraining of Jews younger than forty 
years of age.  The associated groups concluded that German cooperation, coupled with 
the release of a sufficient level of Jewish assets, was essential for a methodical and 
structured emigration system.  However, a special clause (XII) specifically dealt with 
Palestine as a site of resettlement.  The rate of immigration would be dependent upon the 
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economic absorptive capacity of the Mandate.  Such a focus on Palestine gained the 
support of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Joint Distribution Committee.    
     The principal figures of the larger organizations attempted to prevent the 
appearance of smaller Jewish groups before the Conference as a means of creating the 
façade of joint action.  Professor Benjamin Akzin criticized the leadership of some of the 
more prominent Jewish associations, especially Norman Bentwich, for acting as if they 
were the official spokesmen of the collective Jewish people.  Such individuals, Akzin 
believed, were “extremely displeased” with the attendance of the lesser blocs at the 
Conference who were regarded as interlopers or “minor leaguers” and did not warrant 
time to present their case before the technical sub-committee. The self elected elite 
believed that only one, two or three representatives should appear before the conference 
“in the name of all the Jewish federations” prompting Akzin and others to protest in the 
“name of democracy” The subsequent internecine conflict led the directorate of the Evian 
Conference to permit all representatives of Jewish organizations to speak but “what took 
place was a tragicomedy, with plenty of the comedy element.” Each organization was 
allotted only five to ten minutes; a clear sign that “the committee did not take it 
seriously.” 48   The decision of the White sub-committee to significantly curtail 
presentation time essentially negated the efforts of the attendant organizations. Twenty 
four groups who had hoped to offer evidence in support of their cause were limited to 
minutes resulting in confusion and disarray. 49   
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      The private organizations, Jewish and non-Jewish, presented five major 
suggestions to resolve the refugee crisis: 1. Application of pressure upon His Majesty’s 
Government to open the gates of Palestine to Jewish settlement. 2. Negotiations with the 
Reich to increase the amount of personal finances and assets that could be removed by 
the émigrés which at that time was limited to five percent of their holdings. 3. 
Establishment of an international loan to subsidize resettlement of forced refugees. 4. 
Negotiate with governments to liberalize immigration without revision of current “quotas 
and regulations.”  5. Grant permanent residency status and work permits to refugees in 
countries of temporary haven.  As demonstrated, all of these suggested measures were 
either ineffectual or ignored.50 
Solomon Adler-Rudel recalled that standing before the White sub-Committee was 
an entirely “humiliating experience” due to lack of preparation on the part of the Evian 
Conference representatives themselves as well as the witnesses appearing before the 
panel, “none of whom were accustomed to “any kind of interrogation procedure in front 
of a Committee.”  The speakers felt themselves to be “on trial” and were decidedly 
handicapped with the lack of time to adequately and clearly make their case.  
Consequently, “all left the room disheartened and disillusioned.”51  Years later, Dr. 
Nahum Goldmann laid some of the blame on “too many organizations [that] applied and 
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wanted to be heard, so there was no united front, and the goyim said, ‘To hell with all of 
them!’”52  Ernst Marcus observed that the Jewish representatives lacked the requisite 
economic “knowledge nor knew the means for the realization of projects.”  
Consequently, the “undue haste” with which Jews had to present their case, constrained 
by a limited time frame and practical experience, heralded the “tragedy… [that] was 
nearing its clear peak, the annihilation.  The gates had already been closed before us.”53 
      The Jewish leadership in the United Kingdom, Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Americas was divided over Zionism and the issue of Palestine.  The non-Zionists 
argued that Jews did not represent a specific nationality and consequently should not be 
granted the status of a State but rather a protectorate.  They believed the Mandate, 
however, should not place any limitations upon Jewish immigration. The Zionists, such 
as Chaim Weizmann, opposed the diversion of Diaspora resources from Palestine despite 
progressive British restrictions on Jewish immigration. David Ben-Gurion maintained 
that Palestine must remain the central focus of Jewish rescue.  Advising the Zionist 
Executive in a December 11, 1938 letter he asserted that: 
…if the Jews are faced with a choice between the refugee problem and 
rescuing Jews from concentration camps on the one hand, and aid for 
the national museum in Palestine on the other, the Jewish sense of pity 
will prevail and our people’s entire strength will be directed at aid for 
the refugees in the various countries. Zionism will vanish from the 
agenda and … also from Jewish public opinion. We are risking 
Zionism’s very existence if we allow the refugee problem to be 
separated from the Palestine problem.54 
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      Christopher Sykes has argued that the Zionists viewed the Evian Conference 
with “hostile indifference” and that any success would have lessened the pressure to grant 
Jews a National Homeland and diminished the “heightened enthusiasm of Jews with 
Palestine.  This was the last thing the Zionist leaders wished for…”55 Noah Lucas agreed 
that the failure of the Evian Conference was not a setback for the Zionist movement.  
Rather, its success would “have eased the pressure in Palestine.”56  Zionists, according to 
Henry Mentor, executive vice-president of the United Jewish Appeal, did not envision the 
rescue and Aliyah [emigration of Jews to Palestine] of all Central European Jews but 
called for “selectivity.”  Young men and women, with training in agriculture or other 
beneficial industries and who were prepared for the rigors of life in a developing 
Palestine, were the ideal candidates for resettlement.  Mentor warned that “there could be 
no more deadly ammunition provided to the enemies of Zionism” than the inundation of 
Palestine with “very old people or with undesirables.”  Until Palestine had reached a 
suitable level of development only 30,000-60,000 Jews could be admitted per year.57 
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      Various members of the Anglo-British Jewish elite, such as Anthony de 
Rothschild, Neville Laski, Robert Waley-Cohen, Lord Bearsted and others were more 
concerned about maintaining their social positions within British society and especially to 
avoid the proverbial charges of dual loyalties.58 Otto Schiff (1875-1952), was a banker of 
German background, who became president of the Jews’ Temporary Shelter, a major 
communal organization providing services to refugees.  Schiff had received the Order of 
the British Empire (OBE) for his work with Belgian refugees during the Great War.  He 
founded the Jewish Refugees Committee (later renamed the German Jewish Aid 
Committee in 1938).  
Schiff, along with Lionel Cohen, Neville Laski and Leonard Montefiore presented 
to the British Cabinet, during April 1933, a personal financial pledge that guaranteed 
German Jewish refugees admitted into the U.K. would not become public charges.  
Consequently, the Cabinet authorized a very liberal interpretation of the immigration 
requirements while viewing Britain as a way station on the road to overseas resettlement.  
As a result, approximately thirty thousand Jews entered the island nation by the end of 
1938.  By December 1939 these guarantors and other members of the local Jewish 
community had contributed £3,000,000.   
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The fiscal backers of the pledge were concerned not only about the number of the 
refugees but also their class, background, age and national origin. Immigrants older than 
forty five years were excluded as their prospects of overseas relocation were considered 
limited.  Following the Anschluss Schiff encouraged the Home Office to require visas for 
German and Austrian refugees in order to control the quantity and quality of the Jewish 
immigrants entering Britain.  The visa was necessary, according to a delegation of the 
British Jews Board of Deputies (of which Schiff was a member), because of the 
difficulties entailed in removing a refugee once they had successfully landed in Britain.  
Sir Samuel Hoare of the Home Office concurred and warned that a deluge of the 
inappropriate type of migrant would pose a significant risk of inciting anti-Semitism 
among the British natives and the creation of a domestic Jewish Question; a position in 
which the Board of Deputies delegation stood in full agreement.59 
       Dr. Nahum Goldmann, who attended the Evian Conference with Dr. Arthur 
Ruppin, was a member of the unofficial Zionist delegation.  Commenting in 1972 and a 
year later in his memoirs he described the meeting as a “shame and scandal for the entire 
progressive world.”60  The Conference was a “wretched and tragicomic spectacle” and 
from the outset it was clear that the democratic nations would fail to provide meaningful 
and substantive aid to the refugees while substituting warm words of sympathy for 
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tangible humanitarian actions.61 Ruppin noted that it was clearly obvious that the gates 
would be closed to all but a few refugees.   However, to the press Ruppin described the 
Evian Conference as the “first silver lining in the dark clouds” that hovered over the 
Jewish world and he anticipated that the IGCR would play a “big role in the emigration 
problem.”62 Bentwich described the Conference’s final report as “flat, like the mineral 
water of the place” and the exclusion of Palestine from consideration was “stultifying.”63  
The American Hebrew concluded that the “hopes” and aspirations of the real and 
potential forced émigrés was “rapidly sinking” due to the failure of the Conference to 
achieve meaningful results.64    
      Professor Arye Tartakower, historian and sociologist and a senior member of the 
World Jewish Congress, attended the Evian Conference as the representative of a Polish 
emigration society and described the results as a “dismal failure.”65  The “insulting 
episode of the civilized world’s reaction” to German “criminal atrocities” would forever 
be a stain on the collective memory of mankind.66  Historian Joseph Tenenbaum 
attributed the “gloomy failure” of the refugee conference to the plain reality that “no 
country wanted to open its gates to Jews.” He observed that the “flow of oratory and the 
hustling and bustling at special committee meetings did not obscure the paucity of 
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concrete proposals…”67 Haganah historian Dr. Yehuda Slutsky described the “high-
sounding, emotional declarations” of the conference delegates but noted that when faced 
with the need to create a rational and workable plan to resettle refugees the 
representatives became universally “evasive.”68 Solomon Adler-Rudel concluded that the 
sole accomplishment of the international meeting was the creation of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees based in London that ultimately 
proved to be totally ineffectual.  “It offered small comfort to the refugees, the potential 
refugees and the Jews in general, and was a cruel disappointment to the Jewish 
representatives who came to Evian.”69 
      One Jewish delegate summed up the sense of futility represented by the 
Conference: 
“When the old trees of Evian cast their evening shadows over Lake 
Geneva and the bright lights of the Casino shone across the serene 
waters, I was overcome with grief and despair over the situation….All 
our work would soon be ended by a policy of sauve-qui peut [“Every 
man for himself”]. The course which the Evian Conference was 
taking...was a tragedy whose certain end was destruction. The gates had 
been closed before us.” 70 
 
      Editorialist William Zukerman observed (two weeks prior to the opening 
session) that the fate of the Jewish people appeared to hang in the balance at Evian but 
reports emanating from the Jewish European press were, for a variety of reasons, “almost 
[too] pathetic” to read and were the potential harbinger of possible failure.  The Evian 
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Conference represented the first international conclave of governments to confront a 
predominantly Jewish refugee crisis which acquired the veneer of a “matter of great 
importance.”  Secondly, to Eastern and Western European Jews the United States 
maintained its image as the “golden land of hope, freedom and equal opportunities…”  
America was the “embodiment of the conscience of humanity…actuated by pity and true 
idealism” and endowed with faithfulness and morality.  Such sentiments infused a 
“peculiar luster” on the Evian Conference.  The writer warned that the “great hopes” held 
by Jews for a positive outcome, guided by the wise counsel of the United States, would 
end in a disappointment reminiscent of the weaknesses of President Wilson and the Paris 
Peace Conference.  Thirdly, the refugee Jews of Europe were being influenced not by 
logic or practicality but by emotion which was destined to end in “disillusionment.”  
Fourth, little was known about the planned agenda for the Conference or its “terms of 
reference,” scope or possible solutions.  It was clear that Jews represented the crux of the 
refugee problem but preliminary discussions appeared to ignore such a connection.  The 
necessary planning and preparatory work did not appear to “well-informed circles” to 
have been “efficiently done.”  Practical groundwork and action was called for rather than 
the issuance of “mere appeals” for assistance.  Fifth, would those nations who were 
responsible for creating the refugee crisis be confronted?  If agreements were made with 
Germany to facilitate the removal of its unwanted Jews would it stimulate pogroms and 
similar actions in Hungary, Poland and Rumania? Finally, it appeared that many of the 
attendees were lacking the “good-will which [such a] gigantic task requires” and were 
motivated by the fact that it was the United States that had issued the invitations for the 
Conference.  Many European Governments viewed the American plan with great 
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skepticism as a shallow expression of an “idealistic gesture.”  The appointment of Lord 
Winterton, an “outspoken anti-Semite” to represent the British delegation represented the 
“best illustration of [the] lack of sympathy with the spirit of the conference…”  
Zukerman concluded that the Evian Conference would “open auspiciously” but 
“complete failure” could only be averted by the application of “American courage, youth 
and sincerity…”71 
      Overall, the Evian Conference provided little comfort to the involuntary 
refugees and represented a “cruel” disillusionment to Jewish representatives and their 
sympathizers who attended the meeting.72 Hannah Rosen, a young German Jewish 
woman widowed at an early age, managed to acquire a visa admitting her into the United 
States.  She noted in her diary, following the conclusion of the conference on July 16 that 
Jewish hopes had been raised by the President “making it seem as if something would be 
done.  However, nothing was accomplished. Was it all for show?” After the equally 
ineffectual Bermuda Conference in April 1943 Rosen observed that, as with its Evian 
predecessor, the American Government had once again chosen the path of “all words and 
no action.”73 Beit-zvi regarded the conferences failure as symbolic of the Christian 
world’s “indifference” and “hypocrisy” to the fate of the Jewish people.74  
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      A Belgian paper described the conclusion of the Evian Conference as a “gloomy 
experience” for the many real and potential refugees who looked towards Lake Geneva 
for solace and rescue.  Despite the eloquent oratory and lofty idealism and the adoption of 
some “proposals devoid of all merit” nothing of “practical” significance to alleviate the 
sufferings and uncertainties of unwilling refugees was enacted.  The participating nations 
were driven and guided by their “foreign policy needs” and not the requirements of a 
persecuted people. The only true success of the meeting, the paper believed, was the 
cooperation of the United States with the European democratic States.75 
      Alan Dowty concluded that the Evian Conference clearly demonstrated that the 
“final lifeline—the right to flee—no longer existed” while Ya’acov Liberman believed 
that the failure of the democracies to allow the Jews to be “immediately resettled” (an 
unlikely possibility considering the domestic economic, social and political conditions of 
the time) would culminate in Jews of Central Europe being exterminated. 76 Dr. Oscar 
Jászi asserted that the problem of German and Austrian political refugees (inclusive of 
Jews) represented a microcosm within the greater global problem of real and potential 
refugees who had or may be forced to flee from the “intolerance of the Franco 
dictatorship” and the expansion of Nazi influence over the nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe.  Any new mass migration, he believed, would create “a problem of such 
magnitude” that it would defy resolution by the “normal methods of statecraft [that had 
                                                 
     
75Le Peuple (Brussels), July 16, 1938 cited in Katz, “Public Opinions,” 124. 
 
     
76
 Dowty, Closed Borders, 94; Ya’acov Liberman, My China: Jewish Life in the Orient, 1900-1950 
(Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 1998), 99. 
 
276 
 
proven to be] pathetically inadequate.”  Ominously and presciently he warned, “Only the 
catastrophic techniques of war and civil war would remain.”77  
      Robert Gellately maintained that Germany could not be swayed by issues of 
morality and “far from shaming the Nazis into relenting” the Evian Conference and its 
evident impotency merely encouraged the regime to adopt more radical approaches to 
solving the Jewish Question.78 Norman Neimark described the Conference as a “tragic 
failure” and concluded that any “protestations” regarding the difficulties or undesirability 
of accepting stateless refugees was underpinned by a global anti-Semitism that “played a 
central role” in the ultimate failure of the Conference.79 
      Rabbi Jonah B. Wise, the National Chairman of the Joint Distribution 
Committee and private observer at the proceedings of the Evian Conference, however, 
lauded the actions of Myron C. Taylor.  Despite the reticence of the various delegations 
to agree to modification of their respective immigration laws and policies Wise opposed 
any lessening of American immigration requirements for German and Austrian refugees.  
If the aid provided by the JDC and other relief organizations for those “escaping 
oppression…interfere[d] with helping Americans, then we wouldn’t do it.”  He noted that 
the JDC provided more aid funding for use within the United States than for foreign 
relief.80 
                                                 
     
77Oscar Jászi, “Political Refugees” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
203, Refugees (May 1939):  93. 
 
     
78Robert Gellately, Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler: The Age of Social Catastrophe (NY: Vintage Books, 
2008), 323. 
 
     
79Norman M. Neimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 68. 
 
     
80
“Our Needy First, J.B. Wise Asserts,” New York Times, July 21, 1938, 10. 
277 
 
      The American Jewish Committee (AJC) viewed the Evian Conference as the 
“most important step” taken towards solving the refugee crisis.  Both the President and 
Myron C. Taylor were owed the “gratitude of all lovers of humanity for their efforts to 
make the conference a success.”  Although the sole accomplishment of the Conference 
was the establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees the 
discussions between the delegates was “heartening” as an “expression of human 
principles.”  While expressing gratitude for the conflation of the German and Austrian 
quotas by the American Government the American Jewish Year Book (AJYB) criticized 
the “disinclination of other countries” to accept increased numbers of refugees.  The AJC 
observed that the number of emigrants leaving the United States during 1931-1937 
exceeded the number of immigrants by eighty thousand and cited a speech given by Lord 
Winterton on January 26, 1939 that German and Austrian refugees had created new 
industries employing 15,000 out of work Britons.81 By 1941, however, during the early 
years of the European War, the AJC had to admit that the IGCR had accomplished little 
of note.82 
      The Evian Conference also avoided any direct criticism of Nazi “policy towards 
the Jews, however uncivilized and deplorable.”83  There were a number of reasons for 
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this reticence to chastise the Reich including complicated business and economic 
relationships (especially in Latin America) and fears of jeopardizing the sought after 
policy of continental appeasement.  Many Latin American Governments were “dubious 
on the basic principle” that regimes engaged in forced emigration were “obliged” to 
allow refugees the retention of personal assets.  Such a principle represented “undue 
interference” in the internal affairs of a State and might result in an undesirable precedent 
that could be utilized against Latin American countries in the future.5384  Taylor informed 
Secretary of State Hull that many of the Latin American nations, especially Columbia, 
Venezuela, Central American Republics, Uruguay and Chile, threatened to vote against 
the final resolution of the Conference if it adopted any overt criticism of Germany.  
Taylor was told with “great frankness” that threats by Germany against joint commercial 
and compensation agreements precluded taking such a moral stand.  Consequently, the 
text of the final resolution avoided any censure of the Reich or calls upon Germany to 
allow refugees to retain sufficient assets for resettlement. 85 
      In addition, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had warned that if the 
Evian Conference engaged in any anti-German propaganda then the Reich would be 
forced to retaliate against its German Jewish population.86 Despite such dire threats 
Chaim Weizmann recalled the “elegant parties” held by Ribbentrop in the German 
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Embassy and how the elite of “British society was falling over itself to attend.”  An 
invitation to such a fête was a mark of “social distinction” and despite the spilling of 
“Jewish blood which stained the hands of the hosts” the guests chose to ignore the 
victims’ lamentations “to heaven.” Weizmann warned Anthony Eden that the “fire from 
the synagogues” could easily spread from Germany and ignite Westminster Abbey and 
other Anglican churches.  If a State was able to decimate an innocent minority purely on 
the basis of its religion and ethnicity, without any repercussions from the other Powers, 
then Europe as a whole faced the “beginning of anarchy” and the ultimate collapse of 
human civilization.  Nations that chose the role of bystanders would eventually “be 
visited by severe punishment.”87 Adler-Rudel noted that no matter how egregious Nazi 
behavior became foreign leaders were not prevented from “shaking hands or dining with 
Nazi leaders.” Sir George Ogilivie-Forbes, however, writing from Berlin, judged the 
Germans to be “unfit for decent international society” for their harsh treatment of Jews, 
non-Aryans and political prisoners.88 
      Lord Winteron believed that vilification of the Reich would jeopardize any 
chance of German cooperation and noted that the British had successfully blocked an 
American attempt to formulate some “clause of a denunciatory character towards the 
German Government.”89 Correspondent William Shirer doubted that the Evian 
Conference would achieve any positive results as the Americans, British and French 
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appeared “anxious not to do anything to offend Hitler…the man who was responsible for 
their problem.”90  
      David Vital concluded that reticence to discuss the underlying causes of 
involuntary emigration, that is, German anti-Semitic policies, essentially provided “an 
offer of assistance” to the Hitler regime in its ongoing efforts to render Germany 
jüdenrein. 91  There were governments within and outside of Europe, it was believed, who 
placed greater import on the preservation of “proper” diplomatic relations with Germany 
than on the “lives of individual refugees, however numerous…”  The protection of 
human rights was subservient to the needs and interests of the State.92 A Swiss paper 
argued that the international delegates were dealing “purely and simply [with] a human 
problem…of secondary importance—and on no account” should the quest for a solution 
to the refugee crisis harm “normal international relationships.”  It would be quite 
“unfortunate,” another Swiss paper believed, if the proceedings of the Evian Conference 
were perceived to be “directed against Germany.”  The sole focus of the meeting had to 
be the resolution of the refugee problem and the abatement of the difficulties of the 
countries bordering Germany.  Since the Reich and its policies were the genesis of the 
refugee issue overt censure needed to be avoided to facilitate “behind the scenes” 
[German] cooperation.93 Harry Schneiderman, editor of the American Jewish Yearbook 
(1920-1949), however, alleged that the Evian Conference had brought Germany and its 
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anti-Semitic policies before the “bar of civilized world opinion, but although 
condemnation was decisive and unqualified” it failed to stop or reduce the depredations 
of a criminal government which appears to have neither conscience nor regard for world 
opinion.”94 
      Representatives to the conference “manipulated the Intergovernmental 
Committee largely for their own ends, especially to deflect humanitarian pressure” from 
their respective countries.95 Simultaneously they expressed “warm words of idealism” 
awhile offering “few encouraging practical suggestions.”96 Country after country 
expressed their “platonic sympathies” for the plight of the refugees but presented a 
variety of explanations as to why they could not provide any meaningful refuge.97 Most 
of the Evian delegates were drawn from embassy staff or were foreign ministry senior 
officials; no heads of state attended—representative selections that prevented the 
immediate enactment of any decisive policy measures.  In addition, each delegation 
avoided “precise commitments” to accept specified numbers of refugees.  The French 
representatives sidestepped any consideration of resettlement in colonial possessions and 
along with the British prevented inclusion of the Eastern European Jewish Question in 
the conference agenda.98 
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       The unwillingness of the participating nations to commit to accept meaningful 
numbers of involuntary émigrés posed the greatest “stumbling block” in the search for a 
workable solution.  The representatives’ speech-making “left little doubt” that most 
countries would not open their doors to immigration.99  One paper editorialized that “if 
this is coming to the help of refugees, then what would the nations do if they meant to 
desert them?” 100 Time noted that the site of the conference, Evian, was the source of “still 
and unexciting table water [but] after a week of many warm words of idealism [and] few 
practical suggestions” the meeting “took on some of the same characteristics.”101 The 
correspondent for Newsweek observed that during his opening remarks Taylor 
acknowledged the refugee situation had reached a critical stage in which governments 
“’must act and act promptly’” and did so by “promptly…slamming their doors against 
Jewish refugees.”102  A reporter for Life magazine offered a critical opinion of the 
Conference.  “Diplomatic gatherings are notable for their inhuman superiority to reality” 
and the current assembly is no exception.  Lord Winterton’s “hypocritical maunderings 
widened the eyes even of the other delegates.”103 
      Charles Streit, correspondent for the New York Times, described the atmosphere 
at Evian as a “none too trustful poker game”, especially between the U.S., U.K. and 
France, in which each party opposed increasing it own level of immigration and wanted 
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to pass on the burden to the other.  The United States represented the “chief motive 
power” while the “chief brake” was provided by the United Kingdom.  Consequently, an 
“air of inhospitality” pervaded the conference.  The Conference was a call for democratic 
societies to stand up for and protect “the individual against being punished for his 
opinions or [the Jewish blood of] his parents.”  It was obvious early on that the delegates 
“lost sight” of this purpose from the “start.  These poor people and these great principles 
seem so far away from the Hotel Royal tonight.” 104  The New York Herald Tribune 
commented that the Conference was “not exactly a pretty spectacle” that got “nowhere 
with great dignity but a high rate of speed.”105  The New Republic observed that the 
delegates were annoyed with the Nazis not only because of the humanitarian concerns but 
because their respective countries were faced with an “awkward problem of 
absorption.”106  The Richmond News Leader predicted that the American response to the 
refugee crisis would be muted with the Government content to issue “friendly gestures 
and kind words.”107  Deborah Lipstadt noted that while many American papers criticized 
the lack of an adequate response during the Conference (both from the U.S. and other 
nations) they favored the “idea of a conference because it guaranteed no increase in 
immigration.”  Thus, the “failure of Evian was the failure of the rest of the world to 
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shoulder its share of the problem.”108  “Humanitarianism,” according to the Philadelphia 
Record, sustained a “new blow” as the conference failed to rescue the “unhappy exiles” 
of Europe. 109  Gerald Gross described the German and Austrian Jews and non-Aryans as 
“pathetic pawns” for whom the Evian Conference was convened.  The meeting had been 
a “disappointment if not altogether a surprise” to the refugees and their supporters for no 
sooner had the opening session begun delegates arose to say “We feel sorry for the 
refugees and potential refugees but…”110  The Daily Herald asked “if this is coming to 
the help of the refugees, then what would the nations do if they meant to desert them?”111 
      Former High Commissioner and chair of the President’s Committee for Political 
Refugees James G. McDonald claimed in 1944 that the “international organizations have 
almost never faced the realities of the tragedy” of the refugee crisis but instead engaged 
in “face saving maneuvers while millions of innocent men and women have been 
needlessly sacrificed.”112 Sumner Welles himself noted, following World War II, that the 
Evian Conference could have resulted in an “outstanding humanitarian achievement” had 
not the American Government “permitted the committee to become a nullity.”113 Cordell 
Hull, with convenient hindsight, forgot the terms of the invitation which placed 
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significant obstacles in the paths of the refugees and claimed that the Administration had 
called for the conference “lest these victims of persecution be exterminated.” 114  
Theodore C. Achilles, a State Department official and member of the U.S. delegation, 
attributed the failure of the meeting to the simple fact that “nobody wants any more 
Jews.”115   Yepes, the Columbian delegate, compared the character of the Evian 
Conference to that of a “modern wailing wall.”116 New York department store Ira 
Hirschmann, who attended the conference as an observer, left early after becoming 
convinced that the senselessness and indolence of the meeting was a “façade behind 
which the civilized governments could hide their inability to act.”117 
      A German plan to ransom forty thousand Jews ($200-400/head and evacuated 
by August 1) as a means of raising foreign capital was conveyed unofficially by an 
eminent Jewish Viennese physician, Dr. Heinrich von Neumann, but failed due to moral 
objections to “head money” and resistance of potential countries of refuge to allocate the 
necessary funds.118 Bérenger met with Neumann and would take his plan “under 
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advisement” while Taylor promised but never scheduled an appointment.119  He did have 
a discussion with Lord Winterton regarding the situation of Jews in Vienna and 
afterwards informed the press that he was “morally sure” that if havens were found for a 
significant number of Jews then the German Government would allow the migrants to 
retain twenty percent of their assets.120  The doctor was not allowed to testify before the 
White sub-committee and remarked that his personal position was extremely precarious 
as he must return to Germany “with a definite number to be evacuated, not promises of 
investigation by commissions, committees or officers.”121 Neumann reportedly had 
informed Taylor that he had been instructed by the Nazis to relay the warning that if a 
ransom plan was not agreed upon forty thousand Austrian Jews would be sent to 
concentration camps.  Taylor, according to one investigator, established a sub-committee 
to investigate the proposal, chaired by the Columbian delegate, which failed to achieve 
any concrete results.  The role of Neumann, if any, remains unclear and controversial 
although reports of his efforts were reported in the New York Times of July 7-9 and the 
London Daily Express on July 12.122   The Times considered it “noteworthy” that 
Neumann and Loewenherz were in attendance at the Conference and it appeared that they 
were “authorized to obtain specific proposals for a more widely open door on the part of 
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the receiving countries” but it was anticipated that their efforts would prove to be 
unsuccessful.123     
      Golda (Myerson) Meir, an unofficial Jewish observer of the meeting for the 
Histadrut labor union,  was not allowed to address the delegates and regarded the event 
as a “terrible experience” as delegate after delegate rose to express sympathy while 
offering reasons why their respective governments could not aid the refugees.  She did 
not believe that “anyone who didn’t live through it can understand what I felt at Evian—a 
mixture of sorrow, rage, frustration and horror.”   Meir wanted to chastise the 
representatives: “Don’t you know these so-called numbers are human beings” who were 
destined to become prisoners of concentration camps or condemned to wander the “world 
like lepers” unless rescue was provided. 124  Perhaps more importantly she concluded that 
even “a world which was not…anti-Semitic” could tolerate a situation in which Jewry 
was “victimized.”125 Norman Bentwich commented that the convocation of the Evian 
Conference aroused “exaggerated hope” but its accomplishments resulted in 
“exaggerated disappointment.”126 
      Pincus Rutenberg warned James MacDonald that the failure of the Evian 
Conference to achieve meaningful results, coupled with the growing Jewish Question 
within Eastern Europe, Italy and Czechoslovakia, proved that Palestine represented the 
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only place of refuge for displaced Jews.  It might be necessary to “sacrifice the old[er] 
generation” in order to rescue the “still remaining two to three million of young…and 
they can be brought only to Palestine.”127 
      Some observers did view the Evian Conference in a positive light. One Times 
correspondent concluded that the meeting had “done its work admirably” creating 
“machinery” that would convert disorderly migration into an methodical process 
provided the German Government would demonstrate liberality in the release of blocked 
Reichsmarks.  The writer also optimistically believed that each delegation “held out the 
prospect” of relaxing their respective immigration laws allowing the entry and 
resettlement of two hundred thousand forced émigrés.128  The Evian Conference  
represented a “bulwark against despair” for “800,000 to 1,000,000” Austrians and 
Germans endangered by German policies It offered hope to the “potential migrants and 
political refugees” facing displacement in Eastern Europe, Spain, Italy, the Soviet Union 
and the Near East.129 Although the human tragedy that was playing out within Central 
Europe and other regions reflected the “moral deterioration of an era” the Evian 
Conference “projected a swift gleam on light across a desolate continent.”  The 
establishment of the IGCR, with the support and leadership of the American Government, 
symbolized hope as it represented the “first organizational united front of the 
democracies.”  Success, however, in the long-term required German agreement to allow 
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refugees to retain sufficient resources to aid their resettlement. The Conference marked 
the beginning of “active aid” to the stateless refugees; assistance that was expected to 
continue and grow. 130  
      Henri Bérenger, the French representative to Evian and the IGCR foresaw a 
“happy augury for the future,” claiming that the United States had agreed to participate 
for the first time in “intergovernmental action” outside of its own borders.131  He ignored 
previous American involvement in the Washington Naval Conferences, Kellogg-Briand 
Pact and cooperation with the International Red Cross and the International Labor 
Organization.  British Viscount Samuel believed that the primary importance of the Evian 
Conference had been its demonstration that the problem of Central European refugees 
was not merely an internal domestic problem for Germany but posed a threat to all 
countries that would be impacted by an impoverished “flood of humanity.” The creation 
of the IGCR was a “wise conclusion” of the Conference but its success depended upon 
adequate funding for resettlement; monies that had to be released by the German 
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Government.132 [See Appendix C for the formal statement released at end of the Evian 
Conference.] 
      One Jewish editorialist commented that although the Evian Conference appeared 
to be “doomed to failure” he optimistically believed that the “significance of the parley 
itself and the broader picture obtained of the refugee problem [was] of inestimable value.  
From this beginning (even though it may amount to a baby-step along a road which calls 
for giant strides) will of necessity come drastic changes in immigration regulations.”133 
The Jewish Chronicle was bolstered by Taylor’s belief that the Conference represented 
only the beginning of a long process that would eventually provide positive results.  The 
meeting got off to a “dismal start,” the paper believed, but ended with a “mood of 
qualified optimism.”134 The National Zeitung declared that “active aid to the refugees has 
only just begun and will go ahead steadily” in close harmony with the “central theme of 
the energetic speeches with which the French and British representatives closed the 
conference sessions.”135 
       Rabbi Jonah B. Wise praised the initiative of Roosevelt and the chairmanship of 
Taylor for averting the “failure” that was predicted by “cynical observers.”  The 
Conference marked the ascendency of the world’s democracies away from their policies 
of offering “humiliating deference to world tyrants.”  The meeting was a “historic” 
occasion in which the threat against human rights by the “brutalitarian theory of 
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government” was faced with the United States offering “manna from heaven” to the 
global democracies. The conference, Wise believed, “served principally to sound a note 
of humanity and protest” against the political and racial policies of dictatorial regimes.  
“It was remarkable” that thirty two countries “practically agreed that the [refugee] 
problem was one of humanity and not the concern of a few groups of people.” 136 
      The Rabbi’s optimistic opinion was not shared, however, by all in the Jewish 
press who recognized that Central European Jewry had been effectively abandoned by 
those who walked the halls of power.  The Evian Conference effectively  
buried the hopes of thousands upon thousands of unhappy victims of 
totalitarianism.  There was no obituary for the ill-fated parley, no taps 
sounded at dusk.  The press for the most part maintained a stoical 
silence.  Only the refugees who for a day saw the bright bubble of hope 
in intergovernmental action mourned the death of democracy’s first 
significant effort in behalf of disfranchised humanity.  Their heads 
bowed in despair, they marched in spirit behind the somber bier of the 
conference.  A world that had failed to hear their cries of pain could not 
bear their funeral lamentations… 
…The fact remains that the Evian Conference was a crashing failure, as 
final in its failure as the Disarmament Conference, the Conference to 
end Japan’s dismemberment of China…and most other international 
parleys.  Thirty-two nations came together, it is true, but how many 
could have refused the invitation of a democracy as powerful as 
America?  That these nations were for the most part more interested in 
running the gamut of amenities with other countries than in opening 
their doors to refugees was demonstrated clearly enough during the 
sessions at Evian.  The presence of delegates from countries anxious to 
dump surplus Jewish populations upon the Conference’s lap scarcely 
gave the proceedings an air of success…. 
Sifted down, there is little left that is valid but the moral tone of the 
Conference and the fact that machinery has been set in order for a 
permanent refugee committee. 
It is all very well for Dr. Wise to wax optimistic over the Conference 
but to call it a success is like putting rouge on a corpse.  It is small 
comfort to the thousands whose hopes were dashed by the Conference 
to be told that is moral tone was important.  Nor will the totalitarian 
states be greatly moved by the moral implications or be greatly alarmed 
by the proposed August session in London… 
There are times which call for more realistic approaches to world 
problems than Dr. Wise’s Pollyanna utterances in regard to the Evian 
Conference.   Better to look the failure boldly in the face in order to 
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determine a course of action than to confuse the vital problem of 
refugee settlement with saccharine sentiment.137 
 
      The futility and hypocrisy of the Evian Conference was, however, readily 
recognized by the German Government and press and would play a significant role in 
future events.  Failure of the Evian Conference and the reluctance of countries of 
potential refuge to accept increased numbers of refugees reinforced Germany’s belief that 
international pressure would not be applied to force changes in Nazi policies.  Dr. Alfred 
Rosenberg warned that the Jewish Question was not limited to the confines of Greater 
Germany “for what broke out in Germany stands before the doors of a few other 
countries and whether the solution can be restrained as it was in Germany is very 
questionable.”  He believed that Madagascar represented a suitable destination due to its 
size, climate and French suzerainty since it was France that had begun “the emancipation 
of the Jews and still does everything for them today.”138  The major result of the Evian 
Conference, Rosenberg believed, was the creation of a “mammoth executive” based in 
London that had “failed to make any positive proposition.”  The supposedly sympathetic 
democracies had “shed many tears over Jewish misery” in Greater Germany but had 
failed to offer any “radical cure” for the problem.  Consequently, an area large and 
isolated enough to house all of the world’s Jewish population, subsidized by “Jewish 
millionaires and billionaires” and placed under the authority of “administrators trained in 
police work,” would provide a solution to the international dilemma rather than engaging 
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in the “political baiting and economic boycott against Germany.”139  Jews should be 
resettled not in their own State, such as Palestine, but rather in a “Jewish Reserve.”140 
      Hitler remarked that he expected and hoped that the Western democracies that 
held “such deep sympathy for these criminals will at least be generous enough to convert 
this sympathy into practical aid” and offered to place “all these criminals at the disposal 
of other countries…even on luxury ships.”141 He criticized the West for its complaint of 
the “boundless cruelty” of German anti-Jewish policies and noted their failure to offer 
“helpful activity…[O]n the contrary, these countries with icy coldness assured us that 
obviously there was no place for Jews in their territory…So no help is given, but morality 
is saved.”142 Das Schwarze Korps, the official organ of the S.S., noted that the Reich a 
offered to the world a “well assorted stock of Jewish lawyers, well-preserved and well 
rested women doctors, specialists for skin and social disease” and a “considerable rebate” 
for Jewish business owners, wholesalers and salesmen.143 
The S. D. analyzed the events and accomplishments of the Evian Conference.  
The text of the final resolution establishing the London based committee demonstrated 
that a “practical and concrete” solution to the Jewish Question was “not possible” at that 
time.  The statements and qualifications offered by the various delegates confirmed that 
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German “initiative” no longer determined foreign emigration policies because there 
existed among the attendees an “extensive aversion” to admit Jewish refugees, either due 
to “social considerations” or reflective of an “unexpressed racial abhorrence.”  Future 
German emigration policies were now greatly influenced by the actions of the IGCR but 
since the Reich rejected any outside interference in domestic internal affairs and had 
already refused to allow Jews to increase the amount of capital removed from the country 
it was to be expected that over time the rate and numbers of Jews emigrating from 
Germany would progressively diminish.  Thus, until the IGCR was operative it was 
“urgent” for the Government to persuade “as many Jews to emigrate under existing 
conditions.”  However, it was crucial that sufficient foreign currency be provided to 
facilitate this migration.144 
      Germany could not believe and mocked FDR’s “appeal to the nature of the 
world as long as the United States maintains racial quotas for immigrants.”145  “We see 
that one likes to pity the Jews as long as one can use this pity for a wicked agitation 
against Germany, but that no state is prepared to fight the cultural disgrace of central 
Europe by accepting a few thousand Jews.  Thus, the conference serves to justify 
Germany’s policy against Jewry.”146  “It appears astounding that these countries seem in 
no way particularly anxious to make use of this element themselves, now that the 
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opportunity offers.”147 “Aside from the purely administrative creation of a committee that 
will maintain contact between the interested governments…the results of this conference 
are very meager.” 148 “If the Jews of Germany are so dear to their hearts, they can 
certainly have them.” 149  It was considered remarkable that the Australian delegate, 
Minister for Trade and Customs, Thomas White, feared that Jewish immigration would 
“endanger his own race.”150  The Conference’s primary purpose was to garner votes for 
Roosevelt in the upcoming national elections and to generate “anti-Fascist currents” and 
anti-German propaganda.151 The Berlin Der Weltkampf noted in 1939 that Germany 
openly admitted that it did not want any Jews to reside within its borders while the 
democratic nations continued to maintain that they were “willing to receive them—then 
leave the guest out in the cold.  Aren’t we savages better men after all?”152 
      Ominously and reflective of a hardening Nazi policy towards its Jews, Das 
Schwarze Korps called for the economic dislocation and ghettoization of Jews within 
Germany.  Destitute Jews, confined to limited living space, would consequently pose a 
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risk of bolshevism or of becoming an underworld of “politico-criminal subhumans”; a 
possibility that the Reich would not tolerate.  Thus, the Government would be forced to 
deal with the Jewish criminal element in the same manner in which “we exterminate 
criminals generally—by fire and sword.”153 The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
informed its diplomats abroad that the emigration of one hundred thousand Jews had 
fostered anti-Jewish sentiments in other countries.  Continued forced deportations, 
especially of impoverished Jews, would increase the resistance of the citizens of 
receiving nations to further acceptance of Jews and would, therefore, provide sympathy 
and support for official German anti-Semitic actions.154 
      The failure of the Evian Conference thus marked a significant turning point in 
the fate of Central European Jewry.  Following the closure of the Conference Yugoslavia 
and Hungary closed its borders to Jewish refugees and Italy announced its own program 
of anti-Semitic decrees.  Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium also bolstered 
security along its borders as well.155 
      Yitzhak Arad maintained that the failure of the Conference placed the fate of 
German and Austrian Jews “completely in the hands” of the Nazi regime; a failure that 
was fully utilized for the use of anti-Jewish and anti-democratic propaganda and 
justification for more radical measures.  It was not a coincidence, Arad and others 
believed that Kristallnacht (and the tragedy of the S.S. St. Louis) occurred a few months 
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later.156 Skran asserted that the Anschluss, coupled with the failure of the Evian 
Conference and the November 1938 pogrom transformed a “manageable refugee flow 
into an uncontrollable flood”; a situation worsened by the expropriatory practices of the 
Nazis conjoined with rising nationalism and increasingly restrictive immigration policies 
within many Continental powers.157 Expressions of international sympathy without 
meaningful actions demonstrated to the Nazi leadership that Western rhetoric would not 
interfere with the German handling of the Jewish Question.  Prior to Evian Jews faced 
increasing levels of discrimination and economic and civil disenfranchisements but the 
post-Evian period was marked by mass deportations, forced relocations and wide-ranging 
pogroms on a nationwide scale.  The Nazis realized that little interference could be 
expected from the democratic nations in their drive to make Greater Germany jüdenrein.  
      The Reich Government was determined to become free of its internal Jewish 
menace but its conflicting policies of forced emigration coupled with economic 
marginalization raised formidable and often insurmountable obstacles to overseas 
resettlement.  Lack of meaningful cooperation with the newly created Intergovernmental 
Committee for Political Refugees aggravated the situation.  Thus, the Sicherheitsdienst or 
Security Service noted that the current rate of Jewish emigration would prevent rapid 
resolution of the Jewish Question.158 Consequently, a more radical and aggressive policy 
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would be required.  Following Evian greater legal and social proscriptions were enacted 
against the Jews coupled with increasingly dire threats. 
     Hitler advised the Czech Foreign Minister on January 21, 1939, that the “Jews 
among us will be annihilated.  “The Jews had not carried out 9th November 1938 
[assassination of a German diplomat in Paris that precipitated Kristallnacht] in vain; this 
day will be avenged.”159  Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, in “The Jewish 
Question as a Factor of Foreign Policy in 1938,” declared that a more radical approach 
must be taken against German Jews.  The greater the destitution the “more burdensome” 
forced migrants will become to a host country.  Consequently, domestic anti-Semitism 
will be promoted; a measure that would benefit the “propaganda interests” of the Reich.  
Germany recognized that “the emigration problem is…for all practical purposes 
insoluble.”  Nevertheless, the German Government would “take the initiative” and utilize 
whatever “measures” were necessary to resolve the problem and rid itself of the 
unwanted Jews.  However, and most importantly, “for Germany, the Jewish question will 
not have found its final solution [author’s italics] even when the last Jews will have left 
Germany.” 160 
      The Fuehrer expanded on these threats, raising the specter of extermination in an 
address to the Reichstag on January 30, 1939; a speech that was widely carried in the 
international press that offered both the carrot and the stick: 
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…Should not the outside world be most grateful to us for setting free 
these glorious bearers of culture and placing them at its disposal?  In 
accordance with its own statements, how is the outside world to justify 
its refusal to grant refuge in its various countries to these most valuable 
members of the human race? 
 
For how will it rationalize imposing the members of this race on the 
Germans of all people?  How will the states so infatuated with these 
“splendid people” explain why they are suddenly taking refuge in all 
sorts of pretenses just in order to deny asylum to these people? 
 
I believe the earlier this problem is resolved, the better.  For Europe 
cannot find peace before it has dealt properly with the Jewish question. 
 
It is possible that the necessity of resolving this problem sooner or later 
should bring about agreement in Europe…There is more than enough 
room for settlement on this earth…. 
 
I have a prophet very often in my lifetime, and this earned me mostly 
ridicule.  In the time of my struggle for power, it was primarily the 
Jewish people who mocked by prophecy that one day I would assume 
leadership of this Germany, of this state, and of the entire Volk,  and 
that I would press for a resolution of the Jewish question.  The 
resounding laughter of the Jews in Germany then may well stick in 
their throats today, I suspect. 
 
Once again I will be a prophet: should the international Jewry of 
finance succeed, both within and beyond Europe, in plunging mankind 
into yet another world war, then the result will not be a Bolshevization 
of the earth and the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation (Vernichtung) 
of the Jewish race in Europe.161 
 
 
      Following confirmation of the reports of mass murder coming out of occupied 
Europe Freda Kirchey, editor and publisher of The Nation, criticized the inaction of the 
democracies that had led to such destruction.  “If we had behaved like humane and 
generous people instead of complacent, cowardly ones,” she claimed, “the two million 
Jews living today in the earth of Poland and Hitler’s other crowded graveyards would be 
alive and safe…We had it in our power to rescue this doomed people and we did not lift a 
hand to do it—or perhaps would be fairer to say that we lifted just one cautious hand, 
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encased in a tight-fitting glove of quotas and visas and affidavits, and a thick layer of 
prejudice.”  Immigration quotas could have been suspended for the duration of the Hitler 
regime.  Enough funds could have been raised to provide for the destitute refugee carried 
by foreign ships to distant shores.  The solemn “resolutions” of the Evian Conference 
could have become a “reality instead of a hollow gesture.”  International accords could 
have been reached enabling the absorption of forced émigrés based on the respective 
“size and wealth” of recipient nations.  If the United States had shown the way then it 
was highly likely that “no nation would have refused its cooperation.  But nothing was 
done…”162 
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Chapter 12 
Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees 
“Face Saving Organization” 
 
       The sole accomplishment of the Evian Conference was the creation of the 
London-based Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees Coming from 
Germany.  The IGCR differed from earlier refugee organizations in that it enjoyed greater 
support from the United States Government and it represented the “first all-democracy 
world body ever established.”  Its full time director was to be an “eminent American” 
endowed with a greater range of authority and a “freer hand” than had been granted the 
League’s High Commissioner for Refugees.  Countries that created refugees were 
excluded from membership. Additionally, at least in the American view, it would offer 
the opportunity to deal with other groups of refugees.  It would consist of a chairman, 
four vice-chairmen and a director (Winterton as chairman; Taylor as vice-chair).  The 
IGCR, like its League predecessor, pursued a limited mission: to persuade nations to 
offer realistic opportunities for permanent resettlement and to negotiate with and 
convince the German Government involuntary refugees should be allowed to retain 
sufficient financial assets to reestablish themselves in a new life.1  Committee members 
would be drawn from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Argentina and Brazil 
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coupled with the possibility of establishing satellite offices in European capitals.2 The 
chosen director was seventy-year old attorney George Rublee, a Roosevelt friend and 
former classmate at Groton Academy.  However, with little funding and authority its list 
of accomplishments by the outbreak of war on September 1, 1939 was minimal.3 
[Appendix F demonstrates the limited finances available to the IGCR and the allocation 
of expenses among member nations.] Its first meeting was scheduled for August 3.   
      The Americans preferred that this permanent committee be based in Paris but 
official French opposition led to its location in the United Kingdom.  The French Foreign 
Ministry feared that the committee’s refugee operations, based in the capital, would result 
in the proliferation of “every ethnic, religious, or political organization that concerns 
itself with every minority and political opposition group.”  Governmental attempts to 
eradicate the “activities of irresponsible foreign bodies” within France would “thus be 
annihilated.”  Furthermore, involvement with the problem of German and Austrian 
refugees would complicate French foreign affairs and policies.  The Ministry asked if it 
was in the interest of the Republic to assume the role of refuge for “all the misfits” and 
people whom “Germany considers its natural enemy.”  Such humanitarianism could 
permanently create an air of “cultural and racial antagonism” between the two 
neighbors.4   
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      This committee was to operate separately from the League of Nations High 
Commission for Refugees from Germany with which the German Government refused to 
cooperate and did not recognize. Both the Nansen Office headed by Judge Michael 
Hansson and the League Commission for Refugees led by Sir Neill Malcolm were due to 
be closed in December 1938 and it was anticipated that the League Assembly, scheduled 
to meet in September, would combine the two offices under a new High Commissioner.5 
      The French Foreign Minister, George Bonnet, held a meeting with his German 
counterpart, Joachim von Ribbentrop [duly reported to Hitler] on December 7, 1938, in 
which Bonnet stated that France did not want to receive any more German Jews. He 
called upon the Reich to “take some sort of measures” to prevent further entry of 
involuntary émigrés into the Third Republic.  Additionally, the Government sought to 
ship ten thousand Jews already residing within France to other locations such as the 
island of Madagascar off the east coast of Africa.  Ribbentrop replied to Bonnet that 
Germany also desired to be rid of its Jews but the problem “lay in the fact that no country 
wished to receive them.”6  Bonnet assured Ribbentrop that France had no desire to 
interfere with the internal affairs of Germany but the forced expulsion of Jews and non-
Aryans, stripped of sufficient financial assets to reestablish themselves, was adversely 
affecting the willingness of countries of potential resettlement to accept refugees who 
most likely would become public charges. The Reich Foreign Minister did agree, 
however, that a German knowledgeable about the Jewish Question in Germany could 
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meet in an unofficial capacity with a representative of the IGCR to study the issue of 
Jewish resettlement.7  
      Critics of the IGCR viewed it as a “face-saving refugee organization” that would 
be relegated to “endless bickering” with member States and with the German 
Government, especially over the issue of the retention of personal property and assets.  
Currently, the forced émigrés were “plucked practically as clean as dressed fowl” before 
being allowed to leave Greater Germany.8 
      Following the conclusion of the Evian Conference Taylor did suggest to 
Secretary Hull that the United States openly proclaim its willingness to accept a 
significant proportion of the six hundred thousand Germans and Austrians who were 
expected to become involuntary migrants within the next five years.  Without such a 
declaration, Taylor warned, the “other countries of settlement will claim that they are not 
obligated to commit themselves and we shall have no plan to present to the German 
Government.”  Hull was faced with two possible dilemmas: such an American invitation 
could prove too successful and incur the wrath of an increasingly restrictionist Congress 
that could interfere with other items on FDR’s political agenda.  In addition, relaxation of 
immigration barriers could incite large-scale forced emigration from the East. Hull 
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advised the U.S. Ambassador to Poland that American “efforts on behalf of German 
refugees” must not promote the persecution and expulsion of the “unwanted sections” of 
other national groups and the “dumping of these people into the hands of international 
charity.”9 
      Dr. Nahum Goldmann viewed this new standing committee as potentially useful 
if the British would allow increased immigration into Palestine.  Therefore, he concluded, 
the continuity of a close working relationship was a critical task for Jewish 
organizations.10  Likewise, Dr. Arthur Ruppin believed that the creation of the IGCR was 
a “positive” step provided the London-based international committee was “blessed with a 
gifted director.”11  Zalman Rubashov, a correspondent for Davar attending the Evian 
Conference, commended both the United States and France for creating a “third way” 
that would permit negotiations between the Reich and Jews that would ultimately benefit 
Zionist goals.12  The Zionist leadership, however, was not interested in rescuing Jewish 
refugees if it was not tied to increased immigration into Palestine.  Without such a 
connection “all Zionists wanted was to shrug off the entire matter with all possible 
speed.”13  The French under Bérenger, during the August 3, 1938 meeting in London, 
continued to maintain that France had “reached the saturation point” vis-à-vis 
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immigration and any further admittance of refugees would result in a “rupture to the 
equilibrium of her social body…The absorptive capabilities of every people has a limit.  
This limit has long been exceeded in France.  She said so at Evian; she repeats it in 
London.”14 
      Two years prior to the accession of Hitler to power the Weimar Government 
enacted an emigration tax in an attempt to limit removal of foreign currency. In 1933 
emigrants from Germany retained seventy five percent of the value of their assets.  This 
percentage was later decreased to fifteen percent and by 1938 it was reduced to five 
percent; a policy that severely impacted on the willingness of potential receiving nations 
to accept penniless refugees.  German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop warned 
that the refugee problem was an “internal German problem that was not subject to 
discussion.”  The release of adequate amounts of Jewish monies “could not be expected 
of Germany” and any cooperation with the Evian conferees “was out of the question for 
Germany.”  Permanent Foreign Secretary Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker informed 
Ribbentrop that both the American and British Ambassadors were seeking a meeting of 
George Rublee with German officials.  Such an appointment was necessary if the IGCR 
was to “prove its worth.”  Germany would undoubtedly be requested to released 
increased amounts of foreign currency and personal assets; an action that “for obvious 
reasons” the Reich cannot provide.  Such a refusal on the German side would provide an 
opportunity for adverse Western propaganda, namely, that it was “German obstinacy” 
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that was the genesis of the “misery of the Jews.”  Thus, Rublee could not be allowed to 
travel to Berlin merely for the prospect of “making Germany the scapegoat.”15          
      Eventually it was the foreign economic concerns arising in the wake of 
Kristallnacht that led Hermann Goering, the director of the Four Year Plan, to convince 
Hitler to authorize Hjalmar Schacht, the President of the Reichsbank, to meet in London 
with Rublee, Lord Bearsted and Lord Winterton.  The plan offered by Schacht called for 
the freezing of Jewish assets within Germany as security for an international loan that 
would be called due in twenty to twenty five years.  Jewish monies would be held in 
blocked accounts within Germany out of which twenty five percent would be recoverable 
by Jews via the purchase and foreign sale of German export goods (with the balance 
seized by the German Government).  The plan favored one hundred fifty thousand men 
and women, between fifteen and forty five years of age, who were able to work to 
support themselves and two hundred fifty thousand dependents.  The two hundred 
thousand elderly (those over forty five) and those too infirm to migrate would be 
maintained by communal funds and would live undisturbed unless another assassination 
of a Nazi was carried out by a Jew. 16  Jewish holdings were estimated to have a value of 
at least 1.5 billion Reichmarks that could be utilized to generate enough foreign currency 
to fund an orderly migration over the course of three to five years.  Emigration of wage 
earners would be diffused over three to five years and dependents would be allowed to 
emigrate when assured of support abroad.  A German official would coordinate 
                                                 
     
15Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, 3496/EO19935-36, Circular of the State Secretary 
Berlin, July 8, 1938, 83-29 8/7 No. 640; Case XI, NG 1522-23 cited in Reitlinger, The Final Solution, 19. 
 
     
16See Table 6 for breakdown of Jewish population demographics as of January 1, 1938. 
308 
 
resettlement with Jewish relief and communal organizations aided by refugee experts.  
Passport and identity papers would be provided, training facilities would be established 
within Germany and concentration camp inmates would be released once emigration 
began.   
      Schacht, on his return to Germany met with Hitler on January 2, 1939, and was 
appointed special representative for Jewish emigration.  The Foreign Office was ordered 
to end its opposition to the IGCR and negotiations were transferred to Berlin.  The IGCR 
still faced the difficulties of finding places of final resettlement and private sources for 
the short term costs of migration.  Schacht’s discharge from his post, following an 
argument with Hitler on January 20, temporarily ended any possibility of negotiations but 
contact with Rublee was resumed by Helmuth Wohlthat, the director of Foreign Credits 
Control Office. Negotiations foundered, however, on the issue of Jewish assets.  Hitler 
ultimately allowed resumption of talks which resulted in an economic arrangement 
similar in many respects to the earlier Ha’avarah plan which coupled German exports 
with sufficient assets to facilitate emigration to Palestine.  
      Although the Rublee-Schacht and Rublee-Wohlthat plans were viewed by some 
as a form of blackmail that would lead to the impoverishment of German Jewry (and 
perhaps similar demands and actions on the part of Poland, Rumanian and Hungary) the 
IGCR feared outright refusal would convince the German Government that solution of 
the Jewish Question could not be solved via international agreement but would require 
more stringent solutions.17 Under-Secretary Sumner Welles criticized the plan as a form 
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of extortion:  Germany expected “the world to pay a ransom for the release of hostages” 
while trading “human misery for increased exports.” 18  Rublee was advised by the State 
Department that such an agreement could threaten American foreign trade and markets 
and it was averse to any linkage of the financing of Jewish resettlement with increased 
sales of German products.  Welles warned, however, that rejection of the deal could 
provoke further anti-Jewish violence. He favored the creation of a private economic 
foundation under the rubric of the London based IGCR.  The frozen assets of the émigrés 
would be used to purchase German goods needed to foster and support resettlement as 
well as for the care and maintenance of Jews who had to remain in the Reich.  The 
Under-Secretary believed that this arrangement would be more beneficial to Germany 
than the Rublee-Schacht plan.19 George Messersmith opposed the linkage of population 
transfer and German trade.  Acceptance of such an “insidious doctrine” of a “limited 
trade agreement” with the Reich would not “help the conservative elements [or] improve 
the prospects for a more reasonable regime.”20   
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      The IGCR accepted the Schacht plan on December 28, 1938 as a starting point 
for further negotiations by Rublee in Berlin. The Committee announced on February 14 
that an agreement had been reached based on Schacht’s scheme but it eliminated the 
conflation of a Jewish loan and increased German export trade.  Instead, twenty five 
percent of Jewish wealth within Germany would be utilized to create a trust to fund 
transportation and the purchase of necessary supplies and equipment from Germany.  The 
expense of ultimate resettlement would be provided by a private foundation as envisioned 
by Welles.  The German Government agreed to establish training centers for the first 
wave of emigrants and to grant the right to work to those remaining behind.  The 
implementation of this plan was, from the Reich’s view, contingent on the agreement of 
other nations to provide havens of resettlement.  The IGCR officially signed off on 
Germany’s demands on March 1, 1939.21   
      In the end, resistance of the harder line Nazis and the reluctance of the 
democratic nations to open their borders to involuntary refugees prevented 
implementation of such a project and helped to set the stage for the November 1938 
pogrom, Kristallnacht.  The advent of war effectively ended any chance of large-scale 
migration. Schacht did claim during the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg 
that if his plan had been adopted by December 1938 (while it had Hitler’s support) then 
“not a single German Jew would have lost his life.”22 
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      Ultimately, the activities of the IGCR and its two directors, Rublee and his 
successor Sir Herbert Emerson, were relegated to the realm of “diplomatic 
representations” dealing with the permanent placement of refugees residing in temporary 
havens.  Limited public awareness of the “gravity” of the Jewish situation within 
territories controlled by Germany (before and after the start of hostilities) and the 
outbreak of the war itself essentially ended any chance of achieving a realistic solution to 
the German and Austrian (and Czech) refugee crisis.23  
      A fundamental question remains: was there any chance for success of the Evian 
Conference and its offspring, the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees 
from Germany?  Lord Winterton succinctly summarized the basic flaws of the meeting 
during a Parliamentary debate on April 6, 1939, but continued to avoid any linkage with 
Palestine: 
The whole Evian Committee without exception [was] not prepared to 
admit the principle that they are either under a moral obligation or that 
it is practically possible from the point of public support in their 
respective countries to admit financial liability for the transfer and 
upkeep in the countries or for the permanent settlement of refugees.  
Every one of these 32 Governments [was] faced with unemployment 
difficulties.  Every one of them is frightened of the possible growth of 
an anti-Semitic and anti-foreign feeling if it is felt that more is being 
done for foreigners than for their own people.  There [was] no chance 
of getting an alteration in that principle. 
The last thing that would induce the Reich Government to be 
reasonable about the amount of property taken by Jews out of Germany 
would be for the Evian Governments to assume liability for the transfer 
and maintenance of these people…24 
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PART IV 
APPRAISALS 
Chapter 13 
“No Confidence in the Idea” 
                                                        
 “Strife and desolation and destruction are in their paths.  They violate the boundaries of nations, 
and the way of peace they know not.  They assault religion and set at naught ancient covenants of 
justice and right.  Human brotherhood is become a mockery, and there is neither truth, pity, nor 
freedom in the land.”1 
 
 
      Conflicting appraisals of the response of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his 
Administration, Congress, the American people and their foreign democratic counterparts 
to the great European humanitarian crises of the 1930s and early 1940s have arisen in the 
historiography of the Holocaust era.  Director of the IGCR, George Rublee, remained 
highly skeptical of the Evian Conference’s chances for success.  The meeting was called 
for too quickly by Roosevelt with inadequate planning and most attendees “came 
reluctantly and with no confidence in the idea.”    Taylor competently kept the 
delegations “together” while obtaining agreement to create a permanent body “but that is 
all.” Rublee complained that the American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Joseph 
P. Kennedy, appeared disinterested in the workings of the permanent committee and 
never offered “me any real support or assistance” while the President “was not seriously 
[personally] interested.” Rublee advised Hull that he believed Germany was willing to 
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negotiate but the British and French, fearful of the IGCR’s success, were “reluctant” for 
him to hold discussions with the Germans. 2 
      The Conference did not get off to a “good start” due to the lack of the “fullest 
and most adequate preparation.”  To enter into an international congress with the “hope” 
of achieving positive results represented the “best way of courting failure.”  If the United 
States had presented concrete proposals, rather than highlighting an already existing 
immigration quota, then “some result might have been easily achieved.”  It was the 
economic concerns and the fear of creating “anti-Jewish centers” among their respective 
populations that led the delegations and their governments to “hedge” their proposals 
while seeking the “absolute minimum of practical measures.”3  The British consideration 
of Kenya and the establishment of the IGCR were viewed by some as insignificant 
accomplishments when viewed in the context of an international conference in which the 
“greater part of the non-Fascist world” was seated.  Proper planning and consultation 
might have led the various powers to ponder the issue with greater clarity creating the 
potential for collective action.  The Evian Conference was convened “too precipitously” 
and demonstrated that “good intentions are no substitute for well-laid plans.”4  R.A. 
Butler, Parliamentary Undersecretary for the British Foreign Office, warned an 
interdepartmental meeting prior to the Conference that the “whole scheme would fall 
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through” due to lack of adequate funding.5  Helen Fein had argued that the limitation of 
American action to the consolidation of the German and Austrian annual quotas                                                
implied that the Conference was a simple “exercise in Anglo-American collaborative 
hypocrisy.”6   
Harold Ginsburg, the representative of the Joint Distribution Committee noted, 
during a June 27, 1938 meeting of the Council for German Jewry, that conversations held 
with members of the American delegation to the Evian Conference led him to believe that 
the conferees themselves would determine both the goals of and the methodologies 
adopted by the meeting.  The U.S. delegation preferred that sessions be held in private, 
while seeking “unofficial agreements” that would avoid contentious subjects such as the 
Jewish problem in Eastern Europe.  Dr. Jonas Wise noted that the Presidential Advisory 
Committee for Political Refugees, established by Roosevelt, was constituted without a 
dialogue with relevant Jewish organizations.  In addition, with the exception of Secretary 
of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and Bernard Baruch, all of the original selectees were 
Christians. Consequently, to those who were monitoring the progress of the Conference it 
became readily apparent that “no constructive plan” had been formulated prior to the 
convening of the meeting and therefore, it represented “little more than a feeble 
improvisation.”7 
      Ismar Elbogen and Moses Hadas viewed the Evian Conference as symbolic of 
the “complete hopelessness” of the democratic nations of Europe whose representatives 
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were limited to “handsome speeches” but unable to devise any “constructive measures” 
providing the Nazis and their Fascist counterparts the opportunity to “gloat…over their 
fecklessness.”8  Hannah Arendt concluded that it was “obvious” to the delegates at Evian 
that the entirety of German and Austrian Jewry were “potentially stateless”; a conclusion 
that would be shared and acted upon by other nations seeking to “rid” themselves of 
unwanted minorities.9  James MacGregor Burns perceived Roosevelt as a flawed 
individual afflicted by a “derangement of ends and means,” struggling to follow the 
proper moral course while seeking to retain and acquire pure political power.10  Arthur 
Morse, David Wyman, Henry Feingold and Saul Friedman have argued that America, 
influenced by anti-Semitism, economic and social nativism, anti-alien and anti-immigrant 
prejudices, fear of the introduction of dangerous foreign ideologies, isolationism resulting 
from the Great War and the effects of the Depression, had offered little more than public 
expressions of sympathy to the victims of Nazi persecution while maintaining barriers to 
immigration.  The downward spiral of these persecuted minorities’ existence could 
potentially have been altered, they claimed, if the democratic nations of the world had 
reacted in a more positive, forceful and charitable manner. Instead the response was 
muted, generally ineffectual and often contradictory. 11   
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      Henry Feingold accused the Roosevelt Administration of “indifference and even 
complicity in the Final Solution.”12  The State Department’s approach, Feingold claimed, 
was one of waiting while all would-be refugees “clamoring to come to the U.S. would be 
converted into silent corpses,” while at the same time rescue of European Jews was not a 
priority of their American co-religionists. 13  He also was critical of the American Jewish 
leadership believing that they operated under a critical delusion that there existed in the 
Gentile world “a spirit of civilization whose moral concern could be mobilized to save 
the Jews.”14  However, it was important, he believed, to remain cognizant of the world 
view held by many Americans at the time; to evaluate Americans “as they were” rather 
than “how they should have been.”15 Saul Friedman has condemned the Western 
Democracies for its “complicity” during the Holocaust while “perfidy” and the “yoke of 
shame” have stained the accomplishments of FDR and his subordinates.16   
      Herbert Druks accused both Roosevelt Administration and the British of 
engaging in policies that prevented rescue of endangered Jews and facilitated their 
“slaughter” by the Germans and their accomplices.17 Konnilyn Feig theorized that if the 
United States and the other democracies had maintained a “passive” attitude towards 
German anti-Jewish policies then a greater number of Jews would have been rescued for 
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it was the formal discussion of altering national immigration quotas at Evian that doomed 
the conference to failure.18 Similarly, Gil Loescher alleged that the discussion of the 
Jewish Question at the international level “reflected and subsequently strengthened the 
restrictive attitudes and policies” of government and the public.19  Morty Penkower 
argued that nations outside of the German sphere of influence “abdicated [their] moral 
responsibility” and became “accomplices” to ultimate genocide.20 Michael Marrus 
believed that most of the representatives agreed with the “mean spirited” Canadian 
Minister Frederick Blair that a line in the sand had to be drawn against any weakening of 
national immigration restrictions.  Such resilience would compel the Reich to “solve their 
Jewish question internally.” 21  
Jonathan D. Sarna portrayed the Roosevelt initiative as a “politics of gestures” 
introduced with an invitation that was designed to be “carefully hedged.”  The overt 
refusal of the United States to expand its immigration allowance for Germany and 
Austria forecast the meeting’s failure.  FDR and his Administration’s great interest in 
colonization schemes in remote and underdeveloped sites (Philippine Islands, British 
Guiana, Alaska, Lower California, Angola, Ethiopia, Australia and the Dominican 
Republic) represented a hidden “form of group dissolution”; a project that was unlikely to 
generate much Jewish support or enthusiasm.  Such proposals “served as psychological 
compensation for the inhospitality of the United States” and did receive support from 
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groups of middle-class Jews such as the American Jewish Congress and B’nai B’rith.  
B’nai B’rith in 1935, for example, had suggested Birobidzhan as a potential haven for 
Polish Jews.22  The Jewish Labor Committee and the Workmen’s Circle, however, 
opposed such plans recognizing the intrinsic difficulties that stood in the way of the 
fruition of these schemes.  Philosophically they believed in the inherent rights of Jews to 
remain within the bounds of their native country and the right of free emigration to any 
destination including Palestine; rights that obviated the need for colonization. The 
Yiddishe Welt, published in Cleveland on February 4, 1937, commented that many plans 
were being conceived for Jewish colonization.  “All they amount to is a finger pointed to 
a spot on the map.  When, however, we say Palestine, that has a meaning and a 
certainty.”23 
      British historian Martin Gilbert criticized the Evian Conference for adopting a 
non-hostile “neutral stance” that, due to its ultimate failure, would “cost a multitude of 
lives.”24 Rafael Medoff highlighted the failure of the American Jewish leadership, who 
were on “vacation” or “lunching at the regular hour at their favorite restaurant,” instead 
of assuming a more proactive role.25  He also believed that Roosevelt conceived the 
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summit as a means of deflecting any domestic call for action by preemptively taking the 
“wind out of his critic’s sails.”26 
       Yehuda Bauer contended that the President wanted to aid the refugees but at 
minimal cost to the United States: no financial expenditures and maintenance of the 
current quota system.  He believed that an “alliance system,” composed of the democratic 
nations, could successfully negotiate with Germany enabling refugees to retain sufficient 
capital to facilitate their immigration and integration into new countries with more than 
eighty percent heading for destinations other than America.  If successful in this endeavor 
the President would “score” points with domestic liberals, placate American Jews and 
create a “united front” against the Reich on an issue that was very “sensitive.”  The 
achievement of such a goal required the construction of a new international refugee 
organization that was distinct from the ineffectual League of Nations.27 
      Patrick Maney concluded that the chief characteristic of Roosevelt lay in his 
“extraordinary sunny disposition and abiding sense that all was right with the world.”  
His positive outlook helped to maintain the morale of his fellow Americans and the 
persecuted and dispossessed of humanity.  However, he viewed such a character trait as a 
“relatively unimportant leadership quality” out of touch with the gravity of global 
problems.  Luck played a role as seen in the consequences of the Pearl Harbor attack 
which provided the means for the United States to enter the war while simultaneously 
dealing the isolationist movement a decisive blow.  Among the Presidents, Maney 
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concluded, FDR was not a “man for all seasons.”28  Herbert Druks observed that 
Roosevelt had expressed his support for Zionism and the establishment of a Jewish State 
within Palestine but did not actively proceed to achieve such a goal and failed to 
adequately aid and abet the resettlement of Jewish refugees “in Palestine or anywhere 
else.” His primary focus remained on “geopolitical” concerns rather than on 
“humanity.”29 
      William Lasser regarded the Evian Conference as a mere “gesture” on the part 
of the Roosevelt Administration due to the nature of the terms framing the official 
invitation.  The exclusion of German attendance prevented the development of an 
opportunity to conduct negotiations with the Nazi Government.30  Debórah Dwork and 
Robert Jan van Pelt contended the Evian Conference was a political and public relations 
scheme designed to preserve America’s reputation as the refuge for the hopeless and 
persecuted but without taking any constructive actions or bearing any cost.  The refusal 
of FDR to call for changes in global immigration laws and the allocation of adequate 
funds to facilitate emigration and resettlement doomed the conference to becoming a 
“dismal failure and a grave disappointment” that provided “tacit international approval” 
to keep the gates closed.31  Michael Marrus claimed that the sympathetic but empty 
rhetoric expressed at the Evian Conference “simply underscored” the reluctance or 
outright refusal of the Western democracies to accept stateless Jews.  While delegate after 
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delegate rationalized why his nation could not act they simultaneously “congratula[ted] 
themselves on how much had already been accomplished for refugees.”32 
      Thomas C. Howard and William D. Pederson regarded it as “astonishing” that 
Roosevelt called for a refugee conference as legislative limits made the Administration 
“virtually powerless to act.”   The United States’ sole contribution was to combine the 
annual German and Austrian quotas while framing the official invitation in a manner that 
did not require the invitees to liberalize their own domestic regulations.  Consequently, 
Taylor and the American delegation lacked any “bargaining power.”  The ultimate 
letdown of the meeting was a “foregone conclusion.”33  Francis Nicosia claimed that the 
inherent “contradictions in the policies” of the attendees predicted failure.  Countries of 
potential refuge called for German collaboration in the “speedy and orderly emigration” 
of German and Austrian Jews coupled with retention of sufficient personal assets to 
facilitate resettlement while simultaneously maintaining or increasing national barriers to 
immigration.34 
       Caroline Moorehead regarded the Evian Conference as a “shameful milestone in 
the history of refugee affairs.”  Its sole success was the establishment of a “feeble 
intergovernmental committee on refugees” that could not engage in successful 
negotiations with the German Government. Nor could pressure be brought to bear on 
Great Britain (the Mandatory Power) over Palestine, to allow increased levels of Jewish 
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immigration.  The net result of the “world’s evident indifference” to the fate of stateless 
refugees was to encourage the Reich to adopt a harsher and more extreme anti-Jewish 
policy that would culminate in the pogrom of November 1938 and other acts of 
violence.35 
      Alan Dowty maintained that the agreement of international representations to 
attend the meeting was accomplished “only by promising” that participating nations 
would not have to permit the admission of refugees.  The primary goal of the United 
States in calling for the conference in the first place was “precisely to head off” any 
pressure that would require America to liberalize its immigration policies.36 David 
Ticenor and John Hippel claimed that the Evian Conference was predestined to fail from 
the outset due to terms of the official invitation that participating nations were not 
expected to accept involuntary religious and political refugees.37 Abraham Edelheit 
regarded the meeting as an “empty gesture” of a “half-hearted” effort on the part of 
Roosevelt that demonstrated that a “policy of doing nothing was counterproductive.”38   
David Vital deemed the assembly a “singularly futile, dishonest and to some 
extent [a] cruel exercise” that resulted in two major accomplishments: the open 
expression of “the universal refusal” to permit mass Jewish migration as a form of rescue 
and secondly, the confirmation of the “now general disposition” to exclude Jews from the 
“international political arena,” marking a reversal of Jewish Emancipation and integration 
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into Christian society.39  Shlomo Katz described the Evian Conference as the “Jewish 
Munich” in which the human rights of Jews as individuals and as a collective were 
sacrificed by the League of Nations and by the world’s democracies.  It was the 
“weakness of public opinion,” he believed, that helped to pave the way for the ultimate 
Nazi policy for the “solution of the Jewish problem.”40 The gains of the Jewish 
Emancipation of the Nineteenth Century in Central Europe were reversed and German 
and Austrian Jews were cast adrift, subject to the whims and policies of an openly hostile 
government and ideology.  David Cesarani and Sarah Kavanaugh argued that the failure 
of the American Administration to alter its immigration policies set off a “chain reaction” 
in which the other nations either refused to liberalize or adopted a more restrictive policy 
on immigration.  Thus, from the viewpoint of the stateless refugees it would have been 
better if the “conference had not been held at all.”41 
      Rafael Medoff observed that Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, in fact, had frequently and 
unsuccessfully implored FDR to publicly criticize the Reich and its anti-Jewish policies. 
Wise acknowledged, on October 18, 1933, that “we have had nothing but indifference 
and unconcern [from the Administration] up to this time.”  James D. McDonald had 
expressed to the President during early 1933 that “it would be very desirable” if the Chief 
Executive engaged in “frank speaking” with Hitler.  In response, Roosevelt claimed that 
“he had a plan in mind to appeal over the head of Hitler to the German people.”  FDR 
also advised Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and the brother of the New York State Governor, 
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Judge Irving Lehman (September 14, 1933), that he intended to address the general topic 
of human rights violations within the Reich while excluding specific references to the 
Jews. The U.S. Ambassador in Berlin, William E. Dodd, questioned the President about 
official American policy regarding German anti-Semitism and was advised that  the Nazi 
treatment of Jews was an internal “affair” outside the purview of the United States 
Government except when it impacted upon the Jewish-Americans “who happen to be 
made victims.”42   
      FDR utilized the media as a means of disseminating “stories, nearly always 
favorable,” that were assured of nationwide front page coverage that would overpower 
the “adverse editorials” in many newspapers and dominate the front pages to the 
“exasperation of his many enemies.”43 The President skillfully utilized the proverbial 
bloody pulpit, provided by his Presidential News Conferences and his fire side chats, to 
generate a “supply of news” that would overshadow other press stories.44  He could also 
utilize reporters’ questions as a means of promoting and framing the policies of the 
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Administration and was not averse to providing journalists with questions on topics he 
wished to discuss.45  Roosevelt also realized that he possessed the power to promote, 
divert or suppress the reaction of the media and the public to a daily event or public 
policy.46 
      Steven Casey maintained that FDR was particularly influenced by the “shifting 
attitudes of opinion makers,” especially those of “journalists, editors and commentators” 
who opposed liberalization of the quota laws or immigration in general.47 A 
correspondent of the time observed that the President had the ability to quickly ascertain 
the “mood of the country” and the relative importance of “current events, trends [and] 
problems” from the manner in which in which press questions were framed and the 
“tone” used in their construction.48  Roosevelt also utilized the Division of Press 
Intelligence during 1933-1939.  This agency monitored and analyzed the reporting and 
editorializing of approximately four hundred newspapers, providing the White House 
with a daily “intelligence report.”49 A 1995 analysis of the themes of the President’s first 
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seven State of the Union addresses concluded that Roosevelt responded to past “coverage 
in the newspapers more than he influenced subsequent coverage”; a trend that continued 
during the wartime years.50 
      Overall, the President maintained a significant level of public silence over the 
fate of Jews in Central Europe.  During 1933 eight-two press conferences were held in 
which the subject of Jews arose on only one occasion when a reporter inquired if 
Roosevelt had been asked by Jewish and other refugee organizations to develop policies 
opposing the persecution of minorities within the Reich.  FDR noted that a “good many 
of these [entreaties] have come in” but were all transmitted to the State Department.  The 
next reference to the Jews in a Presidential news conference would only take place five 
years and 348 conferences later on September 2, 1938 when he was asked if he had an 
opinion on the Italian plan to deport 22,000 foreign Jews; FDR responded “no.” During 
Kristallnacht and its aftermath the President was questioned during seven press 
conferences about the situation of the Jews within Greater Germany.  He offered only one 
definitive statement:  the Labor Department had been instructed to extend the duration of 
15,000 German and Austrian tourist visas but he qualified this action by noting that they 
were “not all Jews by any means.”51 Roosevelt’s awareness of domestic isolationism and 
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anti-Semitic undercurrents may have led him to avoid explicit references to Jews.  During 
the 998 press conferences held over the course of his multiple terms in office FDR failed 
to deliver the “appeal to the German people” that he had earlier promised to McDonald in 
1933.52   
      Henry Feingold has argued that Roosevelt’s decision to call for the Evian 
Conference was puzzling as the Administration was “virtually powerless to act” in view 
of the restrictions placed on immigration then in effect and the possibility of further 
limitations being enacted by Congress.  In addition, FDR had appeared “content” to place 
the refugee issue solely under the purview of the State Department.  He sought to “remain 
above” any political discord generated by the immigration problem while “occasionally 
[making] an inquiry or a suggestion.”  Thus, Foggy Bottom would absorb “much of the 
pressure and ire” that would and should have aimed directly at the President.  Utilizing 
such a strategy Roosevelt was able to preserve his “benevolent image” especially among 
Jewish Americans.53  
      New York Governor Herbert H. Lehman called upon FDR to alter immigration 
policies during 1936 but Roosevelt replied that officials of the State Department and its 
Consulates abroad were doing everything in their power to “carry out the immigration 
duties placed upon them in a considerate and humane manner.”54 Although the President 
directed the American Consular Service to interpret the LPC clause as liberally as 
possible Immigration and Naturalization officials were instructed to consider such 
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refugees “dispassionately, in spite of the tragic circumstances surrounding their plight.”  
Visitors’ visas would be granted only if the alien had a permanent residence in their 
country of origin (an impossibility in Nazi Germany when the policy of forced 
emigration was adopted) and documentation of the means to return home as well as a 
certificate of good character and behavior to be obtained from the local German and 
Austrian police.55 
      Having achieved “almost nothing of substance” Frank Brecher has argued that 
the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees from Germany 
merely served to extend the longevity of the Evian Conference “under a new name” that 
would serve as a “face-saving device” for the Roosevelt Administration.  None of the 
participating countries was committed to any particular plan of action and the official 
financing of the IGCR would be limited with the bulk provided by private Jewish and 
non-Jewish sources.56 
      Jewish Congressmen also lacked the will to pursue modification of the 
immigration laws.  Representatives Emanuel Celler (NY), Adolph Sabath (Illinois) and 
four others approached George Messersmith on April 17, 1938 regarding the facilitation 
of refugee immigration and the consolidation of unused national quotas.  They were 
warned that such actions could prompt a nativist reaction and a call for more restrictive 
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laws from the House and Senate by inciting the “temper of Congress.”57  Consequently, 
the Congressmen agreed and pledged themselves to discourage any such new legislation.  
Messersmith himself was pessimistic over the prospects of the Evian Conference 
believing that Germany intended to utilize the refugee crisis as a means of pressuring the 
United States into bilateral trade talks or provide other forms of assistance to aid the 
German economy.  Any financial aid, he believed, would be diverted into German 
rearmament.  Consequently, he opposed the creation of the IGCR due to its goal of 
entering into negotiations with the Reich and would have “counseled against its 
formation.”58 Along with Assistant Secretary of State Robert Walton Moore and the 
Chief of the European Division of the State Department Jay Pierrepont Moffat he 
believed that more could be accomplished via the League’s International Labor 
Organization rather than the establishment of a new committee.59   
      Messersmith was also concerned about overtures from Poland regarding the 
emigration of its own Jewish population and he concluded that “humanitarianism was 
encouraging brutality.”  He opposed any alteration of the annual immigration quotas, 
viewing the Jewish refugees “less as innocent victims” than the unknowing means of 
introducing “Nazi subversion” that would threaten domestic social and economic 
stability.  The diplomat did fear that if the Conference was successful then America faced 
a potential inundation of refugees which he strove to prevent.  He complained that Jewish 
professors, academics and other professionals seeking entry visas were sending him the 
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“most extraordinary letters” that inflicted upon him the “rude[st] shocks.”  The writers, 
he claimed, were resentful that the U.S was not providing “on a golden platter a position 
which native-born Americans would be glad to get at the end of a long and hard fought 
career.” America, Messersmith believed, would still belong to the “native-born…”60 
        Myron Taylor, acting as the American representative to the Inter-governmental 
Committee for Political Refugees, reassured a radio listening audience following 
Kristallnacht that America would not be flooded by refugees.  “On the contrary, our 
entire program is based on the existing immigration laws of all the countries concerned, 
and I am confident that within that framework our problems can be solved.”61  Thus, once 
again as with the Evian Conference, the United States would not, despite its expressed 
sympathies, willingly offer refuge to the victims of Nazi persecution, providing a basis 
upon which foreign governments could maintain their own restrictive immigration 
policies.  The pogrom, however, had led Taylor to believe that an orderly plan of 
emigration carried out over a number of years was now a more difficult and perhaps 
impossible goal.  The humanitarian situation had assumed a greater degree of urgency but 
its solution remained constrained by the problem of finding havens for 400,000-500,000 
refugees, a lack of sufficient funds for resettlement and the need for the cooperation of 
the German Government.  Representative Hamilton Fish, in an address on “America’s 
Answer to Religious and Racial Hatred” broadcast following Taylor’s speech, stated he 
would support a motion in Congress to appropriate $10,000,000-20,000,000 to transport 
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and resettle the refugees but with the caveat that Palestine, rather than other locations 
such as the former German African colonies, British Guiana or Alaska, would be the best 
locale. 62 A variety of geographic regions around the world were proposed as potential 
sites of resettlement, in some cases generating surveys and schemes that were limited in 
scope and slow to develop.  The Alaskan Plan, for example, was proposed by the Alaska 
Development Committee in 1938 to create semi-autonomous Jewish colonies of 
unspecified size but met local political and popular resistance. 63 
      David Wyman claimed that Roosevelt, during the critical years of 1938-1945, 
displayed “a pattern of decreasing sensitivity towards the plight of the European Jews” 
due to domestic and foreign priorities that were of greater significance to American 
interests.64 Presidential historian Doris Kearns Goodwin has argued that FDR was 
sympathetic to the situation of the German Jews but was unwilling to expend political 
capital by confronting the anti-immigration and anti-Semitic sentiments of the American 
public or powerful members of Congress.65 The First Lady, Eleanor, noted in This I 
Remember, “While I often felt strongly on various subjects, Franklin frequently refrained 
from causes in which he believed, because of political realities.”66 
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      The failure of the Administration to speak out in favor of increased entry into 
the United States and the unwillingness of the various delegations and their respective 
governments to offer refuge was seen by the Nazis as vindication and support of their 
anti-Semitic policies.  The Evian Conference symbolized the “Jewish Munich” which 
reflected attempts to both appease and dodge confrontations with Germany.67 Klaus P. 
Fischer equated the response of the democracies to the plight of the Jews with the 
abandonment of Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland issue.  Both events represented 
“western appeasement of Hitler [with] the western powers [negotiating] over the heads 
the Czechs, ignoring and selling out their vital interests.”  Similarly, they “negotiated 
over the heads of the Jews by ignoring the deadly threat they faced from the Nazis.”  The 
Evian Conference itself represented, Fischer believed, another example of “western 
collaborative hypocrisy” that supported Hitler’s image of democratic decadence and 
weakness.68 
      FDR did not actively support the 1939 Wagner-Rogers bill and opposed 
settlement in Alaska but, like the British with their eye on British Guiana and Africa, 
adopted “a strategy that would avoid both political conflict at home and confrontations 
with London” while proposing “visionary and grandiose resettlement schemes” in Latin 
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America and Africa.69 Others have argued that the failure of the Evian Conference was a 
blow to the concept of universal human rights and “sanctioned the belief in the inequality 
of humankind.”70  
      Some authors have speculated that the Jewish background of Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull’s wife, Frances Witz, influenced his decision to limit aid to Jews seeking to 
escape from the Reich and not to pressure the British to allow greater Jewish immigration 
into Palestine. Although Frances was an Episcopalian her father, Irwin Witz, was an 
Austrian Jewish immigrant.  Soon after Hull’s appointment to the State Department anti-
Semitic magazine articles claimed that this represented another example of a Jewish 
conspiracy to take over control of the Federal Government.  Irwin Gellman, a Hull 
biographer, claimed that the Secretary hid his wife’s Jewish roots in order to avoid any 
controversy that would threaten a potential bid for the Presidency.  He “feared that [his 
wife’s] Jewish connection” opened him to criticism from American anti-Semites that he 
was favoring Jewish “causes” which could translate into the loss of potential votes.  Prior 
to his decision to run for a third term Roosevelt was supportive of a Hull run for the 
White House.  However, in August 1939 he informed Democratic Senator Burton 
Wheeler (Montana) that the issue of the Frances’ heritage “would be raised” by the 
opposition against Hull.71  Such sentiments were echoed by the notorious German anti-
Semite Julius Streicher in his magazine Der Sturmer, #23/1944, in which the Secretary of 
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State was accused of being one of the leading “Jewish lackeys” in America who 
controlled U.S. foreign policy.  He believed that Hull harbored “concealed Jewish blood 
that enabled him to overcome his horror when he married the baptized full Jewess 
Frances Witz” who was utilizing the “protocols of the 1897 World Jewish Congress in 
Basel” to enable Jewish “world domination.”72 
      Others have provided the counterargument that Roosevelt and his 
Administration did everything that was possible within the context and constraints of 
their time.  The President faced criticism over the recession of 1937 and rising 
unemployment (15% of the workforce), the high level appointments of a small number of 
Jews (which led to his economic plans being  labeled the “Jew Deal”), his failed attempt 
to pack the Supreme Court with additional Justices, the need for political support from 
Congressional Congressmen (especially Southern Democrats) who opposed increasing 
and preferred further restrictions on immigration, fallout from his Quarantine speech and 
the lowest popularity rating since taking office in 1933.73  Faced with an increasingly 
hostile and recalcitrant legislature FDR “felt obliged to husband his waning influence” on 
Capitol Hill for higher priorities: Congressional allocations for military rearmament and 
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new domestic programs.  Emphasis on increased Jewish immigration could precipitate 
greater confrontations and a potential backlash in Congress from anti-immigrationists, 
although Roosevelt was not worried about losing Jewish electoral support.74 John 
Stoessinger argued that Roosevelt and his Administration had taken “a determined step” 
to aid the Jews of Germany. However, despite the “prodding” of the President and the 
Department of State, it was the Congress that was responsible for not liberalizing 
American immigration laws that ensured the failure of the Evian Conference.75 Breitman 
and Kraut asserted that “bureaucratic indifference to moral or humanitarian concerns” 
was a “more significant obstacle to an active refuge policy” than the anti-Semitic and 
anti-immigrant sentiments of Government officials.  Contradictory national priorities 
coupled with limited latitude of domestic political action prohibited the Administration 
from exceeding the restrictions placed on the quota system.  The magnitude and the 
ability to secure rescue of Jews was quite inadequate, they admit, but they concluded that 
“British and American inaction…represented a fundamental failure of western civilized 
values.”76 
      Joseph C. Harsch claimed that FDR had recognized international political 
constraints would prevent the Evian Conference from adopting a program of mass 
migration over a short time frame.  Rather, he envisaged the creation of a permanent 
international organization that would be mandated to accomplish the limited goals that 
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were practicable under the “circumstances of the time”: locating sites for mass 
resettlement of refugee Jews and constructive negotiations with the Reich that would 
culminate in an orderly plan of emigration.  Harsch concluded that the Conference “did 
both.”77 Leonard Dinnerstein noted that Roosevelt represented during the latter part of the 
1930s the “only friend” of the Jewish people among the leaders of the world.  
Unfortunately for the Jews, however, such friendship occurred during a time in which the 
“most inhumane anti-Semitic episodes” in global history were occurring with 
disconcerting and troubling regularity.  The President always aware of his political 
priorities was in “tune with public sentiments” and would avoid taking any pro-active 
stance on immigration in the face of an “obstructionist Congress.”78  Jeffrey Gurlock 
believed the President analyzed the refugee issue in the “context” of domestic politics, an 
arena which he understood and could potentially manipulate.  He recognized that in the 
setting of national economic distress the majority of the American public could not 
understand nor support the admission of large numbers of refugees who potentially would 
be competing for hearth, home and jobs.  Selecting carefully the issues upon which he 
was willing to expend political capital he regarded the question of Jewish refugees more 
like “the fox than the lion… [settling] for a politics of gesture.”  It was this slight of 
symbolic hand that provided the “key to the mystery” of Evian in which the terms of the 
invitation were “carefully hedged” ensuring the ultimate failure of the meeting.  FDR’s 
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enthusiasm for colonization schemes merely represented further attempts at the “politics 
of gesture.”79 
      The Franklin D. Roosevelt Museum, Hyde Park, New York, had included in its 
core exhibit a panel describing the President’s response to the Holocaust: 
During the 1930s, as many European Jews were looking for a safe 
haven from official anti-Semitism, members of the State Department 
enforced the bloodless immigration laws with cold rigidity. Yet even 
Roosevelt's bitterest critics concede that nothing he could have done--
including bombing the rails leading to Auschwitz in 1944--would have 
saved significant numbers from annihilation, let alone dissuaded the 
Nazis from doing what they were so intent on doing. 
 
 
      Twenty-five Holocaust historians have criticized this statement on the grounds 
that it assigns the primary responsibility for underfilling the annual immigration quota to 
the State Department, essentially absolving the President of any personal accountability.  
The actions of Varian Fry and his associates in France (rescued 2,000 Jews in Vichy, 
1940-1941), Raoul Wallenberg (Swedish diplomat who saved thousands in Hungary 
1944) and the U.S. War Refugee Board (established in January 1944, primarily funded by 
American Jews and helped to end deportation of Hungarian Jews from Budapest to 
Auschwitz) and others demonstrated that interventions to save lives, both before and after 
the onset of hostilities, was potentially possible.  Roosevelt’s critics claim he could have 
offered temporary shelter in the U.S. for the duration of the war, pressured the British to 
alter their restrictive stance on Jewish immigration into Palestine or could have provided 
greater funding to the IGCR and the War Refugee Board.80 
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      Robert Rosen declared the President “never left anyone in doubt about his 
position” on the German persecution of Jews and non-Aryans but “it is only in retrospect 
that many have ignored this record.”  Roosevelt, according to the author, came out 
“eloquently and forcefully” against Nazi policies and persecutions and during the late 
1930s focused primarily on the Jews.81  Rosen’s critics, however, maintain the 
Administration remained “silent” about anti-Jewish actions for most of the decade.  
During eighty one Presidential Press Conferences held during 1933 the issue of German 
anti-Semitism was raised only once and not by FDR.  It would take five more years and 
348 further press conferences before the subject was broached again (on the part of a 
reporter and not the President).  During a September 2, 1938 meeting with reporters the 
President was asked to comment on the Fascist Italian order to deport 22,000 Jews.  
FDR’s response: “No.”  Rosen also claimed that Roosevelt “provid[ed] as much relief” to 
Jewish refugees as were permissible under the existing immigration laws. His detractors 
responded by noting the number of quota spots filled during that period: 5.3% in 1933, 
13.7% in 1934, 20.2% in 1935, 24.3% in 1936, 42.1% in 1937 and 65.3% in 1938.  If the 
quotas had been filled to the maximum then a total of 154,220 refugees would have been 
admitted compared with the actual figure of 46,771 due to Consulate and State 
Department intransigence.82  
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      Conrad Black, one of Roosevelt’s latest biographers, concluded the President 
should not be “censored” for not adopting a more outspoken platform against anti-
Semitism because his “paramount duty” to the nation was to bolster American economic 
and military power “in order to exercise a decisive influence on the Manichean struggle 
between good and evil political forces” then raging in Europe.83 
     William Perl viewed Roosevelt primarily as a “shrewd and ruthless” politician 
determined not to endanger a “fragile coalition” in Congress by supporting humanitarian 
causes laden with emotional and political overtones.  The President was poised on the 
brink of launching a campaign for an unprecedented third term and was concerned about 
issues of American rearmament and isolationism.  The convening of an international 
conference dealing with Jewish and non-Aryan potential and real refugees coupled with a 
promise not to tamper with American immigration laws appeared to be the safest course 
to follow and would “divert pressure for a change in legislation.”  
       Myron C. Taylor was chosen by Roosevelt over career diplomats to lead the 
American delegation because of his “pragmatism” and could not be accused of being on a 
“fancy love-everybody dream trip.”   Taylor would demonstrate that matter-of-factness 
during his opening remarks received by the delegations and public in “hushed silence.”  
He expounded with “blatant bluntness,” devoid of any attempt to “veil [his statements] in 
diplomatic phraseology…” The only humane “trimmings” referred to the perilous 
situation of the “unfortunate human beings” who were “coming within the scope of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jewish in practice or by ethnicity. American Jewish Year Book, XL, 1938, 96-97. See also “Exile Haven Here 
Rivals Palestine,” New York Times, October 29, 1939, 26 and Donald Peterson Kent, The Refugee 
Intellectual (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), 12. 
 
     
83Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 496. 
340 
 
conference.”  The term “Jews” was substituted by “political emigrants” and Taylor made 
it absolutely clear that the United States would not pursue any changes in its immigration 
laws or assume any financial burdens nor did it expect any other nation to do otherwise.  
The listening audience could not misinterpret the “full impact” of these words and the 
effect it would undoubtedly have on the other representatives and their respective 
governments.  Lord Winterton expressed similar sentiments and dealt a “second blow” 
against a successful conference essentially “condemning hundreds of thousands to 
death.”84 
      William D. Rubinstein concluded that large-scale rescue of Jews during the 
Holocaust was not possible “given what was actually known…what was actually 
proposed and what was realistically possible” and labeled any criticism of Roosevelt and 
the Allies as “inaccurate and misleading, their arguments illogical and ahistorical.”  He 
described governmental refugee policies during 1933-1940 as “remarkably generous.”85  
      William J. vanden Heuven, president of the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt 
Institute, had written that American Jews at that time “knew that they never had a better 
friend, a more sympathetic leader in the White House [who] opened the offices of 
government as never before to Jews.”  Roosevelt had to contend with a divided and 
economically troubled nation, filled with “profound isolationist sentiments” and 
“disillusion” with involvement in European affairs after the Great War.  The President, he 
maintained, needed to focus on the Hitlerian threat, called for the quarantine of aggressor 
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nations, and, recognizing that he lacked the ability to order an increase in the immigration 
quotas, “constantly [sought] havens for refugees in other countries.”86  
      Jonathan Alter concluded that FDR was “not entirely negligent” in the intensity 
of his efforts to aid European Jews.  An isolationist and restrictionist public limited 
Roosevelt's options but he did sound the clarion of warning about the Nazi threat early on 
and “sponsored international conferences on refugees (Evian 1938 and the even more 
ineffectual Bermuda Conference of 1943).87 Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore regarded 
the American effort as a historic “landmark” in the search for a workable policy for 
international refugees.  The Evian Conference marked the first attempt of the United 
States Government to formulate and lead refugee policies outside the efforts of the 
ineffectual League and its High Commissioner for Refugees.  Despite its ultimate failure 
in identifying sites of resettlement and of concluding successful negotiations with the 
German Government over the issue of funding these authors regarded the creation of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees as the “only concrete result” of the 
Conference.88 
     Mark Rozell and William D. Pederson concluded that the President’s success in 
treading the minefield of politics and achieving his desired goals was due to a “measure 
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of classical Western prudence” artfully co-mingled with “idealism and pragmatism.”89 
Jack Fischel claimed that Roosevelt did not identify the refugees as Jews due to domestic 
concerns of stimulating domestic anti-Semitism as heralded by Father Coughlin, Gerald 
L.K. Smith, Gerald Winrod and the German-American Bund.  Any open display of 
sympathy or support for Jews would open the President to such diatribes as being the 
father of the “Jew Deal.”90  Saul Friedman argued that any support for pro-Jewish 
immigration measures would have caused FDR to suffer “politically” due to his 
increasing unpopularity in opinion polls. 91  
       George L. Warren, former Director of the International Migration Service, 
member of the President’s Advisory Committee on Political Refugees and later advisor to 
Myron Taylor at the Evian Conference, believed FDR called for the July 1938 meeting as 
a means of responding to the Anschluss because “he didn’t know what else to do.”  Faced 
with a potentially hostile Congress and restrictive immigration laws Roosevelt was 
“terribly embarrassed” for having convened the conference. Short of maximizing the 
existing German and Austrian quota there was little he could do to increase immigration 
into the country.  The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, established at Evian to 
negotiate financial arrangements with Germany that would facilitate emigration and 
resettlement, was a “futile effort by George Rublee… [t]hat failed completely.”  He 
offered a number of reasons for the Conference’s failure: the Depression with its 
attendant unemployment; migrations from the countryside into the cities was occurring 
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throughout Latin America; an American Congress increasingly hostile to immigration; 
the insincere and superficial efforts of Britain to offer land for re-settlement in its colonial 
holdings and the generalized feeling “that the only thing to do was to colonize [Jews] in 
agriculture” despite the obvious disconnect between the economic, social and 
technological backgrounds of Central European middle-class and urbanized Jews. 92 
        Following Kristallnacht, however, the President did step forward to offer refuge 
to 12,000-15,000 German and Austrian refugees who were within the United States on 
six-month visitor visas.  The German Government had issued a decree that would annul 
the visitors’ passports (Jews and non-Jews) on December 30, 1938.  Consequently, he 
directed Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins, to extend the visas in order to avoid the 
forced deportation of the refugees to the Reich; an act that would be both “cruel and 
inhuman[e]” due to the likelihood of persecution, arrest and imprisonment in 
concentration camps. Citing an earlier precedent of allowing Russian refugees to remain 
in the United States following the Bolshevik Revolution, he believed Congress would not 
object to the visa extensions and that immigration law did not prevent the President from 
taking such action.93  Representative Martin Dies, Chairman of the House Committee 
Investigating Un-American Activities, objected to the extension of the visitors’ visas, 
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arguing that it violated the “spirit of the [immigration] law [which stated] visitors’ 
permits are granted for temporary purposes.”94 
      The President was seeking, according to Robert Dallek, to improve America’s 
defenses and create a united front against the threat of Nazism.  Consequently, “a fight on 
the later Wagner-Rogers bill [and Jewish immigration in general] would have crippled his 
main objective.”95  His strongest supporters in Congress were Southern Democrats who 
opposed any liberalization of the immigration laws.  They had voted 127:0 for the 1924 
Immigration Act and 106:3 to revise the Neutrality Act in 1939.  After the German 
invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Eleanor Roosevelt called on the President to 
“raise the immigration quotas and persuade the State Department to relax the restrictions 
on admitting Jews.”  He cautioned that any attempt to admit refugees, especially Jews, 
would cost him the support of Southern Democrats who chaired many important Senate 
and House committees.  They would “bolt the party” and block every piece of legislation 
needed to keep this country from collapsing.”  The President concluded that “preparation 
for war is my ‘must’ legislation and I would lose that ability if the party were 
split...Ultimately, we must be prepared to mobilize if we are to survive.” Edwin “Pa” 
Watson, the Presidential Press Secretary, recollected that FDR’s lack of support for the 
1939 Wagner-Rogers bill “doomed the bill and it died in committee.”  However, the 
children under consideration in the 1940 Henning bill were “English and Christians, not 
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Jews.  The patriotic organizations sure won’t object to this one.  It should make things a 
hell of a lot easier.” 96   
Finally, Haskel Lookstein has argued that “divisiveness” in the American Jewish 
community and reticence to respond “to the indifference of America” out of fear of 
generating increased anti-Semitism and more restrictive immigration laws led many 
American Jews to assume the role of “bystander” to the inherent dangers of the German 
anti-Nazi policies.  Such hesitancy was evident during the course of the Evian 
Conference and in later attempts to admit Jewish refugees.  A clear division existed 
between Jews who believed rescue depended upon adopting a more public and vocal 
stance and strategy and those who maintained that back room diplomacy and political 
maneuvering was the only realistic tactic for Jews to follow.  For example, the American 
Jewish committee maintained a low profile during the Congressional hearings on the 
Wagner-Rogers bill.  The Congress Bulletin of the American Jewish Congress noted that 
Jews needed to observe “a great deal of necessary caution” while the hearings were 
underway but this “cautious restraint” could be eased once the bill left committee.  
However, a forceful campaign was not mounted by the Jewish leaders and community 
out of fear of inciting calls for greater immigration restrictions.  This lack of significant 
visible Jewish support for their co-religionists was used by nativist adversaries of the bill 
(and others who were against any increased immigration) as justification for opposition.97 
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Chapter 14 
Ominous Tidings 
Conclusions: The “Unintended Signal” 
The Holocaust was certainly a Jewish tragedy. But it was not only a Jewish tragedy.  It was also a 
Christian tragedy, a tragedy for Western civilization, and a tragedy for all humankind. 1 
 
      Although the democracies cannot be blamed for the Holocaust it was evidently 
clear that the resistance of the Evian Conference attendees and their respective 
governments to accept the stateless refugees would lead to drastic consequences. The 
failure of the Talks marked a “turning point” towards a more radical solution in Nazi 
Jewish policies. It was obvious to contemporaries that Jews could no longer remain 
within the Reich and that the “need for rescue was painfully clear” but any “opportunity 
was lost” by October 1941.2  Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis warned in 
October 1938 that Jews faced an existential threat and that unless “we do not move 
mountains” the Jews of Germany were doomed to the same fate as the Armenians of the 
Ottoman Empire during the Great War.3   
      A memorandum was dispatched from the State Department to the Foreign 
Ministry in Berlin formally advising the German Government that the Evian Conference 
had resulted in the creation of the Inter-Governmental Committee whose stated purpose 
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was to facilitate the resettlement of those “individuals emigrating on account of their 
political opinions, religious beliefs or racial origin.”  The purview of this Committee was 
limited to the enablement of a “practical and orderly solution” to the refugee crisis.  
Significantly, the IGCR (and by inference, the U.S. Government) would avoid “any 
criticism or [potential] interference” with Germany’s inherent “entire right” to enact 
“measures” dealing with the “political opinions, the religious beliefs and the racial 
organization of its citizens.”  However, German internal policies had generated a “wave 
of immigration” creating “serious problems” for the nations of temporary and permanent 
resettlement.  Consequently, Germany must engage in “consultation” and provide data 
regarding the “volume and rate of exodus” and the amount of monies that each refugee 
would retain.  Otherwise, it would be impossible to create an “orderly, permanent [plan 
for] large scale settlement…”  The IGCR had embarked on a “survey” of sites of 
potential resettlement but the “final attitude of the receiving countries” was dependent on 
the outcome of negotiations between the Committee and the Reich.4  Martin Gilbert had 
claimed that this October 1938 memorandum, sent one month before Kristallnacht, 
supplied Hitler with additional “gratuitous support” in that none of the Committee’s 
democratic members contested the right of the Reich Government to treat the German 
Jewish Question as anything but an internal affair.  Significantly, the “lessons of Evian, 
as learnt by the Nazi leadership” may have led to a “decisive” change in anti-Jewish 
policies from forced emigration to physical destruction.5 
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       John C. Torpey had argued that the reluctance or outright refusal of nations to 
admit German Jewish refugees, which could have provided a means of resolving the 
Jewish Question within the Reich, may “ultimately have helped to push the Nazis toward 
extermination as the ‘final solution’ of the ‘Jewish problem.’”6 Gerald Sorin observed 
that the Conference failed to produce any declaratory statement criticizing the Reich for 
its primary responsibility in creating the refugee problem or its persecutory policies. The 
adoption of the role of international bystander resulted in an “unintentional signal” to the 
Nazis that external pressure would not be applied against the methodology utilized by the 
Reich in solving the “Jewish problem.”7   
      Ernst Marcus asserted that 
within Germany the failure of the Evian Conference had the result that the Party and the Gestapo, 
which had been kept under restrain…until then, gained the upper hand over those who preferred 
orderly emigration to the outbreak of chaos within the Jewish community.  There is an immutable 
connection between the…Evian Conference and the events of November [1938 which 
represented] nothing but an attempt by the extremist wing of the Party to solve the Jewish problem 
in their own way.  Auschwitz, Treblinka, etc. were the next stages.8    
 
      Ernest G. Heppner also had argued that the impotency of the Evian Conference 
granted license to Hitler to pursue a more radical solution of the Jewish Question.  The 
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reluctance or outright refusal of the invitees to admit refugee Jews demonstrated to the 
Nazi regime that “political considerations were paramount” in the democracies and that 
Jews were regarded as a class outside the customary protections offered to political 
refugees.  Thus, the Jewish destiny was foretold by international “politics.”9  As earlier 
noted, the November 24, 1938 issue of Das Schwarze Korps (“The Black Corps”), the 
official publication of the SS, described how the progressive impoverishment of Jews 
would force Jews into a life of crime.  “If things were to develop in this way we would be 
faced with the harsh necessity of having to exterminate the Jewish underground in the 
same manner as we are used to exterminating criminals in our Order State: with fire and 
sword.  The result would be the actual and definite end of Jewry in Germany-its complete 
destruction.”10   
      The Polish Government concluded from the limited focus of the Evian 
Conference (German and Austrian Jews only) that only those nations that utilized force 
and intimidation would be granted a “measure of international attention.”11  
Consequently, the influential Camp of National Unity (Obóz Zjednoczenia Nrodowego or 
OZN) initiated in 1939 a “more aggressive attitude” toward Poland’s Jewish population 
which was viewed as a dangerous internal foe.12  While such warnings were clear the 
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rescue of Jews was a low priority on the global and American scene.  As will be 
demonstrated in a future monograph the outcomes of the Wagner-Rogers bill of 1939 and 
the Hennings Bill of 1940 placed greater value on the lives of some children compared to 
others.   
      Although Myron C. Taylor asserted that forced migration was creating 
“catastrophic human suffering” that threatened “general unrest,” the true sentiments or 
apathy of many towards the Nazi persecution of Jewish and non-Aryan minorities could, 
perhaps, be best expressed in the recollections of René Richier, the Chief Concierge of 
the Hotel Royal, site of the conference in Evian:  
Very important people were here and all the delegates had a nice time. 
They took pleasure cruises on the lake. They gambled at night at the 
casino. They took mineral baths and massages at the Etablissement 
Thermal. Some of them took the excursion to Chamonix to go summer 
skiing. Some went riding: we have, you know, one of the finest stables 
in France. But, of course, it is difficult to sit indoors hearing speeches 
when all the pleasures that Evian offers are outside."13 
 
 
Eventually the echoes of the ill-fated Evian Conference struck a positive but 
limited chord in international relations and humanitarianism as reflected in the comments 
of Vice President Walter Mondale when the United States was seeking a solution to the 
problem of the boat people of Southeast Asia fleeing Communist rule.  Mondale stated: 
Some tragedies defy the imagination.  Some misery so surpasses the 
grasp of reason that language itself breaks beneath the strain.  Instead, 
we grasp for metaphors.  Instead, we speak the inaudible dialect of the 
human heart. 
Today we confront such a tragedy.  In virtually all the world’s 
languages, desperate new expressions have been born.  “A barbed-wire 
bondage,” “an archipelago of despair,” “a flood tide of human 
misery”… 
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“The boat people.”  “The land people.”  The phrases are new, but 
unfortunately their precedent in the annals of shame is not.  Forty-one 
years ago this very week, another international conference on Lake 
Geneva concluded its deliberations.  Thirty-two “nations of asylum” 
convened at Evian to save the doomed Jews of Nazi Germany and 
Austria.  On the eve of the conference, Hitler flung the challenge in the 
world’s face.  He said, “I can only hope that the other world, which has 
such deep sympathy for these criminals, will at least be generous 
enough to convert the sympathy into practical aid.”  We have heard 
such a similar argument about the plight of the refugees in Indochina. 
At Evian, they began with high hopes.  But they failed the test of 
civilization. 
The civilized world hid in a cloak of legalisms… 
As the delegates left Evian, Hitler again goaded “the other world” for 
“oozing sympathy for the poor, tormented people, but remained hard 
and obdurate when it comes to helping them.”… 
Let us not re-enact their error.  Let us not be heirs to their shame. 
To alleviate the tragedy in Southeast Asia, we all have a part to play.  
The United States is committed to doing its share…[and] have already 
welcomed over 200,000 Indochinese…[and we] are preparing to 
welcome another 168,000 refugees in the coming year…But the 
growing exodus from Indochina still outstrips international efforts.  We 
must all work together, or the suffering will mount… [and] we will 
inherit the scorn of Evian…Let us renounce that legacy of shame…We 
face a world problem.  Let us fashion a world solution.  
History will not forgive us if we fail.  History will not forget us if we 
succeed.14 
   
 
 
         
          
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
     
14
“The Best Speech I Ever Wrote” by Marty Kaplan, July 30, 2009, available from 
http://www.jewishjournal.com/marty_kaplan/article/the_best_speech_i_ever_wrote_20090730/ ; Internet; 
accessed July 30, 2010.   Mondale’s speech, “Evian and Geneva,” was read on July 21, 1979 
352 
 
                                                                
 
                                                           REFERENCES 
 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
 
Books 
 
Bentwich, Norman. Wanderer between Two Worlds. London: Kegan Paul,  
Trench, Trubner: 1941. 
 
Coughlin, Charles. E. Am I an Anti-Semite? Detroit: Condon Printing, 1939. 
 
Davies, Joseph. Mission to Moscow. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1941. 
 
Goering, Hermann. Germany Reborn. Strand, W.C.2, UK: Elkin Mathews & Marrot   
LTD, 1934. 
 
Harper, Lyn H. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler April 1922-August 1939. Oxford: Oxford 
Press, 1942. 
 
McDonald, James G. The German Refugees and the League of Nations. London: Friends 
of Europe, 1936. 
 
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Vol. III. Washington, D.C.: United States  
Government Printing Office, 1946.  
 
Noakes, Jeremy and Geoffrey Pridham, eds. Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945. London:  
Cape Publishing, 1974.  
 
Press Conferences of FDR, Vol. 11-12, 1938.NY: Da Capo Press, 1972. 
 
Roosevelt, Franklin D. The Public Papers and Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt.  
Volume 7. The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism, 1938. New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1941. 
 
Simpson, Sir John Hope. The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey. London: Oxford  
University Press, 1939. 
 
Thompson, Dorothy.  Refugees: Anarchy or Organization? New York: Random House,   
1938. 
353 
 
 
Treves, Sir Frederick. The Lake of Geneva London: Cassell and Company, LTD, 1922.  
 
Weizmann, Chaim and Barnet Mitvinoff. The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann: 
December 1931-April 1952.  Series B, vol. 2. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers  
University Press, 1984. 
 
 
Documents 
 
British Foreign Office Memorandum on Report of Committee on International Assistance 
to Refugees.  January 16, 1938. PRO FO 371 W445-172-98. 
 
“Circular Letter from the League of Nations Secretary-General August 14, 1928, Official 
Journal (1929): 323. 
 
Congressional Record Appendix 
 
Congressional Record  
 
Department of State, Press Releases 
 
Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945. Series D, IV. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1951.  
 
Foreign Office Minute, “The Refugee Question” August 1, 1938. PRO FO 371/22532 
W11768/104/98. 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States. 
 
Gustave Ador to the League of Nations, “The Question of Russian Refugees, “League of 
Nations Official Journal, Annex 2, 1921 (February 20, 1921): 228. 
 
“Law on Passports of Jews October 5, 1938, 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part 11342,   
Document 2120-PS, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. IV, Washington, D.C.:  
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946, 754-755. 
 
“Law to Remove the Distress of the People and the State (The Enabling Act),” reprinted 
in U.S. Department of State, Division of European Affairs, National Socialism. 
Basic Principles, their Application by the Nazi Party’s Foreign Organizations, and  
the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi Aims. Washington, DC: United States  
Government Printing Office, 1943, Appendix, Document 11, 217-18. 
 
League of Nations, International Assistance to Refugees: Report submitted to the 
twentieth ordinary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations. A.18.1939.XII   
July 24, 1938. 
354 
 
 
“Letter of Resignation of James G. McDonald” December 27, 1935 C1538 20A-80732-  
22873, ix, League of Nations Archives. 
 
Makins, “Refugees—Memorandum on the Refugee Question,” September 1, 1935-   
September 1, 1936 PRO FO 371 W10548/172/98. 
 
“Note by the American Department of State to the German Foreign Ministry on the Evian 
Conference”, October 26, 1938 cited in John Mendelsohn, ed. The Holocaust. Vol. 5 
Jewish Emigration from 1933 to the Evian Conference of 1938, 145-147. 
 
Observations Présentées par Sir Horace Rumbold (annexe) - Comité Pour L’Assistance 
Internationale aux Réfugies. Procès-Verbal (C.A.I.R./P.V.) December 18, 1935.  
R5633/21365/20038 League of Nations Archives. 
 
Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, Evian, France,  
July 6-15, 1938 and Record of the Plenary Meetings of the Committee, Resolutions  
and Reports. 
 
Sir Neill Malcolm, Refugees Coming From Germany: Report submitted to the 
Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations  
A.19.1936.XII. 1 September 1936.   
 
Sir Neill Malcolm, “Refugees Coming from Germany: Report submitted to the  
Nineteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations.”  
A.25.1938.XII 22 August 1938, League of Nations Archives.   
 
The United States Government Manual, 2009-2010 National Archives and Records 
Administration. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009.  
 
 
Internet 
 
“Address before the Pan American Union.” Franklin D. Roosevelt. April 12, 1933 
available from http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/7-2-188/188-01.html ; Internet;  
accessed August 24, 2010. 
 
American Jewish Yearbook Review of the Year 1938-1939 available from 
http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/1938_1939_4_YearReview.pdf;       
Internet; accessed May 14, 2010. 
 
Canadian Jewish Congress Charities National Archives-Collection Guide available from 
http://www.cjccc.ca/national_archives/archives/arcguideA.htm; Internet; accessed  
August 15, 2010. 
 
“German Jewish Response to the Nuremberg Laws (September 24, 1935) available from 
355 
 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/jewnurm.html; Internet; 
accessed October 1, 2010. 
 
“Is the Evian Conference Doomed to Failure? Hopes and Fears for the Refugee Parley” 
by William Zukerman, The Jewish Criterion, July 15, 1938, 12, 16, 17 available from 
http://pjn.library.cmu.edu/books/pages.cgi?call=CRI_1938_092_010_07151938&lay
out=vol0/part0/copy0&file=0012; Internet; accessed July 15, 2010. 
 
“Letter by a German Official to Goering,” March 26, 1938, Nazi Conspiracy and  
Aggression Military Trials Nuremberg, Vol. 5 (Washington, 1946), pp. 275-276   
available from http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.py?imt/nca/nca-06//nca-06-3577-ps;  
Internet; accessed March 16, 2010. 
 
“Memorandum of the Jewish Agency, Palestine, to the Evian Conference,” July 6, 1938 
available from http://www.zupdom.com/icons-
multimedia/ClientsArea/HoH/LIBARC/ARCHIVE/Chapters/Terror/RefugeeP/Memo
ran1.html ; Internet; accessed May 15, 2010. 
 
“Memorandum of the World Jewish Congress to the Evian Conference,” July 6, 1938,  
S7/693, World Jewish Congress Executive Committee Central Zionist Archive, 
Jerusalem available from http://www.zupdom.com/icons-
multimedia/ClientsArea/HoH/LIBARC/ARCHIVE/Chapters/Terror/RefugeeP/Memra
n2.html; Internet; accessed March 23, 2008. 
 
Mit den deutschen Soldaten im befreiten Österreich by Ludwig Sartorius (“With German 
Soldiers in Liberated Austria”) Die Wehrmacht, 2, no. 6 (1938) 4-5 German 
Propaganda Archive available from  
http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/wehr01.htm; Internet; accessed March 8, 
 2010.   
 
“Negroes, Nazis and Jews.” Roy Wilkins The Crisis December 1938, 393 available 
from 
http://books.google.com/books?id=6VoEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA393&dq=Jews&hl=e
n&ei=j1RJTImEJcH48Ab12vntDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=90&
ved=0CL8EEOgBMFk4ZA#v=onepage&q=Jews&f=false; Internet; accessed July 23, 
2010. 
 
Neville Chamberlain statement on the Anschluss Foreign Affairs (Austria) House of 
Commons Debate March 14, 1938 Vol. 333 cc45-169available from 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/mar/14/foreign-affairs-                              
austria#S5CV0333P0_19380314_HOC_256; Internet; accessed October 7, 2010. 
 
“No One Wants to Have Them” Voelkischer Beobachter, July 13, 1938 available from  
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/evian2.html; Internet;  
accessed June 24, 2008. 
 
356 
 
“Oral Answers to Questions—Refugees” House of Common Debates, June 27, 1938 
available from http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=1938-06-     
27a.1516.8&s=%22Evian+Conference%22#g1516.9; Internet; accessed August 7, 
2010. 
 
“Oral History Interview with George L. Warren,” November 10, 1972 by Richard D.  
McKinzie, Harry S. Truman Library available from  
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/warrengl.htm; Internet; accessed March 6,  
2010.   
 
“Proclamation of The (New) Reichsvertretung” in the Juedische Rundschau, no. 78,  
September 29, 1933, available from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/proc.html; Internet;   
accessed October 8, 2010. 
 
“Suggest Loan” The Kingston Daily Freeman (Kingston, NY) December 18, 1938, p. 7 
available from 
http://fultonhistory.com/newspaper%2010/Kingston%20NY%20Daily%20Freeman/
Kingston%20NY%20Daily%20Freeman%201939%20Grayscale/Kingston%20NY%
20Daily%20Freeman%201939%20b%20Grayscale%20-%200126.pdf; Internet; 
accessed August 7, 2010.     
 
The American Jewish Committee Thirty-Second Annual Report 1939. Harry 
Schneiderman, ed., available from  
http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/1939_1940_9_AJCAnnuaReport.pdf;  
Internet; accessed June 11, 2010. 
 
The American Jewish Committee Thirty-Fourth Annual Report 1941, Harry 
Schneiderman, ed., available from 
http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/1941_1942_10_AJCAnnualReport.pdf
;Internet; accessed June 11, 2010. 
 
The American Jewish Year Book 5695 September 10, 1934-  
September 27, 1935, Harry, Schneiderman, ed. vol. 36. Philadelphia: The Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1934 available from  
http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/Vol_36__1934_1935.pdf; Internet;  
accessed October 8, 2010. 
 
“The Constitution of the German Federation of August 11, 1919” cited in H.  
Oppenheirmer, The Constitution of the German Republic available from 
http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~jobrien/reference/ob13.html; Internet; accessed October  
8, 2010. 
 
“The Diary of Hannah Rosen: Europe’s Jews and America’s Response, 1937-1945” by  
Elizabeth S. Rothschild, available from http://remember.org/educate/hrdiary.html;   
Internet; accessed June 26, 2010. 
357 
 
 
“The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King” available from  
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/index-e.html; Internet; accessed  
June 11, 2010. 
 
“The German-Austrian Anschluss, 1938: The British Reaction” available from  
http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~jobrien/reference/ob92.html ; Internet; accessed March 
13, 2010. 
 
“The Jewish Question as a Factor in Foreign Policy in 1938” Joachim von Ribbentrop 
Foreign Ministry Circular January 25, 1939 available from     
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:kGh4aYQrNIAJ:www.jewis
hvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/forpol.html+%22The+Jewisy+Question+as+a+
Factor+in+Foreign+Policy+in+1938%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; Internet;   
accessed May 29, 2010. 
 
“The SD on the Outcome of the Evian Conference Report of SD II 112” Yad Vashem  
Archive, 0.51/OSO/37 Berlin, July 29, 1938 available from 
http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203528.pdf;       
accessed 
June 5, 2010. 
 
“The Trial of Adolf Eichmann Session 18 (Part 5 of 6),” The Nizkor Project available   
from http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-          
adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-018-05.html; Internet; accessed March 12, 2010. 
 
“The Situation of the Jews in Austria, April, 1938,” Leo Lauterbach, London Zionist   
Archives, S5/653 available from  
http://www1.yadvashem.org/about_holocaust/documents/part1/doc43.html;       
Internet;  accessed March 3, 2010.    
 
“The Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919: Part III” available from  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partiii.asp; Internet; accessed March 8, 2010. 
 
“Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria; Protocol,  
Declaration and Special Declaration” September 10, 1919, available from  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/3.html; Internet; accessed 
March 8, 2010. 
 
“To Discriminate Is Not to Persecute,” Corriere Della Sera (Milan), August 5, 1938,  
      available from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/defendrace_italy.html;       
Internet;  accessed June 18, 2010 
 
“Very Important and Strictly Confidential Circular to the Swiss Border Police” 
September 7, 1938, available from  
358 
 
http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203273.pdf;       
accessed June 19, 2010. 
 
“Walter White Scores Persecution of Jews,” The Crisis, 399-400 available from    
http://books.google.com/books?id=6VoEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA393&dq=Jews&hl=e
n&ei=j1RJTImEJcH48Ab12vntDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=90&
ved=0CL8EEOgBMFk4ZA#v=onepage&q=Jews&f=false; Internet; accessed July 23, 
2010. 
 
“What is Americanism?” by Julius Streicher, German Propaganda Archive, available 
from http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/ds1.htm; Internet; accessed March 3,  
2010. 
 
Journals 
 
California and Western Medicine  
 
Christian Century 
 
Foreign Affairs 
Life 
Newsweek 
 
New Zealand Jewish Review  
 
Official Journal (League of Nations, Geneva) 
 
The Crisis 
 
The Sentinel (Chicago) 
 
Time 
 
The United States News 
 
 
Journal Articles  
 
Adams, Walter.  “Extent and Nature of the World Refugee Problem.” The Annals of the  
American Academy of Political and Social Science 203 (May 1939): 37-44. 
 
Ador, Gusatve. “The Question of Russian Refugees, “League of Nations Official Journal,  
Annex 2, 1921 (February 20, 1921): 228. 
 
359 
 
Estorick, Eric.  “The Evian Conference and the Intergovernmental Committee” Annals of  
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 203, Refugees (May,  
1939): 136-141. 
 
Jászi, Oscar. “Political Refugees” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 203, Refugees (May 1939): 83-93.  
 
Katz, Rabbi Solomon, Chairman, Wellington Jewish Refugee Committee, New Zealand   
Jewish Review, (October 1938): 17. 
 
Mann, Erika and Eric Estorick. “Private and Governmental Aid of Refugees.” Annals of  
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 123, Refugees (May, 1939):  
142-154. 
 
Stahl, Rudolph. “Vocational Retraining of Jews in Nazi Germany 1933-1938.” Jewish  
Social Studies, Vol. 1 (April 1939), 169-194. 
 
Thompson, Dorothy. “Refugees: A World Problem.” Foreign Affairs 16, no. 3 (April 
1938): 375-387 
 
Wischnitzer, Mark. “Jewish Emigration from Germany, 1933-1938.” Jewish Social 
Studies 2, no. 1 (January 1940), 23-44. 
 
Newspapers 
 
Afro-American 
 
American Hebrew and Jewish Messenger 
 
Amsterdam Evening (New York State)  
 
Daily Democrat (New York State) 
 
Daily Worker 
 
Danziger Vorposten 
 
Evening Independent 
 
Evening Post (Wellington, New Zealand) 
 
Glasgow Herald (Scotland) 
 
Jacksonville Journal 
 
Jewish Criterion 
360 
 
Leader-Republican (Gloversville and Johnstown, NY) 
 
Lewiston Daily Sun (Maine) 
 
Manchester Guardian (U.K.) 
 
Miami Herald 
 
Meridian Record (Meridian, CT) 
 
Montreal Gazette 
 
New York Times 
 
Ottawa Citizen 
 
Pittsburgh Press 
 
Prescott Evening Courier (Prescott, Arizona) 
 
Pueblo Indicator 
 
Southern Israelite (Atlanta, GA) 
 
St. Petersburg Times 
 
Sydney Morning Herald (Australia) 
 
Sydney Truth (Australia) 
 
Tampa Daily Times 
 
Tampa Tribune 
 
The Straits Times 
 
The Times 
 
Tribune de Genève 
 
Washington Post 
 
Voelkischer Beobachter 
 
  
361 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
Books 
Abella, Irving and Harold Troper. None is Too Many Canada and the Jews of Europe 
1939-1948. New York: Random House, 1983. 
 
Abzug, Robert H. America Views the Holocaust 1933-1945 A Brief Documentary History  
The Bedford Series in History and Culture. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999.  
 
Alderman, Geoffrey.  Modern British Jewry. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press,  
1998. 
 
Alter, Jonathan. The Defining Moment: FDR’s Hundred Days and the Triumph of Hope. 
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008. 
 
Arad, Yitzhak, Reuven Dafni, Gideon Greif and Yehudit Levin, eds. The Pictorial  
History of  the Holocaust. Jerusalem, Israel: Yad Vashem, 1990. 
 
Arendt, Hannah.  The Origins of Totalitarianism. Seventh edition.  NY: Meridian Books,   
1962. 
 
________.Eichmann in Jerusalem—The Banality of Evil. London: Penguin Books,   
1994. 
 
Auron, Yair. Zionism and the Armenian Genocide: The Banality of Indifference. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003. 
 
Avni, Haim. Argentina & the Jews: A History of Jewish Immigration. Tuscaloosa, AL:  
University of Alabama Press, 1991. 
 
Bartrop, Paul. Australia and the Holocaust, 1933-1945. Kew, Victoria: Australian 
Scholarly Publishing, 1994. 
 
Bauer, Yehuda.  Jews for Sale? Nazi-Jewish Negotiations 1933-1945. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1994. 
 
________.American Jewry and the Holocaust: the American Joint Distribution 
Committee 1939-1945. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981. 
 
Baylis, Thomas. How Israel Was Won A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999. 
 
Beaglehole, Ann. A Small Price to Pay: Refugees from Hitler in New Zealand, 1936-  
1946.  Wellington, Allen & Unwin, 1988. 
 
362 
 
Beit-Zvi, Shabtai. Post-Uganda Zionism in the Crisis of the Holocaust. Vol. 1 Tel Aviv:  
AAARGH Publishing House, 2004. 
 
Ben-Dror, Graciela.  The Catholic Church and the Jews: Argentina, 1933-1945  
Jerusalem, Israel: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Anti-Semitism, 
2008. 
 
Bentwich, Norman.  My 77 Years: An Account of My Life and Times, 1883-1960. 
London: Routledge, 1962 
 
Berger, Ronald J. Fathoming the Holocaust: A Social Problems Approach. New York:   
Walter de Gruyter, Inc., 2002.  
 
Black, Conrad. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Champion of Freedom New York:  
Public Affairs, 2003. 
 
Blakeney, Michael. Australia and the Jewish Refugees, 1933-1948. Sydney, Australia:   
Croom Helm, 1985. 
 
Bloch, Michael. Ribbentrop. NY: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1992. 
 
Blum, Morton. From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of the War 1941-1945 Boston:   
Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1959. 
 
Brecher, Frank W. Reluctant Ally: United States Foreign Policy towards the Jews from 
Wilson to Roosevelt. NY: Greenwood Press, 1991. 
 
Breitman, Richard D. and Alan M. Kraut. American Refugee Policy and European Jewry,  
1933-1945. Bloomingdale, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987. 
 
Breitman, Richard D., Barbara McDonald Steward and Severin Hochberg, Refugees and  
Rescue: The Diaries and Papers of James G. McDonald 1935-1945 (Bloomington, 
IN:  Indiana University Press, 2009 
 
Brendon, Piers. The Dark Valley A Panorama of the 1930’s. NY: Vintage Books, 2002. 
 
Burns, James MacGregor. Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom Harcourt Brace Jovanovich  
NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970. 
 
Caestecker, Frank and Bob Moore.  Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal 
European States. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010. 
 
Caron, Vicki. Uneasy Asylum France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933-1942.  
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
 
Casey, Steven. Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and  
363 
 
the War against Nazi Germany. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.  
 
Central Conference of American Rabbis. Gates of Repentance: The New Union 
Prayerbook for the Days of Awe. New York: Central Conference of American Rabbis 
and Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues, 1978.   
 
Cesarani, David.  The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. 
 
________.  Becoming Eichmann Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a “Desk 
Murderer.” Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2006. 
 
Cesarani, David and Paul A. Levine eds. Bystanders to the Holocaust: a Re-Evaluation. 
London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002. 
 
Cesarani, David and Sarah Kavanaugh. Holocaust: Critical Concepts in Historical  
Studies. Vol. 3, NY: Routledge, 2004.  
 
Cohen, Michael J. Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate, The Making of British Policy 
1936-45. London: Paul Elek, 1978. 
 
Complete Presidential Conferences of FDR. Vol. 11-12 1938. NY: Da Capo Press, 1992. 
 
Conot, Robert E.  Justice at Nuremberg. NY: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc. 2000. 
 
Cornwell, Elmer Jr. Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion. Bloomington IN: Indiana  
University Press, 1966. 
 
Daniels, Roger. Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and 
Immigrants Since 1882. NY: Hill and Wang, 2004. 
 
Davis, Harriet. Pioneers in World Order: An American Appraisal of the League of  
Nations. NY: Columbia University Press, 1944. 
 
Diner, Dan. Beyond the Conceivable: Studies on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust.  
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000. 
 
Dinnerstein, Leonard. America and the Survivors of the Holocaust NY: Columbia  
University Press, 1982. 
 
________.  Anti-Semitism in America. NY: Oxford University Press, 1994.  
 
Dippel, John V. H. Bound upon a Wheel of Fire: Why So Many German Jews Made the  
Tragic Decision to Remain in Nazi Germany. New York: Basic Books, 1996. 
 
Dirks, Gerald. E. Canada’s Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism? Quebec: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977. 
364 
 
 
Domarus Max, Patrick Romane, ed. The Essential Hitler Speeches and Commentary.      
Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, Inc., 2007. 
 
Dormois, Jean Pierre. The French Economy in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
 
Dowty, Alan. Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement.  
 New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987. 
 
Draper, Paula, Franca Iacovetta, Robert Ventres, eds. A Nation of Immigrants: Women, 
Workers and Communities in Canadian History. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto 
Press, 2002. 
 
Druks, Herbert. The Failure to Rescue. NY: Robert Speller & Sons, 1977. 
 
________. The Uncertain Friendship: The U.S. and Israel from Roosevelt to 
Kennedy.  Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. 
 
Dwork, Debórah and Robert Jan van Pelt. Holocaust: A History. New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2002. 
 
________. Flight from the Reich: Refugee Jews, 1933-1945.   
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2009.  
 
Edelheit, Abraham J. and Hershel Edelheit. History of the Holocaust: A Handbook and  
Dictionary. Boulder: Westview Press, 2000. 
 
Edelheit, Abraham J. The Yishuv in the Shadow of the Holocaust: Zionist Politics and  
Rescue  Aliya, 1933-1939. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. 
 
Eisenhower, Julie Nixon. Special People. NY: Ballantine, 1977. 
 
Elbogen, Ismar and Moses Hadas. A Century of Jewish Life. Philadelphia, PA: Jewish   
Publication Society, 1946. 
 
Howard Ellis, Charles. The Origin, Structure & Working of the League of Nations.  
Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, LTD., 2003. 
 
Engel, David. In the Shadow of Auschwitz: The Polish Government-in-Exile and the 
Jews. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1987. 
 
Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc. Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British 
Policies. Vol.1. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1947. 
 
Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich in Power 1933-1939. NY: Penguin Press, 2005. 
365 
 
 
Fahmeir, Andreas, Olivier Faron and Patrick Weill, eds., Migration control in the North  
Atlantic World: The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States 
from the French Revolution to the Inter-War Period. New York: Bergahn Books, 
2003. 
 
Feig, Konnilyn G. Hitler’s Death Camps: The Sanity of Madness. NY: Holmes & Meier,  
1981. 
 
Fein, Helen.  Accounting for Genocide. NY: The Free Press, 1979. 
 
Feingold, Henry L. Bearing Witness How America and its Jews Responded to the  
Holocaust. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995 
 
________. The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the  
Holocaust, 1938-1945. Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970. 
 
Fischel, Jack R. The Holocaust. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. 
 
Fischer, Klaus. The History of an Obsession: German Judeophobia and the Holocaust.  
NY: Continuum, 2001. 
 
Fleming, Gerald.  Hitler and the Final Solution. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1984. 
 
Frankel, Jonathan. ed. The Fate of the European Jews, 1939-1945: Continuity or 
Contingency?  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.  
 
Friedländer, Saul. Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution, 1933- 
1939. Vol. 1.  NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997. 
 
Friedman, Saul. No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy towards Jewish  
Refugees, 1938-1945. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973. 
 
Gay, Ruth, The Jews of Germany: A Historical Portrait. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1992. 
 
Gellately, Robert.  Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler: The Age of Social Catastrophe. NY: Vintage 
Books, 2008. 
 
Gilbert, Martin. Exile and Return: The Struggle for a Jewish Homeland. NY: Lippincott,  
1978. 
 
________. The Holocaust, The Jewish Tragedy. London: Collins, 1986. 
 
Goeschel, Christian. Suicide in Nazi Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
366 
 
 
Goldmann, Nahum. Memoirs. Jerusalem: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972. 
 
Good, David F. and Ruth Wodad, eds., From World War to Waldheim: Culture and    
Politics in Austria and the United States. NY: Berghan Books, 1999. 
 
Doris Kearns Goodwin, Doris Kearns. No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor 
Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II. NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994. 
 
Gordon, Paul. Policing Immigration: Britain’s Internal Controls London: Pluto Press  
Ltd., 1985.  
 
Gottfried, Ted.  Displaced Persons: The Liberation and Abuse of Holocaust Survivors 
Brookfield, CT: Twenty-First Century Books, 2001.  
 
Grubel, Fred, ed., Catalog of the Archival Collections Leo Baeck Institute Tübingen:  
J.C.B.  Mohr, 1990. 
 
Gurlock, Jeffrey, ed., American Jewish History Vol. 7. “America, American Jews and the 
Holocaust.” NY: Routledge, 1998. 
 
Hamerow, Theodore S. Why We Watched: Europe, America, and the Holocaust. NY: 
W.W.  Norton & Company, 2008. 
 
Harsch, Joseph C. At the Hinge of History: A Reporter’s Story. Athens, GA: University of   
Georgia Press, 1993. 
 
Hathaway, James. The Rights of Refugees under International Law. Cambridge:   
Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Heppner, Ernest G. Shanghai Refuge: A Memoir of the World War II Jewish Ghetto. 
Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1993. 
 
Herzstein, Robert Edwin. Roosevelt and Hitler: Prelude to War. New York: Paragon 
House, 1989. 
 
Hirschfeld, Gerhard. Exile in Great Britain: Refugees from Hitler’s Germany. London:   
Berg Publishers, 1984. 
 
Holbom, Louise Wilhelmine and Philip Chartrand, Rita Chartrand. Refugees: A Problem 
of Our Time. Vol. 1, Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1975. 
 
Holocaust. Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974. 
 
Hooper, B. Australian Reaction to German Persecution of the Jews and Refugee  
Assimilation (M.A. thesis, Department of History, Australian National University, 
367 
 
1972). 
 
Howard, Thomas C. and William D. Pederson, eds. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
Formation of the Modern World. NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003. 
 
Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland—Second World War, eds. Switzerland  
and Refugees in the Nazi Era. Bern, Switzerland: 1999. 
 
Jackson, Ivor C.  The Refugee Concept in Group Situations. Cambridge, MA: Kluwer 
Law International, 1999. 
 
Johnson, Paul. A History of the Jews. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987 
 
Kelly, Ninette and Michael J. Trebilcock. The Making of the Mosaic: A History of  
Canadian Immigration Policy. London, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 2000.  
 
Kennedy, David Michael. Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and 
War, 1929-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
Kent, Donald Peterson. The Refugee Intellectual. New York: Columbia University Press,  
1953. 
 
Keogh, Dermot. Jews in Twentieth-Century Ireland: Refugees; Anti-Semitism and the 
Holocaust. Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 1998.  
 
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis. NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. 
 
Knowles, Valerie. First Person: A Biography of Cairine Wilson, Canada’s First Woman 
Senator. Toronto, Canada: Dunburn Press Limited, 1988.  
 
Kontler, László. A History of Hungary: A Millennium in Central Europe. Basingstoke:  
Palgrave, 2002. 
 
Kochavi, Arieh J.  Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States & Jewish Refugees,  
1945-1948. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 
 
Kramer, Naomi and Ronald Headland.  The Fallacy of Race and the Shoah.  Ottawa,  
Ont.: University of Ottawa Press, 1998. 
 
Krell, Wilhelm. “La Communauté Culturelle Israelite de Vienne,” Les Juifs en Europe, 
1939-1945. Vol. 8. Centre de documentation juive contemporaine, Paris: 1949. 
 
Kreuter, Maria-Luise. Wo liegt Ecuador?: Exil in einem unbekannten Land 1938 bis zum 
Ende der fünfizer Jahre. Berlin: Metropol-Verl., 1995. 
 
Krispyn, Egbert. Anti-Nazi Writers in Exile. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press,  
368 
 
1978.  
 
Kushner, Tony and Katharine Knox. Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National, 
 and Local Perspectives. NY: Frank Cass, 1999.  
 
Laffer, Dennis R. “Evian Conference,” History in Dispute, The Holocaust 1933-1945.  
Vol. 11. Farmington Hills, MI: St. James Press, 2003.   
 
Landau, Ronnie S. The Nazi Holocaust. London: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1994. 
 
Langlais, Jacques and David Rome.  Jews & French Quebecers: Two Hundred Years of  
Shared History. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1991.  
 
Laqueur, Walter and Judith Tydor Baumel, The Holocaust Encyclopedia. Willard, Ohio: 
R.R. Donnelley & Sons, 2001. 
 
Laqueur, Walter.  A History of Zionism. London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2003.  
 
Large, David Clay. And the World Closed Its Doors: The Story of One Family 
Abandoned to the Holocaust.  NY: Basic Books, 2003. 
 
Lasser, William.  Benjamin V. Cohen: Architect of the New Deal. New Haven, CT.: Yale 
University Press, 2002. 
 
Laurendeau, André. The Diary of André Laurendeau: Written during the Royal  
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism 1964-1967. Toronto, ON: James 
Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1991.  
 
Lebow, Richard Ned, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu. The Politics of Memory in 
Postwar Europe. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Lesser, Jeff. Welcoming the Undesirables: Brazil and the Jewish Question. Berkeley,  
CA: University of California Press, 1995. 
 
Levy, Richard S., ed., Anti-Semitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and  
Persecution, Vol. 2, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc. 2005. 
 
Liberman, Ya’acov. My China: Jewish Life in the Orient, 1900-1950. Jerusalem: Gefen   
Publishing House LTD, 1998. 
 
Lipman, Vivian David.  A History of the Jews in Britain since 1858. New York: Holmes 
& Meier, 1990. 
 
Lipstadt, Deborah E. Beyond Belief: The American Press & The Coming of the Holocaust   
1933-1945. NY: The Free Press, 1986. 
 
369 
 
Loescher, Gil. The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
 
London, Louise. Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948 Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000. 
 
Lookstein, Haskel. Were We Our Brother’s Keepers? The Public Response of American 
Jews  to the Holocaust 1938-1944. NY: Hartmore House, 1985. 
 
Loval, Werner. We Were Europeans: A Personal History of a Turbulent Century.  
Jerusalem, Israel: Gefen Publishing House, Ltd., 2010. 
 
Lucas, Noah. The History of Modern Israel. Praeger: NY, 1975. 
 
Malloy, Sean and Doug Lorimer, eds. The Palestinian Struggle, Zionism and Anti-     
Semitism.  Chippendale, NSW, Australia: Resistance Books, 2002.  
  
Maney, Patrick. The Roosevelt Presence. New York: Twayne, 1992. 
 
Marrus, Michael R. and Robert O. Paxton. Vichy France and the Jews. Stanford, CA:     
Stanford University Press, 1995. 
 
________. The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War 
through the Cold War. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002. 
 
McClure, Marc Eric.  Earnest Endeavors: The Life and Public Work of George Rublee.  
Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. 
 
Medding, Peter Y. ed., Values, Interests and Identity: Jews and Politics in a Changing 
World Studies in Contemporary Jewry. Vol. XI. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 1995. 
 
 Michael, Robert and Philip Rosen. Dictionary of Antisemitism from the Earliest Times to  
the Present. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007.   
 
Medoff, Rafael. The Deafening Silence. New York: Shapolsky Publishers, 1988. 
 
________. Jewish Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook  
Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc, 2002 
 
________. Blowing the Whistle on Genocide: Josiah E. Dubois, Jr., and the 
Struggle for a U.S. Response to the Holocaust. W. Lafayette, IN: Purdue University 
Press, 2009.  
 
Meir, Golda. Golda Meir, My Life NY: Putnam & Sons, 1975. 
 
370 
 
Mendelsohn, John. ed. The Holocaust. Vol. 5. NY: Garland Publishing, 1982. 
 
Michael, Robert. A Concise History of American Anti-Semitism. Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. 
 
Michael, Robert and Philip Rosen. Dictionary of Antisemitism from the Earliest Times to 
the  Present. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007.   
 
Midlarsky, Manus I. The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century Cambridge:  
Cambridge, 2005.  
 
Moorehead, Caroline. Human Cargo: A Journey among Refugees. NY: Picador, 2006.  
 
Mor, Menachem, ed. Eretz, Israel, Israel and the Jewish Diaspora: Mutual Relations. 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc.:  1988. 
 
Morris, Katherine. Odyssey of Exile: Jewish Women Flee the Nazis for Brazil Detroit, 
MI: Wayne State University Press, 1996. 
 
Morse, Arthur D. While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy. NY: The 
Overlook Press, 1967. 
 
Moser, Benjamin. Why This World: A Biography of Clarice Lispector. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 2009. 
  
Mosse, Werner E and Julius Carlebach, eds.  Second Chance: Two Centuries of German-  
Speaking Jews in the United Kingdom. Tübingen: Mohr, 1991. 
 
Nahshon, Edna, ed. Jewish Theatre: A Global View. Leiden, The Netherlands,   
Koninklijke Brill, 2009. 
 
Neimark, Norman M. Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe.   
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.  
 
Philip Orchard, Philip. “A Right to Leave: Refugees; States, and International Society.”  
Ph.D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 2008. 
 
Reut-Nicolussi E., A.P. Sereni, C. Rousseau, Sir Gerald G. Fizmaurice, G. Salvioli,  
Yuen-Li  Liang. Recueil des cours. Vol. 73. The Hague, The Netherlands: Académie 
de Droit International de la Haye, 1948. 
 
Nixon, Edgar B. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs. Vol. III: September 1935-  
January 1937. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969. 
 
Nicosia, Francis R. The Third Reich & the Palestine Question. New Brunswick, NJ:   
Transaction Publishers, 2000. 
371 
 
 
Noakes Jeremy and Geoffrey Pridham. Documents on Nazism 1919-1945. NY: Viking 
Press, 1975. 
 
Novick, Peter. The Holocaust in American Life NY: Mariner Books, 2000. 
 
Newton, Ronald C. The “Nazi Menace” in Argentina, 1931-1947, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1992. 
 
Newton, Verne W. ed. FDR and the Holocaust. NY: St. Marten’s Press, 1996.  
 
Offner, Arnold A. American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany,    
1933-38. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969. 
 
Penkower, Monty Noam. The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the  
Holocaust.  Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1988.  
 
Perl, William F. The Holocaust Conspiracy: An International Policy of Genocide. NY:   
Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 1989. 
 
Piorloot, Roland A., Henk Hillenaar and Walter Schönau, eds. Fathers and Mothers in 
Literature: Psychoanalysis and Culture. Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 1994. 
 
Rees, Laurence. The Nazis: A Warning from History.  London: New Press,  
1997. 
 
Reitlinger, Gerald. The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe,   
1939-1945. NY: Beechhurst Press, 1953. 
 
Rigg, Bryan Mark. Rescued from the Reich: How One of Hitler’s Soldiers Save the  
Lubavitcher Rebbe. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004.  
 
Roorda, Eric Paul. The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo 
Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1998. 
 
Rosen, Robert N. Saving the Jews Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Holocaust. NY:   
Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2006. 
 
Roosevelt, Eleanor. This I Remember. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975. 
 
Rozell, Mark J. and William D. Pederson. FDR and the Modern Presidency: Leadership 
and Legacy. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. 
 
Rubinstein, William D. The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have 
Saved More Jews from the Nazis. NY: Rutledge, 1977. 
372 
 
 
Ruppin, Arthur. Chapters of My Life in the Building of the Land and the Nation,  
1920-1942. (Hebrew) Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968.   
 
Ryan, Donna F. The Holocaust & the Jews of Marseille: The Enforcement of Anti- 
Semitic Policies in Vichy France. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996.  
 
Sanders, Ronald.  Shores of Refuge A Hundred Years of Jewish Emigration. New  
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1988. 
 
Sarna, Jonathan D. The American Jewish Experience. NY: Holmes & Meier, 1986. 
 
Schleues, Karl A. The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy toward German Jews, 
1933-1939. Urbana, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1970. 
 
Schoeman, Roy H.  Salvation is from the Jews (John 4:22): the Role of Judaism in   
Salvation History from Abraham to the Second Coming. Ignatius Press, 2003. 
 
Schoenberner, Gerhard.  The Yellow Star: The Persecution of the Jews in Europe, 1933- 
1945. Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2004  
 
Semelin, Jacques. Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide.  
NY: Columbia University Press, 2007.  
 
Sharf, Andrew. The British Press and Jews under Nazi Rule. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1964. 
 
Shepherd, Naomi. A Refugee from Darkness: Wilfrid Israel and the Rescue of the Jews. 
NY: Pantheon Books, 1984. 
 
Sherman, A.J. Island Refuge, Britain and the Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933-1939. 
London: Elek Books Limited, 1973. 
 
Shirer, William. Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934-1941. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1941. 
 
Skran, Claudena M. Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime.   
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
 
Sompolinsky, Meier. Britain and the Holocaust: The Failure of Anglo-Jewish 
Leadership?  Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 1999. 
 
Sorin, Gerald. Tradition Transformed: The Jewish Experience in America. Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1997. 
 
Soumerai, Eve Nussbaum and Carol D. Schulz. A Voice from the Holocaust. Westport,  
373 
 
CT: Greenwood Press, 2003. 
 
Spitzer, Leo. Hotel Bolivia: The Culture of Memory in a Refugee from Nazism. NY:   
Hill and Wang, 1999 
 
Steele, Richard W. Propaganda in an Open Society: The Roosevelt Administration and  
the Media, 1933-1941. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985.  
 
Steiner, George. George Steiner at the New Yorker. NY: New Directions Books, 2009. 
 
Steinhouse, Carl L. Barred: The Shameful Refusal of FDR’s State Department to Save 
Tens of Thousands of Europe’s Jews from Extermination. Bloomington, IN, 2007. 
 
Stembler, Charles H. Jews in the Mind of America. New York: Basis Books, 1966. 
 
Stewart, Barbara McDonald.  United States Government Policy on Refugees from  
Nazism, 1933-1940. New York: Garland Publishing, 1962.  
 
Stiller, Jesse H. George S. Messersmith, Diplomat of Democracy. Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1987. 
 
Stoessinger, John George. The Refugee and the World Community Minneapolis, MN:  
University of Minnesota Press, 1956. 
 
Straub, Ervin. The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
 
Susser, Bernard and Charles S. Liebman.  Choosing Survival: Strategies for a Jewish 
Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.  
 
Tebbell, John Williams and Sarah Miles Watts. The Press and the Presidency: From 
GeorgeWashington to Ronald Reagan NY: Oxford University Press, 1995.  
 
Tenenbaum, Joseph. Race and Reich: The Story of an Epoch Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1976. 
 
Tichenor, Daniel E. Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America.  
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
 
Torpey, John C. The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
 
________. “Passports and the Development of Immigration Controls in the North  
Atlantic World during the Long Nineteenth Century.” A. Fahrmeir, O. Faron, and P. 
Weil, eds.  Migration control in the North Atlantic World. New York: Bergahn 
Books, 2003.   
374 
 
 
Tulchinsky, Gerald.  Canada’s Jews: A People’s Journey. Toronto, ON: University of  
Toronto Press, 2008.  
 
Urofsky, Melvin I. A Voice that Spoke for Justice: The Life and Times of Stephen S. Wise 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1982. 
 
Vernant, Jacques. The Refugee in the Post-War World. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1953. 
 
Vital, David. A People Apart: The Jews of Europe, 1789-1939. Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
 
olko, Shulamit. Germans, Jews and Antisemites: Trials in Emancipation.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006.  
 
Wasserstein Bernard. Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979. 
 
Weisgal, Meyer W. ed. Chaim Weizmann: Statesman, Scientist, Builder of the Jewish  
Commonwealth. New York: Dial Press, 1944. 
 
Weitz, John. Hitler’s Banker:  Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht.  NY: Little, Brown and  
Company, 1997. 
 
Weizmann, Chaim. Trial and Error. London:  Hamish Hamilton, 1949 
 
Welles, Benjamin. Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist A Biography. NY: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1977. 
 
Wheatcroft, Geoffrey. The Controversy of Zion: Jewish Nationalism, the Jewish State  
and the Unresolved Jewish Dilemma. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1997. 
 
White, Graham.  FDR and the Press. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.  
 
Wigoder, Geoffrey. ed., Encyclopaedia Judaica. Vol. VI, Jerusalem: Keter Publishing 
House, 1970. 
 
Winfield, Betty H. FDR and the News Media. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press,  
1990.  
 
Wyden, Peter. Stella. New York: Anchor Books, 1993. 
 
Wyman, David S. Paper Walls America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-1941.  Amherst:     
University of Massachusetts Press, 1968. 
 
375 
 
Wyman, David S. and Charles H. Rosenzveig, eds., The World Reacts to the 
Holocaust. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1996. 
 
Ye’Or, Bat and Miriam Kochan Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide.  
Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2002. 
 
Zimmerman, Joshua D. ed. Contested Memories: Poles and Jews during the 
Holocaust and its Aftermath New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003.  
 
Internet 
 
“A Child of the Century” by Ben Hecht available from 
http://www.saveisrael.com/others/hecht/hechtchild.htm; Internet; accessed August 
4, 2010. 
 
“Aid and Rescue,” 2006, available from  
http://www.edwardvictor.com/Holocaust/2006/Aid_and_rescue.htm ; Internet;   
accessed August 23, 2010. 
 
“A Dominican Haven for Jews Fleeing Hitler” December 4, 2008 available from 
http://www.eurojewcong.org/ejc/news.php?id_article=3200; Internet; accessed May  
28, 2010. 
 
Allen, Fred. “Regarding conferences.” Quotes.net available from  
http://www.quotes.net/quotations/%22Evian%20Conference%22; Internet; accessed  
July 23, 2010. 
 
“America’s Ambivalence and Apathy,” by Henry Feingold, vol. 8, no. 2 in “Dimensions:  
A Journal of Holocaust Studies,” vol. 10, no. 1 available from 
http://www.adl.org/braun/vol10_no1.asp; Internet; accessed June 24, 2010. 
 
“America and the Holocaust” by William J. vanden Heuvel available from 
http://www.feri.org/common/news/details.cfm?QID=826&clientid=11005; Internet;   
accessed April 20, 2008. 
 
“A Re-Evaluation of the Versailles Peace” by William R. Keylor. Relevance 5, no.   
3 (Fall 1996) available from   http://www.worldwar1.com/tgws/rel007.htm; Internet;   
accessed July 17, 2010.   
 
“Argentina in World War II Timeline” available from 
http://history.sandiego.edu/GEN/st/~tpace/Timeline.html; Internet; accessed  
December 26, 2009. 
 
“A View from the United States-Social, Economic, and Legal Change, the Persistence of  
the State, and Immigration Policy in the Coming Century” by John A. Scanlan,  
376 
 
available from                                                          
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/law_reviews/018global_legal_studies/vol2/scanlan
.html; Internet; accessed May 31, 2010.   
 
“Belgian Authorities Destroy Holocaust Records” by Paul Belien. August 31, 2006 The 
Brussels Journal available from http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1287; Internet;   
accessed August 15, 2010. 
 
Canadian Jewish Congress Charities Committee National Archives-Collection Guide  
available from http://www.cjccc.ca/national_archives/archives/arcguideA.htm;   
Internet; accessed August 15, 2010. 
 
“Christmas Without Jews: A Holocaust Controversy” by Rafael Medoff (December  
2003) available from http://www.wymaninstitute.org/articles/2003-12-christmas.php;  
Internet; accessed August 4, 2010. 
 
“Deathly Silence Teaching Guide: Bystander Psychology.” The Southern Institute for  
Education and Research available from  
http://www.southerninstitute.info/holocaust_education/ds9.html; Internet; accessed  
October 4, 2009. 
 
“Ecuador” Jewish Virtual Library available from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0006_0_05541.html;                 
Internet; accessed September 4, 2010. 
 
Emigration from Germany and Austria, April 1933-May 1939, Encyclopedia Judaica  
(1971), vol. 7, col. 491 available from 
http://www.geschichteinchronologie.ch/eu/D/EndJud_juden-in-Deutschland-05-3R-     
1933-     1939-ENGL.html; Internet; accessed March 12, 2007. 
 
“Eugenic Laws against Race Mixing” Image Archive on the American Eugenics   
Movement Dolan DNA Learning Center Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory available 
from http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/essay7text.html; Internet; 
accessed September 4, 2010. 
 
“Evian: The Most Fateful Conference of All Times in Jewish 
History” by Ervin Birnbaum. Part One. NATV A Journal of Politics and the Arts 2008 
Ariel Center for Policy Research available from  
http://www.mideast.org.il/0811-2%20ebirnbaumE1.pdf; Internet; accessed 0ctober 
10, 2009. 
 
“Exhibit Highlights Haiti’s Heroism in Holocaust” by Janice Arnold, Canadian Jewish  
Congress, available from http://www.cjc.ca/2010/03/17/exhibit-highlights-     
haiti%E2%80%99s-heroism-in-holocaust/; Internet; accessed June 26, 2010. 
 
“Feng Shan Ho and the Rescue of Austrian Jews” Visas for Life Project available from  
377 
 
http://isurvived.org/4Debates/Exhibit-RickshawORG/FengShanHo-bio-Eric.html;  
Internet; accessed March 19, 2010. 
 
Ferrero, Shaul. “Switzerland and the Refugees Fleeing Nazism: Documents on the  
German Jews Turned Back at the Basel Border in 1938-1939,”by Shaul Ferrero  
available from  
http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-     %203212.pdf;        
Internet; accessed January 27, 2011. 
 
“Genocide and Other State Murders in the Twentieth Century,” by Helen Fein, October  
24, 1995, 14 available from  
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/analysis/details/1995-10-24-02/fein.pdf; Internet;  
accessed October 4, 2010. 
 
“German-Jewish Refugees, 1933-1939,” Holocaust Encyclopedia, available from  
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005468; Internet;  
accessed January 6, 2008. 
 
“Germany: Jewish Population in 1933,” Holocaust Encyclopedia available from 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005276; Internet; accessed  
June 12, 2010. 
 
“Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden” Shoah Resource Center available from  
http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%206371.pdf;  
Internet; accessed October 1, 2010. 
 
“Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland—Second World War “Switzerland 
and Refugees in the Nazi Era” (Bern: 1999), 41 available from  
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Documents/DOC_15_Bergier_Refugee.pdf;   
Internet; accessed June 19, 2010. 
 
“Jeune-Canada” The Canadian Encyclopedia available from 
http://www.canadianencyclopedia.ca/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA000
4127; Internet, accessed August 15, 2010. 
 
“Jews and Haitians: A Forgotten History” by Daniel Smajovits, March 16, 2010, Jewish 
Tribune available from  
http://www.jewishtribune.ca/TribuneV2/index.php/201003162781/Jews-and-   
Haitians-A-forgotten-history.html; Internet; accessed June 26, 2010 
 
“Jews in Ecuador Jewish Immigration in the National Socialist Period” by Michael  
Palomino 2008 available from http://www.geschichteinchronologie.ch/am-  
S/ecuador/EncJud_juden-in-Ecuador-ENGL.html; Internet; accessed September 4, 
2010)  
 
“Joseph Avenol’s Betrayal of the League of Nations” available from  
378 
 
http://www.historynet.com/joseph-avenols-betrayal-of-the-league-of-nations.htm;      
Internet; accessed August 9, 2010. 
 
“Leopoldstadt, Vienna” available from 
http://www.fact- index.com/l/le/leopoldstadt__vienna.html; Internet;  
accessed March 13, 2010 
 
“Looking Back, Moving Forward: The History and Future of Refugee Protection” by 
Shauma Labman, available from  
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=shauna_labman;     
Internet; accessed May 31, 2010. 
 
“Madagascar Plan” Shoah Resource Center available from  
http://www.yadvashem.org; Internet; accessed October 3, 2010. 
 
“Minority Distrust of Medicine: A Historical Perspective” by Robert Baker, PhD 
available from http://www.mssm.edu/msjournal/66/v66_4_212a.pdf; Internet;  
accessed April 6, 2010 
 
My Brother’s Keeper: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 
1929-1939 available from http://www.geschichteinchronologie.ch/judentum- 
ktenlage/hol/joint/Bauer_joint05-prelude-of-holocaust-whole-chapter-ENGL.html; 
Internet; accessed May 2, 2010. 
 
“News of the Holocaust: Why FDR Didn’t Tell and the Press Didn’t Ask” by Laurel Leff.  
Hakirah: A Journal of Jewish and Ethnic Studies, 2006, 11 available from 
http://wymaninstitute.org/articles/News%20of%20the%20Holocaust-
%20Why%20FDR%20Didn't%20Tell%20and%20the%20Press%20Didn't%20Ask.p
df; Internet; accessed October 3, 2010. 
 
“New Zealand to 1950” by Sanderson Beck available from  
http://www.san.beck.org/20-  13-NewZealandto1950.html ; Internet; accessed  
August 22, 2010. 
 
“1920 White New Zealand Policy Introduced” available from  
http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/timeline/9/11; Internet; accessed August 22, 2010. 
 
“Not ‘desirable’: Government Scapegoating of Jewish Refugees” by Samuel Pietsch.  
Jubilee Conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association Australian 
National University, Canberra, October 2002, p. 2 available from  
http://arts.anu.edu.au/sss/apsa/Papers/pietsch.pdf; Internet; accessed October 3, 
2010. 
 
“Open Knowledge—Americans Did Not Like Immigrant Jews” June 16, 2006, available 
from http://crasch.livejournal.com/429343.html; Internet; accessed February 17,   
2008. 
379 
 
 
“Palestine Office,” Jewish Virtual Library, available from  
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0015_0_15348.html;  
Internet; accessed October 1, 2010. 
 
“Peru” Jewish Virtual Library 2008 available from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0015_0_15634.html;    
Internet; accessed September 4, 2010. 
 
“Port-au-Prince—Haiti A Nation that Saved Jews during Nazi Era,” March 26, 2010, 
available from http://www.vosizneias.com/52134/2010/03/26/port-au-prince-haiti-a- 
nation-that-saved-jews-during-nazi-era; Internet; accessed June 26, 2010. 
 
“Refugees from Nazism” Explore Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand  available 
from 
http://www.teara.govt.nz/NewZealanders/NewZealandPeoples/HistoryOfImmigration
/13/ENZ-Resources/Standard/1/en ; Internet; accessed February 25, 2008. 
 
“Response to the Article by Joan R. Deman ‘A Rebuttal to the Claims Made by the 
Organization Visas for Life” by Eric Saul available from 
http://www.chgs.umn.edu/museum/exhibitions/rescuers/ericSaul.html; Internet;  
(Last update October 22, 2009); accessed March 19, 2010. 
 
“Roosevelt Museum Distorts FDR’s Holocaust Record” by Rafael Medoff, April 2005, 
available from http://www.wymaninstitute.org/articles/2005-08-fdr.php; Internet;   
accessed June 12, 2010. 
 
Sachar, Howard Morley. A History of the Jews in the Modern World (Vintage eBooks) 
available from 
http://books.google.com/books?id=TLxA9W7q74sC&pg=PT477&dq=%E2%80%9C
these+parasites+who+suck+Rumanian+and+Christian+blood+%22Rumanian+Jews%
22&hl=en&ei=DrpzTe2wPMS1tweO3JTLBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&re
snum=1&ved=0CC4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%E2%80%9Cthese%20parasites%2
0who%20suck%20Rumanian%20and%20Christian%20blood%20%22Rumanian%20
Jews%22&f=false; Internet; accessed March 6, 2011. 
 
“Safe Haven: 2. Immigration and Settlement—Government Policy” by Paul Bartrop  
available from      
http://www.naa.gov.au/naaresources/publications/research_guides/guides/haven/page
s/chapter2.htm; Internet; accessed June 27, 2010. 
 
“Senator Allen’s ‘Jewish Problem’” The David S. Wyman Institute for Holocaust 
Studies, March 3, 2010, available from  
http://www.wymaninstitute.org/articles/2006-10-senator-allen.php; Internet; accessed  
March 3, 2010. 
 
380 
 
“Senator Elbert D. Thomas A Courageous Voice against the Holocaust” available from 
http://www.wymaninstitute.org/education/Elbert%20T.pdf ; Internet; last update  
2004, accessed March 14, 2010. 
 
“Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era” Independent Commission of Experts  
Switzerland—Second World War (Bern: 1999) available from 
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Documents/DOC_15_Bergier_Refugee.pdf; 
Internet; accessed June 19, 2010) 
 
“Sosua’s Beginnings: A Haven for Jews Fleeing Hitler,” November 5, 2008 available 
from http://popreport.com/edition/2008/11/sosua-a-dominican-haven-for-jews-
fleeing-     hitler/; Internet; accessed May 28, 2010. 
 
Stanton, Gregory. “The 8 Stages of Genocide” available from  
http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html; Internet;  
accessed June 25, 2009. 
 
“St-Jean-Baptiste Society” The Canadian Encyclopedia 2010 available from    
http://thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0007
080; Internet; accessed August 15, 2010. 
 
“Teaching the Hero in Holocaust History: The Cases of Raoul Wallenberg and Gösta Engzell” by  
Paul Levine, October 14, 1999, available from 
http://www1.yadvashem.org/download/education/conf/Levine.pdf; Internet; accessed May 
31, 2010. 
 
“The Angel of Austria’s Jews” by Mark O’Neil South China Morning Post available 
from http://journeyeast.tripod.com/angel_of_austria_s_jews.html; Internet; accessed 
March 20, 2010. 
 
“The Austrian Jewish Community before the Anschluss” Claims Conference The 
Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany available from 
http://www.claimscon.org/index.asp?url=austria/before; Internet; accessed March 11, 
2010. 
 
“The Best Speech I Ever Wrote” by Marty Kaplan, July 30, 2009, available from                 
http://www.jewishjournal.com/marty_kaplan/article/the_best_speech_i_ever_wrote_2
0090730/ ; Internet; accessed July 30, 2010.    
 
“The 1998 Wiesenthal Reports on Switzerland” available from 
http://www.alanschom.com/theReport.htm; Internet; accessed April 6, 2010. 
 
“The Politics of ‘Transmigration’: Why Jewish Refugees had to Leave Switzerland from 
1944-1954” by Simon Erlanger. Jewish Political Studies Review 18: 1-2 (Spring 
2006) available from http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-erlanger-s06.htm; Internet; 
accessed June 30, 2010.   
 
381 
 
“The Response of the New Zealand Government to Jewish Refugees, 1933-1939”  
available from 
www.holocaustcentre.org.nz/oldsite/jewish%20refugees%20website.doc; Internet;  
accessed June 11, 2010. 
 
“The Sad Voyage of the St. Louis Anti-Semitism Rampant in Canada in the 1930s”  
October 7, 2009 available from 
http://weuropeanhistory.suite101.com/article.cfm/the_sad_voyage_of_the_st_louis;       
Internet; accessed June 11, 2010. 
 
“The Transfer Agreement and the Boycott Movement: A Jewish Dilemma on the Eve of 
the Holocaust” by Yf’aat Weiss, Shoah Resource Center, available from 
http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203231.pdf;       
Internet; accessed October 7, 2010.   
 
“The Trial of Adolf Eichmann Session 18 (Part 5 of 6)” available from 
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-     018-05.html ; 
Internet; accessed March 12, 2010.   
 
“The Virtual Jewish History Tour Ecuador” by Jacqueline Shields, 1998, available from  
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/Ecuador.html; Internet; accessed  
September 4, 2010. 
 
“The Virtual Jewish History Tour Haiti” by Ariel Scheib available from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/haiti.html; Internet; accessed June 
25, 2010. 
 
Weltsch, Robert. “Wear It With Pride, The Yellow Badge,” Jüdische Rundschau, no. 27,    
April 4, 1933, available from  
http://www1.yadvashem.org/about_holocaust/documents/part1/doc14.html; Internet;   
accessed March 12, 2009. 
 
“Whitewashing FDR’s Holocaust Record: An Analysis of Robert N. Rosen’s Saving the  
Jews: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Holocaust New Documents Shed More Light on  
FDR’s Holocaust Failure” by Laurel Leff and Rafael Medoff, April 2004, available  
from http://www.wymaninstitute.org/articles/2004-04-fdrdocs.php; Internet; accessed 
June 12, 2010.   
 
“Zionism and the Holocaust,” by Tony Greenstein (June 2006) available from             
http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/document/mideast/greenstein/zionism2.htm#n46
;Internet; accessed May 14, 2010. 
 
Journals 
 
Adelman, Howard. “From Refugees to Forced Migration: the UNHCR and Human  
Security” The International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 7-32. 
382 
 
 
Adler-Rudel, S. “The Evian Conference on the Refugee Question.” Year Book XIII of the 
Leo Baeck Institute (London: 1968): 235-273. 
 
Bartop, Paul M. “Drawing the Line Somewhere: The Dominions and Refugee 
Immigration in the 1930s” Paper presented at ACSANA Canadian Studies 
     Conference’88 Canberra, Australia June 22-24, 1988. 
 
Boylston, Frances. “The Dominican Republic.” Inroads no. 13 (Summer 2003): 110-121. 
 
Burgess, Greg. “France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933.” French History.  
16, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 203-229. 
 
Cross, Gary S. “Toward Social Peace and Prosperity: The Politics of Immigration in 
France During the Era of World War I.” French Historical Studies 11, no. 4 (Fall 
1980): 610-632. 
 
Feingold, Henry L. “Who Shall Bear Guilt for the Holocaust: The Human Dilemma,”  
American Jewish History vol. 68 no. 3 (March: 1979): 261-282. 
 
Frankel, Josef. The Jews of Austria, Essays on their Life, History and Destruction.  
London: Valentine, Mitchell, 1967. 
 
Grobman, Alex. “A Closer Look at the Use of Statistics by Some Critics of the 
Abandonment of the Jews.” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 40, no. 4 (2003): 381-385. 
 
Harwood, Edwin. “American Public Opinion and US Immigration Policy.” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science. 487 (1986): 201-212. 
 
Holmes Colin.  “The Myth of Fairness: Racial Violence in Britain 1911-1919.” History 
Today 35, no. 10 (October 1, 1985): 41-45. 
 
Horne, Fiona. “Explaining British Refugee Policy, March 1938-July 1940.” Masters of 
Arts in History Thesis, University of Canterbury, New Zealand (March 2008): 1-106. 
 
Jaeger, Gilbert, “On the History of the International Protection of Refugees,”  
International Review of the Red Cross 83, no. 843 (September 2001): 727-736. 
 
Johnson, Thomas J., Wayne Wanta, John T. Byrd and Cindy Lee. “Exploring FDR’s  
Relationship with the Press: A Historical Agenda-Setting Study.” Political 
Communication 12 (1995): 157-172. 
 
Kaplan, Marian A. “’A Very Modest Experiment”—The Jewish Refugee Settlement in 
Sosua, 1940-1945” The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 53 no. 1 (2008): 127-155. 
 
Katz, Shlomo Z. “Public Opinion in Western Europe and the Evian Conference of July 
383 
 
1938.” Yad Vashem Studies 9 (1973): 105-132. 
 
Kimer, James T. “Landmarks in U.S. Immigration Policy.” NACLA Report on the 
Americas 39, no. 1 (July/August 2005): 34-35. 
 
Kirchwey, Freda.  “While the Jews Die,” The Nation (March 13, 1943): 366-367. 
 
Kraut, Alan M., Richard Breitman, and Thomas W. Imhoof. “The State Department, the  
Labor Department, and the German Jewish Immigration, 1930-1940.” Journal of 
American Ethnic History (Spring 1984): 5-38. 
 
Luxner, Larry. “Moving Memorial to Jewish Settlers” Americas 56, no. 5, (September- 
October 2004): 5. 
 
Maga, Timothy P. “Closing the Door: The French Government and Refugee Policy, 
1933-1939.” French Historical Studies 12, no. 3 (Spring 1982): 424-442. 
 
Marcus, Ernst. “The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Question in the Period 
1933-1939.” Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958), 179-204. 
 
Markus, Andrew. “Jewish Migration to Australia 1938-49” Journal of Australian Studies, 
13 (November 1983): 19. 
 
Mashberg, Michael.  “American Diplomacy and the Jewish Refugees, 1938-1939,” Yivo  
Annual of Jewish Social Science 15 (1974): 339-365. 
 
Melzer, Emanuel, “Poland, the United States, and the Emigration of East European 
Jewry—The Plan for a ‘Supplemental Jewish Homeland’ in Angola, 1938-1939,”   
Gal-Ed 11 (1989): 65, 81-85. 
 
Michman, Dan. “The Committee for Jewish Refugees in Holland (1933-1940).” Yad  
Vashem Studies 14 (1981): 205-232. 
 
Porath, Yehoshua. “Nuri al-Sa’id’s Arab Unity Programme.” Middle Eastern Studies 20, 
no.4 (October 1984): 76-98. 
 
Romain, Gemma. “The Anschluss: the British Response to the Refugee Crisis.” The  
Journal of Holocaust Education 8, no. 3 (Winter 1999): 87-102. 
 
Roorda, Eric Paul.  “Genocide Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy, the Trujillo 
Regime and the Haitian Massacre of 1937” Diplomatic History Vol. 20, No. 3  
(Summer 1996): 301-319. 
 
Skran, Claudena. "Profiles of the First Two Commissioners." Journal of Refugee Studies  
1, no. 3/4 (1988):  277-95. 
 
384 
 
Shafir, Shlomo. “George S. Messersmith: An Anti-Nazi Diplomat’s View of the German- 
Jewish Crisis” Jewish Social Studies vol. 35, no. 1 (January, 1973): 32-41. 
 
________. “American Diplomats in Berlin (1933-1939).” Yad Vashem Studies 9 
(1973): 71-104 
 
Spear, Sheldon. “The United States and the Persecution of the Jews in Germany, 1933- 
1939.” Jewish Social Studies 30, no. 4 (October, 1968): 215-242 
 
Leo Spitzer, “Rootless Nostalgia: Vienna in La Paz, La Paz in Elsewhere,” Shofar: An  
Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 10.3 (2001): 6-17. 
 
Srebrnik, Henry. “Red Star over Birobidzhan: Canadian Jewish Communists and the 
‘Jewish  
Autonomous Region’ in the Soviet Union,” Labour 44 (Fall 1999): 129-147. 
 
Tartakower, Arieh.  “The Jewish Refugees: A Sociological Survey.” Jewish Social 
Studies, vol. 4, no. 4 (October, 1942): 311-348. 
 
Tenenbaum, Joseph. “The Crucial Year 1938.” Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958): 49-77.  
 
Wischnitzer, Mark. “The Historical Background of the Settlement of Jewish Refugees in 
Santo Domingo.” Jewish Social Studies 4 no. 1 (January 1942): 45-58. 
 
Zucker, Bat-Ami. “Frances Perkins and the German-Jewish Refugee, 1933-1940.” 
American Jewish History 89, no. 1 (2001): 35-59. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
385 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
386 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country-by-country breakdown of Jewish refugee immigration, using widely 
accepted history texts concerning refugees from Nazism: 
Reception of Jewish refugees, 1933-19451  
  
 United States  
 Abella: (14) (1933-45) 200,000  
 Bauer: (15) (1933-39) 85,000  
 Marrus: (16) (1940-45) 116,000  
  
 (Together, the figures of Bauer and Marrus cover the period of 1933-1945 and add up to 
201,000.)  
  
 Tartakower: (17) (1933-43) 190,000  
  
 (Add 10,399 for 1944 and 1945, (18) and the 874 who were brought to  
 Oswego, thus giving a total for 1933-45 of 201,273.)  
  
 Wyman: (19) (1933-45) 250,518  
  
 (Wyman's figure is given as the maximum possible estimate for all  
 refugees from Nazism. Deduct from that ten percent for the number who  
 were non-Jewish political refugees, and another 15,000 for those who  
 entered by 1941 with visitor visas and by 1945 had been readmitted as  
 permanent quota immigrants and were thus included in the 250,518  
 figure. Accordingly, the maximum number is 210,466.)  
  
 Palestine  
  
 Bauer: (1933-39) 80,000  
 Marrus: (1940-45) 58,000  
  
 (Together, the figures of Bauer and Marrus cover the entire period of  
 1933-45 and add up to 138,000.)  
  
 Marrus (1933-37) 43,000  
 Ofer: (20) (1938-39) 40,000  
                                                 
1
 Alex Grobman,  “A Closer Look at the Use of Statistics by Some Critics of the Abandonment of the 
Jews,”  Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 40, no. 4, 2003, 381. 
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 Marrus (1940-45) 58,000  
  
 (Together, the figures of Marrus and Ofer cover the entire period of  
 1933-45 and add up to 141,000.)  
  
 Tartakower: (1933-43) 120,000  
 Marrus: (1944) 14,000  
  
 (Together, the figures of Tartakower and Marrus add up to 134,000.  
 However, Marrus's calculation for 1944 includes only those Jews who  
 entered via Turkey and is thus an underestimate; furthermore, he  
 does not provide a figure for 1945 alone.)  
  
 Abella: (1933-45) 125,000  
  
 Latin America  
  
 Bauer: (1933-39) 85,000  
 Abella: (1933-45) 77,000  
  
 (This figure is based on Argentina and Brazil only.)  
  
 Tartakower: (1933-43) 128,000  
  
 Great Britain  
 Abella: (1933-45) 70,000  
 Breitman: (21) (1933-45) 70,000  
 Tartakower: (1933-43) 65,000  
 Marrus: (1933-39) 56,000  
  
 Sherman: (22) (1933-39) 56,000  
  
 Canada  
 Abella: (1933-45) 5,000  
 Tartakower: (1933-43) 8,000  
  
 Australia  
 Abella: (1933-45) 15,000  
 Tartakower: (1933-43) 9,000  
  
 Switzerland  
 Marrus: (1933-45) 22,000  
 Wyman: (23) (1933-44) 27,000  
 Tartakower: (1933-43) 16,000  
  
 Shanghai  
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 Bauer: (1933-39) 18,000  
 Wyman: (1938-40) 18,000  
 Marrus: (1933-39) 17,000  
 Tartakower: (1933-43) 25,000  
  
 Sweden  
 Wyman: (24) (1943-45) 12,000  
  
 Although there are several possible choices for each country, using an  
 approximate average for each, and taking into account that some  
 additional thousands of Jewish refugees were taken into other  
 countries, including South Africa, Japan, Spain, and Portugal, a  
 reasonable summary would conclude that the number of Jewish refugees  
 taken in between 1933 and 1945 by the United States and the rest of the  
 world was as follows:  
  
 United States 200,000  
 Palestine 138,000  
 Latin America 85,000  
 Great Britain 70,000  
 Canada 5,000  
 Australia 15,000  
 Switzerland 22,000  
 Shanghai [China] 18,000  
 Sweden 12,000  
  
 TOTAL 565,000  
  
 United States: 200,000 (35%)  
 Rest of the world: 365,000 (65%) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF UNASSIMILATED REFUGEES POLITICAL 
REFUGEES OFFICIALLY RECORDED IN FRANCE 1922-19391 
 
NATIONALITY        1922               1924              1930           1933-34            1935-38 
Russians                    67-75,000                           150-250,000   50,000            100-120,000                               
Armenians                                                              35-40,000 
Spaniards                                                                                                                    300,000                                 
Germans                                                                                       46,000                37-40,000 
Italians                                            50,000                                                                   10,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
     
1
 Sir John Hope Simpson,  The Refugee Problem Report, Tables LXII, LXIII, LXIV, LXV, LXVI and 
119-20, 328-329, 333-334 in Maga, French Historical Studies “The French Government and Refugee 
Policy”, p. 427. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF JEWISH AND NON-JEWISH RELIEF ORGANIZATION TESTIFYING 
BEFORE THE EVIAN CONFERENCE1 
 
International Christian Committee for Non-Aryans (London); 
Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews, Chairman Dr. Arthur Ruppin 
(London); 
Jewish Colonization Association, O.E. d’Avigdor Goldsmid (Paris); 
German Jewish Aid Committee, Otto M. Schiff (London); 
Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (London); 
Comité d’aide et d’assistance aux victemes de l’anti-sémitisme en Allemagne 
(Paris); 
Comité d’assitance aux réfugiés (Paris); 
Comite voor Bijzondere Joodsche Belangen (Amsterdam); 
Centre Suisse pour l’aide aux réfugiés (Basle); 
Comité central tchécoslovaque pour les réfugiés provenant d’Allemagne (Prague); 
Fédération internationale des émigrés d’Allemagne (Paris);  
International Migration Service (Geneva); 
International Student Service (Geneva); 
Comité international pour le placement des intellectuals réfugiés (Geneva); 
The Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the 
Anglo-Jewish Association, Neville Laski and Leonard G. Montefiore (London); 
Agudas Israël World Organization, J. Rosenheim (London); 
American Joint Distribution Committee; endorsed joint memorandum but 
instructed their representative, Rabbi Jonah B. Wise to submit separate statement 
(Paris); 
Council for German Jewry, Lord Herbert Samuel (London); 
HICEM (Association des Emigrés Hias-Ica), James Bernstein (Paris); 
Notgemeinschaft Deutsche der Wissenschaftler im Ausland (London); 
The Society of Friends (German Emergency Committee) (London); 
Bureau international pour le respect du droit d’aisle et l’aide aux réfugiés 
politiques (Paris); 
World Jewish Congress (Paris); 
New Zionist Organization (London); 
Emigration Advisory Committee (London); 
                                                 
     
1Erika Mann and Eric Estorick, “Private and Governmental Aid of Refugees,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 123, Refugees (May, 1939), 150-151; Proceedings of the 
Intergovernmental Committee, 49. 
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Alliance israélite universelle (Paris); 
Comité pour le développement de la grande colonization juive (Zurich); 
Internationale ouvriè et socialiste (Paris-Brussels); 
Comité Catholiques Américains, anglais, Belge, Français, Néerlandais et Suisse 
pour l’aide aux émigrés;  
‘Freeland’ Association (London); 
‘Ort’ (Paris); 
Centre de recherches de solutions au problème juif (Paris); 
League of Nations Union (London); 
Jewish Agency for Palestine; endorsed joint and submitted separate memorandum 
to White Sub-committee regarding resettlement in Palestine (London); 
Comité pour la defense des droits des Israélites en Europe centrale et orientale 
(Paris);  
Union des Sociétés ‘Osé’ (Paris); 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (London); 
Fédération des émigrés d’Autriche (Paris); 
Société d’émigration et de colonization juive ‘Emcol’ (Paris); 
Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland, Dr. Otto Hirsch, Dr. Paul Epstein, 
Michael Traub (Palestine Office) and Dr. Werner Rosenberg (Hilfsverein der 
Juden in Deutschland) 
Juedische Kultusgemeinde Wien, Prof. Dr. Heinrich Neuman, Dr. Joseph 
Loewenherz and Kommerzialrat B.J. Storfer;  
Organization of Jewish Settlers from Germany, Mr. Kurt Blumenfeld, Dr. 
Siegfried Moses and Dr. Max Kreutzberger (Tel Aviv);  
General Federation of Jewish Labor, Golda Meirson (Tel Aviv); 
Palestine paper Davar, Mr. Zalman Rubashov (Tel Aviv) 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decisions taken at the Evian Conference on Jewish Refugees, July 19381 
The Intergovernmental Committee   
Adopted by the Committee on July 14th, 1938  
"Having met at Evian, France, from July 6th to July 13th, 1938: 
1. Considering that the question of involuntary emigration has assumed major proportions 
and that the fate of the unfortunate people affected has become a problem for 
intergovernmental deliberation; 
2. Aware that the involuntary emigration of large numbers of people, of different creeds, 
economic conditions, professions and trades, from the country or countries where they 
have been established, is disturbing to the general economy, since these persons are 
obliged to seek refuge, either temporarily or permanently, in other countries at a time 
when there is serious unemployment; that, in consequence, countries of refuge and 
settlement are faced with problems, not only of an economic and social nature, but also of 
public order, and that there is a severe strain on the administrative facilities and 
absorptive capacities of the receiving countries; 
3. Aware, moreover, that the involuntary emigration of people in large numbers has 
become so great that it renders racial and religious problems more acute, increases 
international unrest, and may hinder seriously the processes of appeasement in 
international relations; 
4. Believing that it is essential that a long-range program should be envisaged, whereby 
assistance to involuntary emigrants, actual and potential, may be coordinated within the 
framework of existing migration laws and practices of Governments; 
5. Considering that if countries of refuge or settlement are to cooperate in finding an 
orderly solution of the problem before the Committee they should have the collaboration 
of the country of origin and are therefore persuaded that it will make its contribution by 
enabling involuntary emigrants to take with them their property and possessions and 
emigrate in an orderly manner; 
                                                 
1
 Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, Evian, July 6th to 15th, 1938...Record of the Plenary 
Meetings of the Committee. Resolutions and Reports, London, July 1938. 
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6. Welcoming heartily the initiative taken by the President of the United States of 
America in calling the Intergovernmental Meeting at Evian for the primary purpose of 
facilitating involuntary emigration from Germany (including Austria), and expressing 
profound appreciation to the French Government for its courtesy in receiving the 
Intergovernmental Meeting at Evian; 
7. Bearing in mind the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on 
May 14th, 1938, concerning international assistance to refugees: 
Recommends: 
8. a) That the persons coming within the scope of the activity of the Intergovernmental 
Committee shall be 1) persons who have not already left their country of origin 
(Germany, including Austria), but who must emigrate on account of their political 
opinion, religious beliefs or racial origin, and 2) persons as defined in 1) who have 
already left their country of origin and who have not yet established themselves 
permanently elsewhere; 
b) That the Governments participating in the Intergovernmental Committee shall continue 
to furnish the Committee for its strictly confidential information, with 1) details regarding 
such immigrants as each Government may be prepared to receive under its existing laws 
and practices and 2) details of these laws and practices; 
c) That in view of the fact that the countries of refuge and settlement are entitled to take 
into account the economic and social adaptability of immigrants, these should in many 
cases be required to accept, at least for a time, changed conditions of living in the 
countries of settlement; 
d) That the Governments of the countries of refuge and settlement should not assume any 
obligations for the financing of involuntary emigration; 
e) That, with regard to the documents required by the countries of refuge and settlement, 
the Governments represented on the Intergovernmental Committee should consider the 
adoption of the following provision: 
In those individual immigration cases in which the usually required documents emanating 
from foreign official sources are found not to be available, there should be accepted such 
other documents serving the purpose of the requirements of law as may be available to 
the immigrant, and that, as regards the document which may be issued to an involuntary 
emigrant by the country of his foreign residence to serve the purpose of a passport, note 
be taken of the several international agreements providing for the issue of a travel 
document serving the purpose of a passport and of the advantage of their wide 
application; 
f) That there should meet at London an Intergovernmental Committee consisting of such 
representatives as the Governments participating in the Evian Meeting may desire to 
394 
 
designate. This Committee shall continue and develop the work of the Intergovernmental 
Meeting at Evian and shall be constituted and shall function in the following manner: 
There shall be a Chairman of this Committee and four Vice-Chairmen; there shall be a 
director of authority, appointed by the Intergovernmental Committee, who shall be 
guided by it in his actions. He shall undertake negotiations to improve the present 
conditions of exodus and to replace them by conditions of orderly emigration. He shall 
approach the Governments of the countries of refuge and settlement with a view to 
developing opportunities for permanent settlement. The Intergovernmental Committee, 
recognizing the value of the work of the existing refugee services of the League of 
Nations and of the studies of migration made by the International Labor Office, shall 
cooperate fully with these organizations, and the Intergovernmental Committee at 
London shall consider the means by which the cooperation of the Committee and the 
director with these organizations shall be established. The Intergovernmental Committee, 
at its forthcoming meeting at London, will consider the scale on which its expenses shall 
be apportioned among the participating Governments; 
9. That the Intergovernmental Committee in its continued form shall hold a first meeting 
at London on August 3rd, 1938." 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEWISH POPULATION OF THE WORLD AT END OF 19371  
(In thousands) 
 
America  5,375  
Europe  9,970  
Africa  655  
Asia  725  
 --------  
Total  16,725  
United States  4,800  
Argentine  170  
Brazil  55  
Uruguay  25  
Mexico  20  
Cuba  10  
Chile  10  
Other  15  
 --------  
America  5,375  
British Isles  340  
France  270  
Holland  115  
Belgium  70  
Scandinavia  20  
 --------  
Western 
Europe  815  
 
Germany  365  
Czechoslovakia  360  
Austria  150  
Italy  55  
Switzerland  20  
 --------  
Central Europe  950  
Poland  3,275  
U.S.S.R. (incl. 
Asia)  3,130  
Rumania  800  
Hungary  440  
Lithuania  160  
Latvia  95  
Greece  75  
Yugoslavia  75  
Turkey (incl. Asia)  75  
Bulgaria  50  
 --------  
Eastern Europe  8,175  
Minor European 
Countries  30  
 
French Morocco  175  
Algiers  130  
South Africa  95  
Tunis  70  
Egypt  70  
Abyssinia  50  
Libya  25  
Spanish Morocco  25  
Other  15  
 --------  
Africa  655  
Palestine  420  
Iraq  100  
Iran  50  
Yemen  50  
Australia  25  
India  25  
Japan and China  20  
Syria and 
   Lebanon  15  
New Zealand  5  
Other  15  
 --------  
Asia (and 
Oceania)  725  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Estimates of Jewish Agency for Palestine, prepared by Dr. Arthur 
Ruppin for the Evian Conference adjusted for U. S. A. and Abyssinia in accord with 
American Jewish Yearbook, 1944-45 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROPOSALS BY THE BUREAU REGARDING THE EXPENSES OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE AND THEIR ALLOCATION1 
Adopted by the Committee on July 14th, 1938 
 
If, as at present anticipated, the Evian session of the Intergovernmental Committee closes 
this week, the costs incurred which have been advanced by the French Government can 
now be estimated to amount altogether to 16,000 Swiss francs.  In detail this amount can 
be roughly subdivided as follows: 
 
Allowances paid to the League of Nations Secretariat for the staff put at the disposal of 
the Intergovernmental Committee……………………………………12,000 Swiss francs. 
Paper, stencils and roneo ink…………………………………………..1,500      “      “ 
Miscellaneous expenses (telephone and telegraph communications, liaison by motor-car 
between Evian and Geneva, 
etc.)………………………………………………………………………500      “      “ 
Minutes of plenary meetings and reports of the two Sub-Committees…2,000 Swiss francs 
                                                                                                        Total 16,000    “        “ 
     In the invitation sent by the United States Government to the States attending the 
Intergovernmental Committee at Evian, it was suggested that these costs should be 
equitably apportioned.  The Secretary-General accordingly suggests the application of the 
League of Nations scale of allocation of expenditure; thus, each country in the 
Intergovernmental Committee would assume responsibility for the same number of units 
of expenditure as that allotted to it at the present time by the League Secretariat at 
Geneva. 
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The following table shows in Swiss francs the contribution which each member of the 
Intergovernmental Committee would thus be asked to make. 
 
                                                                                         Units                       Swiss Francs 
USA                                                                                  108                                      3,024  
Argentine Republic                                                            23                                         644   
Australia                                                                             23                                         644                 
Belgium                                                                              19                                         532                
Bolivia                                                                                  2                                           56                
United Kingdom                                                               108                                     3,024                
Brazil                                                                                   23                                        644                    
Canada                                                                                35                                         980              
Chile                                                                                      8                                        224                   
Columbia                                                                               5                                        140         
Costa Rica                                                                              1                                         28               
Cuba                                                                                       5                                       140                  
Denmark                                                                              12                                        336                      
Denmark                                                                              12                                        336                  
Dominican Republic                                                              1                                         28                 
Ecuador                                                                                  1                                         28                
France                                                                                  80                                     2,240                 
Guatemala                                                                           0.5                                         14                  
Haiti                                                                                        1                                         28                 
Honduras                                                                             0.5                                         14        
Ireland                                                                                  10                                       280              
Mexico                                                                                  13                                      364                  
Nicaragua                                                                             0.5                                        14                
Norway                                                                                   9                                      252              
New Zealand                                                                          8                                      224              
Panama                                                                                   1                                        28                 
Paraguay                                                                              0.5                                        14        
Netherlands                                                                          24                                      672       
Peru                                                                                         5                                     140        
Sweden                                                                                  19                                     532    
Switzerland                                                                           17                                     476    
Uruguay                                                                                   4                                     112    
Venezuela                                                                                4                                     112    
                                                                             Total        571                               15,988    
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